Hill Climb Racing 2 Industrial Deals Fall Reading Shop new men's suiting nav_sap_plcc_ascpsc Alexa on Mobile PCB for Musical Instruments Starting at $39.99 Grocery Handmade Tote Bags Home Gift Guide Off to College Home Gift Guide Book a house cleaner for 2 or more hours on Amazon Spider-Man: Homecoming available to buy Spider-Man: Homecoming available to buy Spider-Man: Homecoming available to buy  Introducing Echo Show Introducing All-New Fire HD 10 with Alexa hands-free $149.99 Kindle Oasis, unlike any Kindle you've ever held GNO Shop Now ToyHW17_gno

Customer reviews

4.1 out of 5 stars
10
Format: Paperback|Change
Price:$55.81+ Free shipping with Amazon Prime


There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Showing 1-7 of 7 reviews(Verified Purchases). See all 10 reviews
on July 27, 2013
This is an excellent book, one that requires a highlighter and your laptop open to Evernote so you can capture your notes. I have followed Dr Grey's work for several years. You can also access his occasional papers and thought-pieces on the US Army Strategic Studies institute web site.

THIS BOOK IS NOT LIGHT READING, do not expect to go through this quickly, if you do you will miss the pearls of his insights that are contained on each page. Also, if you can, be sure to have a 1976 edition of On War, Ed by Howard and Paret.

Ideally, take your time with this book and take time to digest what he compares and contrasts with other historical and contemporary thought leaders and academics on this topic.

All i can say is that this book will surely be your desk reference, once you dig into it.
0Comment| One person found this helpful. Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse
on December 24, 2008
Colin Gray's "Modern Strategy" is essentially an attempt to update and amend the strategic theory of Clausewitz in response to the developments of the last century and to make his strategic lessons more accessible to modern readers by illuminating its main points in light of 20th century events that those readers are likely to already be familiar with. Gray is unapologetically a Clausewitzian strategist, war must be studied holistically and strategy is the linking of military efforts to deliberate, although not necessarily concrete, political goals.

Gray has undertaken a massive endeavor with this work. Clausewitz himself set out to do the impossible by trying to explain the nature of war, something no single person is likely intellectually capable of understanding, in his seminal work "On War" which was actually a set of notes that was never finished before his pre-mature death let alone sufficiently organized into coherent book form. Picking up from this stepping stone, the brightest shining gem to guide us in strategic affairs we have, Gray tries to continue organizing Clausewitz's thoughts and to account for the additional layers of complexity introduced since his time or ignored by the great man, namely seapower, airpower, electromagnetic warfare, cyberwar, nuclear war, the modern resurgence of irregular warriors versus regular combatants, and spacepower. As such, combined with reading "On War" first, this is probably the best book to ground anyone with an interest in strategy and give them the tools to actually learn strategy from analyzing history using the tenets of Clausewitzian thought spelled out in here. It is also good history of the strategic thoughts and their contribution to the whole of strategic theory of many luminaries since Clausewitz, including figures as diverse as Jomini, Mahan, Ludendorff, Corbett, Smuts, Boyd, and Ralph Peters.

Gray also makes a consistent and persuasive case that the nature of warfare does not change, only it's character. Like the costumes or set pieces changing in different productions of a play, the look and feel may be different but the underlying story is the same. Much of this book represents his fight against modern trends to be allured by the chimerical promises of "new" warfare, i.e. 4th gen or bloodless cyberwar, and the consequential folly of abandoning the lessons of history.

If nothing else Gray is extremely widely read and comprehensive, and there is scarcely a sentence in this book that isn't footnoted. He has certainly done his homework, and after reading it you will be armed with a set of references you can read to bring yourself up to speed with practically any topic in the pantheon of modern war.

My only criticism of this book is that Gray's writing style is dense and repetitive, which of course is not made easier by the complexity and difficulty of his subject. This book is not light or fun reading! It requires a lot of time and patience to get through it, and it will not deliver enlightenment nor free people from being beholden to ideology. But it will give you the strategic tools to analyze history and strategic options more effectively and efficiently, or at least make your ideological case more elegantly.

Recommended for military officers, and especially for defense industry officials and politicians involved in defense.
0Comment| 5 people found this helpful. Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse
Edit of 23 Feb 08 to add links. This book remains priceless & relevant.

First published in 1999, this is an original tour d-horizon that is essential to any discussion of the theory and practice of conflict in the 21st Century, to include all those discussions of the alleged Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the need for "defense transformation", and the changing nature of civil-military relations.

I am much impressed by this book and the decades of thinking that have gone into it, and will outline below a few of its many signal contributions to the rather important questions of how one must devise and manage national power in an increasingly complex world.

First, the author is quite clear on the point that technology does not a revolution make-nor can technology dominate a national strategy. If anything-and he cites Luttwak, among others, with great regard-an excessive emphasis on technology will be very expensive, susceptible to asymmetric attack, and subversive of other elements of the national strategy that must be managed in harmony. People matter most.

Second, and this is the point that hit me hardest, it is clear that security strategy requires a holistic approach and the rather renaissance capability of managing a multiplicity of capabilities-diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, psychological, information-in a balanced manner and under the over-arching umbrella of a strategy.

Third, and consistent with the second, "war proper" is not exclusively about force of arms, but rather about achieving the national political objective by imposing one's will on another. Those that would skew their net assessments and force structure capabilities toward "real war" writ in their conventional terms are demeaning Clausewitz rather than honoring him.

Fourth, as I contemplate in this and other readings how best to achieve lasting peace and prosperity, I see implicit in all that the author puts forward, but especially in a quote from Donald Kegan, the raw fact that it is not enough for America to have a preponderance of the traditional military and economic power in the world-we must also accept the burden and responsibility of preserving the peace and responding to the complex emergencies around the globe that must inevitably undermine our stability and prosperity at home.

Fifth, it is noteworthy that of all the dimensions of strategy that are brought forward, one-time-is unique for being unimprovable. Use it or lose it. Time is a strategic dimension too little understood and consequently too little valued by Americans in particular and the Western alliance in general.

Sixth, it merits comment that the author, perhaps the greatest authority on Clausewitz in this era, clarifies the fact that the "trinity" is less about people, government, and an army, than about primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (the people); chance and probability on the battlefield, most akin to a game of cards (the army); and instrumental rationality (the government)-and that these are not fixed isolated elements, but interpenetrate one another and interact in changing ways over time and space.

Seventh, the author devotes an entire chapter to "Strategic Culture as Context" and this is most helpful, particularly in so far as it brings forward the weakness of the American strategic culture, notably a pre-disposition to isolationism and to technical solutions in the abstract. Perhaps more importantly, a good strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.

Eighth, and finally, the author courageously takes on the issue of small wars and other savage violence, seeking to demonstrate that grand strategy applies equally well to the savage criminal and warlord parasites that Ralph Peters has noted are not susceptible to our traditional legal and military conventions. While he does not succeed (and notes in passing that Clausewitz's own largest weakness was a failure to catalogue the enemy and the dialog with the enemy as a major factor in strategic success and failure), the coverage is acceptable in making three key points:

1) small wars and sub-national conflicts are generally not resolved decisively at the irregular level-conventional forces are required at some point;

2) special operations forces have a role to play but lack a strategic context (that is to say, current political and military leaders have no appreciation for the strategic value of special operations forces); and

3) small wars and non-traditional threats-asymmetrical threats-must be taken seriously and co-equally with symmetrical regular conflicts.

At the end of the day, this erudite scholar finds common cause with gutter warrior Ralph Peters and gang-warfare iconoclast Martin Van Crevald by concluding his book with a quote from Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "In the Computer Age we will live by the law of the Stone Age: the man with the bigger club is right. But we pretend this isn't so. We don't notice or even suspect it-why surely our morality progresses together with our civilization."

See also (and also my lists):

The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations
Security Studies for the 21st Century
War, Peace, and Victory Strategy and Statecraft for The Next Century
Strategy: Process, Content, Context: An International Perspective
War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition
Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (International Series on Materials Science and Technology)
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time (Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity, and the Human Sciences)
0Comment| 32 people found this helpful. Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse
on December 17, 2014
Excellent book, good purchase.
0Comment|Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse
on February 9, 2008
From what i have read Grey is a very intelligent writer who really has some great nuggets of information but i wish more of his material was original instead of expanding on other's writings so often.
11 comment| 3 people found this helpful. Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse
on October 8, 2013
It was delivered in time and it met the right description. It is a wonderful book. I recommend it to anyone who wishes to understand strategy.
0Comment|Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse
on May 21, 2015
Strategically speaking NATO will kill anything that is ugly and freaky. Now the in's and out's of those good times depends solely on the sobriety of the four star generals at the time of execution. It is also important to note that factories are lovely creatures and to do them harm would frighten a neutron bomb clean off a long range missile and we don't want that, now do we?
0Comment|Was this review helpful to you?YesNoReport abuse