Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach 1st Edition

Have not finished it yet but a brilliant book so far. I very much intend to purchase the follow up tome, Applied Ethics, in the near future. AG

A rough definition of politics is that it is 'who gets what, when, and how.' We live in a world that has absorbed utilitarian thinking - a world that puts human lives through a benefit-cost analysis. If slavery made a racist population happy enough then slavery would be moral according to utilitarianism. The goal is to maximize utility, but utiltiarians don't mind throwing a few sacrificial lambs under the bus in order to reach that goal. Natural rights morality is different. Like utilitarianism is begins with the premise that everyone has equal dignity and moral worth, but unlike utilitarianism is structured in such a way that no one can be thrown under the bus. Let's briefly look at two ways that natural rights differs from utiltiarianism.

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The Principle of Double Effect
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Consider the classic thought experiment of transplant. Five sick people will die unless they get an organ transplant. A healthy young man goes to see his doctor for a routine checkup. The doctor notices that he has the same tissue type as the five sick people, so he kills the healthy young man and gives them his organs. According to utilitarianism transplant is morally good, but most people strongly disagree. Natural rights morality explains why. For an act to be good three things have to be in harmony. 1) "The Ends" must be good. That's true in the case of transplant (on balance four lives are saved). 2) "The means" must also be good. It is wrong to use a bad means - like killing - to achieve a good end. That's where transplant fails. 3) Intention. Acting with good intentions is the single most important plank of natural rights morality. Transplant probably fails this test as well. Critics may argue that the doctor's intention was to save the five lives, but "he who intends the ends intends the means." The doctor had to intentionally kill in order to intentionally save lives.

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Acts and Omissions
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Suppose Alice sends poisoned meat to Africa which kills ten people. Bob fails to donate any money to African poverty relief so ten people starve to death. Has Bob acted as wrongly as Alice? Most people say no (if you disagree then please send yourself to jail immediately!) Utilitarians respond with a different thought experiment. Smith drowns his cousin in a bathtub to get an inheritance. Jones sees his cousin drowning in a bathtub and does nothing to save him. Is Jones as guilty as Smith? Most people now say yes. I personally disagree. Smith may be more vicious than Jones - you can't get away from the importance of intention. However let's concede the point. Utilitarians are still in trouble. They are forced to argue that there is never a difference between an act (killing) and an omission (failing to save a life). By contrast, natural rights moralists argue a much more modest position. Sometimes there is a difference. In those cases it is morally permissible (but not morally good) to do nothing.

The failure to distinguish between Acts and Omissions explains a lot of the fuzzy-headed moralizing that goes on in modern society. People who are pro-life are often called hypocrites for opposing euthanasia, or even the removal of a feeding tube from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. But they allow people to forego expensive medical treatments. According to these critics, Christians serve two masters. When they have to chose between God and Mammon (money), they choose money. The distinction between acts and omissions shows that this is not so. Foregoing expensive, cutting-edge medical techniques is like not donating to African poverty (morally permissible although not morally good). Removing a feeding tube is like watching a cousin drown in a bathtub (morally bad).

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Criticisms
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This book is a powerful and vigorous defense of natural rights morality. I would make a few nitpicks. I do not like Oderberg's defense of moral realism. I find the argument to be wishy-washy. The only decent argument I've seen for objective moral principles bases them on God's loving nature. Moral realism also means that atheists don't need God for there to be objective ethics and a meaning for life.

Another problem is that I don't like the heavy emphasis on intention at the expense of "the means." I think this backs you into a corner. Consider the case of a soldier who jumps on a grenade to save his brothers-in-arms. Most people would agree that this act is moral. But what about pushing another soldier on a grenade? Some people might dodge the question by arguing that your intention must really be to save your own skin, not the lives of all the other soldiers. The intention is not for the greater good. But what if it really was for the greater good? What if the other soldier had a better angle at the grenade? I think that Warren Quinn has the better solution, which is to focus on "the means" (or agency). You have the right to sacrifice your own life for others just as you have the right to sacrifice your own money for others. But you do not have the right to steal from others even if you want to use the money to donate to charity. The same thing applies to forcing another soldier to make the ultimate sacrifice. IIRC, Oderberg does not get into the soldiers and the grenade case, but a close reading of 'Moral Theory' shows the problems of relying on intention to do the heavy lifting. Even Oderberg admits that these cases are brutally tough. I think Quinn's approach of using "the means" works better.

Finally, there is one more flaw that is increasingly troubling for me. I've read a fairish amount of Christian philosophy and apologetics and much of it has been extremely sophisticated. But they have neglected the mainstream scholarship from the social sciences. Philosophers in general need to do a better job of being less bound to their armchairs and do more work grappling with the empirical research. That is doubly true for Christian philosophers because modern scholarship makes a strong cases for traditional Judeo-Christian morality. Consider the field of behavioral economics. A superficial reading of the literature is "people are irrational, we need the government to steer people towards good decisions." Another superficial reading is "people are irrational, utilitarian thinking is the theoretical ideal." But a more honest reading is that strategic behavior, reciprocity, fairness norms, and prosocial traits such as shame and guilt are the reasons why people tend to behave "irrationally" and that these traits lead to more efficient and stable societies. See for example, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences(you can profitably skip the math) and Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms.

David S. Oderberg's Moral Theory (along with its companion volume Applied Ethics)presents itself as a defense of traditional morality. It is in fact a philosophical defense of the substantive teachings of traditional Catholic moral theology, which have been reaffirmed by the current Pope in such writings as the new official Catechism of the Catholic Church and such encyclicals as Veritatis Splendor and Evangelium Vitae. Although Oderberg defends these teachings, he does so solely by reference to rational arguments intended to persuade all fair-minded persons, not by appeal to authority or religious dogma. Since I am very sympathetic to this sort of project, I was eager to read Oderberg's two books. However, I am not as delighted as I thought I would be, despite my substantial agreement with most of the views he defends. In Moral Theory, Oderberg lays out the shape of traditional morality by investigating the central notions of moral theory, presenting an essentially Aristotelian/Thomistic account of the human good, virtue and right action, natural law and natural rights. Most of this will be familiar territory to those acquainted with this tradition of moral theorizing. Inter alia, he also attacks consequentialism and utilitarianism, which, while spent forces in moral philosophy are still attractive to Catholic moral theologians hoping to weaken or finesse the traditional teaching to the effect that there are certain actions which are always wrong regardless of the agent's motives, circumstances or the consequences of the act. However, he tends to concentrate his fire on extreme consequentialists, such as Peter Singer and James Rachels, who are hardly representatives of mainstream in moral theory nor, I think, likely to become so. Oderberg is at his best when he presents and defends the Principle of Double Effect and the acts/omissions doctrine as alternatives to consequentialist calculation in situations involving moral dilemmas and is well worth reading on these points. In his discussion of the vexing idea that the moral quality of an act is determined by its "object", Oderberg seems to endorse the 17th century Jesuit view that the object of an act is determined by subjective intention. Adopting this view (so famously ridiculed by Pascal)seems to me a false step. Recent defenders of the position that the morality of an act is determined by its object tend to stress that it is the inherent features of the acts themselves, as objects of deliberate choice with full knowledge, which determine the moral quality of the act, rather than one's subjective intention (to the extent that this can be separated from one's motive). For example, the wrongness of adultery resides simply in the fact that it is an act of intercourse with someone else's spouse, which is a sin against the good of marriage and hence can never knowlingly be the object of the free choice of a good will, but instead always makes that will an evil one. This may be only a verbal dispute, but I am not sure. I do not find Oderberg's response to the objection that we can change the moral quality of our act simply by wilfuly directing our intentions convincing. However, let each reader judge for himself whether I am right about this. There is a polemical undertone to Moral Theory which some readers may find irksome; I rather enjoyed it myself. At any rate, those who are interested in these matters will find this a thought-provoking book but in many respects tantalizingly incomplete. I hope we can look forward to a more sustained and detailed account of these matters at the hand of this author.

Oderberg does an excellent job defending classical natural law theory against primarily the consequentialist theories that currently hold sway (Peter Singer features prominently, though contractarian theories also get some discussion). Despite being largely polemical in nature, Oderberg also does a decent job at sketching what the classical natural law theory involves and why it counts as plausible in its own right. Large sections of the book are dedicated to defending parts of natural law theory against contemporary criticisms; these include the principle of double effect, the sanctity of human life, natural (and inalienable) human rights, the intention/foresight distinction, act/omission distinction, and others. Although this is a good introduction to Thomistic-Aristotelian normative theory, as well as ethics broadly construed, it could be improved as an introduction by reserving the polemics for separate sections (that could be skipped by a less technically-inclined audience, e.g. intro ethics students) and more expansively detailing the principles that govern natural law normative theory.

Against the implications of another reviewer, this book is not at all religious in content (it is thus not 'a rational defense of Catholic moral teaching' as such, although the moral conclusions drawn by the Catholic faith and those drawn by classical natural law theory do coincide).