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The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies Hardcover – May 6, 2007
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The greatest obstacle to sound economic policy is not entrenched special interests or rampant lobbying, but the popular misconceptions, irrational beliefs, and personal biases held by ordinary voters. This is economist Bryan Caplan's sobering assessment in this provocative and eye-opening book. Caplan argues that voters continually elect politicians who either share their biases or else pretend to, resulting in bad policies winning again and again by popular demand.
Boldly calling into question our most basic assumptions about American politics, Caplan contends that democracy fails precisely because it does what voters want. Through an analysis of Americans' voting behavior and opinions on a range of economic issues, he makes the convincing case that noneconomists suffer from four prevailing biases: they underestimate the wisdom of the market mechanism, distrust foreigners, undervalue the benefits of conserving labor, and pessimistically believe the economy is going from bad to worse. Caplan lays out several bold ways to make democratic government work better--for example, urging economic educators to focus on correcting popular misconceptions and recommending that democracies do less and let markets take up the slack.
The Myth of the Rational Voter takes an unflinching look at how people who vote under the influence of false beliefs ultimately end up with government that delivers lousy results. With the upcoming presidential election season drawing nearer, this thought-provoking book is sure to spark a long-overdue reappraisal of our elective system.
- Print length288 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPrinceton University Press
- Publication dateMay 6, 2007
- Dimensions6.5 x 1 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-100691129428
- ISBN-13978-0691129426
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Review
(Nicholas D. Kristof New York Times )
Caplan thinks that democracy as it is now practiced cannot be salvaged, and his position is based on a simple observation: 'Democracy is a commons, not a market.'
(Louis Menand The New Yorker )
One of the two or three best books on public choice in the last twenty years.
(Tyler Cowen Marginal Revolution )
Like a few recent best sellers--Freakonomics, The Tipping Point, The Wisdom of Crowds--The Myth of the Rational Voter unwraps economic theories and applies them to everyday life. Mr. Caplan's thesis, though, lacks any semblance of a compliment: The 'unwisdom of crowds' is closer to his point. He believes that the American public is biased against sensible, empirically proved economic policies about which nearly all economists agree. Voters, he says, are not just ignorant in the sense of having insufficient information. They actually hold wrong-headed and damaging beliefs about how the economy works.
(Daniel Casse The Wall Street Journal )
The Myth of the Rational Voter usefully extends the discussion [about democracy] by linking it with 'public choice' theory. . . . Public choice theory faces a dilemma. A rational and self-interested person has no incentive to study political issues, as the chances of his or her determining the outcome are negligible. This has become known as 'rational ignorance'. Caplan maintains that the reality is much worse. He shows that voters are not just ignorant but systematically biased in favor of mistaken views.
(Samuel Brittan Financial Times )
Caplan is right to detect a stubborn irrationality in ordinary voters and he correctly points out to his rational choice colleagues that their models are hopelessly unrealistic.
(Martin Leet Australian Review of Public Affairs )
Caplan argues convincingly that irrational behaviour is pervasive among many of us today....Caplan's point, however, is that most voters are irrational. And that is worse than being ignorant....Their irrationality comes with a host of misconceptions that drive policy choices.
(Fazil Mihlar The Vancouver Sun )
This engaging and provocative volume describes why democracy gives us far less than its promise. Countering existing theories of rationally ignorant voters, Caplan argues persuasively that voters are irrational, registering systematically biased beliefs--and consequently votes--against markets and other sound economy policy metrics...[T]his is a compelling book, offering readers a well-written and well-argued competing theory for why democracy fails and why we should limit what is done through the political process.
(M. Steckbeck Choice )
[Caplan] argues that voters' own irrational biases, rather than flaws in the democratic process, compel voters to support policies that are not in their interest. While one may quibble with his specifics, the overall argument is convincing and applicable across a variety of fields...Forces the reader to take a second look at our nation's unshakable faith in the wisdom of the electorate.
(Pio Szamel Harvard Political Review )
A brilliant and disturbing analysis of decision making by electorates that--[Caplan] documents--are perversely ignorant and woefully misinformed.
(Neil Reynolds The Globe and Mail )
From the Inside Flap
"Caplan offers readers a delightful mixture of economics, political science, psychology, philosophy, and history to resolve a puzzle that, at one time or another, has intrigued every student of public policy."--N. Gregory Mankiw, Harvard University, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers
"Why democracies so often make a hash out of economic policy is one of the great questions of political economy. Bryan Caplan suggests some provocative, and highly original, answers. This book may make you smile or it may make you scowl, but it will definitely not make you bored."--Alan S. Blinder, Princeton University
"The Myth of the Rational Voter discredits the fashionable view that democratic politics necessarily prevents socially harmful policies. Voters lack incentives to become well informed about political controversies, Bryan Caplan shows, and their policy choices tend to be based on deeply, persistently, and systematically mistaken models of reality. Caplan's findings lead inexorably to the conclusion that democratic governance can be improved only through reforms based on realistic assumptions about human cognition. Anyone concerned about political efficiency should read this elegant book carefully."--Timur Kuran, author ofIslam and Mammon
"Bryan Caplan blends economics, political science, and psychology in an arresting and informative polemic that is witty, crisp, cogent, provocative, and timely. You may or may not agree with his assessment of our democracy, but you will be entertained, challenged, and perhaps angered, but also enlightened."--Scott Keeter, Pew Research Center
"The argument Caplan offers is basically right and is extremely important. I suspect this book will stir up a certain amount of controversy. The argument challenges conventional public choice in that it radically undermines the notion of substantively rational voting. At the same time, it is in the same skeptical tradition as public-choice orthodoxy, challenging the claims of democratic enthusiasts. It is a book that deserves to be taken very seriously."--Geoffrey Brennan, coauthor ofThe Economy of Esteem
"Poorly informed voters are a big problem in democracy, and Caplan makes the interesting argument that this is not necessarily a problem that can be easily fixed--it may be fundamental to the system. Caplan thinks that voting itself is the problem."--Andrew Gelman, Columbia University
From the Back Cover
"Caplan offers readers a delightful mixture of economics, political science, psychology, philosophy, and history to resolve a puzzle that, at one time or another, has intrigued every student of public policy."--N. Gregory Mankiw, Harvard University, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers
"Why democracies so often make a hash out of economic policy is one of the great questions of political economy. Bryan Caplan suggests some provocative, and highly original, answers. This book may make you smile or it may make you scowl, but it will definitely not make you bored."--Alan S. Blinder, Princeton University
"The Myth of the Rational Voter discredits the fashionable view that democratic politics necessarily prevents socially harmful policies. Voters lack incentives to become well informed about political controversies, Bryan Caplan shows, and their policy choices tend to be based on deeply, persistently, and systematically mistaken models of reality. Caplan's findings lead inexorably to the conclusion that democratic governance can be improved only through reforms based on realistic assumptions about human cognition. Anyone concerned about political efficiency should read this elegant book carefully."--Timur Kuran, author ofIslam and Mammon
"Bryan Caplan blends economics, political science, and psychology in an arresting and informative polemic that is witty, crisp, cogent, provocative, and timely. You may or may not agree with his assessment of our democracy, but you will be entertained, challenged, and perhaps angered, but also enlightened."--Scott Keeter, Pew Research Center
"The argument Caplan offers is basically right and is extremely important. I suspect this book will stir up a certain amount of controversy. The argument challenges conventional public choice in that it radically undermines the notion of substantively rational voting. At the same time, it is in the same skeptical tradition as public-choice orthodoxy, challenging the claims of democratic enthusiasts. It is a book that deserves to be taken very seriously."--Geoffrey Brennan, coauthor ofThe Economy of Esteem
"Poorly informed voters are a big problem in democracy, and Caplan makes the interesting argument that this is not necessarily a problem that can be easily fixed--it may be fundamental to the system. Caplan thinks that voting itself is the problem."--Andrew Gelman, Columbia University
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Princeton University Press (May 6, 2007)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 288 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0691129428
- ISBN-13 : 978-0691129426
- Item Weight : 1.19 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #774,200 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #862 in Elections
- #934 in Economic Policy
- #949 in Economic Policy & Development (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Customer reviews
Top reviews from the United States
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While a representative republic is a TYPE of democracy, we are not a democracy. He based all his points, analysis, and prescriptions for a country that is a direct democracy making the whole book irrelevant.
Caplan talks like an economist when describing this phenomenon. He claims that irrationality is IN DEMAND and is essentially costless, so we get a lot of it.
Caplan provides two lines of evidence to support his thesis. First, Caplan cites the fact that people make SYSTEMATIC errors (not just random errors) which suggests something more than simple ignorance is at fault. Second, Caplan provides anecdotal evidence of groups of people who are perfectly rational when it comes to their profession or something that affects their well-being, but who revert to irrational belief as soon as there are no consequences for doing so.
Caplan's thesis is interesting insofar as it directly contradicts the "rational ignorance" hypothesis put forth by public choice theorists like James Buchanan etc. Whereas Buchanan states that voters are ignorant because it's not worth the expense or effort to acquire more information, Caplan claims that voters are outright irrational and enjoy entertaining absurd or vehement opinions.
This book is good but it has several drawbacks, as follows. 1) The book does not include enough evidence to support its main contention; it includes some empirical evidence but that evidence is not definitive. 2) The last few chapters of the book are filled with meandering thoughts which are less interesting and are not fully supported. It seems like Caplan ran out of material (he laid out his full thesis in the first half of the book) and so filled in the rest of the book with filler.
Overall, though, I give the book 5 stars because it has a novel hypothesis which is reasonably well argued.
This argument has several implications. I'll mention five of them: (i) State capture is not the main culprit of the many problems of democracy. The answer is elsewhere, in the misconceptions and systematic ignorance of the people, (ii) the most damaging (and pervasive) trait of politicians is demagoguery, (iii) people tend to hate markets, to deny progress, to misunderstand creative-destruction, and to blame foreign trade for almost all bad outcomes, (iv) "voters have a visceral dislike for candidates who seem intellectual, let alone try to make the electorate do arithmetic", and (v) economists are tragic heroes who dare say what nobody wants to hear. They may sound callous, but are never hypocritical.
This is a good book. Some would say it is too simplistic. Others may suggest it suffers from academic elitism. But all in all the book is compelling. Not as a general theory of democratic failure, but as an eloquent defense of sensible politicians and economists who try to promote good policies against the false beliefs and erroneous misconceptions of the masses.
Top reviews from other countries
Bryan Caplan suggests a common economic model for understanding voter behavior: that we vote in our rational self-interest, is false. Political scientists have rejected this idea in the face of clear evidence, but the model persists in economics. Caplan, suggests an alternative model which would explain the evidence we see from political science and observing how government functions. The model has three parts:
1. That voters have almost zero incentive to vote rationally. The chance an individual ballot will change the outcome of an election is so small, that individuals can vote nearly however they like knowing that, individually, their decision will not have costs.
2. That voters have preferences over beliefs. Put simply, there are beliefs that voters hold which they prefer over other beliefs, perhaps because those beliefs make them feel better about themselves, those beliefs signal group loyalty or those beliefs operate as default human assumptions about the world and require effort to be disabused.
3. This mild preference over beliefs dominates the low individual cost of voting misconduct, therefore voters consistently elect politicians that represent these preferenced beliefs, rather than either their self-interest or sense of public welfare.
Bryan Caplan enumerates four types of these beliefs which create harmful policy:
1. Anti-foreign bias. We distrust foreigners, so we limit trade and immigration much more than is necessary.
2. Anti-market bias. We don't understand how markets and pricing mechanisms work, so we don't employ them in many situations where they would be preferable to command and control type solutions.
3. Make-work bias. We think in terms of jobs, not in terms of production, even though production is what matters. Labor saving technologies are viewed as destroying jobs, when they really should be viewed as saving people toil.
4. Pessimistic bias. We are overly pessimistic about the future, which leads to poor decisions.
Caplan's conclusion is that we would be better off if fewer decisions were put in the hands of the electorate and left to markets.
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