How can the US diplomatic community broker peace in the Middle East? Ambassador Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, drawing on lessons from the past, offer the answers in this brief review of American leadership in the Middle East and how to pave the way to peace. The...
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How can the US diplomatic community broker peace in the Middle East? Ambassador Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, drawing on lessons from the past, offer the answers in this brief review of American leadership in the Middle East and how to pave the way to peace.
The book opens up with an overview of the policies for peace and track record of the past three administrations: Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43, reviewing each one's focus, discipline, and ability to garner domestic support for a peace plan. Although the Bush 41 team inherited an advantageous strategic environment, with the US as the only world's superpower at the fall of the USSR, and with an unequivocal success after the first Gulf War, there was no focused effort in building a domestic coalition to support the peace process. Clinton was successful in building this coalition, but his efforts were lacking in focus and discipline. Bush 43's track record was the least successful of the three, due not only to the post 9/11 environment, but also to some "more discretionary factors" (p. 15) and to a lack of "both commitment and a sense of strategic purpose" (p. 21).
The authors then shift to a discussion of the ten lessons learned in the Arab-Israeli peace process, divided up into four sections: (1) The Strategic Context; (2) Style and Substance; (3) The Foreign Policy Process and U.S. Domestic Politics; and (4) The Negotiator's Toolkit. The ten lessons learned are as follow:
- Arab-Israeli peace is in America's interest. September 11, increasing instability in the Middle East, the occupation of Iraq, and the threat from al Qaeda make American leadership in achieving Arab-Israeli peace even more important.
- U.S. Policy must be defined in Washington. Consultations with the parties may take place outside of Washington, but they must be based on American-defined policy. It may be informed by the Arabs and Israelis, but not dictated by them.
- The US must "not only exploit openings but also actively encourages, seek out, and create opportunities for peacemaking" (p. 34). Both the Clinton and Bush 43 administrations failed to exploit openings that presented themselves for peacemaking.
- US leadership must help the parties make the necessary trade-offs to reach endgame solutions by bringing in key international and regional actors. To avoid resistance that may come in from within the region, the US should engage in careful regional consultations before releasing any peace plans.
- The US must ensure compliance with the peace plans by "monitoring, setting standards of accountability, reporting violations fairly to the parties, and exacting consequences when commitments are broken or agreements not implemented" (p. 43).
- The US president's direct intervention should be reserved for when it is necessary and useful. In early phases of negotiation, issues are best left to senior aides. Presidents can become more directly involved during pivotal moments when such involvement is needed to close a deal or seize a diplomatic opportunity.
- Draw on the expertise of diverse, disciplined, and experienced negotiators on a team with clear lines of authority, open debate, deliberation, and information sharing, and proper policy planning and preparation.
- Build broad and bipartisan domestic support by cultivating relationships on Capitol Hill and with advocacy groups. There must be coordination with Congress, which may take action in the form of expressive measures (e.g., nonbinding resolutions) and legislation on foreign aid and arms sales.
- A successful envoy must have strong, unambiguous support from the White House, credibility with all of the parties, a broad mandate, and a meaningful policy.
- Use diplomatic tools, such as economic assistance and summitry, judiciously and with strategic objectives in mind. Otherwise, the cost may be "a loss of credibility and degradation of an important diplomatic tool" (p. 73).
This book is not intended to be a compilation of policy recommendations as to what the content of Arab-Israeli peace should be. Rather, it offers guidance as to how to strategically build domestic support, win the favor of all of the parties in a negotiation, and draw on the expertise of experienced negotiators. It suggests how the American administration may successfully negotiate peace, but it does not suggest what the content of such peace should be. It does offer some possibilities, such as a two-state solution, as well as some of the obstacles that may frustrate such a solution (the Palestinian Intifada and Israel's tough counterterrorist response, the ongoing problems of Israeli settlements and occupation practices, the radicalization of Palestinian politics" [p. 78], etc.), but it does not provide concrete details or espouse any one particular plan.
Furthermore, this book is not a history of the region and it does not summarize or analyze the events in and around Israel over the last sixty years. It does present a timeline of the events that occurred from the 1967 Six-Day War until Bush's 2007 Roadmap for Peace, but it does not cover the 1948 and 1957 Wars or any other events prior to 1967.
How can the US diplomatic community broker peace in the Middle East? Ambassador Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, drawing on lessons from the past, offer the answers in this brief review of American leadership in the Middle East and how to pave the way to peace.
The book opens up with an overview of the policies for peace and track record of the past three administrations: Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43, reviewing each one's focus, discipline, and ability to garner domestic support for a peace plan. Although the Bush 41 team inherited an advantageous strategic environment, with the US as the only world's superpower at the fall of the USSR, and with an unequivocal success after the first Gulf War, there was no focused effort in building a domestic coalition to support the peace process. Clinton was successful in building this coalition, but his efforts were lacking in focus and discipline. Bush 43's track record was the least successful of the three, due not only to the post 9/11 environment, but also to some "more discretionary factors" (p. 15) and to a lack of "both commitment and a sense of strategic purpose" (p. 21).
The authors then shift to a discussion of the ten lessons learned in the Arab-Israeli peace process, divided up into four sections: (1) The Strategic Context; (2) Style and Substance; (3) The Foreign Policy Process and U.S. Domestic Politics; and (4) The Negotiator's Toolkit. The ten lessons learned are as follow:
- Arab-Israeli peace is in America's interest. September 11, increasing instability in the Middle East, the occupation of Iraq, and the threat from al Qaeda make American leadership in achieving Arab-Israeli peace even more important.
- U.S. Policy must be defined in Washington. Consultations with the parties may take place outside of Washington, but they must be based on American-defined policy. It may be informed by the Arabs and Israelis, but not dictated by them.
- The US must "not only exploit openings but also actively encourages, seek out, and create opportunities for peacemaking" (p. 34). Both the Clinton and Bush 43 administrations failed to exploit openings that presented themselves for peacemaking.
- US leadership must help the parties make the necessary trade-offs to reach endgame solutions by bringing in key international and regional actors. To avoid resistance that may come in from within the region, the US should engage in careful regional consultations before releasing any peace plans.
- The US must ensure compliance with the peace plans by "monitoring, setting standards of accountability, reporting violations fairly to the parties, and exacting consequences when commitments are broken or agreements not implemented" (p. 43).
- The US president's direct intervention should be reserved for when it is necessary and useful. In early phases of negotiation, issues are best left to senior aides. Presidents can become more directly involved during pivotal moments when such involvement is needed to close a deal or seize a diplomatic opportunity.
- Draw on the expertise of diverse, disciplined, and experienced negotiators on a team with clear lines of authority, open debate, deliberation, and information sharing, and proper policy planning and preparation.
- Build broad and bipartisan domestic support by cultivating relationships on Capitol Hill and with advocacy groups. There must be coordination with Congress, which may take action in the form of expressive measures (e.g., nonbinding resolutions) and legislation on foreign aid and arms sales.
- A successful envoy must have strong, unambiguous support from the White House, credibility with all of the parties, a broad mandate, and a meaningful policy.
- Use diplomatic tools, such as economic assistance and summitry, judiciously and with strategic objectives in mind. Otherwise, the cost may be "a loss of credibility and degradation of an important diplomatic tool" (p. 73).
This book is not intended to be a compilation of policy recommendations as to what the content of Arab-Israeli peace should be. Rather, it offers guidance as to how to strategically build domestic support, win the favor of all of the parties in a negotiation, and draw on the expertise of experienced negotiators. It suggests how the American administration may successfully negotiate peace, but it does not suggest what the content of such peace should be. It does offer some possibilities, such as a two-state solution, as well as some of the obstacles that may frustrate such a solution (the Palestinian Intifada and Israel's tough counterterrorist response, the ongoing problems of Israeli settlements and occupation practices, the radicalization of Palestinian politics" [p. 78], etc.), but it does not provide concrete details or espouse any one particular plan.
Furthermore, this book is not a history of the region and it does not summarize or analyze the events in and around Israel over the last sixty years. It does present a timeline of the events that occurred from the 1967 Six-Day War until Bush's 2007 Roadmap for Peace, but it does not cover the 1948 and 1957 Wars or any other events prior to 1967.
