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The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century Hardcover – January 27, 2009
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“Conventional analysis suffers from a profound failure of imagination. It imagines passing clouds to be permanent and is blind to powerful, long-term shifts taking place in full view of the world.” —George Friedman
In his long-awaited and provocative new book, George Friedman turns his eye on the future—offering a lucid, highly readable forecast of the changes we can expect around the world during the twenty-first century. He explains where and why future wars will erupt (and how they will be fought), which nations will gain and lose economic and political power, and how new technologies and cultural trends will alter the way we live in the new century.
The Next 100 Years draws on a fascinating exploration of history and geopolitical patterns dating back hundreds of years. Friedman shows that we are now, for the first time in half a millennium, at the dawn of a new era—with changes in store, including:
• The U.S.-Jihadist war will conclude—replaced by a second full-blown cold war with Russia.
• China will undergo a major extended internal crisis, and Mexico will emerge as an important world power.
• A new global war will unfold toward the middle of the century between the United States and an unexpected coalition from Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and the Far East; but armies will be much smaller and wars will be less deadly.
• Technology will focus on space—both for major military uses and for a dramatic new energy resource that will have radical environmental implications.
• The United States will experience a Golden Age in the second half of the century.
Written with the keen insight and thoughtful analysis that has made George Friedman a renowned expert in geopolitics and forecasting, The Next 100 Years presents a fascinating picture of what lies ahead.
For continual, updated analysis and supplemental material, go to www.Stratfor.com
Amazon.com Review
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
From Booklist
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“This is a book about unintended consequences and how the constraints of time and place impact the behavior of individuals and nations and offer a view of future events. [Friedman’s] theories are fascinating….This is an excellent book.”
--Booklist
“Futurologist Friedman entertainingly explains how America will bestride the world during this century. Prophecy, whether by astrologers, science-fiction writers or geopoliticians, has a dismal track record, but readers will enjoy this steady stream of clever historical analogies, economic analyses and startling demographic data.”
--Kirkus
“There is a temptation, when you are around George Friedman, to treat him like a Magic 8-Ball.”
—New York Times Magazine
“Barron’s consistently has found Stratfor’s insights informative and largely on the money—as has the company’s large client base, which ranges from corporations to media outlets and government agencies.”
—Barron’s
“One of the country’s leading strategic affairs experts.”
—Lou Dobbs
About the Author
GEORGE FRIEDMAN is the founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the world’s leading private intelligence and forecasting company. He is frequently called upon as a media expert and is the author of four books, including most recently America’s Secret War, and numerous articles on national security, information warfare, computer security, and the intelligence business. He lives in Austin, Texas.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The Dawn of the American Age
There is a deep-seated belief in America that the United States is approaching the eve of its destruction. Read letters to the editor, peruse the Web, and listen to public discourse. Disastrous wars, uncontrolled deficits, high gasoline prices, shootings at universities, corruption in business and government, and an endless litany of other shortcomings--all of them quite real--create a sense that the American dream has been shattered and that America is past its prime. If that doesn't convince you, listen to Europeans. They will assure you that America's best day is behind it.
The odd thing is that all of this foreboding was present during the presidency of Richard Nixon, together with many of the same issues. There is a continual fear that American power and prosperity are illusory, and that disaster is just around the corner. The sense transcends ideology. Environmentalists and Christian conservatives are both delivering the same message. Unless we repent of our ways, we will pay the price--and it may be too late already.
It's interesting to note that the nation that believes in its manifest destiny has not only a sense of impending disaster but a nagging feeling that the country simply isn't what it used to be. We have a deep sense of nostalgia for the 1950s as a "simpler" time. This is quite a strange belief. With the Korean War and McCarthy at one end, Little Rock in the middle, and Sputnik and Berlin at the other end, and the very real threat of nuclear war throughout, the 1950s was actually a time of intense anxiety and foreboding. A widely read book published in the 1950s was entitled The Age of Anxiety. In the 1950s, they looked back nostalgically at an earlier America, just as we look back nostalgically at the 1950s.
American culture is the manic combination of exultant hubris and profound gloom. The net result is a sense of confidence constantly undermined by the fear that we may be drowned by melting ice caps caused by global warming or smitten dead by a wrathful God for gay marriage, both outcomes being our personal responsibility. American mood swings make it hard to develop a real sense of the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century. But the fact is that the United States is stunningly powerful. It may be that it is heading for a catastrophe, but it is hard to see one when you look at the basic facts.
Let's consider some illuminating figures. Americans constitute about 4 percent of the world's population but produce about 26 percent of all goods and services. In 2007 U.S. gross domestic product was about $14 trillion, compared to the world's GDP of $54 trillion--about 26 percent of the world's economic activity takes place in the United States. The next largest economy in the world is Japan's, with a GDP of about $4.4 trillion--about a third the size of ours. The American economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined: Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom.
Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States. Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion (in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than Japan's and China's industries combined.
There is talk of oil shortages, which certainly seem to exist and will undoubtedly increase. However, it is important to realize that the United States produced 8.3 million barrels of oil every day in 2006. Compare that with 9.7 million for Russia and 10.7 million for Saudi Arabia. U.S. oil production is 85 percent that of Saudi Arabia. The United States produces more oil than Iran, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates. Imports of oil into the country are vast, but given its industrial production, that's understandable. Comparing natural gas production in 2006, Russia was in first place with 22.4 trillion cubic feet and the United States was second with 18.7 trillion cubic feet. U.S. natural gas production is greater than that of the next five producers combined. In other words, although there is great concern that the United States is wholly dependent on foreign energy, it is actually one of the world's largest energy producers.
Given the vast size of the American economy, it is interesting to note that the United States is still underpopulated by global standards. Measured in inhabitants per square kilometer, the world's average population density is 49. Japan's is 338, Germany's is 230, and America's is only 31. If we exclude Alaska, which is largely uninhabitable, U.S. population density rises to 34. Compared to Japan or Germany, or the rest of Europe, the United States is hugely underpopulated. Even when we simply compare population in proportion to arable land--land that is suitable for agriculture--America has five times as much land per person as Asia, almost twice as much as Europe, and three times as much as the global average. An economy consists of land, labor, and capital. In the case of the United States, these numbers show that the nation can still grow--it has plenty of room to increase all three.
There are many answers to the question of why the U.S. economy is so powerful, but the simplest answer is military power. The United States completely dominates a continent that is invulnerable to invasion and occupation and in which its military overwhelms those of its neighbors. Virtually every other industrial power in the world has experienced devastating warfare in the twentieth century. The United States waged war, but America itself never experienced it. Military power and geographical reality created an economic reality. Other countries have lost time recovering from wars. The United States has not. It has actually grown because of them.
Consider this simple fact that I'll be returning to many times. The United States Navy controls all of the oceans of the world. Whether it's a junk in the South China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed--or denied--at will by the U.S. Navy. The combined naval force of the rest of the world doesn't come close to equaling that of the U.S. Navy.
This has never happened before in human history, even with Britain. There have been regionally dominant navies, but never one that was globally and overwhelmingly dominant. This has meant that the United States could invade other countries--but never be invaded. It has meant that in the final analysis the United States controls international trade. It has become the foundation of American security and American wealth. Control of the seas emerged after World War II, solidified during the final phase of the European Age, and is now the flip side of American economic power, the basis of its military power.
Whatever passing problems exist for the United States, the most important factor in world affairs is the tremendous imbalance of economic, military, and political power. Any attempt to forecast the twenty-first century that does not begin with the recognition of the extraordinary nature of American power is out of touch with reality. But I am making a broader, more unexpected claim, too: the United States is only at the beginning of its power. The twenty-first century will be the American century.
That assertion rests on a deeper point. For the past five hundred years, the global system has rested on the power of Atlantic Europe, the European countries that bordered on the Atlantic Ocean: Portugal, Spain, France, England, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands. These countries transformed the world, creating the first global political and economic system in human history. As we know, European power collapsed during the twentieth century, along with the European empires. This created a vacuum that was filled by the United States, the dominant power in North America, and the only great power bordering both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. North America has assumed the place that Europe occupied for five hundred years, between Columbus's voyage in 1492 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It has become the center of gravity of the international system.
Why? In order to understand the twenty-first century, it is important to understand the fundamental structural shifts that took place late in the twentieth century, setting the stage for a new century that will be radically different in form and substance, just as the United States is so different from Europe. My argument is not only that something extraordinary has happened but that the United States has had very little choice in it. This isn't about policy. It is about the way in which impersonal geopolitical forces work.
Europe
Until the fifteenth century, humans lived in self-enclosed, sequestered worlds. Humanity did not know itself as consisting of a single fabric. The Chinese didn't know of the Aztecs, and the Mayas didn't know of the Zulus. The Europeans may have heard of the Japanese, but they didn't really know them--and they certainly didn't interact with them. The Tower of Babel had done more than make it impossible for people to speak to each other. It made civilizations oblivious to each other.
Europeans living on the eastern rim of the Atlantic Ocean shattered the barriers between these sequestered regions and turned the world into a single entity in which all of the parts interacted with each other. What happened to Australian aborigines was intimately connected to the British relationship with Ireland and the need to find penal colonies for British prisoners overseas. What happened to Inca kings was tied to the relationship between Spain and Portugal. The imperialism of Atlantic Europe created a single world.
Atlantic Europe became the center of gravity of the global system (see map, page 20). What happened in Europe defined much of what happened elsewhere in the world. Other nations and regions did everything with one eye on Europe. From the sixteenth to the twentieth century hardly any part of the world escaped European influence and power. Everything, for good or evil, revolved around it. And the pivot of Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled that stretch of water controlled the highway to the world.
Europe was neither the most civilized nor the most advanced region in the world. So what made it the center? Europe really was a technical and intellectual backwater in the fifteenth century as opposed to China or the Islamic world. Why these small, out-of-the-way countries? And why did they begin their domination then and not five hundred years before or five hundred years later?
European power was about two things: money and geography. Europe depended on imports from Asia, particularly India. Pepper, for example, was not simply a cooking spice but also a meat preservative; its importation was a critical part of the European economy. Asia was filled with luxury goods that Europe needed, and would pay for, and historically Asian imports would come overland along the famous Silk Road and other routes until reaching the Mediterranean. The rise of Turkey--about which much more will be heard in the twenty-first century--closed these routes and increased the cost of imports.
European traders were desperate to find a way around the Turks. Spaniards and Portuguese--the Iberians--chose the nonmilitary alternative: they sought another route to India. The Iberians knew of only one route to India that avoided Turkey, down the length of the African coast and up into the Indian Ocean. They theorized about another route, assuming that the world was round, a route that would take them to India by going west.
This was a unique moment. At other points in history Atlantic Europe would have only fallen even deeper into backwardness and poverty. But the economic pain was real and the Turks were very dangerous, so there was pressure to do something. It was also a crucial psychological moment. The Spaniards, having just expelled the Muslims from Spain, were at the height of their barbaric hubris. Finally, the means for carrying out such exploration was at hand as well. Technology existed that, if properly used, might provide a solution to the Turkey problem.
The Iberians had a ship, the caravel, that could handle deep-sea voyages. They had an array of navigational devices, from the compass to the astrolabe. Finally they had guns, particularly cannons. All of these might have been borrowed from other cultures, but the Iberians integrated them into an effective economic and military system. They could now sail to distant places. When they arrived they were able to fight--and win. People who heard a cannon fire and saw a building explode tended to be more flexible in negotiations. When the Iberians reached their destinations, they could kick in the door and take over. Over the next several centuries, European ships, guns, and money dominated the world and created the first global system, the European Age.
Here is the irony: Europe dominated the world, but it failed to dominate itself. For five hundred years Europe tore itself apart in civil wars, and as a result there was never a European empire--there was instead a British empire, a Spanish empire, a French empire, a Portuguese empire, and so on. The European nations exhausted themselves in endless wars with each other while they invaded, subjugated, and eventually ruled much of the world.
There were many reasons for the inability of the Europeans to unite, but in the end it came down to a simple feature of geography: the English Channel. First the Spanish, then the French, and finally the Germans managed to dominate the European continent, but none of them could cross the Channel. Because no one could defeat Britain, conqueror after conqueror failed to hold Europe as a whole. Periods of peace were simply temporary truces. Europe was exhausted by the advent of World War I, in which over ten million men died--a good part of a generation. The European economy was shattered, and European confidence broken. Europe emerged as a demographic, economic, and cultural shadow of its former self. And then things got even worse.
- Print length272 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherDoubleday
- Publication dateJanuary 27, 2009
- Dimensions6.36 x 1.11 x 9.56 inches
- ISBN-10038551705X
- ISBN-13978-0385517058
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- Publisher : Doubleday; First Edition (January 27, 2009)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 272 pages
- ISBN-10 : 038551705X
- ISBN-13 : 978-0385517058
- Item Weight : 1.15 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.36 x 1.11 x 9.56 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #431,930 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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About the author

George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the Founder and Chairman of Geopolitical Futures, an online publication that analyzes and predicts the international system.
Friedman is a New York Times bestselling author and his most popular book, The Next 100 Years (2009) is kept alive by the prescience of its geopolitical predictions as they unfold in many countries. Other of Friedman’s best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into over 20 languages.
Determined to discover those principles of logic that govern the world, George received his PhD in government from Cornell University, granting him access to some of the most brilliant thinkers in the field… in the US and across the globe.
George’s unmatched analysis in geopolitics has led him to regularly brief military organizations and consult for Fortune 100 executives. He also founded the geopolitical intelligence consulting firm Stratfor in 1996 and left Stratfor in 2015 to start Geopolitical Futures.
You can read all of George's current thoughts and analysis by visiting his website, http://www.geopoliticalfutures.com.
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Still, he suggests, other nations and peoples will not be able to help but dislike, and align themselves against, us anymore than we can help acting in our own interests.
Beginning with the trend of globalization he argues that, as the world modernizes, the incentive to procreate will continue to diminish resulting in a significant downturn in world populations. In urban societies, larger numbers of children, he reminds us, are a burden on their parents, not a boon. Given this he suggests that:
1) Global Warming, though in his view real and manmade (as claimed by its proponents), will start to ease because demand will drop of its own accord; and
2) The energy crisis will diminish because of the demand drop as well.
As populations trend downward, population replenishment will become the major problem for nation states in this century. Western European nations (England, France, Germany, etc.) are already in advanced decline, he argues, their culture one of cynicism and relativism. The population of these nations will continue to be disproportionately older, as well, as they experience a more rapid population drop-off than in many other parts of the world, including North America. Their economies will be correspondingly less robust, he argues, too.
Regarding current events, he suggests that the American war with the Jihadists already looks to be over. America, he says, has won because America is in a position of global dominance and so doesn't need to defeat its enemies. It must only keep them off balance. Russia, he adds, though now in the throes of a revanchist resurgence under Putin will not be able to sustain this because of its radical population decline and lack of new inflows of people. He believes a revived Russian Empire will reclaim its "near abroad" in the short term but will self-destruct some time in the 2020's because of demographic problems, leaving a vacuum that, he predicts, will be filled by an eastern bloc in Europe led by Poland (the largest and most energetic of the eastern European states), and by Turkey, a nation well-positioned to dominate southern Russia and its environs, along with the eastern Mediterranean and much of the Near East.
In the far east he thinks China will self-destruct shortly after Russia because the Chinese system is sitting on a population that is much poorer than it looks with greater wealth disparities. He believes that the inherent weaknesses this represents will lead to a break down in the current Communist regime's ability to exert central control over the bulk of Chinese territory and that the regions on the coast will follow their own economic interest, leading them to work with other nations, like Japan, to the detriment of the central Chinese authority. The relative isolation of China (landlocked on three sides with border regions that are difficult to occupy or traverse -- from the Himalayas to the Gobi desert and from Siberia to the jungles of Southeast Asia) works against China exerting much influence beyond its borders in these directions while the eastern coastal regions, following their own self-interest, will break away, either in fact or de jure, ulitmately weakening the Chinese polity.
On the other hand, he thinks Japan will see a resurgence, thanks to Japanese education and industry and its traditional access to areas beyond its borders via the sea. But, because Japan suffers the same demographic problems as other top tier urbanized states, while having a strong disinclination to permit non-Japanese to enter its homeland and dilute the native culture, it will turn outward and aim to dominate a fragmented China in the western Pacific region, seeking both resources and population to fuel its manufacturing engine. Thus Japan will again look for empire at China's expense as it has done in the past.
Friedman thinks the U.S. is best positioned geographically for continued global dominance because it controls North America which sits astride the two major oceans and because the U.S. system continues to attract new immigrants, thereby enabling it to continue to grow (or at least shrink less), while other major modern states are feeling deeper population losses. But, because of the U.S. global role, it will continue to have a vested interest in ensuring that no other state arises to challenge its dominance. (This is not a function of explicit American planning but of national dynamics, i.e., any state in this position, he says, would act in roughly the same way out of national self-interest). Thus the U.S. need not win all its conflicts on Friedman's view. It only has to make sure no one else manages to win theirs in certain critical theaters so that potential challengers never achieve enough stability to threaten U.S. dominance.
But other nations, driven by these same kinds of concerns will not be able to keep from challenging the U.S. Thus Japan and Turkey will gradually find themselves in a position, he argues, that puts them at odds with the U.S. (about mid-century). By that point Friedman predicts the U.S. will have shifted its military focus to control of the orbital areas around Earth and to reliance on manned, fixed spy and missile launching satellites, with pinpoint targeting capabilities. There will also be occupation of the moon for research and military applications. Control of these area will become paramount to American power. He assumes other nations will also go into space and operate on the moon, too.
As the U.S. moves to prevent Japan and Turkey from achieving irreversible hegemony in their regions, these two powers will see it as in their interest to act against the U.S. and initiate a pre-emptive strike some time around 2050 against the U.S., beginning with an attack on American spy and missile launching satellites. He thinks the attack will likely succeed, at least initially, but that the U.S.'s geographic and resource advantages, combined with an alliance with the Polish bloc, that will by then be at odds with the growing Turkish power, will eventually lead to a reversal of fortunes, the U.S. and Poland defeating Turkey and Japan, just as the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. defeated the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) in World War II.
In the course of this war, he predicts the U.S. military will make huge technological strides in space, accelerated by wartime demands. This will result in the replacement of carbon fuels, including oil, with solar power collected in space and beamed to Earth in the war's aftermath, giving the U.S. dominance in energy supplies, too.
But the opening up of U.S. immigration floodgates that will have occurred in the earlier part of the century and which will have been the source of much of America's continued strength and growth throughout the century will also contain the seeds of America's future problems as Mexicans emigrate into, and remain in, the American Southwest without fully giving up their cultural and national affiliations. The American Southwest, of course, was once part of Mexico and was wrested away by the U.S. via the Texas rebellion and the later Mexican War. The new substantial Hispanic population in this part of the U.S., Friedman predicts, will result in yet another war with a stronger and more economically robust Mexico by the end of the century, a war whose outcome will determine which country, the U.S. or Mexico, will control North America and thus claim global dominance for the following century.
Intriguingly, he sees little likelihood of a resurgent Islam restoring the medieval Islamic caliphate that once dominated the world, citing too much factionalism and geographic fragmentation in the Muslim world. Yet he takes no account of the fact that once before, in the eighth and ninth centuries AD, Islam DID in fact achieve such unification without benefit of geographical or even demographic advantages.
Aside from his overly easy dismissal of Islam's potential to alter the global picture, this was a fascinating and perceptive analysis of current and likely future trends based on historical precedent, human and national natures and the physical facts underlying the distribution and interaction of nations and peoples. An important book, even if only some of its predictions hold up, it's just too bad most of us are going to miss the end of the show!
Stuart W. Mirsky
author of the historical novel The King of Vinland's Saga
and A Raft on the River , the true story of one fifteen year old girl's survival in Nazi occupied Poland during World War II
If I am convinced of the new point of view on its merits, then my worldview has been enhanced. My stance has moved from a position that is less correct to one that is more correct. If I remain unconvinced, on the other hand, then my original viewpoint has been strengthened... stress-tested and found worthy, as it were. And either way, new layers of nuance and subtlety are always a plus.
My views were certainly challenged - and yours will be too - by the stance in George Friedman's new book, "The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century."
The book pulls no punches. There are predictions in here that will surprise your socks off. Just consider some of the timeline bullets from the front cover:
* 2020: China Fragments.
* 2050: Global War Between U.S., Turkey, Poland, and Japan - The New Great Powers.
* 2080: Space-Based Energy Powers Earth.
* 2100: Mexico Challenges U.S.
If your initial reaction is anything similar to mine, it runs along the lines of "What?!? Is this guy smoking banana peels?"
Most assuredly he is not. Friedman is the founder and CEO of Stratfor, an outfit billed as "the world's leading private intelligence and forecasting company." Geopolitics is Friedman's game... and it's a game he takes very seriously.
Expect the Unexpected
Conventional thinkers dismiss wildly unexpected views out of hand. For Friedman, that's the whole point. "Expect the unexpected" is a geopolitical forecaster's mantra. This point is hammered home in the introduction of the book, in which the reader is taken on a series of 20-year jumps through the 20th century. With each jump, the landscape looks radically different.
Friedman's point in highlighting these radical landscape shifts is not that some mystical cycle kicks in like clockwork every two decades. It's merely that, when it comes to geopolitics and major world events, conventional wisdom is almost always wrong. The present order of things is no guide as to how things will look two decades out.
China as Backwater?
Friedman's views on China are particularly eye-opening.
"I don't share the view that China is going to be a major world power," he writes. "I don't even believe it will hold together as a unified country... China is important, however, because it appears to be the most likely global challenger in the near term - at least in the minds of others."
You need extremely powerful arguments to back statements like this one, and Friedman has them. He looks at China from a number of angles many others have not considered - and his arguments make sense. China has a number of geographical and cultural hurdles that will prove very tough to overcome.
Many point to China's 30 years of breakneck growth. If Friedman is right in his view that "30 years is not a very long time" and that China will revert back to isolationist trend, the world will look very different ten years on than many of us expected.
Friedman may well be wrong, of course... but he isn't just stirring the pot for the sake of being controversial. His logic is coherent.
Oceans Trump All
Take the emphasis on naval power, for example. One of the reasons Friedman expects the U.S. to dominate is because of America's absolute dominance of the world's oceans.
"The United States Navy controls all of the oceans in the world," Friedman opines. "Whether it's a junk in the south China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed - or denied - at will by the US Navy."
In the European Age, transatlantic trade was the key to wealth and prosperity. But then, closer to the end of the 20th century, something momentous happened. Transpacific trade - that is to say, trade across the Pacific Ocean, as opposed to the Atlantic - began to rise up.
This shift heavily favors the United States as the only great power with coastal access to both oceans - Atlantic and Pacific. This factors huge in the geopolitical calculus that sits at the heart of Friedman's work.
What's more, Friedman argues, the United States does not have to win wars. Because America has already established global geopolitical dominance, the goal is to disrupt any and all attempts of other regional powers to form. If this means fomenting an expensive conflict that America appears to "lose," then that's fine - because the strategic goal is not to win, but merely to keep competitive alliances from forming.
America as Adolescent
Friedman further compares the United States to an "adolescent" - still young and belligerent, not yet confident in its own ability to project and wield power.
This moody teenager mindset explains a lot when it comes to thinking about US foreign policy: the undercurrents of extreme insecurity interwoven with brash outbursts of confidence... the clumsy willingness to stomp around like a bull in a China shop (no pun intended)... and so on.
It is truly a unique point of view. America in the very early stages of influence on the world stage, rather than the days of twilight? Who would have thought? It's a hallmark of US culture, Friedman points out, to be deeply insecure about certain things - while at the same time harboring that deep streak of brashness.
To his credit, Friedman is the only analyst I've come across who has made a serious effort to consider military power, alongside economic power, in his forecasts.
And Friedman has thought about the economics too. In "The Next 100 Years" he makes the further argument that America is vastly underpopulated yet growing (whereas other competitors are shrinking) and that certain aspects of agricultural production and economic resilience will also make a real long-run difference.
Guaranteed To Make You Think
There are plenty of other crazy-yet-plausible assertions in this book that are guaranteed to make you think. (Poland and Turkey as two of the next "great powers?" Wow! And there are even wilder ideas than that...)
I don't embrace Friedman's ideas without reservation. But "The Next 100 Years" has certainly made me think, and think hard, on some of the more popular forecast notions I've long entertained.
Top reviews from other countries
Full of insights and interesting perspective
I definitely recommend this book to better understand ongoing global dynamics and forces












