This is an important book which has not gotten the public attention it deserves. Kimball and Burr make a compelling case that the diplomatic side of President Nixon's efforts to end the Vietnam War -- masterminded by Nixon himself in uneasy partnership with Henry Kissinger -- was based on wildly unrealistic assumptions about America's power and ability to influence governments with far different outlooks than ours. The use of real time records from our North Vietnamese and Soviet adversaries also shows that those governments were far more clear-eyed and coldly unemotional, consistently seeing through Nixon, Kissinger and both their arguments and erratic actions, than ours as events moved along. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger emerge from this work as either perceptive strategists or steady administrators of the withdrawal effort. And, because both of them appear to have revealed their weak hands regularly to the Soviet and North Vietnamese officials with whom they interacted, even their basic --- and still vaunted -- negotiating skills are called into question.
However, there are also several weaknesses to Kimball's and Burr's almost entirely negative analysis. From the beginning, the North Vietnamese were adamant on two conditions to which no American president (save perhaps George McGovern) would have agreed: the overthrow of our South Vietnamese ally's sitting government and withdrawal without return of American prisoners of war. The fact that Nixon and Kissinger finally did achieve satisfactory resolution of these two barriers is insufficiently discussed and credited here. Nixon and Kissinger did better than expert establishment opinion had a right to expect, or did expect, in January, 1969.
Even more importantly, what probably led to North Vietnam's belated concessions is also given short shrift. As in most Vietnam era books, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is favorably portrayed here as a shrewd political operator with his own agenda, but not overtly recognized, along with his field commander Creighton Abrams, as the one American high official who did actually understand how to end the war and did the most to achieve that outcome. But enough is here to show Laird to be by far Nixon's most perceptive, effective aide and not just a canny manipulator. From day one, Laird thought Nixon's and Kissinger's diplomatic efforts were futile -- and their sporadic, apocalyptic, and often intemperate escalations dangerously counterproductive by fueling unnecessary domestic and international dissent. Instead, he quietly poured his own immense energies into the Vietnamization of the war effort he thought would ultimately determine how it could end. Whatever the long-term prospects of the South Vietnamese military in 1972, there is no doubt it performed admirably in the spring offensive that year and that that performance, more than anything else, led to Nixon's and Kissinger's ultimately successful, if fragile, negotiated settlement. Laird himself appears to believe that, had his and Abrams' efforts been sustained by the Ford Administration, a more lasting successful result could probably have been secured.
Regardless of one's initial impulses on that issue (Kimball and Burr themselves are clearly skeptical), Laird's mastery as Secretary of Defense should give credibility to views that deserve more thoughtful consideration than they have yet received in Vietnam War histories. Melvin Laird is to the Vietnam War what George Marshall was to World War II -- a behind-the-scenes American hero. Our voluminous Vietnam literature is rich in the details of Nixon's and Kissinger's machinations that are often described, though not here, far more favorably than warranted. That it is equivalently weak in considering what Laird did on his own (and in courageous disregard of both his Joint Chiefs of Staff military subordinates and White House superior) is an historical misjudgment and injustice deserving the full-bodied reappraisal the authors of this valuable work would appear very capable of providing. Here's hoping they or others take it on.
Loading your book clubs
There was a problem loading your book clubs. Please try again.
Not in a club? Learn more
Join or create book clubs
Choose books together
Track your books
Bring your club to Amazon Book Clubs, start a new book club and invite your friends to join, or find a club that’s right for you for free.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Flip to back Flip to front
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
