No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War Illustrated Edition

by Gregory A. Daddis (Author)

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ISBN-13: 978-0199746873

ISBN-10: 0199746877

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Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far
deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.

Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy
missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses.
Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that
American forces suffered in Vietnam.

Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing
counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

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Editorial Reviews

Review

"This timely and important book is a major addition to the military history of the Vietnam
War. It should be required reading for those grappling with the issues posed by counterinsurgency wars today." --George C. Herring, Alumni Professor Emeritus of History, University of Kentucky, and author of From Colony to Superpower

"In No Sure Victory, Gregory Daddis has asked questions about the past that speak directly to the present: How should progress in a counterinsurgency war be measured? What is the defi nition of victory-and what is its meaning? The effort of the US military and civilian command to answer these
questions and their ultimate failure to do so is the burden of Daddis' book. He writes as a professional soldier as well as an historian, and his meticulously researched and carefully argued account makes a signifi cant contribution to the ongoing effort to understand the Vietnam War." --Marilyn B.
Young, Professor of History, New York University, and author of The Vietnam Wars

"Stunning in its research and highly sophisticated in its analysis, No Sure Victory is far
and away the best study we have of the way the US Army measured its performance
during the Vietnam War. Daddis argues that US strategists were far more interested in
data collection than they were in data analysis. This failure had a dramatic impact on the
conduct and outcome of the war. An important study with monumental implications for
US military policy in the future." --Robert Brigham, Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations, Vassar College

"...Engaging...Daddis has written a provocative and well-researched book...It will be of value to both students and historians of the Vietnam War, in addition to military professionals interested in contemporary counterinsurgency operations." --Vietnam Magazine

"No Sure Victory is a thought-provoking look at a problem that is both perennial and current...essential reading for anyone concerned with our current and probable future conflicts." --MILITARY REVIEW

"Deeply researched and revealing" -- VVA Veteran

"Daddis ... probes more deeply than anyone has previously done into the army's Measurements of Progress Reports, and the collective inability to agree on a set of meaningful dominant indicators of military and political effectiveness." --Times Literary Supplement

"No Sure Victory is well researched, nicely organized, and lucidly written. The author backs his arguments with a judicious use of quotations and copious footnotes, and he frequently provides balance by explaining differing points of view. In short, this is a book worthy of serious consideration."
--ARMY HISTORY

"Daddis has written an insightful analysis into the failure of American military and political leaders in measuring the effectiveness and progress of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam... No Sure Victory is a must read for anyone interested in avoiding the blatant mistakes of Vietnam." --ON POINT

About the Author

Gregory A. Daddis is Academy Professor of History at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and a Colonel in the US Army. A West Point graduate, he has served in numerous army command and staff positions in the United States and overseas and is a veteran of both Operations Desert Storm and
Iraqi Freedom. He is the author of Fighting in the Great Crusade: An 8th Infantry Artillery Officer in World War II.

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ Oxford University Press; Illustrated edition (June 1, 2011)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 368 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0199746877
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0199746873
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.35 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 9.3 x 1.3 x 6.1 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #2,380,675 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2,276 in Military History (Books)
- #2,417 in Political History (Books)
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Gregory A. Daddis

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Gregory A. Daddis is a professor of history and the USS Midway Chair in Modern US Military History at San Diego State University. Dr. Daddis joined SDSU from Chapman University, where he directed the MA Program in War and Society Studies. Prior, he served as the Chief of the American History Division in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy at West Point. A retired US Army colonel, he has served in both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Daddis specializes in the history of the Vietnam Wars and the Cold War era.

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Gaius Calpernius Piso

Measuring success in counterinsurgency--still a relevant question

Reviewed in the United States on January 26, 2012

Verified Purchase

Over the past decade American soldiers and policymakers have wrestled with the thorny question of how to determine whether one is winning or losing when waging a counterinsurgency. The author sheds light on this matter by reviewing how the US attempted to do so in Vietnam. He describes the many errors and pitfalls made in the pursuit of metrics. It is thus a cautionary tale for today's leaders.

While an important subject, the author seems to think that America's failure to develop an accurate system of metrics was a major cause for its defeat. I think he goes too far. Certainly it was a problem, but it is hard to accept that a better system for gaging progress would have transformed the war and altered the outcome. A pair of glasses might help a nearsighted batter hit a pitch, but it will not necessarily mean he will improve his hitting enough to win the game.

9 people found this helpful

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John

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United States on October 17, 2016

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Great

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Chieflong

Mostly about information processing

Reviewed in the United States on June 18, 2013

Verified Purchase

This book covers the inability of military and government officials to assess the situation (winning or losing) in Vietnam. OK for statisticians--not so much for history buffs. After awhile, it gets repetitious, as there are continuing references to the same problems.

4 people found this helpful

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Zachary

Outstanding

Reviewed in the United States on March 17, 2013

Verified Purchase

An excellent book that covers the Army program in Vietnam. Covers much of the war outside of metrics to check effectiveness including Project 100,000. Great big picture read.

3 people found this helpful

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Christian Potholm

"There is more to winning than counting"

Reviewed in the United States on November 19, 2017

Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (London: Oxford University Press, 2011). Carefully examines the process by which the Pentagon tried to measure success or failure in Vietnam, concluding that the metrics used (such as body counts or tons of rice seized) were not as accurate as some not used (as to how many village leaders slept in the villages they claimed were “secure”). The author concludes the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) employed and collected vast amounts of statistics, but improper analysis of those statistics and “intellectual rigidity” hurt the enterprise. He also observes rather wryly that “…there is more to winning than counting.”

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No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War Illustrated Edition

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