No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War 1st Edition

by Gregory A. Daddis (Author)

6 ratings

ISBN-13: 978-0199746873

ISBN-10: 0199746877

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Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.

Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam.

Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"This timely and important book is a major addition to the military history of the Vietnam
War. It should be required reading for those grappling with the issues posed by counterinsurgency wars today." --George C. Herring, Alumni Professor Emeritus of History, University of Kentucky, and author of From Colony to Superpower

"In No Sure Victory, Gregory Daddis has asked questions about the past that speak directly to the present: How should progress in a counterinsurgency war be measured? What is the defi nition of victory-and what is its meaning? The effort of the US military and civilian command to answer these questions and their ultimate failure to do so is the burden of Daddis' book. He writes as a professional soldier as well as an historian, and his meticulously researched and carefully argued account makes a signifi cant contribution to the ongoing effort to understand the Vietnam War." --Marilyn B. Young, Professor of History, New York University, and author of The Vietnam Wars

"Stunning in its research and highly sophisticated in its analysis, No Sure Victory is far
and away the best study we have of the way the US Army measured its performance
during the Vietnam War. Daddis argues that US strategists were far more interested in
data collection than they were in data analysis. This failure had a dramatic impact on the
conduct and outcome of the war. An important study with monumental implications for
US military policy in the future." --Robert Brigham, Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations, Vassar College

"...Engaging...Daddis has written a provocative and well-researched book...It will be of value to both students and historians of the Vietnam War, in addition to military professionals interested in contemporary counterinsurgency operations." --Vietnam Magazine

"No Sure Victory is a thought-provoking look at a problem that is both perennial and current...essential reading for anyone concerned with our current and probable future conflicts." --MILITARY REVIEW

"Deeply researched and revealing" -- VVA Veteran

"Daddis ... probes more deeply than anyone has previously done into the army's Measurements of Progress Reports, and the collective inability to agree on a set of meaningful dominant indicators of military and political effectiveness." --Times Literary Supplement

"No Sure Victory is well researched, nicely organized, and lucidly written. The author backs his arguments with a judicious use of quotations and copious footnotes, and he frequently provides balance by explaining differing points of view. In short, this is a book worthy of serious consideration." --ARMY HISTORY

"Daddis has written an insightful analysis into the failure of American military and political leaders in measuring the effectiveness and progress of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam... No Sure Victory is a must read for anyone interested in avoiding the blatant mistakes of Vietnam." --ON POINT

About the Author

Gregory A. Daddis is Academy Professor of History at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and a Colonel in the US Army. A West Point graduate, he has served in numerous army command and staff positions in the United States and overseas and is a veteran of both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. He is the author of Fighting in the Great Crusade: An 8th Infantry Artillery Officer in World War II.

Hardcover: 368 pages
Publisher: Oxford University Press; 1 edition (June 1, 2011)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0199746877
ISBN-13: 978-0199746873
Product Dimensions: 9.4 x 1.3 x 6.4 inches
Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
Customer Reviews: 6 customer reviews
Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,366,120 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2145 in Political History (Books)
- #2668 in National & International Security (Books)
- #2777 in Vietnam War History (Books)

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Gaius Calpernius Piso

Measuring success in counterinsurgency--still a relevant question

January 26, 2012

Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase

Over the past decade American soldiers and policymakers have wrestled with the thorny question of how to determine whether one is winning or losing when waging a counterinsurgency. The author sheds light on this matter by reviewing how the US attempted to do so in Vietnam. He describes the many errors and pitfalls made in the pursuit of metrics. It is thus a cautionary tale for today's leaders.

While an important subject, the author seems to think that America's failure to develop an accurate system of metrics was a major cause for its defeat. I think he goes too far. Certainly it was a problem, but it is hard to accept that a better system for gaging progress would have transformed the war and altered the outcome. A pair of glasses might help a nearsighted batter hit a pitch, but it will not necessarily mean he will improve his hitting enough to win the game.

8 people found this helpful

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John

Five Stars

October 17, 2016

Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase

Great

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Van Pham

Flaw Analysis

September 9, 2017

Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase

I bought this book based on the premise that the author will introduce a new method to show how flaw statistics may have caused the lots of the Vietnamese.

The author criticizes the flaw metrics that the Americans collected during the war. Insinuating that it may have been the reason why the American lost the was. The author also put the loss of the war at the feet of "Marvin The Arvin., the slanted eyes Asian troops that were universal despite by most American troops as the author phrase it.

The author was completely ignorant that while American ground forces were fighting in Vietnam, they face a battalion or multi-battalion NVA and NLF troops, as the war progress, they grew in intensity, especially when The American ground forces quit Vietnam.

In 1968, the majority of the battles against the PAVN (also known as NVA) and NLF involved regiments, in 1971, the majority of the major battles were fought NVA divisions again. In 1973, the battles between the ARVN and NVA included army corp, and from 1974 to 1975, major battles were found involving multi-army corps. Each NVA army corps consists of three division and various support troops. If the "Marvin the Arvin" was useless, then how could they meet and defeat such large and well equipped from the NVA and NLF when the American could not? According to Vo Nguyen Giap memoir, after the 1973 Peace Agreement, many North Vietnamese generals were worried that the NVA would not be able to defeat the ARVN due the effective performance of the ARVN when adequately supply

Just remember that the American quit Vietnam with out destroying the Ho Chi Minh Trail, without destroying the NVA, and fail to "discourage" the NVA despite the use of massive and often indiscriminate fire power.

The author completely ignores Vietnamese sources (both the communist and non_communist sources and High relevant people both side and focus only on American sources, probably because the author do not read and write Vietnamese nor does he keep up with new and pertinent sources from Vietnam and the Non-Communist Vietnamese sources. Imagine a doctoral student research and ignoring over 75 percent from relevant sources, would such research be accurate?

Had the author was a better research he should have known that recent sources from Bay Van (one of the wives of Le Duan, the actual leader of North Vietnam during the war against the Americans) and the BBC article "Lê Duẩn thắng Mỹ nhưng cái giá quá cao". Le Duan was determined to fight until over 90 per cent of all North Vietnamese would be dead (including children). The NVA consist of 11 percent of the total population of North Vietnam). The North also employed another 11 percent of the population to transport war materials to the south; this effort includes effort from people too young to fight like teenagers from the Thanh Nien Xung Phong. Also, most of the individuals in the North were also group into self-defense forces along with 400,000 Chinese troops and advisers.

Unless the U.S was willing to commit genocide and exterminate more than 90 percent of the people of North Vietnam, the war of attrition and the metrics collected for conducting such a war is useless.

Why did the U.S lose in Vietnam? The American lost because of their arrogance, stupidity, bigotry and the over confidence in fire power. The Americans know nothing about their enemy, about the capability of their enemy and the support from the Communist blocks. The Americans have no clue about themselves and their capability; they have no idea how the American public would react as American casualties mount. By the time Nixon became president, the Americans only want to give the South Vietnamese enough materials fight hold off the NVA so that the American had time to run away from Vietnam in "honor." Naturally, after "American honor" was satisfied, the fate of South Vietnam Laos and Kampuchea was no longer in doubt.

Not understand themselves, not understanding their enemy and thinking that fire power can resolve a lack strategy. All of these reasons caused the American to lose the war in Vietnam. Until most American historian and the politician truly understand why they lost the war in Vietnam, the mistakes made in Vietnam will repeat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

4 people found this helpful

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Chieflong

Mostly about information processing

June 18, 2013

Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase

This book covers the inability of military and government officials to assess the situation (winning or losing) in Vietnam. OK for statisticians--not so much for history buffs. After awhile, it gets repetitious, as there are continuing references to the same problems.

4 people found this helpful

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Zachary

Outstanding

March 17, 2013

Format: Kindle EditionVerified Purchase

An excellent book that covers the Army program in Vietnam. Covers much of the war outside of metrics to check effectiveness including Project 100,000. Great big picture read.

3 people found this helpful

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Christian Potholm

"There is more to winning than counting"

November 19, 2017

Format: Hardcover

Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (London: Oxford University Press, 2011). Carefully examines the process by which the Pentagon tried to measure success or failure in Vietnam, concluding that the metrics used (such as body counts or tons of rice seized) were not as accurate as some not used (as to how many village leaders slept in the villages they claimed were “secure”). The author concludes the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) employed and collected vast amounts of statistics, but improper analysis of those statistics and “intellectual rigidity” hurt the enterprise. He also observes rather wryly that “…there is more to winning than counting.”

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No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War 1st Edition