In February, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met with Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, to discuss a topic that, even a year earlier, would have been considered a pipe dream: reunification of East and West Germany. Gorbachev, a staunch Communist but also a naïve idealist whose grip on power was slipping, was willing to discuss German reunification but had one principal concern. If the USSR agreed to reunification of Germany, would NATO expand and post troops or station nuclear weapons in this former Soviet sphere of influence? Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain: what if, in return for the USSR agreeing to German unification, NATO would agree “not [to] shift one inch eastward from its present position?”
President George H.W. Bush disagreed with and quickly sought to disown and deemphasize Baker’s suggestion, and U.S. negotiators took pains not to recognize it as an explicit condition of German reunification. In return for a massive economic assistance package from West Germany, the USSR agreed to German reunification, removing hundreds of thousands of its troops from East Germany. The vaguely-worded German reunification agreement did not make it clear that NATO could never expand. But Gorbachev and other Soviet officials later claimed they agreed to reunification based on an understanding that NATO would not expand.
In late 1991, Gorbachev completely lost control as the USSR suddenly collapsed and dissolved, breaking up into its constituent parts including Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Boris Yeltsin, an alcoholic populist and non-Communist, was elected president of Russia. He forged a close friendship with U.S. President Bill Clinton and helped usher in a remarkable era of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. The two countries reduced stockpiles of nuclear weapons, “de-targeted” ballistic missiles aimed at each other’s cities, and sent troops to serve alongside each other in a Bosnian peace-keeping mission. A primary U.S. goal at this time was persuading former Warsaw Pact and USSR territories—including Ukraine—to return tens of thousands of nuclear weapons to Russia, to prevent de facto creation of a dozen new nuclear nations and prevent sale of weapons on the black market. The U.S. engaged in considerable arm-twisting to persuade Ukraine to return thousands of nuclear weapons to Russia, assuaging Ukrainian concerns about future Russian aggression by agreeing to help preserve (but not “guaranty”) Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
That era of U.S./Russian cooperation is only a distant memory today as the U.S. and Russia seem close to war in the wake of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. In her detailed and informative book, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate, M. E. Sarotte, who teaches at John Hopkins and serves on the Council on Foreign Relations, analyzes the missteps and missed opportunities that led to the collapse of relations between the U.S. and Russia.
With the demise of the USSR, over a dozen countries and territories in Central and Eastern Europe that had suffered under Soviet or Russian domination suddenly won independence. They immediately began clamoring for admission into NATO, to obtain the benefit of its Article-5 protection before the “bad bear” of Russian imperialism had a chance to re-emerge. Yeltsin did not help calm fears when he invaded Chechnya, where Russian troops committed atrocities similar to those inflicted on Ukrainians today. The Clinton administration initially prioritized good relations with Russia and the opportunity for historic reductions in the countries’ nuclear arms. But with the collapse of the USSR, members of the U.S. state and foreign service departments (along with counterparts in other NATO countries) saw another historic opportunity—to expand NATO into former Warsaw Pact countries and protect them from future Russian imperialism.
Despite fierce opposition from a Russia too weak at the time to stop it from happening, in 1996 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join NATO. Soon thereafter, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to seek membership. This shifted the old Cold War dividing line many Russians viewed as an important buffer zone (won at great cost in the Second World War) against possible future invasions like those of Napoleon and Hitler—to the borders of Russia. These Russian leaders—who included a former mid-level KGB agent named Vladimir Putin—were resentful and felt the West had taken advantage of Russia in a time of economic and military weakness. “[O]ne day,” warned French President Jacques Chirac, “there will be dangerous nationalist backlash.” British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind warned of another potential problem: “[O]ne should not enter into solemn treaty obligations involving a potential declaration of war . . . based simply on an assumption that one would never be called upon to honor such obligations.”
On the other hand, those who supported NATO's quick expansion might argue that Russia's actions in Ukraine entirely justifies that expansion.
In any event, this is an excellent read for anyone interested in the detailed history of how the current Ukrainian crisis arose.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Follow the authors
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.
Book recommendations, author interviews, editors' picks, and more. Read it now.
Great on Kindle
Great Experience. Great Value.
Putting our best book forward
Each Great on Kindle book offers a great reading experience, at a better value than print to keep your wallet happy.
Explore your book, then jump right back to where you left off with Page Flip.
View high quality images that let you zoom in to take a closer look.
Enjoy features only possible in digital – start reading right away, carry your library with you, adjust the font, create shareable notes and highlights, and more.
Discover additional details about the events, people, and places in your book, with Wikipedia integration.
Get the free Kindle app: 
Enjoy a great reading experience when you buy the Kindle edition of this book. Learn more about Great on Kindle, available in select categories.
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
- The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet UnionPaperback$13.89 shippingOnly 14 left in stock (more on the way).
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews. Please reload the page.
- Reviewed in the United States on May 4, 2022
- Reviewed in the United States on March 29, 2025
- Reviewed in the United States on February 24, 2023
- Reviewed in the United States on September 30, 2022
Top reviews from other countries
-
- MillanReviewed in the United Kingdom on April 23, 2022
Insightful research on 1990s relationship of the West with Russia
- URKReviewed in Canada on March 28, 2023
Please read you will learn more than you imagine you could
- Paradesi K.YarikipatiReviewed in India on September 22, 2023
How Gorbachev cheated by the West
-
