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Colonel Harry G Summers Jr has written a very important critique of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Written originally as a study of the war for the US Army War College Colonel Summers' work was an instant success in the military as well as with the general public.
First published in 1982 this book makes clear that the outcome of the war had nothing to do with the fighting ability of the US military. Colonel Summers says, “On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable. In engagement after engagement the forces of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged victorious. How could we have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably? That disturbing question was the reason for this book.” (p 1) The Army was attempting to come to terms with the defeat in Vietnam.
Early on in the book the author makes clear that the answer to the question is “a failure in strategic military doctrine.” (p 89) The entire book (the text, excluding the appendix, is only 194 pages) is a close examination of the principles of war and how the US Army failed to apply them. As a framework for the critical analysis of the war Colonel Summers uses the principles of war set down by Carl von Clausewitz. Colonel Summers also examines those principles as set down in the US Army field manuals, the texts used by the Army to craft strategy and tactics.
Colonel Summers’ central tenant is “We thought we were pursuing a new strategy called counterinsurgency, but actually we were pursuing a defensive strategy in pursuit of a negative aim [counterinsurgency].” (p 88) “Basic to the success of a strategic defensive in pursuit of the negative aim…is the assumption that time is on your side.” (p 89) But time was not on the side of the US. The clock would run out in 1968.
The author’s central argument is that the Communist insurgency was an economy of force tactic and not the main effort of the North Vietnamese. To support this Colonel Summers notes that after Tet the Viet Cong insurgency was all but destroyed yet the war continued. He also notes that of the three occasions when the North Vietnamese decided the time was ripe to finish the South Vietnamese Army and Government they relied on NVA formations. Of course only one of those efforts was successful, the one in 1975.
This is a very brief overview of what Colonel Summers has to say about the war. He has much more to offer and it is all extremely compelling and very readable. Anyone interested in what the hell happened in Vietnam should read this book. Although it is not necessary I think the reader would get the most form this book if the reader has a working knowledge of the War.
- Series: Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
- Paperback: 240 pages
- Publisher: Presidio Press; Reissue edition (June 1, 1995)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0891415637
- ISBN-13: 978-0891415633
- Product Dimensions: 5.4 x 0.5 x 8.2 inches
- Shipping Weight: 9.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
- Customer Reviews: 60 customer reviews
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Amazon Best Sellers Rank:
#616,437 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1337 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- #710 in Southeast Asia History
- #1349 in Vietnam War History (Books)
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