Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
Other Sellers on Amazon
+ $3.99 shipping
+ $3.99 shipping
The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 Hardcover – June 20, 2006
|New from||Used from|
See the Best Books of 2018 So Far
Looking for something great to read? Browse our editors' picks for the best books of the year so far in fiction, nonfiction, mysteries, children's books, and much more.
From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. In this troubling portrait of the war on terror, America's intelligence agencies confront not just al-Qaeda but the Bush administration's politicized incompetence. Journalist Suskind (The Price of Loyalty) follows the triumphs and failures of the "invisibles"—the counterterrorism experts at the NSA, the FBI and especially the CIA—as they painstakingly track terrorists' communications and financial transactions, interrogate prisoners and cultivate elusive al-Qaeda informants. Unfortunately, he contends, their meticulous intelligence-sifting went unappreciated by administration policymakers, especially Dick Cheney, who formulated an overriding "one percent" doctrine: threats with even a 1% likelihood must be treated as certainties. The result was "the severing of fact-based analysis from forceful response," most glaringly in the trumped-up alarm over Iraqi WMDs. In dramatizing the tensions between CIA professionals and White House ideologues, Suskind makes his sympathies clear: CIA chief George Tenet, pressured to align intelligence with administration policy, emerges as a tragic fall guy, while President Bush comes off as a dunce and a bully, likened by some observers to a ventriloquist's dummy on Cheney's knee. Suskind's novelistic scene-setting—"Condi looked up, impatiently"—sometimes meanders. But he assembles perhaps the most detailed, revealing account yet of American counterterrorism efforts and a hard-hitting critique of their direction. (June 20)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
From The New Yorker
In November, 2001, Suskind writes, Vice-President Dick Cheney announced that if there was "a one percent chance" that a threat was real "we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response." He added, "It's not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence." This view of a White House dangerously indifferent to facts is familiar from, among other sources, Suskind's "The Price of Loyalty," but he adds much here that is disconcerting, particularly regarding the embrace of torture. (It's hard to shake the image of Bush asking, literally, for Ayman al-Zawahiri's head, which the C.I.A. briefly thought it had found in a riverbed in Afghanistan.) Suskind, whose main source seems to be the former C.I.A. director George Tenet (to whom he is very kind), has made news with revelations about Western Union's coöperation with the C.I.A. and about a plan to release cyanide gas in subways, although it's not clear that this threat was more real than other phantom! s the White House chased.
Copyright © 2006 The New Yorker
Top customer reviews
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
All a fantasy. A strong Justification for the invasion: Saddam Hussein "did not admit to having WMD", therefore he was lying and an invasion would prove it. Bush's daily prayers and strong connection to Infinite Wisdom (the Higher Power he listens to) didn't uncover any truths.
That gobblydegook, was mixed in a bubbling cauldron together with "concepts" such as known unknowns, and a bunch of other hooey. Together with the idea that the electorate and most of the administration outside the inner circle did not need to be truthfully and/or fully informed, was the road to hell, albeit not evidently paved with good intentions.
So all in all thoroughly worth reading.
I was a bit taken aback by the old thinking on Lockerbie, which I thought most of the intelligence community had moved away from somewhat, and as usual there was no mention of Lindauer or Dr Fuisz which was a shame, given the topics being discussed.
Am now moving onto Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency, which is a good companion volume.
Suskind demonstrates empathy toward people at the pinnacle of power in the U.S. at the time. The President came to office without the experience normally expected for the position, and he had the most experienced Vice-President in our history. The two were able to work together to advance the one percent doctrine established before the war by Cheney. The doctrine held that if there was one percent chance of a certain threat, policy would have to be based on the idea that the threat was certain (one hundred percent). The intention was to be extra safe, to err in the strongest terms on the side of caution regarding national security.
Suskind shows how the Cheney Doctrine must have been the lynchpin for the policy that followed. Using this view, we can make some sense of the disregard for analysis, particularly intelligence analysis. Response was therefore the first thing to get right, and that in turn had to shape the intelligence, which followed. The importance of ideology and its precedence over independently produced information and analysis presented problems and opportunities for other officials. In particular, the National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA had to comply with the Doctrine.
While reading this book, I felt as if watching a slow train wreck and sharing in the helplessness to stop it. It seemed unfair to the citizens of the country to experience such self-inflicted wounds on top of the wounds that were inflicted upon us. At the same time there is no one person responsible for the resulting failures. At times I imagined "what if" scenarios that could have averted disaster. Years later this book by Suskind opens up wounds.
Most recent customer reviews
I enjoyed Suskind's O'Neill book and was looking forward to this one; I also enjoy...Read more