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The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution Kindle Edition
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A landmark history of the origins of modern democratic societies by one of our most important political thinkers.
A New York Times Notable Book for 2011
A Globe and Mail Best Books of the Year 2011 Title
A Kirkus Reviews Best Nonfiction of 2011 title
Virtually all human societies were once organized tribally, yet over time most developed new political institutions which included a central state that could keep the peace and uniform laws that applied to all citizens. Some went on to create governments that were accountable to their constituents. We take these institutions for granted, but they are absent or are unable to perform in many of today's developing countries—with often disastrous consequences for the rest of the world.
Francis Fukuyama, author of the bestselling The End of History and the Last Man and one of our most important political thinkers, provides a sweeping account of how today's basic political institutions developed. The first of a major two-volume work, The Origins of Political Order begins with politics among our primate ancestors and follows the story through the emergence of tribal societies, the growth of the first modern state in China, the beginning of the rule of law in India and the Middle East, and the development of political accountability in Europe up until the eve of the French Revolution.
Drawing on a vast body of knowledge—history, evolutionary biology, archaeology, and economics—Fukuyama has produced a brilliant, provocative work that offers fresh insights on the origins of democratic societies and raises essential questions about the nature of politics and its discontents.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherFarrar, Straus and Giroux
- Publication dateApril 12, 2011
- File size2179 KB
- The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution1
Kindle Edition$12.99$12.99
Editorial Reviews
Review
“In many respects, Fukuyama is an ideal guide for this enormous undertaking. He combines a deep expertise in political institutions with an impressive familiarity of world history, philosophy and social theory. An engaging writer, his prose crackles with sharp observations and illuminating comparisons, and the book marshals a breathtaking array of stimulating facts and provocative generalizations. Who knew, for instance, that the tsetse fly retarded the spread of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa? Simply as a compendium of fascinating minutiae and social science theory, the book offers a treasure trove to the casual student of political history. More important, Fukuyama's book can help us appreciate why so many countries fail to combine the strong institutions, rule of law and accountability that are the hallmark of peaceful and prosperous nations.” —Eric Oliver, San Francisco Chronicle
“Fukuyama’s intellectual instincts hard-wire him into the most geopolitically stra...About the Author
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He has previously taught at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and at the George Mason University School of Public Policy. He was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served as the deputy director in the State Department's policy planning staff. He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, Trust, and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. He lives with his wife in California.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.From Publishers Weekly
(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Booklist
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
PART ONEBefore the State1THE NECESSITY OF POLITICSThe third wave of democratization and contemporary anxieties about the future of contemporary liberal democracy; how both the Left and the Right entertain fantasies about the abolition of government; how contemporary developing countries represent the fulfillment of these fantasies; how we take institutions for granted but in fact have no idea where they come fromDuring the forty-year period from 1970 to 2010, there was an enormous upsurge in the number of democracies around the world. In 1973, only 45 of the world's 151 countries were counted as "free" by Freedom House, a nongovernmental organization that produces quantitative measures of civil and political rights for countries around the world.1 That year, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were dictatorships; the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites looked like strong and cohesive societies; China was caught up in Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution; Africa saw the consolidation of rule by a group of corrupt "presidents for life"; and most of Latin America had fallen under military dictatorship. The following generation saw momentous political change, with democracies and market-oriented economies spreading in virtually every part of the world except for the Arab Middle East. By the late 1990s, some 120 countries around the world--more than 60 percent of the world's independent states--had become electoral democracies.2 This transformation was Samuel Huntington's third wave of democratization; liberal democracy as the default form of government became part of the accepted political landscape at the beginning of the twenty-first century.3Underlying these changes in political systems was a massive social transformation as well. The shift to democracy was a result of millions of formerly passive individuals around the world organizing themselves and participating in the political life of their societies. This social mobilizationwas driven by a host of factors: greatly expanded access to education that made people more aware of themselves and the political world around them; information technology, which facilitated the rapid spread of ideas and knowledge; cheap travel and communications that allowed people to vote with their feet if they didn't like their government; and greater prosperity, which induced people to demand better protection of their rights.The third wave crested after the late 1990s, however, and a "democratic recession" emerged in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Approximately one in five countries that had been part of the third wave either reverted to authoritarianism or saw a significant erosion of democratic institutions.4 Freedom House noted that 2009 marked the fourth consecutive year in which freedom had declined around the world, the first time this had happened since it established its measures of freedom in 1973.5POLITICAL ANXIETIESAt the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, malaise in the democratic world took several distinct forms. The first was the outright reversal of democratic gains that had occurred in countries such as Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, where elected leaders were busy dismantling democratic institutions by manipulating elections, closing down or buying independent TV and newspaper outlets, and clamping down on opposition activities. Liberal democracy is more than majority voting in elections; it is a complex set of institutions that restrain and regularize the exercise of power through law and a system of checks and balances. In many countries, official acceptance of democratic legitimacy was accompanied by the systematic removal of checks on executive power and the erosion of the rule of law.In other cases, countries that seemed to be making a transition from authoritarian government got stuck in what the analyst Thomas Carothers has labeled a "gray zone," where they were neither fully authoritarian nor meaningfully democratic.6 Many successor states to the former Soviet Union, like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, found themselves in this situation. There had been a broad assumption in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that virtually all countries were transitioning to democracy and that failures of democratic practice would be overcome with the simple passage of time. Carothers pointed out that this"transition paradigm" was an unwarranted assumption and that many authoritarian elites had no interest in implementing democratic institutions that would dilute their power.A third category of concern has to do not with the failure of political systems to become or remain democratic but rather their failure to deliver the basic services that people demand from their governments. The mere fact that a country has democratic institutions tells us very little about whether it is well or badly governed. This failure to deliver on the promise of democracy poses what is perhaps the greatest challenge to the legitimacy of such political systems.An example of this was Ukraine. Ukraine surprised the world in 2004 when tens of thousands of people turned up in Kiev's Maidan Square to protest manipulation of that country's presidential election. These protests, which came to be known as the Orange Revolution, triggered a new election and the rise of the reformer Viktor Yushchenko as president. Once in power, however, the Orange Coalition proved utterly feckless, and Yushchenko himself disappointed the hopes of those who supported him. The government quarreled internally, failed to deal with Ukraine's serious corruption problem, and presided over a meltdown of the economy during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The result was the election in early 2010 of Viktor Yanukovich, the very man accused of stealing the 2004 election that had triggered the Orange Revolution in the first place.Many other species of governance failure plague democratic countries. It is well understood that Latin America has the highest level of economic inequality of any region in the world, in which class hierarchies often correspond to racial and ethnic ones. The rise of populist leaders like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia is less a cause of instability than a symptom of that inequality and the feeling of social exclusion felt by many who are nominally citizens. Persistent poverty often breeds other kinds of social dysfunctions, like gangs, narcotrafficking, and a general feeling of insecurity on the part of ordinary people. In Colombia, Mexico, and El Salvador, organized criminality threatens the state itself and its basic institutions, and the failure to deal effectively with these problems has undermined the legitimacy of democracy.India, to take another example, has been a remarkably successful democracy since its independence in 1947--an achievement all the more remarkable given its poverty, ethnic and religious diversity, and enormous size. (Why a longer historical view of Indian political development shouldlessen our surprise is the subject of chapters 10-12.) Nonetheless, Indian democracy, like sausage making, looks less appealing the closer one gets to the process. Nearly one-third of Indian legislators, for example, are under some form of criminal indictment, some for serious crimes like murder and rape. Indian politicians often practice an overt form of patronage politics, in which votes are traded for political favors. The fractiousness of Indian democracy makes it very hard for the government to make major decisions on issues like investments in major infrastructure projects. And in many Indian cities, glittering high-tech centers of excellence exist next to African-style poverty.The apparent chaos and corruption of democratic politics in India has frequently been contrasted to the quick and efficient decision making of China. Chinese rulers are not constrained by either a rule of law or democratic accountability; if they want to build a huge dam, bulldoze neighborhoods to make way for highways or airports, or mount a rapid economic stimulus package, they can do so far more quickly than democratic India.A fourth broad source of political anxiety concerns the economy. Modern global capitalism has proved to be productive and wealth-creating beyond the dreams of anyone living before the year 1800. In the period following the oil crises of the 1970s, the size of the world economy almost quadrupled,7 and Asia, based on its openness to trade and investment, saw much of its population join the developed world. But global capitalism has not found a way to avoid high levels of volatility, particularly in the financial sector. Global economic growth has been plagued by periodic financial crises, striking Europe in the early 1990s, Asia in 1997-1998, Russia and Brazil in 1998-1999, and Argentina in 2001. This instability culminated, perhaps with poetic justice, in the great crisis that struck the United States, the home of global capitalism, in 2008-2009. Free markets are necessary to promote long-term growth, but they are not self-regulating, particularly when it comes to banks and other large financial institutions. The system's instability is a reflection of what is ultimately a political failure, that is, the failure to provide sufficient regulatory oversight both at a national and an international level.8The cumulative effect of these economic crises has not necessarily been to undermine confidence in market-based economics and globalization as engines of economic growth. China, India, Brazil, and any number of other so-called emerging market countries continue to perform well economically based on their participation in global capitalism. But it is clear that thepolitical job of finding the right regulatory mechanisms to tame capitalism's volatility have not yet been found.POLITICAL DECAY</d... --This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
Product details
- ASIN : B00457X7VI
- Publisher : Farrar, Straus and Giroux (April 12, 2011)
- Publication date : April 12, 2011
- Language : English
- File size : 2179 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
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- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 620 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #111,168 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
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About the author

Francis Fukuyama is Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, and Mosbacher DIrector of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
Dr. Fukuyama has writtenon questions concerning governance, democratization, and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man, was published by Free Press in 1992 and has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His most recent books are The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, and Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. His book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment will be published in Septmer 2018.
Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation from 1979-1980, then again from 1983-89, and from 1995-96. In 1981-82 and in 1989 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State, and was a member of the US delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004.
Francis Fukuyama is married to Laura Holmgren and lives in Palo Alto, California.
March 2018
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For Huntington, whether a country is a capitalist democracy or a communist dictatorship is far less crucial than whether or not it has a government that is actually capable of governing -- i.e. maintaining law and order, insuring peace and security, and providing essential public goods and services. As he saw it, the problem with many countries in the developing world is not that they have the wrong system of government, but that they barely have any government at all. The first order of business for political development has to be building a state that is strong enough to govern, and stable enough to withstand political conflict, economic crisis, and social upheaval without collapsing. Once a strong, stable state is in place, the administration of that state needs to be professionalized and purged of corruption and cronyism. Only then should we worry about what specific form of government that state has. Perhaps the worst mistake we can make when dealing with developing countries is to prematurely push them towards holding free elections -- which are almost always destabilizing -- before they have even established basic political order within their societies. This is a recipe for chaos. (And, despite Huntington's warning, we are still making this same mistake today in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine.)
In 2011, political scientist Francis Fukuyama, a former student, colleague, and friend of Samuel Huntington, published a new book dedicated to his late mentor. Fukuyama is best known for his 1992 book, "The End of History and the Last Man", which explored what the end of communism had to teach us about political development and the spread of liberal democracy. More recently, he has become a noted critic of neoconservatism, a political philosophy he had supported before the Iraq War, but which he abandoned once it became clear that the neoconservative foreign policy of the Bush administration was a complete disaster. But in his most recent book, Fukuyama returns to the topic of political development, giving an updated follow-up to Huntington's classic text on the subject.
Fukuyama's goal in "The Origins of Political Order" is to lay the foundations for a theory of political development that is able to explain where political institutions come from, how they develop, which institutions are necessary for good governance, and why some countries have those institutions while others do not. As far as I'm concerned, Fukuyama achieves this goal quite admirably. This book is a worthy successor to "Political Order in Changing Societies", and should be required reading for students of comparative politics. In fact, I think Fukuyama has written the definitive text on political development. I'm not suggesting that political science students ought to stop reading Huntington -- his insights are still important -- but, in my opinion, Fukuyama's contributions to the field surpass those of his former teacher. This book should be incorporated into the standard political science curriculum as quickly as possible.
So, what insights does Fukuyama bring to the study of political development? First, he argues (persuasively, in my opinion) that a society needs three very distinct things if it is to be well governed: First, a strong state. Second, the rule of law. And third, political accountability. As Huntington noted back in 1968, if a state can't govern the territory it is supposed to be sovereign over -- if it can't enforce laws, maintain order, settle disputes, defend the borders, put down attempted coups and insurrections, collect taxes, provide public goods and services, manage public works projects, etc. -- it doesn't really matter whether it is democratic or authoritarian: it will be unable to protect and serve its citizens, leaving them vulnerable to violence, deprivation, and exploitation. Contrary to anarchist and libertarian fantasies, keeping the government weak will not safeguard the freedom of ordinary citizens. In fact, quite the opposite. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the "state of nature" abhors a power vacuum. If government officials aren't able to exercise control over a given territory, then someone else -- warlords, strongmen, street gangs, organized crime bosses, business interests, landowners, religious authorities, demagogues, factional leaders, tribal elders, local bigwigs, etc. -- certainly will; and they will do so in a way that advances their own parochial interests with little regard for the rights, liberties, or welfare of anyone outside their own favored in-group. So, the first thing a society needs in order to insure the wellbeing of its citizens is a strong state that is actually capable of exercising sovereign political power throughout a given territory.
But if a society has a strong state, what's to prevent that state from abusing its power and oppressing the people? That's where the other two requisites for good governance come in: the rule of law and political accountability. Without these two things, there's little to prevent a powerful state from becoming an abusive state. The rule of law means that the state can't simply exercise its power arbitrarily, but has to do everything in accordance with certain established rules and procedures. This places a much-needed check on the power of the state without leaving it too weak to govern. In modern times, the rule of law often takes the form of a (written or unwritten) constitution, and an independent judiciary with at least some power of judicial review. In pre-modern times, it often took the form of an organized religion with the self-proclaimed authority to speak on behalf of a power higher than the state, which upheld a body of sacred laws that even kings were obliged to obey. But, regardless of how the rule of law gets implemented in any particular society at any given point in time, the fundamental principle behind it is the same: The government is not above the law.
But the rule of law, by itself, might not be sufficient to insure that a strong state doesn't abuse its power. One additional thing is needed: political accountability. In other words, the government, and those entrusted to run it, must be held to account for how the power of the state is used. Abuses of power must be punished. Corrupt or incompetent officials must be removed from office. Bad laws must be repealed; ineffective policies changed; and attempts at government overreach halted. Nowadays, political accountability is often equated with electoral democracy: We vote our political leaders into office, and can vote them out if we don't like how they are doing their job. But, this is a very modern view of accountability. Democracy, as we think of it today, with universal adult suffrage, was essentially nonexistent before the 20th century. Different mechanisms of accountability were used in earlier times, when the elites of civil society, rather than the masses, were entrusted with the responsibility of keeping tabs on the government. But, regardless of what specific mechanisms are used, the important thing is that the government is held accountable for how it uses its power.
So, these three things are the key to a well-governed society: a strong state, the rule of law, and political accountability. Modern societies in the developed world are generally regarded as having all three. But, even today, there are many countries around the world that don't have all of these requisites for good governance: Some have two of the three; some have only one; and some have none. Why is this the case? Why are some societies less politically developed than others? That's what Francis Fukuyama spends most of this book trying to explain.
Using historical case studies from around the world, Fukuyama explores how states first arose out of tribal and feudal societies when neighboring tribes or fiefdoms were forced to unite under a single sovereign power so they could more effectively wage war against distant enemies; how organized religion gave us the concept of law, and established the principle that law ought to be seen as distinct from, and even superior to, the state; and how struggles between the state and independently powerful private interests (e.g. the aristocracy, the landed gentry, and the bourgeoisie) over issues such as taxation and the administration of justice led to the creation of strong parliaments with the authority to say "no" to kings. He also shows why this process didn't occur uniformly around the world: why strong states failed to emerge in places where the pressure to unite against foreign enemies was low; why the rule of law never took root in societies where there was no effective "separation of church and state"; and why political accountability is practically nonexistent in those countries where rulers were able to co-opt or suppress the most powerful private interests within their society.
The bulk of "The Origins of Political Order" is devoted to case studies demonstrating how political institutions originated in pre-modern times; but, in the final two chapters, Fukuyama summarizes his ideas about where our political institutions came from, and what this tells us about the course of political development. I won't try to recap the details of his theory here; but I will say that, at least in my view, it gives a convincing explanation of how we got our most important political institutions; and it does so while managing to avoid both the Scylla of historicism and the Charybdis of reductionism.
I should note that this book is only the first part of what is planned to be a two-volume set on political development. This first part focuses on the pre-modern era, which covers the period from prehistoric times up to the eve of the French Revolution. The second volume (still unfinished as of this writing) is supposed to pick up where this book leaves off, and examine political development in the modern era. If the second volume is even remotely as good as the first, then I can't wait to read it.
Fukuyama distinguishes three broad aspects to any developing political order. A coherent "territorial state" administered more or less uniformly across some geographic domain. To be a true state, the central power (however it emerges) must control, more rather than less, the administration of its domain. Next, the "rule of law" which at a minimum means that the central authority recognizes that there are some (perhaps not many) codified limits to its power especially concerning property (land) rights. Third comes "accountability" which can go upwards (people become accountable to the government) and downwards (government accountable to people). These are broad ideas. Rule of law need not be constitutional (for example) and accountability of the government to "the people" might include only the noble class and not literally everyone.
Cutting across Fukuyama's distinctions here are evolving groups within an evolving political order. There comes to be the king or other autocrat, some nobility (an elite class of one sort or another almost always land owners) and everyone else. Eventually the "everyone else" divides into skilled craftsmen, traders, professionals, a bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The non-peasant group he calls the "third estate". There is a lot of variation within each of these groups and Fukuyama covers many of those variations as they bear substantially on how the three aspects (state, law, accountability) come together or fail to do so in different circumstances. The circumstances are the most varied of all as one might expect. War or the threat of war, famine, geography, climate, economics, evolving religion, accidents of succession (the king dies without heirs) and technology all played their part.
Fukuyama begins with China which developed "true statehood" by 300 BC, far earlier than any other polity. This is not to say the first state lasted. There were many ups and downs, reversions to a more tribal form of social organization and the evolution of new states. While China developed true territorial states with meritocratic administrations earlier than anyone else, it has not, even today achieved a true rule of law nor top down accountability. He moves on from China to South Asia where India was next to develop state-like organization while religion in its case (Brahmanism) actually solidified class differences along the lines of earlier tribal organizations. Today India has all three components in its polity, but the state is weak having far to much of the strong tribe-like organization competing with it. I am oversimplifying here. I cannot do justice to Fukuyama's much more nuanced analysis in a short review.
Next he moves west and explores the emergence of Islamic polities and in particular the Ottomans who developed some of the strangest meritocratic institutions of all. Islam unified all classes in a religious sense, but it never managed to disentangle itself from secular institutions leaving this whole part of the world "caesaropapist" meaning that the head of the state is also the head of the religious order, though often there is a class of priests and scholars who are supposed to be consulted...
Lastly Fukuyama moves over to Europe where he focuses on France, Spain, England, Hungary, Russia, and the Nordic nations. In all of these countries the Catholic church had an enormous influence unifying law across all social classes and eventually separating from the early caesaropapist style into a true church separate from the true state that remained strong enough to impose rule of law (more or less) on kings. "More or less" usually because there were different balances between king, nobility, and all the others. Of these England, for historical and geographic reasons, had the best and earliest balance of all the various social forces leading to genuine rule of law and bi-directional accountability. Hungary had a version of the English Magna Carta, called the "Golden Bull". But the Magna Carta left in place a strong king and a balanced nobility, while the Golden Bull made the nobility so powerful that its vested interests eventually destroyed the state.
By contrast to Catholic France, Spain, and Orthodox Russia, the Reformation was largely responsible for the evolution of upward accountability in the Nordic region because to realize the Protestant principle, that every man should interpret the Bible for himself, everyone, even the peasants, were taught to read! This enabled the peasants to organize politically, something that did not happen anywhere else except England where it occurred for quite different reasons. Among other factors English peasants were allowed to escape the land and become part of the third estate in evolving cities because the king used them to balance the lords. By contrast France, Spain, and Russia blocked this evolution because their kings aligned themselves with the nobility against the peasantry.
In his second-to-last chapter Fukuyama summarizes how these various balances worked themselves out everywhere from China around to Europe. In the last chapter he briefly covers how the play of these forces changed following the industrial revolution and how present technology and modern economics comes to bear on them.
This is a long scholarly work with lots of references. Throughout Fukuyama writes in an easy style and colors the analysis with enough specifics to keep it interesting without becoming over bearing. I am looking forward to volume II.
Top reviews from other countries
El autor relata con todo detalle la evolución de las instituciones políticas desde el origen del hombre y procura tener una visión no sólo anglosajona sino que relata los casos de otros países como China, India, Francia, España, etc.
Sus afirmaciones y teorías me parecen convincentes, están bien explicadas y establece un marco mental de porque unos países funcionan y otros no. Creo que es una lectura complementaria imprescindible junto a la obra de -Why nations fail- de Robinson y Acemoglu.


