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A.J.P. Taylor

The Origins of The Second World War Paperback – April 1, 1996

by A.J.P. Taylor (Author)

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From influential British historian A.J.P. Taylor, a reprint of his influential text The Origins of the Second World War. Controversial for his thesis that Hitler was an opportunist with no thorough plan, The Origins of the Second World War is an extensive exploration of the international politics and foreign policy that lead up to the one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 20th century.

Published in 1961, The Origins of the Second World War is a classic of modern history. A.J.P. Taylor's years of research helped change the long-accepted view that Adolf Hitler had wanted and planned in detail for a war. With clear and relatable prose, Taylor depicts the diplomatic mistakes from both the Allied and Axis powers that lead to the outbreak of World War II. A groundbreaking work, The Origins of the Second World War "is an almost faultless masterpiece, perfectly proportioned, perfectly controlled" (The Observer).

Print length

320 pages
Language

English
Publisher

Simon & Schuster
Publication date

April 1, 1996
Dimensions

5.5 x 1 x 8.25 inches
ISBN-10

0684829479
ISBN-13

978-0684829470
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Editorial Reviews

Review

“This is an almost faultless masterpiece.” -- Sebastian Haffner ― The Observer

“The only English historian now writing who can bend the bow of Gibbon and Macaulay.” -- David Marquand ― The New Statesman

About the Author

A.J.P. Taylor, born Allan John Percivale Taylor in Lancashire, England in 1906, was a celebrated historian and journalist. He graduated from Oxford with first class honors in history in 1927. He served in the Home Guard during World War II and later became a history lecturer at several universities. He wrote several seminal texts on 19th and 20th century history, his most famous and controversial being The Origins of the Second World War, published in 1961. Along with writing books, Taylor also worked extensively in print and broadcast journalism. Married three times, he had six children. He died in 1990.

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Technical Details

Publisher

‎Simon & Schuster (April 1, 1996)

Language

‎English

Paperback

‎320 pages

ISBN-10

‎0684829479

ISBN-13

‎978-0684829470

Item Weight

‎13.9 ounces

Dimensions

‎5.5 x 1 x 8.25 inches

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Tommy Newtron

A very good history of WWII

Reviewed in the United States on November 6, 2019

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In today's blatantly propagandized world, where anti-Russian hysteria is being whipped up by cynical liars unable to accept responsibility for losing to a game show host, and history is being deliberately re-written and falsified by these filthy lying scum, this history is a breath of fresh air. Written by an actual historian and not a gang of spooks and marketeers and propagandists, this history gives a clear picture of the actuality of WWII, with erudition and a clear style.

Highly recommended. Read this and throw away your teevee. They don't call it programming for nothing.

21 people found this helpful

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Leonard J. Wilson

Fascinating Insights into the Strategic Thinking of WWII World Leaders

Reviewed in the United States on May 24, 2019

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The style is a bit dated (copy write was in 1961), but A.J.P. Taylor's Origins of the Second World War has some fascinating insights. Here are a couple:

1. In 1939, before Hitler invaded Poland, both the British-French and the Germans were seeking alliances or non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Union. When Britain and France pledged to defend Poland if it were attacked by Germany, Stalin realized that he had nothing to gain by an alliance/pact with Britain and France. Hitler would have to invade Poland to get to the Soviet Union, so Britain and France would already be fighting Hitler, even if they weren’t doing so on Stalin’s behalf. That realization made it wiser for Stalin to ditch the British & French and conclude his non-aggression pact with Hitler (including Hitler’s ceding half of Poland plus the Baltic states to the Soviets). This strategy gave the Soviet Union an actual pact with Hitler plus a de facto alliance with Britain & France (for all the good that did him when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union anyway).
2. Britain recognized that a major war in Europe would likely result in the rise of the primary winner, whether it was Germany or the Soviet Union, as the dominant power in central Europe. In either case, that rise would further diminish Britain’s status as a world major power, a status already diminished as a result of WWI. This fear of further diminishment explains, even if it does not justify, Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler up to the German attack on Poland in 1939. So much for “Peace in Our Time”.

14 people found this helpful

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Spineless Media

Did you know there was a FIRST World War???

Reviewed in the United States on April 21, 2020

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OK, I should make one thing clear right off the top: I KNOW that "II" means "2." I'm not some idiot who sees "World War II" and thinks "Wow, look at World War eye-eye." I get it. Having said that, I *don't* think it's obvious that "World War II" implies that there was a World War I. If anything, the addition of "II" makes it MORE confusing. Who's ever heard of a war getting a sequel? Was there a Prussian War II? Was there a Six Days War II: The Seventh Day? No! Because when a war is over, it's over. People are dead. If a war gets a sequel, IT MEANS THE WAR ISN'T OVER. It should just be called "World War: PHASE II" Maybe that's what's meant by "World War II?" But I've never heard anyone call it "the second phase of the World War." Maybe they should.

And that brings me to this book, which coherently and clearly makes the case that conflict known as "World War II" was in fact *a continuation* of the first World War. Now, the author doesn't go so far as to say that we shouldn't call it "World War II" but you can kinda tell that, if society would permit it, he'd be down. Perhaps he'll expand on this idea in his next book: The Origins of the Second World War: II.

5 people found this helpful

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Pilgrim

Another perspective on the world war against Germany

Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2020

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It is often said that history is written by the winners, and certainly such is the case with World Wars 1 and 2. At least for the second world war, there was a sense of public shame in Germany regarding Hitler and the events of his era, and memory of the Hitler era was understandably suppressed. Should Germans write a war history at this time, it would be meaningless and probably concur with everything written in the past by the “victors”. Yet, one cannot expect the English speaking world to write a fair and balanced history of the war. From the inception of the Great War (World War 1), the British masterminded propaganda regarding the Germans. Germans were painted as blood-thirsty savages that raped women and slaughtered babies, and who had absolutely no regard for human life, being brute beasts that lacked any form of dignity or humanity. The hypocrisy of the English was profound in painting the Germans as such, since their own lineage of Queens and Kings were of German origin, even resulting in them quietly changing their name from Saxe-Coburg and Gotha to that of Windsor. Their royalty was more proficient at speaking German than English. Oh well! This fact must be securely hidden and forgotten. Perfidious propaganda and defaming characterizations persisted well after both wars against the Germans. I was reading about the meeting of some British and German climbers high in the Himalayas in the 1970s, and a German noted to a Brit that the Brits were recently beaten by the Germans in their national sport of soccer, to which the Brit replied that they just beat the Germans twice in their national sport of war. This ignores the fact that the Brits had been in constant war for at least the past two centuries in their attempt to rule the world. Oh well again! This current book was written in the early 1960’s by a Brit that has gone against the standard line which started back then and persists. This book is not revisionist history since it was written soon after the end of WW2 and based entirely on documents made public and publicly available evidence.

AJP Taylor provides a slightly different type of history of the events leading up to WW2, in that it is history almost entirely spent in recounting the work of ambassadors and statesmen from England, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and other involved European countries. In this book, you are told what was said, and just as importantly what was not said in trying to negotiate a lasting peace. What is clear (but often vehemently denied) was that the second world war reallystarted in 1918/19 at the signing of the treaty of Versailles and was just a continuation of what we call the first world war. The British and French both eventually developed a sense that the treaty of Versailles was pathologically flawed, yet flailed at resolving how to undo this treaty as well as other treaties that were made in the interim before the world war resumed in 1939.

Taylor notes that we have abundant documents from Germany since they were left in the rubble after the war and used in the Nürnberg trials. He also notes that we don’t have that luxury of obtaining essential documents from the Soviet Union since they have kept to this day most of their records as secret. The British and French have been selective in what records they have allowed to be seen. Thus, there will remain an intrinsic bias to any account as to the cause of world war 2. Regardless, the unearthed German documents tell a much different story than the current party line as to why there was a continuation of the war into what we call world war 2.

It would be weary for me to recount on a chapter by chapter basis the reiteration of what was said so eloquently by AJP Taylor. But a summary of the main thesis is simple. It is clear that Versailles demanded another war. It is clear that there was massive ineptness on the part of ambassadors and their states in trying to resolve the slow unraveling of the Versailles treaty, which by this time was looked on dimly by all parties. Hindsight is a wretched curse on all of us, yet we can now see that the war could have been prevented or made far more limited would the British and French had not wished to maintain their illusion of their being the prevailing super-power in Europe and honestly sought for reconciliation of the bad decisions at Versailles. The Germans were accused of frequently lying to the Brits and French, though Taylor has been able to show that both sides maintained an equal wealth of lies in their statesmanship. Most importantly, it can be shown quite clearly that the Germans (and especially Hitler) did not have a plan to conquer Europe or the world, and for that matter, had no interest in going to war with either Great Britain or France. Most certainly, the records from Germany demonstrate quite adequately that much of what happened in the events of 1936-1939 was unplanned and happened off the cuff; they were not the demonstration of a well thought out over-arching plan to stepwise conquer Europe. That the teaching still exists that Hitler was some evil mastermind going by a well-crafted script is testimony of how people wish to retain their own narratives regardless of the factual content of those narratives.

I’ve been told that the above recounting of the origin of WW2 is only one man’s opinion, and the debate continues and will never be resolved. It seems strange that those who say that simply wish to deny the evidence out there, their thinking being cemented in place by the fictional narratives that have created both world wars. Other authors have supported the thesis of Taylor by writing of the grave errors in the statesmanship of the Germans, British and French, specifically referring to Patrick Buchanan (Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War). Unfortunately, because we refuse to see the past clearly, we most certainly will persist in our errors in the future. More world wars can be expected, and blame will be fixated on the vanquished, regardless of the actual facts.

2 people found this helpful

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Top reviews from other countries

Kevin Botting

The untold story

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 2, 2019

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AJP Taylor was the master of historical narrative. In this book he debunks the myth that Hitler's agenda controlled events across Europe from 1933 onwards, and reveals the German Fuhrer as an opportunist who grabbed those opportunities as they arose, and who was prepared to wait if such opportunities did not arise. For example, he initially wanted to first render Czechoslovakia a client state and then render Austria a client state. However, the chance course of events meant that Austria had to be tackled first, and at the very last minute he decided to incorporate Austria into Germany itself - very much a spontaneous decision. This pushed the Czech issue into second place and again, rather than it becoming the client state he sought he found the French and British pushing their "allies" into handing over Sudeten German lands - Hitler had not sought this, but of course was happy to receive it.
Much of the time Hitler was bluffing - he had no powerful army at this time in 1938 and could have easily been slapped down by the large French army, but the French were afraid of another European war and sought only to defend France.
The British had agreements with Hitler regarding naval quotas which maintained British maritime dominance so they were really not bothered with Central and Eastern Europe - in fact Hitler was seen as a bulwark against Soviet Russia.
What really comes across is how small-minded and colourless the inter-war politicians of Europe were - the two fascist dictators were able to bluff and bully them all from positions of considerable weakness. And even the dictators were small-minded men at heart who had learnt that being a braggart could make their idle daydreams come true.
The book reveals how Britain and France unintentionally steered Europe in the direction of war, and shows how they were in many ways trapped into pursuing events as they did, even if they appeared to make poor decisions - or no decisions at all. Yes, Europe drifted into war - far more than it did in 1914.

11 people found this helpful

Thomas Dunskus

In Germany, nobody wants to know …

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 14, 2015

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The reviewer who has read the book in the English Penguin edition of 1991 was surprised to note that while the book was translated into German soon after its first British edition some 50 years ago the Germans never seem to have given it much attention, in spite of the fact that what the author has to say about Germany is much more positive than historiography in general and German historiography in particular would have it.

By now, the book is some fifty years old and one wonders whether it is still an interesting read. In a foreword ("Second Thoughts") to the 1991 edition, the author takes up this question and does not significantly alter his views; on the subject of the 'Austrian Anschluss' of early 1938 (p. 8), he says: "the Austrian crisis was launched by Schuschnigg, not by Hitler" he muses about the German occupation of the Czech lands a year later (p. 9) and says that for many years he had been under the impression that Hacha, the president of Czechoslovakia had been ordered by Hitler to come to Berlin, whereas the files available at Prague document that the trip was undertaken at Hacha's initiative who was wondering what to do in the face of the obvious break-up of the country once Slovakia had claimed independence and unrest was brewing among the Hungarian and other minorities.

Taylor also raises the question why Hitler, if he did have the intention to secure living space in the East should go to war against Britain and France and discards the idea that Hitler was nothing but a power-hungry maniac. He rather considers Hitler to have been a politician who, whenever new situations arose, would rely on his instincts to profit from a given constellation.

The author is also sceptical as to the thesis that Hitler went out of his way to make war; he underlines the fact that the often-quoted "Hossbach-Protokoll" is a very weak basis for such a view and, materially speaking, a highly questionable document. Far from depicting Hitler as an angel of peace and judging him very harshly in his foreword, he does say that "in international affairs there was nothing wrong with Hitler except that he was a German".

The main portion of the book is devoted to the various phases of the inter-war period and describes the fate of the Treaty of Versailles and its long agony over the decade following its signature; he reviews the various stages of its demise, the conferences and agreements that could not prevent the Treaty from becoming a worthless piece of paper on account of its inherent contradictions and tensions which affected the signatories in various ways (including the former Allies among themselves). Here, Taylor shows that once Hitler had been brought into the Reich government, he toed the line of his predecessors as far Germany's foreign policy was concerned while, internally, turning the country itself upside down.

According to Taylor, Hitler never wanted a war in the West, his primary aim was a return in the East to the status after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the treaty which the victorious Central Powers had concluded with the nascent Soviet Union in 1917/18; for Taylor, anything beyond that is speculation. To reach his goal, Hitler employed two means, words and patience, and, for years, was succesful in his efforts.

The mid-1930s caused profound changes on the continent of Europe, the consequences of which the author - while not going so far as to make the British say "rather Hitler than Baldwin" - expresses as "rather Hitler than Stalin". He does, however, identify a feeling of "rather Hitler than Léon Blum" among the bourgeois (and catholic) French in the face of the successes of the "Front populaire" in 1936. Everybody knows that what happened in Spain was even more dramatic and menacing, since the Soviet Union, in this case, became involved in Western Europe for the first time.

The penultimate of the many crises of the 1930s affected Czechoslovakia, and here, too, the author does not identify any evil machinations by the Germans: the German chancellor simply made use of a situation in which that country, a shaky and articifial construct of Versailles, was bound to end up in, once the calls for the independence of its constituent ethnicities (not only the Sudeten Germans) had become louder and louder after the events in Austria.

The Munich conference attempted to consolidate what was left, but the country fell apart under its own weight over the following months, not least, because the Polish military invasion into and annexation of the Teschen area - without any reaction in the West - had shown that the country as such meant nothing to its erstwhile creators.

What Taylor does not mention in this connection (but which is mentioned in the memoirs, "Dernier Rapport", of Jozef Beck, the last Polish foreign minister) is that once the Sudeten lands had been tranferred to Germany, Poland approached the Reich on the subject of the Oderberg/Bohumin rail hub which was now German, asking for traffic rights. Hitler not only gave Poland such an authorization but ceded the whole region to Poland retaining only such traffic rights for Germany against payment of a fee.

Taylor's assessment of the British guarantee for Poland, given in early 1939 when the question of Danzig and the Polish Corridor became acute, is devastating: London gave Poland the unrestricted right to push Britain (and France) into a war with Germany (but not with the Soviet Union!) in the ludicrous expectation that Hitler would thus be more cautious than Chamberlain himself and that Stalin, too, would accept obvious disadvantages. Chamberlain had gone so far in this guarantee as to involve France as well, without ever consulting Paris - France had to follow suit, whether she wanted to or not.

Everything else now followed automatically: Poland refused any concessions and began harrassing her German minority, Hitler could hardly go back with respect to Danzig, and Europe slid into an abyss. The constellations became so absurd that Taylor is able to state that Hitler's diplomatic initiative launched on 29 August should have been launched the day before if war was to be avoided. On 1st September 1939 Europe crumbled, never really being able to reshape itself. Poland went under in three weeks of fighting although Taylor makes a point of saying (p. 267) that the state of Germany's armaments in 1939 proved that Hitler did not want a major war, if any war at all.

In view of such unorthodox opinions it is not surprising that Taylor, in post-war Germany, was regarded as a non-entity, for if influential circles in Germany had accepted his theses, the policy of the Allies after the war would have become unacceptable - be it the Nuremberg trials, the eradication of Prussia or the expropriation and expulsion of 12 Million Germans from their rightful lands. It is much easier for today's Germans to accomodate themselves to the status quo than to ask questions.

27 people found this helpful

TIM BLUE

An interesting read

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 1, 2021

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This book must have raised quite a few eyebrows when it was first published in 1961. It challenged the widely held view that just about everything was Germany's fault (full stop). A.J.P. Taylor delved into the archives in order to get closer to the real facts. He shined a light on some of the talks held behind the scenes and the diplomatic blunders committed by all sides. However, I can't help thinking that the author left quite a few stones unturned and didn't relate the whole story. I believe that we're still waiting for the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth to be told ... ... ... It was still an interesting read, despite the shortcomings.

2 people found this helpful

Davies

annoying, contradictory

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 2, 2017

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This is a dense ('factually'), annoying, contradictory, idiosyncratic, challenging and often quite ridiculous read, that keeps you on your toes.
I didn't commence to read this book critically, but in the light of the rave reviews, I didn't expect 'raving'. No doubt in 1961 (when published), this book created a sensation. Now??
AJP seems to have started with a thesis, and sets out to prove it. He puts forth an analysis, & then uses his own analysis or views to prove it.I think he fell in love with controversy for its own sake, sometimes with jaw-dropping results.
A central theory, Hitler didn't long term plan, he waited for circumstances and events to come to him (AJP is not kind to other historians eg A Bullock re long term plans). These 'circumstances' are a little freely interpreted, but AJP accepts that Hitler's ambition was mastery of Europe (possibly the world). Eggs and omelettes come to mind. Is the cause more important than the result? perhaps so, but. Besides which, his Army/LW always seems to be ready to a planned schedule/date of action, well in advance.
There are a few inaccuracies, due to post-1961 information? They do however throw doubt on some of the rest of the text.
This book is still provides an interesting angle worthy of perusal.
Controversy is useful, it challenges pre-conceptions.

7 people found this helpful

J. J. Bradshaw

Perhaps Taylor's most controversial work, a book which should not be ignored

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 2, 2014

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Taylor was perhaps the first celebrity historian and in his lifetime was known to a huge audience. This was as much because of his communication skills and an awareness of how to present himself as for his gifts as a historian, prodigious though these gifts were. He had an uncanny ability to present complex arguments in a way which allowed a general audience to understand the arguments and a wonderful literary style which was very tight, fluid and concise or what might be called very readable. Taylor was passionate that the word history included "story" and that his books should present this story in a way which encouraged people to read it. That another highly regarded historian could write a biography of him entitled "Troublemaker" in itself is a good indicator of his impact as a historian and also his ready willingness to court controversey. This book remains controversial even today, over half a century after it was published and even those who criticise the book would have to concede that it has left a lasting impact.
Taylor's essential argument is that the fundamental issue was the position of Germany within Europe and how the other powers of Europe would accomodate this. Starting with the defeat of Germany in 1918 and the settlement of Versailles the book moves through the Weimar Republic, hyper inflation, the diplomacy of Stresemann and the great economic depression before examining the role of Hitler. This sets a context which is essential and often ignored as whilst Hitler's methods and beliefs on issues such as anti-semitism were clearly appalling his determination to restore Germany to the position of being a great power and to reverse the settlement of Versailles were no more than a continuation of those who had gone before and were certainly not the policies of a lunatic fringe bent on war. Once Germany was restored as a great power then it was almost inevitable that the existing order of Europe would have to be revised with Germany again developing a dominant position over much of the continent. Taylor believed that whilst Hitler's methods were reprehensible, his ambitions to restore Germany to this position of dominance within Europe were both rational and consistent with German history. He upset many by his comments that Germany was no more wrong in pursuing such ambitions than other powers such as Britain and France were in denying them. At a time when the consensus of opinion was that Hitler was a demonic mad man who deliberately wanted war Taylor presented a human picture of a rational man who was an opportunist and who wanted the fruits of victory but who wanted to achieve these fruits without a great war. Many words have been written about the arguments around opportunism and planning, and in some ways this is an argument over nuances and what is understood by the word "plan". Taylor took a very narrow view that "plan" indicates something which has been worked out in detail, his critics have pointed towards various speeches, writings and diplomatic records to present these as plans. Tellingly, after the book was published the concept of consistent aims achieved through flexible means became widely accepted as a way of describing Hitler's career, which in effect is a way of reconciling both positions and recognising that whilst Hitler had a clear idea of what he wanted to achieve his execution was opportunistic. Perhaps one of Taylor's weaknesses was an adherence to official records, his insistence that for meetings to be considered as actal events that formally recorded, agreed and archived minutes were needed is questionable given the ad-hoc nature of Hitler's methods and his methods of giving subordinates broad outlines ideas to implement. There is a sense that Taylor should have been more receptive to less official records, although the flip side of this is that his adherence to a strict methodology did help to debunk records such as the Hossbach memorandum. His opinion that the record of German re-armament and economic policy shows that Hitler did not want a general war was lambasted at the time (it should be noted Taylor was not the only person to present such a view at the time, nor was he the first) yet it is inarguable that if Hitler was really determined to fight a great war then this is not supported by economic planning and armament. The German armed forces re-armed in breadth but not depth and this itself indicates that whilst Hitler may indeed have wanted short, sharp victorious limited wars he was not planning a general war against the great powers, at least not a war in 1939. He does appear to have dreamt of a war of conquest in the East and he greatly underestimated Soviet power, but he was hardly alone in either sense. Turning away from Hitler and Germany, Taylor stimulated a re-appraisal of appeasement and showed that far from being a small clique acting against public opinion that appeasement represented the consensus position and further courted controversey by presenting appeasement as considered and well intentioned efforts to avoid war. Hindsight has made appeasement a dirty word but those who attack appeasers should first consider the alternatives, was a European war really justified as a response to the Anschluss, or the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, or of Hitler's claims on behalf of ethnic German's in neighbouring countries when many in the rest of the world felf that these minorities had justified grievances?
The book maybe described as revisionist, but it could more accurately be described as one of the first attempts to step outside simplistic assumptions of war guilt and demonic representations of Hitler and to try to understand Hitler as a deeply unpleasant man who implemented the most appalling crimes against humanity yet who was (at least in the 1930's) a rational and considered human being who whilst possessing some hideous views such as his anti-semitism was also representative of a wider German tradition in foreign policy. I certainly would not advocate that this book be read in isolation or accepted without reading other views but the book cannot be ignored. Those who argue that Taylor was just being wilfully contrarian and causing mischief just to generate book sales do the book a huge disservice. The book made a lasting impression and one of the principal reasons it was so controversial was precisely because Taylor presented an argument that cannot just be dismissed lightly. He challenged perceptions and the book created a historical debate with lasting consequences (such as the shift towards a centrist idea of consistent aims achieved by flexible means to reconcile the arguments over opportunist vs. planner) and if nothing else made people re-think the causes of the second world war. Very highly recommended and quite simply an essential book for anybody with an interest in the subject.

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