In 1989, 10 years after invading Afghanistan, the last Soviet troops were pulled out under the terms of accords signed in Geneva. This book gives the inside story of the negotiations, with alternating chapters written by Diego Cordovez, the principal United Nations negotiator, and by Selig S. Harrison, an American specialist in Asian affairs. They tell of an opportunity for a constructive peace disastrously missed. The United States, holding all the cards, chose to oppose a Soviet offer of installing an interim regime headed by the deposed Afghan monarch, Zahir Shah, in favor of continuing to back their favored factions. In the game of superpower brinkmanship no attention was paid to the fact that those factions were Islamists fundamentally opposed to America.
The UN, represented largely by coauthor Cordovez, played an unprecedented mediatory role in the conflict between the superpowers over the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, prodding both Moscow and Washington to make concessions and supervising the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops. The authors' informative account?a major addition to the literature of modern diplomacy?reveals that the U.S. tried to prevent the emergence of a UN role in the impasse: "Blinded by its distrust of Moscow, Washington distrusted the UN as well." Could the withdrawal have occurred earlier than it did? It would seem so: Yuri Andropov's overtures toward negotiation during his 1982-84 tenure as Soviet leader were evidently serious; likewise, the Reagan administration was slow to recognize that military disengagement from Afghanistan was one of Mikhail Gorbachev's main objectives when he assumed power in 1985. The authors conclude this survey of the Soviet adventure and its resolution by explaining how the 1988 Geneva Accords, which ended the occupation, contributed to the great unraveling in 1991 by improving East-West relations. Cordovez, an Ecuadorian, served as undersecretary general for special political affairs at the UN; Harrison is a former foreign correspondent with the Washington Post.
Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Review
"The detailed account by Cordovez and harrison, both veteran participants in behind the scenes discussions of the war...details the factionalism in Moscow--and in Washington, between the 'bleeders' and the 'dealers' in the Reagan administration."--
The New Republic"Contrary to conventional wisdom propagated by the Western media...Cordovez and Harrison tell us that the Red Army was on the ground in Afghanistan when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw. After endless blunders on both the Soviet and American sides, and after six years of excruciatingly ticklish
diplomacy (authoritatively described here), negotiators found a way to secure a settlement. Cordovez's personal role in the dealings lends the book an inside perspective."--
The Washington Post Book World"This is probably the most comprehensive volume written about the events which might be considered a landmark in contemporary history."--
International Relations"The Harrison-Cordovez book represents a major contribution to our understanding of a crucial moment in the Cold War--the Soviet intervention and defeat in Afghanistan."--President Jimmy Carter
"This is a fascinating and important book, and for once a book that lives up to its title. With Diego Cordovez's key personal role, and Selig Harrison's background experience and research, this
is "the inside story" of the intricate, multifaceted diplomatic drama behind the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, and it presents a well-grounded account of the Soviet decisions to intervene and later to pull out as well."--Raymond L. Garthoff, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution and author of
The Great Transition: American Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War
From the Back Cover
Cordovez and Harrison provide the definitive account of the Soviet blunders that led up to the invasion and the bitter struggles over the withdrawal that raged in the Soviet and Afghan Communist parties and the Reagan Administration. The authors are particularly well-suited to their task: Cordovez was the United Nations mediator who negotiated the Soviet pullout, and Harrison is a leading South Asia expert with four decades of experience in covering Afghanistan. Their story of the U.N. negotiations is interwoven with a gripping chronicle of the war years, complete with palace shootouts in Kabul, turf warfare between rival Soviet intelligence agencies, and the C.I.A. role in building up Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla leaders at the expense of Afghan moderates. Cordovez opens up his diaries to take us behind the scenes in his negotiations, and Harrison draws on interviews with Mikhail Gorbachev, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and other key actors. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was one of the pivotal events of recent history. Out of Afghanistan destroys many of the myths surrounding the Afghan war and will have a profound impact on the emerging debate over how and why the Cold War ended.
About the Author
Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs of the United Nations from 1981 to 1988, Diego Cordovez was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating the Geneva Accords. Selig S. Harrison, a former Washington Post foreign correspondent and the author of five books about
Asia, is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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