The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm 1st Edition
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Robert F. Bruner
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Sean D. Carr
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Review
"The Panic of 1907 is a great tale, and I recommend it to any investor with an interest in history. I also recommend it to any investor who wants to understand what is happening right now." (Cliff Ransom, Ransom Research, Inc., October 31, 2008)
"There is a great book that came out last year, by Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, entitled The Panic of 1907. It details the fear that gripped the market during that time a century ago. Fear bred mistrust, and mistrust bred repeated runs on the bank. Only when J. Pierpont Morgan himself stepped in to assert authority in the crisis was confidence restored and the downward slide and expanding wave of panic halted. The events of that time are remarkably similar to what is occurring today." (Steven M. Davidoff, The Deal Professor, New York Times, September 18, 2008)
"...a great academic study, which was meant to be a warning. Instead, it reads like a description of what has just happened." (Financial Times)
"A dull textbook it's not: Most chapters amount to six or seven pages of storytelling with cliffhangers… entertaining read..." (Bloomberg News)
"…the definitive guide to the stock market panic of ‘07" (The TImes)
"an important read..." (thestreet.com)
"Bruner, dean of the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business, and Carr, director of the school's Batten Institute, tell the gripping tale of one of the worst financial panics in modern history, where greed and lack of liquidity (sound familiar, people?) dragged stocks down 37 percent." (U.S. News & World Report)
"When The Business Press Maven first cast his eye for business journalism onto business books, it was with the ultimate hope of familiarizing investors with historical insight, which is more common in books than what is demonstrated in newsrooms and trading floors--where yesterday's news and trades qualify as fixtures from a bygone era . . . . That is why I am going to grant The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm, a resounding "Help" label from The Business Press Maven, putting it in the probable running for Top 10 Business Press Maven Books of 2007. In case you still don't get it, this is very high praise." (Marek Fuchs, The Business Press Maven, TheStreet.com)
"This retelling of Morgan's bravura performance is a page-turning mix of high finance and high drama" (Barron's)
"…the definitive guide to the stock market panic of ‘07” (The Times, Thursday 13th September 2007)
"Well worth reading" (The Business, Saturday 15th September 2007)
"With this book as their guide, readers will take away important insights...developing a deeper understanding of financial markets" (What Investment?, November 2007)
"A very worthwhile book for advisors who, having just lived through a financial crisis of global implications, are casting about for a larger conceptual framework regarding such events." (Financial Advisor)
"Steering clear of the extremes, the authors dissect the ‘perfect storm’ that blew through the financial system in 1907 and identify seven elements that converge to cause financial crisis . . . Timely read." (The Hindu Business Line, October 19, 2007)
"a useful book on market contagion" (bloomberg.com, Wednesday 5th December 2007)
"Anyone who needs convincing that financial history is constantly repeating itself should pursue this timely tome." (Spear's Wealth & Management Survey, January 2008)
"My column today quotes from one of the most insightful books I have ever read, “The Panic of 1907.” When I read it last year, I thought it had lessons for today, but I did not realize just how quickly those lessons would become crucial." (Floyd Norris, New York Times)
"A very relevant read in today's subprime infested financial environment." (Gulf Business, February 2008)
"Bruner and Carr deliver more than just a good story." (Risk, February 2008)
"Robert Bruner and Sean Carr, both scholars from the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia, have written a very important book titled The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm.
The value of Bruner and Carr’s book is not only the detailed historical examination of the 1907 financial panic but the scholarly work they did in examining the financial panics that have occurred over the past one hundred years. It was by examining numerous panics that Bruner and Carr were able to develop an outline of how panics begin, spread, and how they are ultimately resolved." (Roger G. Hagstrom, Legg Mason Growth Trust, Investment Commentary and Quarterly Report to Shareholders, March 31, 2008)
From the Inside Flap
Why do markets crash and bank panics happen? Conventional wisdom has gathered, like iron filings, at two intellectual poles: at one extreme is a hodge-podge of idiosyncratic, period-specific causes and at the other is a host of all-encompassing "single bullet" theories. In The Panic of 1907, authors Robert Bruner and Sean Carr offer an alternate perspective through a detailed narrative of one of the worst crises in modern financial historyone which ultimately transformed the American financial system and resulted in the establishment of the modern Federal Reserve.
Drawing from rare source materials, Bruner and Carr take you day by day through the crisis in 1907, revealing what happened, why it matters, and what we can learn from it. Beginning with a catastrophic earthquake in San Francisco and culminating in the shocking suicide of the deposed president of one of New York's leading financial institutions, this book will draw you into the central issues surrounding the panic of 1907. Throughout this journey, you'll not only become familiar with the events of the crisis, but you'll also discover how larger-than-life figures, such as the inestimable J. Pierpont Morgan, took it upon themselves to provide leadershipand inspire confidenceat a time of great uncertainty and instability.
Filled with in-depth insights, The Panic of 1907 offers a deeper understanding of what influences financial marketsboth then and now. Through this engaging case study of the panic and crash, Bruner and Carr provide a useful framework for understanding these events, suggesting that major financial crises can be the result of a convergence of certain, unique forcesthe forces of the market's "perfect storm"that can cause investors to react with alarm.
When the many elements of the next financial storm converge, will you be ready? With The Panic of 1907 as your guide, you'll be prepared to assess, understand, and anticipate the factors that can lead to a crisis.
From the Back Cover
"Before reading The Panic of 1907, the year 1907 seemed like a long time ago and a different world. The authors, however, bring this story alive in a fast-moving book, and the reader sees how events of that time are very relevant for today's financial world. In spite of all of our advances, including a stronger monetary system and modern tools for managing risk, Bruner and Carr help us understand that we are not immune to a future crisis."
—Dwight B. Crane, Baker Foundation Professor, Harvard Business School
"Bruner and Carr provide a thorough, masterly, and highly readable account of the 1907 crisis and its management by the great private banker J. P. Morgan. Congress heeded the lessons of 1907, launching the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to prevent banking panics and foster financial stability. We still have financial problems. But because of 1907 and Morgan, a century later we have a respected central bank as well as greater confidence in our money and our banks than our great-grandparents had in theirs."
—Richard Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of the History of Financial Institutions and Markets, and Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University
"A fascinating portrayal of the events and personalities of the crisis and panic of 1907. Lessons learned and parallels to the present have great relevance. Crises and panics are as much a part of our future as our past."
—John Strangfeld, Vice Chairman, Prudential Financial
"Who would have thought that a hundred years after the Panic of 1907 so much remained to be written about it? Bruner and Carr break significant new ground because they are willing to do the heavy lifting of combing through massive archival material to identify and weave together important facts. Their book will be of interest not only to banking theorists and financial historians, but also to business school and economics students, for its rare ability to teach so clearly why and how a panic unfolds."
—Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business
About the Author
Sean D. Carr is the Director of Corporate Innovation Programs at the Darden School's Batten Institute, University of Virginia. His applied research in new ventures and corporate finance has been published in numerous award-winning case studies, books, and digital media. Previously, Carr spent a decade as a journalist, having served as a producer for both CNN and ABC News's World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. He holds a BA from Northwestern University, an MS from Columbia University, and an MBA from the University of Virginia.
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Product details
- Publisher : John Wiley and Sons; 1st edition (August 31, 2007)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 280 pages
- ISBN-10 : 047015263X
- ISBN-13 : 978-0470152638
- Item Weight : 1.04 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.3 x 1 x 9.3 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#834,016 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #855 in Business Finance
- #2,110 in Economic History (Books)
- #3,392 in United States History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
Customer reviews
Top reviews from the United States
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This was an easy and entertaining read. One gets a real sense of what a bank run feels like. A speculator in community banks goes insolvent, starts a run its primary creditor, and next thing you know you have panic spreading through the New Your banking system and, eventually, the nation at large. Many of the stories you may have heard in snippets throughout the blogosphere. It was a nice compilation of the stories in one place. The descriptions of what was going on in back rooms and at the teller windows was very entertaining. Of course, JP Morgan plays a prominent role (albeit painted in profoundly favorable light.)
The authors briefly touch upon theories put forth aggressively by Griffin in "Creature from Jekyll Island" that the panic was intentionally induced by the large banks to elicit formation of the Federal Reserve. Unlike Griffin, these authors seem less convinced. Reading the narrative, you cannot help but wonder why anyone would trigger this kind of risk and carnage. There is also a shortage of credit given (excuse the pun) to excessive credit causing the booms. No matter how many we have, we never seem to figure out that credit excess is deadly.
The author appears to have boxed and shipped the book right before the real panic occurred in 2008-09. It is entertaining to listen to his projections about potential future panics. He foresaw a hedge fund-induced collapse when, in fact, it really was the banks themselves with the hedge funds remaining largely intact. The only complaint I have is a tacit endorsement of centralized backstops in the form of central banks. This reviewer thinks the merits of the Federal Reserve are far more limited and debatable than implied by the authors. Overall, however, I have no regrets about reading the book.
As usual, I went and scanned a few Amazon reviews after completing my assessment, paying particular attention to those giving it a poor rating. One singles out the support of JP Morgan as excessive as well as the tendency toward shallow explanation of causes; I cannot disagree. Another focused on the shallow analysis of the credit cycle. Again, I cannot disagree. One condemned the book in the context of "Creature from Jekyll Island" which certainly was a more detailed analysis but not lacking in assertions requiring confirmation from independent sources.
As an aside, the number two in the hierarchy of bankers of the era seems to be George Fisher Baker. (Many agree with this although other famous characters play prominent roles.) I mention this because I am typing this review while sitting in a science complex built, in part, with money from Baker given right before the panic. Down the street I can see Weill Life Sciences building, paid for with money donated by Sandy Weill right before the most recent bank panic. There may be a "university building indicator" here that tells you when bankers donate buildings to colleges, panic!
The overstretched capital market exposed a short selling stock scam in the shares of United Copper Co., an "on the curb" or what we would call a "pink sheet" stock today. This had been brought about by a failed effort by United Copper to corner the copper commodities market. More shares had been borrowed and sold than in fact existed. One by one the banks that had accepted the stock as collateral began to fail, both in New York and in the west. Then there was a lull in which they thought the worst was over. Then, a run on the Knickerbocker bank which caused it to slowly suffocate and the panic began to spread like a virus.
Because the United States National Bank rechartering had been vetoed long beforehand by Andrew Jackson, the U.S. had no central bank to manage the money supply. Thus, it fell to the bankers themselves to clear up the mess. J.P. Morgan became their leader and forged the deal that ended the crisis. He also needed President Theodore Roosevelt to agree to the deal. Roosevelt's recent speech about the "malefactors of wealth" was thought to have been aimed at Morgan and it had contributed to the further erosion of the stock market.
This Panic exposed the need to reestablish a central banking function in the United States to gain control of the credit market. This led to the creation of the Federal Reserve System.
Bruner and Carr recount this story in the first twenty chapters and then discuss their model for a panic and the lessons learned in the last chapter. Their discussion of Keynes, Friedman, Schumpeter, and Minsky is a good introductory explanation of the theories of the business cycle for a general audience.
I did notice one small error in the book. The author Sinclair Lewis is described as: "Muckraking writers such as Sinclair Lewis famously focused attention on unsanitary conditions in meatpacking." It was Upton Sinclair(1878-1968) who wrote the novel The Jungle(1906) about the meatpacking industry. A common mistake annoying to both men.
I think this is a useful book to read not only in the current situation but in the future. Business cycles will never disappear; they are part of our nature.
Top reviews from other countries
This would also be a good book for a general reader who wanted to know something about banking crises and 1907 in particular. There is not much financial detail and so it would be easily accessible. Having said that, it is well referenced, so would be a good resource for further research: there is a good combination of scholarship and readability.
From a UK perspective, where crises have been dealt with by the Bank of England, it is interesting to see what happens in the absence of a central bank (as was the case in the USA in 1907).
"The Panic of 1907" by Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr is economic history, and I thought it might be dull reading. However, these two professors from the University of Virginia have managed to put together a very readable account of the liquidity crisis that followed the devastating earthquake in what was then the financial centre of the American West. The real story though, takes place in New York. As the book's subtitle indicates, this was the perfect financial storm. Everything was in place: newfangled, unregulated institutions called trust companies, a highly interlocked financial network, an interventionist President (Teddy Roosevelt), a good dose of greed and of course, the earthquake which led to unprecedented demands for cash which the financial system simply could not provide due to the machinations of several individuals on Wall Street and the precarious financial reserves of the trust companies.
While I thought that Bruner and Carr painted J.P. Morgan in a very rosy light, this is still a highly readable account of the events that were to lead to the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913. Bruner and Carr argue that the creation of a central bank in the United States was necessary to replace the hodgepodge of clearing houses which propped up the system in 1907. I'm not sure that I buy this argument and I think that J.P. Morgan et al had more than the public's interest in mind during this financial crisis and subsequent founding of the Fed. But that's a whole 'nother story.










