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The Paradox of American Democracy: Elites, Special Interests, and the Betrayal of Public Trust Kindle Edition
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John B. Judis
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John B. Judis, one of our most insightful political commentators, most rational and careful thinkers, and most engaged witnesses in Washington, has taken on a challenge that even the most concerned American citizens shrink from: forecasting the American political climate at the turn of the century. The Paradox of American Democracy is a penetrating examination of our democracy that illuminates the forces and institutions that once enlivened it and now threaten to undermine it. It is the well-reasoned discussion we need in this era of unrestrained expert opinions and ideologically biased testimony.
The disenchantment with our political system can be seen in decreasing voter turnout, political parties co-opted by consultants and large contributors, the corrupting influence of "soft money," and concern for national welfare subverted by lobbying organizations and special-interest groups. Judis revisits particular moments—the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the 1960s—to discover what makes democracy the most efficacious and, consequently, most inefficacious. What has worked in the past is a balancing act between groups of elites—trade commissions, labor relations boards, policy groups—whose mandates are to act in the national interest and whose actions are governed by a disinterested pursuit of the common good. Judis explains how the displacment of such elites by a new lobbying community in Whashington has given rise to the cynicism that corrodes the current political system.
The Paradox of American Democracy goes straight to the heart of every political debate in this country.
The disenchantment with our political system can be seen in decreasing voter turnout, political parties co-opted by consultants and large contributors, the corrupting influence of "soft money," and concern for national welfare subverted by lobbying organizations and special-interest groups. Judis revisits particular moments—the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the 1960s—to discover what makes democracy the most efficacious and, consequently, most inefficacious. What has worked in the past is a balancing act between groups of elites—trade commissions, labor relations boards, policy groups—whose mandates are to act in the national interest and whose actions are governed by a disinterested pursuit of the common good. Judis explains how the displacment of such elites by a new lobbying community in Whashington has given rise to the cynicism that corrodes the current political system.
The Paradox of American Democracy goes straight to the heart of every political debate in this country.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPantheon
- Publication dateJuly 24, 2013
- File size3276 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Amazon.com Review
As the United States faces what many see as another lackluster election in November 2000, John B. Judis's The Paradox of American Democracy addresses the decline of public participation in national politics over the course of the 20th century. He persuasively attributes the blame to the deteriorated relationship between unions and grassroots activists and the elite policy foundations that often championed their causes, a relationship eroded by self-interested businessmen and populist demagoguery. American political life, Judis writes, was never strictly a contest between popular and wealthy special-interest groups. Public policy organizations such as the Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution, for example, have pushed for, or refereed, legislation for social, economic, and political reform that benefited labor, civil rights, and environmental activists. Since the 1970s, though, think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute have pursued their own economic interests by forging links with reactionary populist groups like the Moral Majority, silencing progressive voices less able to present their interests amidst the onslaught of corporate propaganda. Public policy, Judis feels, is now formed primarily by lobbyists rather than those concerned about the broader public welfare.
Paradox presents a detailed portrait of how organized political blocs, independent public policy foundations, and the federal government have interacted over the last 100 years, and how the relationship has been eroded by corporate priorities. While his facts are correct, Judis's fondness for the hegemonic social order of FDR's New Deal and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society might raise objections from sympathetic readers who feel that vital leftist energy was co-opted by post-Fordism, not enabled by it. The link between activists' declining access to power and the dwindling electoral turnout could also be made more explicit. Judis nevertheless provides a brisk and informative history of the structure of American civic life. --John M. Anderson
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.From Library Journal
Is America a place primarily for business or for people? This book explores that question by examining the role that elites have played in 20th-century America. Judis (senior editor, New Republic) considers public-minded elites essential to American democracy. He compares such elites with those of the post-Vietnam era, whose greed was reminiscent of the conservative elites of the 1920s. Judis presents a convincing expos? of this greed and the individuals and groups it feeds. Less convincing, however, is the author's assumption that the "masses" need an elite of either leaning. The unintended irony of his analysis is that the rise of the crude, conservative counterelite may be an inevitable reaction to self-righteous, liberal elitism. Judis nonetheless presents a readable account of how greed corrupts American values and contributes to governmental gridlock. Recommended for public and academic libraries.
-William D. Pederson, Louisiana State Univ., Shreveport
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
-William D. Pederson, Louisiana State Univ., Shreveport
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Kirkus Reviews
The senior editor of the New Republic (Grand Illusion: Critics and Champions of the American Century, 1992, etc.) wonders how we can ``strengthen our institutions'' when they are so firmly in the grip of ``vested interests. Surveying the American landscape, Judis identifies a variety of problems that threaten our political integrity. He is most concerned with the enormous power now exercised by interest groups and lobbyists, and by the coalition of big business and conservative Republicans that has been able to thwart recent reform initiatives. Judis begins by examining the 1960sa period he believes actually extended from the Rosa Parks incident (1955) to the resignation of President Nixon (1974). The radical left of that period, he maintains, ``wielded enormous influence over the nation's political and legislative agenda,'' and produced necessary reform in race relations, environmental policy, and women's issues. In response to what they viewed as a dangerous increase in the scope of the government, conservative foundations and business alliances began a campaign to alter public opinion, to create the perception that the government, rather than business, was ``responsible for America's ills. Their success bore the fruits of the Reagan Revolution, the advent of centrist Democrats, the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich, the defeat of health care and campaign-finance reform, and the Clinton impeachment, which he characterizes as a ``travesty of Constitutional government. A clear-eyed marksman, Judis misses few targets: Henry Kissinger's lobbying efforts ``confirmed the public's perception that everyone was for sale; the post-60s generation was ``narcissistic''; Gingrich embraced ``mundane and craven strategies. To remedy our political ills, Judis prescribes several plans, including an effort to encourage our ``best and brightest to serve rather than sell out. Although Judis cuts a wide swath through the political right, his principal targets are greed and self-interest, two persistent and pervasive enemies of American democracy. -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Introduction
America has experienced a steady growth of industry and invention over this century -- not interrupted even by the Great Depression. Today, our country is awash in new technology -- from the World Wide Web to gene splicing -- and abounds in brilliant entrepreneurs, such as Microsoft's Bill Gates, TCI's John Malone, and Federal Express's Frederick W. Smith. Information technology has transformed how Americans work and where they buy and sell their goods and services. Within a decade, innovations in biotechnology may utterly change agriculture and medicine. The burgeoning American trade deficit, once a mark of weakness, now symbolizes the nation's status as the consumer of last resort for other nations mired in recession. In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States has also achieved unchallenged military supremacy; it has no credible adversaries. And American culture -- from movies to teenage fashion -- dominates the world market. In this sense, the American century that Henry Luce predicted in 1941 has truly arrived. But while we have hurtled forward in technology and enjoy global hegemony in cruise missiles and designer jeans, we have not made similar progress in our political institutions. As we look out upon a new century, American politics seems in far worse shape than it did at the last turn of the century.
There are telling signs that something is wrong with America's political system. Voter turnout in the 1996 presidential contest was 48.9 percent, the lowest since 1924, and turnout in the 1998 Congressional races was the lowest since 1942, a wartime election. Perhaps more important, there is a noticeable lack of popular political activity in the country, except, perhaps, for the Christian right in the South and the environmental movement in the West. During the last decade, formidable grassroots organizations have dissolved or been transformed into letterhead groups. The labor movement, once a bulwark of popular power, has continued to lose its hold over America's working class. Political parties have become subordinated to political consultants, media experts, pollsters, and public relations flacks, none of whom are accountable to voters. The political system has become ruled by large contributors, who through loopholes in the porous campaign laws hold the balance of power in elections and popular referenda.
While activity outside Washington has atrophied, activity on or around Washington's K Street has spread and expanded. In 1997, 11,500 lobbyists spent $1.26 billion lobbying Congress -- or $2.4 million for each member. There are thousands of lobbying organizations in Washington representing every conceivable interest group, from Alaska crab fishermen and Armenian-Americans (two organizations) to mink exporters and motorcyclists. There are also hundreds of political organizations ranging from the Defenders of Wildlife to Handgun Control to the Conservative Caucus. Very few of these organizations have real members. Instead, they are run by Washington staff and funded by direct mail, and they survive by attempting to capture public attention for single issues. They defy the old-fashioned view that politics rests ultimately on a shared view of the national interest. Far from deepening citizen involvement in politics, the proliferation of these Washington organizations discourages it by making politics the exclusive province of paid hacks and single-issue fanatics.
Congress appears incapable of passing significant reform legislation. In 1993 and 1994, Congress couldn't produce any bill aimed at reducing the growing ranks of Americans who have no health insurance. After the 1996 election, when there was widespread public support for campaign reform, Congress could not even pass the most perfunctory measure. During the 1997-98 session, the only large-scale legislation adopted was a $218 billion transportation bill that, while needed to modernize crumbling infrastructure, was heavily larded with pork-barrel projects. Even the onset of large budget surpluses, which would allow generous expenditures in education and healthcare, failed to shake Congress's torpor. Much of Congress's time has been consumed by such "hot button" issues as "partial birth" abortion, gay rights in the military, and funding for UN birth control programs and for the National Endowment for the Arts -- issues that are of very little concern to most Americans. Serious national issues, such as military intervention in the Balkans, have been debated in a spirit of the most narrow partisanship. Worse still, hearings and investigations into scandals -- from the imbroglio over Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination in 1991 to the charges of perjury against President Clinton in 1998 -- have overshadowed any consideration of the country's future. These scandals have generally not involved the flagrant misuse of government funds or an attempt to subvert the Constitution, but instead petty corruption and inappropriate personal behavior. They have been triggered by partisan struggles for power inside Washington, and arouse only passing or prurient interest outside of Washington. They reached a pinnacle of absurdity in 1999 with the impeachment trial of Clinton -- an event driven by partisan fanaticism and opposed by the general public.
The president and the executive branch are equally paralyzed, and not simply by the opposition in Congress. Domestic politics is dominated by public opinion polling. After the defeat of its health care initiative, the Clinton administration limited itself to what campaign consultant Dick Morris called "bite-size programs" that were designed to win popular favor, but even if adopted by Congress had little chance of solving the problems they were intended to address. Foreign policy decisions lacked a widely accepted and understood rationale. Instead, intermittent decisions to use American forces in the Balkans or Middle East appeared to reflect not just interests and ideals, but also transient political pressures and passing diplomatic fancies. And they were conducted in an atmosphere of public uncertainty and partisan bickering.
In the past, the existence of a powerful political establishment could make up for the shortcomings of public institutions and could work to overcome the absence of shared national goals, but there has been a disturbing decline in the quality of the American leadership class -- the former public officials, investment bankers, CEOs, and academics who are periodically summoned to lend their wisdom and experience to the government and the country. Former officials who used to provide dispassionate guidance on difficult foreign or domestic policy issues have become lobbyists and consultants for American and foreign businesses. Former Secretaries of State make provocative public statements defending China while not revealing their own financial stake in the current Chinese government. Former senators call for the privatization of Social Security without revealing that they are on the boards of directors of securities firms that would stand to benefit mightily from such a change. Former presidential candidates lobby for businesses that, as politicians, they had denounced only a year before. Bankers, business leaders, and corporate lawyers who, in past generations, might have been driven to devote part of their time to public service and to the greater good confine their public activity to lobbying on behalf of their own firm or industry. And academics and policy intellectuals who brought a spirit of scientific objectivity and disinterest to political deliberations lend their name and expertise to think tanks and policy groups that are dedicated to promoting the narrowest interests of business contributors.
Together, the irresponsibility of the nation's elites, the power and proliferation of special interest groups, and the paralysis of Congress and the executive have contributed to a corrosive public cynicism. Americans, of course, have often been skeptical about government and politicians, but over the last decades, this skepticism has hardened. Political scientist Hugh Heclo writes, "A long-term downward trend in political trust reflects not simply a skepticism toward authority but a much more negative cynicism toward anything that happens in politics. To doubt and question public authority is a time-honored American tradition. Always to expect the worst is not." Put this cynicism together with a certain complacency born of temporarily good times and one has the ingredients for a massive withdrawal from public activity and vital public questions.
These developments suggest that even as the Dow-Jones stock index exceeds a record 10,000, our political system is faltering, and faltering in a way that might eventually undermine our progress as a nation. Periods of prosperity should provide welcome opportunities to strengthen our institutions to prepare for future adversity, but our political institutions make it impossible to adopt far-reaching policies, particularly if they threaten vested interests. Like holiday travelers, we are prepared for the pleasures of the next stop, but are completely ill-equipped to handle even the smallest crisis, let alone a severe economic downturn or a war. How did this happen, and why, and what can be done about it? These are the questions that this book will attempt to answer. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
America has experienced a steady growth of industry and invention over this century -- not interrupted even by the Great Depression. Today, our country is awash in new technology -- from the World Wide Web to gene splicing -- and abounds in brilliant entrepreneurs, such as Microsoft's Bill Gates, TCI's John Malone, and Federal Express's Frederick W. Smith. Information technology has transformed how Americans work and where they buy and sell their goods and services. Within a decade, innovations in biotechnology may utterly change agriculture and medicine. The burgeoning American trade deficit, once a mark of weakness, now symbolizes the nation's status as the consumer of last resort for other nations mired in recession. In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States has also achieved unchallenged military supremacy; it has no credible adversaries. And American culture -- from movies to teenage fashion -- dominates the world market. In this sense, the American century that Henry Luce predicted in 1941 has truly arrived. But while we have hurtled forward in technology and enjoy global hegemony in cruise missiles and designer jeans, we have not made similar progress in our political institutions. As we look out upon a new century, American politics seems in far worse shape than it did at the last turn of the century.
There are telling signs that something is wrong with America's political system. Voter turnout in the 1996 presidential contest was 48.9 percent, the lowest since 1924, and turnout in the 1998 Congressional races was the lowest since 1942, a wartime election. Perhaps more important, there is a noticeable lack of popular political activity in the country, except, perhaps, for the Christian right in the South and the environmental movement in the West. During the last decade, formidable grassroots organizations have dissolved or been transformed into letterhead groups. The labor movement, once a bulwark of popular power, has continued to lose its hold over America's working class. Political parties have become subordinated to political consultants, media experts, pollsters, and public relations flacks, none of whom are accountable to voters. The political system has become ruled by large contributors, who through loopholes in the porous campaign laws hold the balance of power in elections and popular referenda.
While activity outside Washington has atrophied, activity on or around Washington's K Street has spread and expanded. In 1997, 11,500 lobbyists spent $1.26 billion lobbying Congress -- or $2.4 million for each member. There are thousands of lobbying organizations in Washington representing every conceivable interest group, from Alaska crab fishermen and Armenian-Americans (two organizations) to mink exporters and motorcyclists. There are also hundreds of political organizations ranging from the Defenders of Wildlife to Handgun Control to the Conservative Caucus. Very few of these organizations have real members. Instead, they are run by Washington staff and funded by direct mail, and they survive by attempting to capture public attention for single issues. They defy the old-fashioned view that politics rests ultimately on a shared view of the national interest. Far from deepening citizen involvement in politics, the proliferation of these Washington organizations discourages it by making politics the exclusive province of paid hacks and single-issue fanatics.
Congress appears incapable of passing significant reform legislation. In 1993 and 1994, Congress couldn't produce any bill aimed at reducing the growing ranks of Americans who have no health insurance. After the 1996 election, when there was widespread public support for campaign reform, Congress could not even pass the most perfunctory measure. During the 1997-98 session, the only large-scale legislation adopted was a $218 billion transportation bill that, while needed to modernize crumbling infrastructure, was heavily larded with pork-barrel projects. Even the onset of large budget surpluses, which would allow generous expenditures in education and healthcare, failed to shake Congress's torpor. Much of Congress's time has been consumed by such "hot button" issues as "partial birth" abortion, gay rights in the military, and funding for UN birth control programs and for the National Endowment for the Arts -- issues that are of very little concern to most Americans. Serious national issues, such as military intervention in the Balkans, have been debated in a spirit of the most narrow partisanship. Worse still, hearings and investigations into scandals -- from the imbroglio over Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination in 1991 to the charges of perjury against President Clinton in 1998 -- have overshadowed any consideration of the country's future. These scandals have generally not involved the flagrant misuse of government funds or an attempt to subvert the Constitution, but instead petty corruption and inappropriate personal behavior. They have been triggered by partisan struggles for power inside Washington, and arouse only passing or prurient interest outside of Washington. They reached a pinnacle of absurdity in 1999 with the impeachment trial of Clinton -- an event driven by partisan fanaticism and opposed by the general public.
The president and the executive branch are equally paralyzed, and not simply by the opposition in Congress. Domestic politics is dominated by public opinion polling. After the defeat of its health care initiative, the Clinton administration limited itself to what campaign consultant Dick Morris called "bite-size programs" that were designed to win popular favor, but even if adopted by Congress had little chance of solving the problems they were intended to address. Foreign policy decisions lacked a widely accepted and understood rationale. Instead, intermittent decisions to use American forces in the Balkans or Middle East appeared to reflect not just interests and ideals, but also transient political pressures and passing diplomatic fancies. And they were conducted in an atmosphere of public uncertainty and partisan bickering.
In the past, the existence of a powerful political establishment could make up for the shortcomings of public institutions and could work to overcome the absence of shared national goals, but there has been a disturbing decline in the quality of the American leadership class -- the former public officials, investment bankers, CEOs, and academics who are periodically summoned to lend their wisdom and experience to the government and the country. Former officials who used to provide dispassionate guidance on difficult foreign or domestic policy issues have become lobbyists and consultants for American and foreign businesses. Former Secretaries of State make provocative public statements defending China while not revealing their own financial stake in the current Chinese government. Former senators call for the privatization of Social Security without revealing that they are on the boards of directors of securities firms that would stand to benefit mightily from such a change. Former presidential candidates lobby for businesses that, as politicians, they had denounced only a year before. Bankers, business leaders, and corporate lawyers who, in past generations, might have been driven to devote part of their time to public service and to the greater good confine their public activity to lobbying on behalf of their own firm or industry. And academics and policy intellectuals who brought a spirit of scientific objectivity and disinterest to political deliberations lend their name and expertise to think tanks and policy groups that are dedicated to promoting the narrowest interests of business contributors.
Together, the irresponsibility of the nation's elites, the power and proliferation of special interest groups, and the paralysis of Congress and the executive have contributed to a corrosive public cynicism. Americans, of course, have often been skeptical about government and politicians, but over the last decades, this skepticism has hardened. Political scientist Hugh Heclo writes, "A long-term downward trend in political trust reflects not simply a skepticism toward authority but a much more negative cynicism toward anything that happens in politics. To doubt and question public authority is a time-honored American tradition. Always to expect the worst is not." Put this cynicism together with a certain complacency born of temporarily good times and one has the ingredients for a massive withdrawal from public activity and vital public questions.
These developments suggest that even as the Dow-Jones stock index exceeds a record 10,000, our political system is faltering, and faltering in a way that might eventually undermine our progress as a nation. Periods of prosperity should provide welcome opportunities to strengthen our institutions to prepare for future adversity, but our political institutions make it impossible to adopt far-reaching policies, particularly if they threaten vested interests. Like holiday travelers, we are prepared for the pleasures of the next stop, but are completely ill-equipped to handle even the smallest crisis, let alone a severe economic downturn or a war. How did this happen, and why, and what can be done about it? These are the questions that this book will attempt to answer. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Publishers Weekly
Judis (William F. Buckley: Patron Saint of the Conservatives), senior editor at the New Republic, presents a familiar diagnosis of American democracy with an interesting twist. He deplores the absence of even a basic conception of the common good in contemporary pluralism. Individuals and organizations enter the political arena to empower and enrich themselves at the expense of others, and advances in information and technology serve to further entrench the influence of money. Indeed, the proliferation of think tanks and lobbying organizations has undermined popular participation in politics rather than enhancing it, says Judis, "making politics the exclusive province of paid hacks and single-issue fanatics." American democracy has had its ups and downs over the years, and Judis is not the first to suggest that we are currently at a low ebb. His unique contribution is the identification of a key variable in the historical cycle: he contends that elites shape the health of political activity. During periods when influential private citizens, especially business leaders, share or at least tolerate a national vision for the country, politics has been a vehicle for improving the lives of citizens, e.g., during the Progressive era and the New Deal. By contrast, he says, today business concern for the country ends at the offices of K Street lobbyists, and "narcissism," "selfish individualism" and "narrow moralism" have left Americans seeking "either wealth or moral perfection" and politicians walking the corridors of the Capitol "with a check... in one hand and a Bible in the other." Judas pulls no punches in making his point that reinvigorating democracy requires a renewed assumption of public responsibility by elites. (Feb.)
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From the Back Cover
"John Judis is our finest reporter and analyst of Washington's inner workings. His new book brilliantly relates the secret history of the Clinton era -- its origins, its frustrations, and its disloyal opponents. It is a chilling tale that others have been either too trusting or too timid to tell straight."
-- Sean Wilentz, Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Princeton University
-- Sean Wilentz, Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Princeton University
"This is a compelling analysis of our irresponsible elite -- and an astute history of times when 'the public interest' had real meaning. John Judis is one of America's best political journalists, and his book is essential to understanding our current political mandates."
-- Michael Kazin, author of The Populist Persuasion: An American History
"With the insight that has made him one of our wisest political observers, John Judis makes a trenchant analysis of what has gone wrong with American democracy -- and how it can be corrected."
-- Ronald Steel, author of In Love with Night: The American Romance with Robert Kennedy
About the Author
John Judis is the author of William F. Buckley: Patron Saint of the Conservatives. He is a senior editor at The New Republic, as well as a writer-at-large for GQ and a columnist for The American Prospect. His work has appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post, The Washington Monthly, and The Wilson Quarterly, among other publications. He lives in Silver Spring, Maryland. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Review
"John Judis is our finest reporter and analyst of Washington's inner workings. His new book brilliantly relates the secret history of the Clinton era -- its origins, its frustrations, and its disloyal opponents. It is a chilling tale that others have been either too trusting or too timid to tell straight."
-- Sean Wilentz, Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Princeton University
"This is a compelling analysis of our irresponsible elite -- and an astute history of times when 'the public interest' had real meaning. John Judis is one of America's best political journalists, and his book is essential to understanding our current political mandates."
-- Michael Kazin, author of The Populist Persuasion: An American History
"With the insight that has made him one of our wisest political observers, John Judis makes a trenchant analysis of what has gone wrong with American democracy -- and how it can be corrected."
-- Ronald Steel, author of In Love with Night: The American Romance with Robert Kennedy --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
-- Sean Wilentz, Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Princeton University
"This is a compelling analysis of our irresponsible elite -- and an astute history of times when 'the public interest' had real meaning. John Judis is one of America's best political journalists, and his book is essential to understanding our current political mandates."
-- Michael Kazin, author of The Populist Persuasion: An American History
"With the insight that has made him one of our wisest political observers, John Judis makes a trenchant analysis of what has gone wrong with American democracy -- and how it can be corrected."
-- Ronald Steel, author of In Love with Night: The American Romance with Robert Kennedy --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From the Inside Flap
s, one of our most insightful political commentators, most rational and careful thinkers, and most engaged witnesses in Washington, has taken on a challenge that even the most concerned American citizens shrink from: forecasting the American political climate at the turn of the century. <b>The Paradox of American Democracy</b> is a penetrating examination of our democracy that illuminates the forces and institutions that once enlivened it and now threaten to undermine it. It is the well-reasoned discussion we need in this era of unrestrained expert opinions and ideologically biased testimony.<br><br>The disenchantment with our political system can be seen in decreasing voter turnout, political parties co-opted by consultants and large contributors, the corrupting influence of "soft money," and concern for national welfare subverted by lobbying organizations and special-interest groups. Judis revisits particular moments -- the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the 1960s -- to discove --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Product details
- ASIN : B00DPTL24G
- Publisher : Pantheon (July 24, 2013)
- Publication date : July 24, 2013
- Language : English
- File size : 3276 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 320 pages
- Lending : Not Enabled
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,385,566 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #633 in Leadership (Kindle Store)
- #1,590 in Political Leadership
- #1,833 in Democracy (Kindle Store)
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John B. Judis is Editor-At-Large at Talking Points Memo and author of eight books, including The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics (Columbia Global Reports, 2016), Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origin of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014), The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (Scribner, 2004), The Emerging Democratic Majority with Ruy Teixeira(Scribner, 2002), and The Paradox of American Democracy: Elites, Special Interests, and Betrayal of Public Trust (Pantheon, 2000). He has written for numerous publications, including The New Republic, The National Journal, The New York Times Magazine, Mother Jones, and The Washington Post. Born in Chicago, he received his B.A. and M.A. degrees in Philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley. He lives in Silver Spring, MD.
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This book is very blatantly biased towards the left! His vision in this book paints unions as the good guys and corporations as evil as usual.I do not recommend this book for anyone.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 31, 2000
I enjoyed this book and recommend it to anybody interested in American history and politics. John B. Judis gives a historic account of how our democracy has been damaged by big money and irresponsible elites, focusing from the progressieve era to today. The book is an easy read, and Judis makes his points well understood. He analyzes how different elites and special interest groups have functioned in America.
The chapters "Business and the Rise of K Street," and "Triumph of Conservatives," were very interesting and thought provoking. Judis gives a closer and infromative look at how political action committees and conservative groups have contributed huge amounts of money to politicians, and how they recently dramatically increased their influence in governments decisions.
The last two chapters are also good in explaining how changes in big business influenceing government even more in the 70's and 80's is hard to shake when dealing with a reform agenda. It is chalk full of statistics that are astounding, and are attributed to respectable sources: PAC's gave 72% of their money to Republicans during the last six weeks of teh 1978 elections.
A problem with this book though is that it blames the Republicans too much when talking about the lack of public participation in politics. I guess that was expected though considering that Mr. Judis is a senior editor of "The New Republic" (a liberal magazine), although he does not seem to be a fan of Clinton. All together this book is very informative and holds your interest. Along with recommending this book, I will recommend reading Jim Hightower's "If the Gods had meant us to vote they would have given us Candidates." It bashed both Republicans and Democrats, and is comparable to this book, however discusses more recent issues.
This book informs us on the ever-changing-postion government, elites, and society has had over time, and explains how American democracy has evolved to today's current corrupt system. John B. Judis also gives us hope and discusses how our democracy can be corrected.
The chapters "Business and the Rise of K Street," and "Triumph of Conservatives," were very interesting and thought provoking. Judis gives a closer and infromative look at how political action committees and conservative groups have contributed huge amounts of money to politicians, and how they recently dramatically increased their influence in governments decisions.
The last two chapters are also good in explaining how changes in big business influenceing government even more in the 70's and 80's is hard to shake when dealing with a reform agenda. It is chalk full of statistics that are astounding, and are attributed to respectable sources: PAC's gave 72% of their money to Republicans during the last six weeks of teh 1978 elections.
A problem with this book though is that it blames the Republicans too much when talking about the lack of public participation in politics. I guess that was expected though considering that Mr. Judis is a senior editor of "The New Republic" (a liberal magazine), although he does not seem to be a fan of Clinton. All together this book is very informative and holds your interest. Along with recommending this book, I will recommend reading Jim Hightower's "If the Gods had meant us to vote they would have given us Candidates." It bashed both Republicans and Democrats, and is comparable to this book, however discusses more recent issues.
This book informs us on the ever-changing-postion government, elites, and society has had over time, and explains how American democracy has evolved to today's current corrupt system. John B. Judis also gives us hope and discusses how our democracy can be corrected.
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Reviewed in the United States on July 31, 2003
The most compelling theme of this book to me was its historical explanation of why there seems to be no informed/reasoned middle ground in politics today, which is something I find particularly mystifying and frustrating. The history and mechanics Judis describes of how disinterested elites have disappeared while letterhead advocacy groups have become rampant is very plausible, especially with the numerous detailed examples he cites.
The book might lose a little gas after the Reagan years, but I thought that was OK since Clinton+ has been dissected a million different ways and I wasn't looking for another take on that.
The book also serves as a valuable field guide to policy groups of different stripes. If you are a little fuzzy on the difference between the Heritage Foundation and the Brookings Institute (as I admit I was), then that's a big part of the problem Judis is describing.
The book might lose a little gas after the Reagan years, but I thought that was OK since Clinton+ has been dissected a million different ways and I wasn't looking for another take on that.
The book also serves as a valuable field guide to policy groups of different stripes. If you are a little fuzzy on the difference between the Heritage Foundation and the Brookings Institute (as I admit I was), then that's a big part of the problem Judis is describing.
13 people found this helpful
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Luger Joseph
4.0 out of 5 stars
Buon libro
Reviewed in Italy on September 28, 2017Verified Purchase
Anche se ho ricevuto il libro in ritardo, lo mi serve.
Ho anche ricevuto la prima copia che e' comparsa. Adesso ho due copie della stessa copia. Cosa faccio un'laltro? Grazie altretanto.
Ho anche ricevuto la prima copia che e' comparsa. Adesso ho due copie della stessa copia. Cosa faccio un'laltro? Grazie altretanto.
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