Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought) Later Printing Used Edition

This slim volume succinctly criticizes liberal-democratic regimes on the basis of reality and facts. It challenges many of the underlying premises of liberal democratic regimes and works through how they are do not be out in practice.

As I grow older I find it hard to understand some of our American egalitarian social premises. Equality, that slogan shared with the French revolutionaries, denotes sameness. Difference is not sameness. Individuals are different. Hence they are not the same. That which is not the same is not equal. Individuals are not the same hence nor are they equal. And yet citizen equality is a counter-factual premise of modern parliamentary democracy. How does Schmitt deal with human difference; or, to use another slogan of our day, how does he regard the impact of diversity?

There is a rich vein of European thought which criticizes democracy going right back to and standing on the shoulders of Plato's Republic. This book is a worthy update.

Time passing will increasingly remove the opprobrium imposed by the victors on Schmitt's work and it will continue to advance. The topics in this modest work are timely as ever for the student of politics.

The central thesis of this book can be roughly summarized as follows: The theoretical justifications of parliamentary democracy are no longer valid since they no longer accord with the reality of parliamentary democracy as it is actually practiced (assuming they ever did).

The book itself, however, is broken up into four separate sections and only the second section deals explicitly with the intellectual foundations of parliamentarism. The first section is about the theoretical foundations of democracy, which Schmitt does not consider to be identical to those of parliamentarism. The third section deals with the Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat, and the final section deals with Georges Sorel and his theory of myth and the irrational grounds of political action.

The book is not as unified, in my opinion, as it could be. So I will attempt to deal with the sections individually.

In the first section Schmitt defines democracy. In the preface Schmitt writes, "Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second...elimination or eradication of heterogeneity" (Pg. 9).

This is certainly a controversial statement and I must admit I had a great deal of trouble in following Schmitt's argument here. I would love it if someone who has studied Schmitt, or democratic theory, more than I have would respond to this review and fill in any gaps in my argument or correct any mistakes.

As far as I have been able to determine Schmitt's argument runs something like this: First, Schmitt sees democracy as resting on a series of identities; an identity between governed and governing, sovereign and subject, the subject and object of state authority, etc. (pg. 26). These identities seem, for Schmitt, to require a certain degree of homogeneity within the community. If heterogeneity is introduced (in the form of classes for instance) it will no longer be possible to define the "General Will" and there will be a duality between ruling and ruled. The actions of state will be seen as based on the will of a particular group, who will be the rulers, and the rest of the population will be the ruled.

I should point out that Schmitt nowhere in this book actually makes this argument explicit. This is simply my attempt to understand why Schmitt would make the claim that democracy requires homogeneity. It is certainly true that a democracy will need to make certain distinctions between people (the most important perhaps being that between a citizen and non-citizen). And it is certainly true that no democratic society, as of yet, has tried to define every person in the entire world as having equal status before the law. The principle of universal human equality is not, therefore, strictly speaking a principle of democracy. But I see no reason, other then that outlined above, why this distinction should require homogeneity (social, cultural, or racial) among the citizens of a democracy. This is the part of Schmitt's argument I am not following...

But I will leave this part of Schmitt's argument aside for the moment. The more interesting claim, in my opinion, that Schmitt makes about democracy involves the purely formal character of democracy and the "dialectical iversion" of sorts that democracy is prone to due to its purely formal character.

Schmitt argues that democracy on its own has no political content and can be used in the service of various political programs, some of which may even be anti-democratic in terms of their content. This puts the defender of democracy in a curious position. The defender of democracy is faced with having to either suspend democracy in an attempt to defend it, or remain faithful to democracy despite the fact that doing so will lead to democracy's destruction. As Schmitt points out this is not merely an abstract dialectic thought up by ivory tower professors. There are plenty of examples in history of political movements using democratic means to pursue anti-democratic ends. This dialectic certainly needs to be taken into consideration when thinking about and defending democracy.

The second section of the book is where Schmitt develops his main thesis which I outlined above.

Schmitt first dismisses the idea that parliamentarism is simply based on the practical necessity of having representatives for the people's will. Schmitt points out that the democratic principle of the identity of the governed and the governing does not require that there be more than one representative of the people's will. This practical necessity does not, therefore, constitute an adequate intellectual foundation for parliamentarism.

Schmitt, instead, sees the ultimate intellectual grounds for parliamentarism in the notions of openness and discussion. Ultimately this view rests on a certain interpretation of the nature of reason. According to this view it is through the clash of opinions that human beings are able to approach the truth. Parliamentarism finds it's justification in the fact that it creates an open and public forum for discussion, in which opinions can be presented, questioned, and defended, and through this process the "true" or best policy or course of action will become evident.

Schmitt believes this intellectual justification for parliamentarism does not accord well with the facts. The reality of parliamentarism as it is actually practiced reveals that it is a system based on parties. These parties make their decisions about policy in private meetings and committees, behind closed doors, before they ever enter the arena of public debate (I trust this description will not sound wildly unfamiliar to anyone). This is what constitutes "the crisis of parliamentary democracy". It is ultimately a legitimacy crisis. The best reasons that have been offered for the superiority of parliamentary democracy over other forms of government by thinkers like John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham, are not valid reasons for preferring parliamentary forms of government to other forms because they are purely ideal.

There is a lot more in this second chapter then I am able to summarize in this relatively brief space. The second section is, in my opinion, the most interesting and thought-provoking section of the whole book. But that is at least a brief summary of Schmitt's central thesis.

The last two sections can be dealt with more briefly. I believe they are an attempt on Schmitt's part to explain two alternatives to parliamentarism that were influential in Schmitt's own time. One of Schmitt's main thesis is that it is not enough of a defense of parliamentary forms of government to simply say "What else?" The lack of any truly legitimizing arguments for parliamentary government leaves a vacuum that can be filled by alternatives. Since this is the only book I have read by Schmitt I am not sure what Schmitt's own personal preferences would be in terms of an alternative to parliamentary forms of government, I know he briefly supported the Nazis, which will certainly not recommend him to many readers today. But he does, in the last two chapters, present two alternatives to parliamentarism, though I should point out that Schmitt nowhere endorses either of these alternatives.

One alternative is the Marxian dictatorship of the proletariat. Schmitt has a somewhat interesting understanding of the theoretical justifications for a Marxian dictatorship of the proletariat. Basically he sees it's justification as resting on an alternative, dialectical, notion of reason. This notion of reason is in direct contrast to what might be called the intersubjective notion of reason which is based on open discussion. The dialectical view is ultimately based on Hegel's dictum that "the real is rational, and the rational is real." On this view history itself is a rational development of dialectical reason in which each new historical era is the dialectical negation of the previous era. It is necessary, therefore, to attempt to understand one's own time as best as one can in order to have a true insight into it's dialectical negation and to align oneself on the correct side of history. Those who have this insight are in possession of the absolute truth and there is, therefore, no longer any reason for open discussion. This makes it possible to justify a dictatorship of reason.

The final section addresses the theories of Georges Sorel. Georges Sorel claims that every political society finds it's ground in a sustaining myth. Myths are what engage the vital instincts of humanity. Parliamentarism on this view is the abandonment of myth and the enthusiasm on which every form of government depends. This can be seen as the ultimate negation of parliamentarism because it does not replace it with another version of rationalism but replaces it with a conscious irrationalism. It is not just the rejection of the particular form of reason parliamentarism is based on, but is an attack on reason itself at least as a ground or justification for a form of government.

In conclusion, I would simply say that I found this book extremely interesting and worth reading. At the very least it requires us to take a closer look at our justifications for democracy and parliamentarism.

Carl Schmitt's _Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy_ offers a trenchant, and largely convincing critique of liberal democracy. Ultimately, however, it is disappointing in that it fails to offer solutions to the problems it identifies.

Schmitt begins his critique of parliamentary democracy by rejecting the standard argument marshalled in its defence -- that whatever its flaws, it should be sustained, because all other known systems of government are worse. Schmitt argues that a principled defence of parliamentary democracy must do more than simply declare "What else?"

Schmitt proceeds to define democracy, and parliamentarism in a way that most 21st century liberal democrats will find peculiar, as two philosophies of government that are in fact fundamentally different, and do not necessarily complement one another.

In constructing a definition of democracy, Schmitt turns to Aristotle and Rousseau. Democracy requires that equals be treated equally, and unequals, unequally (9).* Thus, there is always a condition one must satisfy to be granted equal political rights. In an Aristotelian democracy, that condition is 'virtue'. Only the virtuous or excellent have full rights as citizens. In the 19th century version, full political rights belong to those who are members of "the nation" (9). In other words, democracy demands 'homogeneity' either in virtue, nationality, or some other category. The idea of granting political rights to everyone, without any qualification for membership in the political community, is not a democratic, but a liberal idea, says Schmitt (11). Liberalism proposes something which is utterly absurd, a "democracy of mankind" (11). Moreover, following Rousseau, Schmitt says that democracy expresses the people's 'general will', which only exists where the people are so homogeneous that there is essential unanimity (13).

Defined in this way, democracy is very different from parliamentarism. Citing Burke, Bentham, Guizot and J.S. Mill, Schmitt argues that parliamentarism is a system of government whose philosophical justification lies in the supposed value of 'open discussion'. The essence of parliamentarism is not that it is a form of representative government, but that it is a form of deliberative government. The purpose of a parliament or congress is that parliamentarians or congressmen should deliberate upon important affairs of state and devise appropriate policies. The truth, or the right policy, is supposed to result from discussion, from the competition of different opinions and ideas, and from the capacity and willingness of the parliamentarians to persuade and be persuaded as to the best course of action for the political community as a whole (5, 46).

Now, in the real world, argues Schmitt, 'parliamentary democracy' is neither parliamentary nor democratic. In the first place, policies in parliamentary governments are not arrived at through open discussion of affairs of state among the hundreds of members who compose the legislative body. Instead 'small and exclusive committees of parties or of party coalitions make their decisions behind closed doors, and what representatives of the big capitalist interest groups agree to in the smallest committees is more important to the fate of millions of people than, perhaps, any political decision' (50) Parliament is not a place where the truth is found out through deliberation. It is place where the interests of powerful groups become government policy.

If parliamentary democracy is not parliamentary, then it is obviously not democratic. 'Newspaper articles, speeches at demonstrations, and parliamentary debates' are supposed to make government accountable to the will of the people. Yet today, 'there are not many more who believe that these freedoms still exist where they could actually endanger the real holders of power' 50.

Thus, parliamentary democracy is only a 'facade' (49). If it does not live up to its ideals, then it no longer has legitimacy.

If Schmitt impresses the reader with his critique, his failure to offer solutions disappoints. Schmitt actually does offer alternatives to liberal democracy, but one has to look elsewhere for these, for example, in _Legality and Legitimacy_, and _Constitutional Theory_. Needless to say, liberal democrats, however disillusioned, will not find Schmitt's solutions palatable.

*This is a misinterpretation of Aristotle. Aristotle's ideal form of government was aristocracy, government by the virtuous. Schmitt confounds this with Aristotle's formulation of democracy.