Explores the productive friendships of such contrasting personalities as Grant and Sherman and Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, bringing to life the struggle between McClellan and Lincoln and Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston.
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This is an outstanding study. The only flaw was the author’s hackneyed and amateur psychoanalysis of McClellan at the very end. We get enough of this prattle from Stephen Sears, et al. For a more balanced analysis of McClellan consult The work of Ethan Rafuse or Steven Stottlemeyer.
The author's insights about the relationships between six major Civil War generals and their commanders-in-chief, as well with as their peers, is extremely valuable. Interesting also, is the partnership that developed between Grant and (Admiral) Porter that developed during the Vicksburg campaign. Great book, highly recommended for any CW collection!
Reviewed in the United States on November 18, 2006
The thesis of this book is one that takes the reader beyond an elementary understanding of the Civil War. Glatthaar's main point throughout the book is that the types of relationships that the commanders in the upper echelons of the military structure had made a tangible difference in the progress and outcome of the war. I think Glatthaar proves his point very well; the chapters on the Lincoln-McClellan, Grant-Sherman, and Lincoln-Grant relationships were particularly convincing. Nevertheless, I think Glatthaar fails to look at other command relationships that don't necessarily fit so neatly into his thesis.
The most significant example, in my mind, would be the Lee-Longstreet relationship. At the end of this book Glatthaar writes, "It was imperative for leaders to assemble personnel who complemented rather than supplemented their own capabilities, so that they could draw from a wide range of talents to tap into and employ resources most effectively to meet the increasingly complex demands of the war." (p. 236) Certainly I think this is generally true, and hold true throughout the Civil War. However, I think the Lee-Longstreet relationship was more of a complementary nature than the Lee-Jackson relationship was, and yet much success is attributed to the latter. Glatthaar does not explore this issue. Nor Does he link the success/failures of relationships to those on the other side. For example, certainly the Lincoln-McClellan relationship lead to failure due to its own problems; however, that relationship existed while the Lee-Jackson relationship was at its height. The same dynamic can be said to some degree of the Grant-Sherman and Davis-Johnston relationships.
Aside from the above shortcoming, I think this book was an excellent read that thoroughly defends a unique argument. I also like that the relationships are discussed with an ear for the chronology of the war, so the reader learns about the relationships and the overall trends of the war at the same time. I would recommend this book for anyone looking to step beyond the rudimentary education of the topic that is usually provided in high school.
It is a condense conversion why these partners were able to work or not work together. It gave me a understanding of their good & bad points. I found it very interesting.
Glatthaar argues that command partnerships that worked well on both professional and personal levels were the key to military success in the American Civil War. He gives narrative accounts of several partnerships, both positive and negative -- Lee and Jackson, Lincoln and McClellan, Sherman and Grant, and so on.
I don't find his thesis all that convincing -- since it doesn't really account for the Union's ability to absorb a long string of failed commanders before Grant -- and am also unconvinced by the personal, psychological portrayals of individual commanders without much detailed supporting evidence from primary sources. At times, Glatthaar makes inexplicable comments like "Most Confederates were a propertied class (Glatthaar, 226)" that seem, if not outright incorrect, at least oversimplified.
Readers who enjoy the "great man" approach to history may well find this book a pleasant read.
I thoroughly enjoyed Glatthaar's title describing the quality of working relationships between Civil War leaders. Some of the relationships include:
1. Lee and Jackson
2. Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston
3. McClellan and Lincoln
4. Lincoln and Grant
5. Grant, Sherman, and Porter
Glatthaar makes a strong case for the Confederacy's ultimate defeat being due to the lack of strong command relationships, particular after Stonewall Jackson's death after Chancellorsville. Granted, the Confederacy could very well have been doomed from the beginning to to a much lower population and manufacturing base. However, the war could have been protracted if certain Confederate generals and politicians would have had better working relationships.
I particularly liked the section on the cooperation between U.S. Grant and William Sherman of the Union army and Admiral David Porter of the U.S. Navy. Glatthaar argues convincingly that the cooperation between the U.S. Army and Navy played an integral part of the most complete victory of the war at Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Whatever your opinion, the book is an entertaining read that will challenge you to think about how command relationships can positively or negatively affect the conduct of a war.
In my humble opinion, leaders from all backgrounds (business, government, ministry, family, etc.) will benefit from the book as they learn more about how important it is to submerge one's ego and pride be able to work well with people to realize ultimate success in any endeavor.