This is primarily an examination of the information and analysis America had at its disposal and why she was caught off guard in the surprise attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. The framing of signals, noise, actionable intelligence has clear takeaways for our time of big data analysis.
After reading it, here's my take why it happened, in order of my ranking:
1. BIAS
US thinking was heavily influenced by her own view of Japan's objectives and assessments, and it deduced that an attack on US soil was a very low probability. It placed much greater emphasis on Japan's next significant hostile moves taking place against Russia in Siberia or against one of the European colonies in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Indonesia, etc). As such, testing of the hypothesis of an attack on Hawaii was virtually non-existent;
2. DATA SELECTION
Due to US low weighting of an attack on US soil, data collection that would have indicated Japan's intent toward that end was either not collected or downplayed. More generally, because a lot of data was in somewhat bulky physical format, much of it was destroyed which eliminated the technical possibility of recognizing patterns in time-series or changing sentiment;
3. SEPARATION OF DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYTICS
The data gatherers in the field ("Intelligence Officers") were instructed only to acquire data, and not analyze it. This eliminated from the system important insights from those closest to action, and introduced delays in analysis;
4. BUREAUCRACY
As might be expected, inter-department barriers and rivalries kept information from being shared.
5. JAPANESE SOPHISTICATION
Japan placed much greater emphasis on the importance of "intelligence" (what today we'd more generally refer to as "Data Analytics"), and were better at hiding real signals, while releasing misleading ones.
The takeaways are further supported by the Author's overall fair and balanced view, wherein she will sympathize with the decision makers when it makes sense rather than just piling on blame. The book is detailed and granular (and somewhat repetitive), but it has to be when we're talking about data. Otherwise the book's conclusions would rely too much on commentary.
Throughout there's a gloomy undertone of a war that neither side really wanted, but was nonetheless inevitable due to errors and miscalculations on both sides:
- Japan thought America would lose it's will to fight after the attack, rather than the much more probable outcome of it instilling in the population a desire to fully defeat Japan;
- US thinking Japan would not strike US targets first, even though the US had treaties of mutual defense with nearly all other potential first strike targets, meaning an attack on them was equivalent to an attack on US anyway;
- US not understanding that its demand that Japan retreat in Asia meant an unacceptable humiliation;
The key insight here is that both sides were generally accurate (and thus on the same page) with the relative advantage of US in the advent of war, as well as troop and fleet movements, however they were diametrically opposed on how the other side would act on that information.
The most obvious analogue to more modern times is how the US could have been so caught off guard at home on 9/11. Answer seems that just like US hypothesis of probable Japanese attack points steered it away from information leading to Pearl harbor, thus did the Bush administration's bias toward a threat from Iraq steer it from information on Al Qaeda prep for attack on WTC...e.g. Richard Clarke's disclosure that Condi Rice deep sixed that very report as it did not fit into the Iraq/Saddam narrative; i.e. via tautology, one cannot test an hypothesis that hasn't been tested.
At the very end the author loses her way a bit by warning of the asymmetric benefit of launching first strike nuclear attack to take out of the other's sides capabilities, by not considering the doctrine of "Mutually Assured Destruction" that came to dominate and at least thus far preclude this from happening. But just like the US officials had been biased by their environments in thinking Japan would not attack US first, we can forgive the author for being influenced by the environment when this book was published in 1962, and just prior to the deployment of nuclear armed submarines which no longer made feasible the possibility of eliminating the all of the targets nuclear counter-strike capabilities.
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision 1st Edition
by
Roberta Wohlstetter
(Author),
Thomas C. Schelling
(Foreword)
ISBN-13:
978-0804705981
ISBN-10:
0804705984
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Prodigiously researched, lucidly and excitingly written, and absolutely fair work of scholarship. It is one of those rare specimens in the literature of current history, the definitive book."
The New York Times
The New York Times
"Unquestionably the best book to date on the Pearl Harbor disaster. . . . Admirable both as history and analysis."
Walter Millis
,The American Historical Review
Walter Millis
,The American Historical Review
"Well researched, clearly and excitingly written, and skillfully and admirably organized. One might say that Mrs. Wohlstetter has written the definitive book."
The Review of Politics
The Review of Politics
From the Back Cover
It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely ordinary blunder. In fact, 'blunder' is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.
About the Author
Roberta Wohlstetter was a historian of military intelligence who worked for the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization, from 1948 to 1965 where she continued on as a consultant through 2002. She was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Ronald Reagan jointly with her husband in 1985.
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Product details
- Publisher : Stanford University Press; 1st edition (June 1, 1962)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 428 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0804705984
- ISBN-13 : 978-0804705981
- Item Weight : 1.16 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.5 x 1.12 x 8.5 inches
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Reviewed in the United States on July 12, 2017
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4.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent review of who knew what and when and why they acted or didn't act as they did.
Reviewed in the United States on November 25, 2016Verified Purchase
Excellent review and analysis of who knew what and when about the imminent Japanese attack. A particular aspect of the analysis is that in any bureaucracy such as the State Department, the Army, and the Navy the leadership adopts a policy or viewpoint and then searches for evidence to support that viewpoint. There are not many people in subordinate positions who are willing to risk professional approbation by saying "Here is what the evidence actually shows. You need to change your policy accordingly."
In late 1941 most of the attention of the US government was focused on the Atlantic battles and Europe. Most analyses thought that Japan was most likely going to attack the USSR in its Far Eastern province and the port of Vladivostok. The next most likely point of attack was thought to be Thailand with an attack aimed toward Rangoon in Burma in order to cut off supples to China via the Burma Road. Pearl Harbor was at the bottom of most peoples' priority list of attention.
There was also just a lack of imagination: the idea that Japan might attack Pearl Harbor or even the Philippines was simply inconceivable to most Army generals and Navy admirals and intelligence agencies. Both the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, along with Singapore, were regarded as impregnable.
Finally, there is the point that in 1941 there was no single intelligence agency or person who saw all the intelligence reports and analyses and was in a position to draw a unified conclusion.
In sum, there were many reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred and this book discusses all of them. The book presents a very rational and comprehensive discussion of the reasons; conspiracy advocates and anti-FDR types therefore won't like it.
In late 1941 most of the attention of the US government was focused on the Atlantic battles and Europe. Most analyses thought that Japan was most likely going to attack the USSR in its Far Eastern province and the port of Vladivostok. The next most likely point of attack was thought to be Thailand with an attack aimed toward Rangoon in Burma in order to cut off supples to China via the Burma Road. Pearl Harbor was at the bottom of most peoples' priority list of attention.
There was also just a lack of imagination: the idea that Japan might attack Pearl Harbor or even the Philippines was simply inconceivable to most Army generals and Navy admirals and intelligence agencies. Both the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, along with Singapore, were regarded as impregnable.
Finally, there is the point that in 1941 there was no single intelligence agency or person who saw all the intelligence reports and analyses and was in a position to draw a unified conclusion.
In sum, there were many reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred and this book discusses all of them. The book presents a very rational and comprehensive discussion of the reasons; conspiracy advocates and anti-FDR types therefore won't like it.
6 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on February 27, 2017
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Roberta Wohlstetter's classic account of the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor not only provided a comprehensive explanation for that surprise attack, it also established guidelines for strategic surprise theory in general by providing obstacles for timely warning. The obstacles she identified included: 1) The difficulty of separating true warning signs from irrelevant ones, which she referred to as "Signals" vs "Noise, 2) The challenge of translating a general warning of war into specific concrete steps that would prepare a military for an attack 3) The role of false alarms in dulling the senses of the defenders. She notes three instances of false alarms that made the defenders wary that such an attack would ever occur. This is known as the "cry-wolf syndrome," 4) The role of deception and secrecy by the attacker in disguising their plans, as the Japanese high command limited the number of people who knew of the Pearl Harbor attack to a handful of senior officers 5) Organizational obstacles inherent to large bureaucracies that make quick communication difficult, 6) Psychological barriers that make if difficult to take in new information. These include confirmation bias, looking for information that validates previous beliefs, and cognitive dissonance, rejecting information which does not fit into previous assumptions. All these obstacles have been used to explain intelligence failures ever since Wohlstetter first proposed them in 1962.
And yet, despite these enormous contributions to the literature on surprise attack, Wohlstetter's own analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack suffers from a huge, and somewhat obvious deficiency. She claims that the key to the failure was not due a lack of relevant signals as there were plenty of these, but an overabundance of irrelevant ones, some taking attention away from the Pacific area to the Atlantic area, and some pointing to an attack in southeast Asia instead. This is a stunning claim, considering that in her own detailed lists of warning signals officers received not one of them pointed to, or even hinted at an attack on Pearl Harbor. All the relevant signals pointed to an attack on southeast Asia, which did indeed occur, in addition to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Therefore, there was no reason to warn of an attack on Pearl Harbor. This is not the first time this flaw in Wohlstetter's analysis has been noted, and several academics have pointed it out. Despite this error, Wohlstetter's version remains the primary one usually cited as the reason for the failure at Pearl Harbor. Her contributions to the warning literature are enormous, but on this one key point her explanation leaves much to be desired.
And yet, despite these enormous contributions to the literature on surprise attack, Wohlstetter's own analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack suffers from a huge, and somewhat obvious deficiency. She claims that the key to the failure was not due a lack of relevant signals as there were plenty of these, but an overabundance of irrelevant ones, some taking attention away from the Pacific area to the Atlantic area, and some pointing to an attack in southeast Asia instead. This is a stunning claim, considering that in her own detailed lists of warning signals officers received not one of them pointed to, or even hinted at an attack on Pearl Harbor. All the relevant signals pointed to an attack on southeast Asia, which did indeed occur, in addition to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Therefore, there was no reason to warn of an attack on Pearl Harbor. This is not the first time this flaw in Wohlstetter's analysis has been noted, and several academics have pointed it out. Despite this error, Wohlstetter's version remains the primary one usually cited as the reason for the failure at Pearl Harbor. Her contributions to the warning literature are enormous, but on this one key point her explanation leaves much to be desired.
6 people found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries
Syd Morgan
5.0 out of 5 stars
If you want to know what happened at Pearl, buy the book!
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 7, 2016Verified Purchase
Excellent detail. Very well written. Author handled the mass of information marvellously. I now understand Pearl Harbour! Definitely a book for those who want to know the facts, with all the evidence.
Amazon Kunde
5.0 out of 5 stars
Good
Reviewed in Germany on January 27, 2020Verified Purchase
Good
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