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Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam Paperback – September 20, 2006
| Gareth Porter (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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Challenging conventional wisdom about the origins of the war, Porter argues that the main impetus for military intervention in Vietnam came not from presidents Kennedy and Johnson but from high-ranking national security officials in their administrations who were heavily influenced by U.S. dominance over its Cold War foes. Porter argues that presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were all strongly opposed to sending combat forces to Vietnam, but that both Kennedy and Johnson were strongly pressured by their national security advisers to undertake military intervention. Porter reveals for the first time that Kennedy attempted to open a diplomatic track for peace negotiations with North Vietnam in 1962 but was frustrated by bureaucratic resistance. Significantly revising the historical account of a major turning point, Porter describes how Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara deliberately misled Johnson in the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, effectively taking the decision to bomb North Vietnam out of the president's hands.
- Print length421 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherUniversity of California Press
- Publication dateSeptember 20, 2006
- Dimensions6 x 1 x 9 inches
- ISBN-100520250044
- ISBN-13978-0520250048
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Product details
- Publisher : University of California Press; First edition (September 20, 2006)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 421 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0520250044
- ISBN-13 : 978-0520250048
- Item Weight : 1.3 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #694,707 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #629 in Southeast Asia History
- #932 in Globalization & Politics
- #1,270 in Vietnam War History (Books)
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"Perils of Dominance" takes a topic of mind-boggling complexity, weaves a clear and consistent narrative from all the elements, and presents a picture staggering in its basic indictment of back-stabbing, endless lying, high crimes and misdemeanors, and outright treason. The traitors were the Hawk extremists who did all they could to drag John F. Kennedy(who successfully resisted until his execution) and Lyndon Johnson(whose resistance weakened under his huge domestic goals) into the war that killed 60,000 American soldiers and 3,000,000 Southeast Asians. Perhaps the most surprising and moving part of "Perils" is the picture of Lyndon Johnson, a strong opponent of expansion from Dallas through his defeat of Goldwater. We know of Tonkin Gulf, of course. And LBJ has been crucified for 40 years because of the deceptions involved. Porter shows us that it was Johnson himself who was most skeptical of the torpedo lies. And it was Johnson himself who trashed the attempts of the Hawks following the initial incident to fabricate more Tonkin Gulf-type phony attacks to justify the bombing of the North and takeover of the war by the U.S. military. Once elected, of course, LBJ gave up the ghost and the rest is genocidal history.
The real hero of the book is John F. Kennedy. Kaiser, Jones and Newman had gone pretty far in making the case that if not for Dallas, there would have been no wider war. And the horrors of the 60s and 70s for Southeast Asia would have been avoided. (At least the U.S. generated part of it.) Gareth Porter clinches it. Kennedy here is a true Machiavellian, outflanking and trumping opponents of his anti-war policy, playing things very close to the vest. Until Diem. The murders of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother shocked Kennedy. And -- perhaps for the first time -- he understood exactly what he was up against. In the weeks that followed, he spoke often of his own death and possible assassination. Including the morning of November 22, 1963.
One hopes for a sequel from Porter, taking us through the anguish of Johnson's second term, and into the intentional genocide of the Whittier Vampire and his Nobel Peace Prize-winning lapdog.
that has been known for some time in a very different light,
casting doubts not only as to how we have viewed the conflicts
in Southeast Asia, but the entire Cold War as well, right up to
the "perils" of the present American dominance
Interesting to this reader was how our real or perceived power dominance was applied to our Cold War Viet Nam decision making. It's generally assumed the stronger our military the safer and better off we'll be. But Porter shows how the perception of having the upper hand led us into danger, loss and defeat while dismissing an early option for a peaceful resolution we'd have been thrilled to accept later.
Another notable message here is that although our leaders' repeatedly claimed the domino theory meant a defeat in South Viet Nam would lead to a path of losses worldwide eventually threatening us at our borders, even our leaders didn't accept this theory. The more genuine reasons were much more political and involved "motivational bias" in which things are perceived as threats not because they actually are but because it serves interests to regard them as threats. Probably neither LBJ, McNamera and most of the NSC then believed South Viet Nam itself had value to us. What they believed was that the loss of South Viet Nam would reduce our world influence and credibility in our dominance, and have profoundly adverse domestic political consequences.


