Philosophy of Mind: Bolinda Beginner Guides Audiobook – Unabridged

This book is a wonderful introduction to the philosophy of mind from a broadly dualist perspective. Along the way, Feser surveys such topics as qualia, thought, intentionality, and reason. What makes this book so valuable is the way Feser is able to explain somewhat technical issues in terms an interested layperson can understand, without sacrificing any of the intellectual weight of the discipline. Feser himself is a Thomist, and as such, is a kind of dualist, but this doesn't prevent him from treating fairly the various materialist concepts of the mind. What shines through, in my view, is just how hopeless the materialist case is. What one encounters again and again is an assertion or implication by a materialist concept that "this phenomenon or set of phenomena is identical to mind." And the answer, quite frankly, is "No, it isn't." The materialist will assert, for example, that a belief is a set of neural wiring. The problem is that the belief has properties a set of neurons don't: a belief is "about" something (intentionality) whereas a set of neurons, being material, is not inherently "about" anything at all. It just is. This problem leads to what I think was the most insightful portion of the book: an exploration of the concept that the mind is a computer. Feser shows, following John Searle, that a thing's function as a computer is only relative to mind in the first place. Electrical wiring which encodes an algorithm is such that when one stimulates certain wires with a key bearing a symbol for a number, it will fire some wiring and generate a set of pixels which constitutes a symbol of another number. The problem with the materialist concept is that these pixels do not have an inherent (that is, in themselves) relation to the numbers they symbolize. They only have that function with respect to a mind which bears these concepts. Consequently, to develop the notion that the mind is a sort of computer is to put the cart before the horse. A computer is only a computer with respect to the mind, which entails that the computer cannot be the basis for mind.

This is essential reading for anybody who wants to understand why the claims about the mind or soul that one sees in pop-science and on atheist forums are entirely unjustified.

Edward Feser's book is a fine introduction to the contemporary issues in Philosophy of Mind. I believe this is saying a lot because Philosophy of Mind is a terribly difficult subject and there are no really solid boundaries between today's major thinkers. For example, Daniel Dennett (Consciousness Explained), John Searle (Mind, Language, and Society : Philosophy in the Real World), Jerry Fodor (LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited) and Paul Churchland (Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind) are all given some mention and their ideas are discussed in a useful way.

Two major benefits of this book are the Glossary at the end of the book and the Further Reading sections at the end of each chapter. Feser does a great job hitting the high points and the history of Philosophy of Mind in nine painless chapters: 1) Perception, 2) Dualism, 3) Materialism, 4) Qualia, 5) Consciousness, 6) Thought, 7) Intentionality, 8) Person and 9) Postscript (2006). My degree is in Philosophy and I wish I had had this book my freshman year. And while it may not help resolve any of the issues on the topic, it is very helpful in understanding the issues involved. I highly recommend it.

Feser's "Philosophy of Mind" is an extremely well written and balanced introduction to the different views on the philosophy of mind. For some strange reason, I have never been that excited about the arguments and questions in the realm of philosophy of mind. Yet Feser's book has made me realize the value in considering the questions raised by the study of mind. For example, does the existence of qualia undermine materialism? Does Cartesian dualism fall to the "interaction problem" i.e. how does this different substance (the soul) interact or cause changes in this material substance (the body)? These questions are somewhat indicative of the style Feser takes in his book, for as I mentioned above, Feser writes a balanced book, looking at both reasons for and against materialism and for and against Cartesian dualism. These are the two broad categories that Feser compares and contrasts with each other throughout the book. In fact, the book is so balanced for the first 2/3rds or so that I began to think that Feser wrote it in between his atheism and Catholicism stages of his life, and that he personally didn't hold to one position or another at the time of his writing. However, we do learn towards the end that Feser ultimately defends (rightly I believe) hylomorphic dualism. This is a great culmination of the book, as Feser has set it up so that there are some things that Cartesian dualism seems to answer better than materialism, but other things where Cartesian dualism falls short. The solution to the problem is another kind of dualism, the classic dualism of Aquinas and others, one which is totally immune from the interaction problem as well as new scientific findings in neuroscience.

If you are interested in a balanced introduction to philosophy of mind where the author will eventually culminate giving his personal opinion or answer to the questions he poses (I'm annoyed at books/courses that are attempted to be written/taught objectively with no answers given or proposed), this is a great place to start. Feser takes a complicated idea and makes it accessible.