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Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The Cia's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong Hardcover – December 1, 1997
by
Mark Moyar
(Author)
| Mark Moyar (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
Explodes myths surrounding the CIA's top-secret effort to destroy the Viet Cong by neutralizing its civilian leaders, drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with US, South Vietnamese, and North Vietnamese sources. Dissects various attempts to eradicate the Viet Cong infrastructure and analyzes the effectiveness of each, offering a new interpretation of the rise of the Viet Cong and the role the shadow government played in its ascent. Discusses the effects of the program on South Vietnamese villagers, and offers an insider's view of intelligence operations based on officers' and mercenaries' accounts. Includes b&w photos. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.
- Print length416 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Inst Pr
- Publication dateDecember 1, 1997
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.25 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-101557505934
- ISBN-13978-1557505934
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Editorial Reviews
Review
Mark Moyar, a young (born in 1971) Harvard-trained historian, unburdened by the stories drummed into the public psyche by those who built careers on the conventional wisdom, has written a remarkable book that challenges what has become the "Jane Fonda" interpretation of the Vietnam War. Based on primary documents and interviews of firsthand participants on all sides of the conflict. Moyar's book focuses on the CIA role in the now notorious Phoenix Program... [Moyar] displays an uncommon grasp of the problems of agent recruitment and handling peculiar to Vietnam, the social and practical challenges faced by the American advisors and the Vietnamese at all levels, and the blinkered reaction of those reading, watching, and criticizing at home. One is forced to wonder how Phoenix and the Birds of Prey will be received by the many contemporary commentators who for years promulgated as truth views that the book exposes as myths, if not falsehoods. Dare we hope for a broad public debate, or is it more likely that Oliver Stone will produce his own "truth" about Phoenix? -- World Intelligence Review, Hayden Peake, Spring 1998
Mr. Moyar does not moralize; war as he describes it is brutish and occasionally gruesome... Mr. Moyar ably demonstrates that young persons can emerge from Harvard with their senses intact, provided they keep their minds open. This is a fine war read. -- The Washington Times, Joseph Goulden, July 5, 1998
Today's best young scholars tend to question the dogma of an antiwar left that has grown gray without abandoning its animus toward those who served. As one example, Mark Moyar won the 1993 prize for historical research at Harvard University by peeling away the shibboleths that have surrounded the Phoenix program, an effort directed against Vietcong leaders. Mr. Moyar's book, "Phoenix and the Birds of Prey" (Naval Institute, 1997), is a product of that research and a groundbreaking piece of revisionist history on the war. -- The Wall Street Journal, James Webb, July 15, 1998
As an impartial, credible observer, Mark Moyar deserves a laurel for bringing the facts of the Phoenix Program to light. -- Special Warfare, Robert B. Adolph Jr., Winter 1999
He succeeds admirably. His work could be a textbook for the do's and don'ts of counterinsurgency warfare. -- Asian Thought & Society, William Nester, January-April 2000
Moyar began this study as an undergraduate thesis at Harvard, and even though he is now only in his mid-twenties, this book makes him a serious scholar of the Vietnam War. -- Infantry, Joe P. Dunn, January-April 1999
Mr. Moyar does not moralize; war as he describes it is brutish and occasionally gruesome... Mr. Moyar ably demonstrates that young persons can emerge from Harvard with their senses intact, provided they keep their minds open. This is a fine war read. -- The Washington Times, Joseph Goulden, July 5, 1998
Today's best young scholars tend to question the dogma of an antiwar left that has grown gray without abandoning its animus toward those who served. As one example, Mark Moyar won the 1993 prize for historical research at Harvard University by peeling away the shibboleths that have surrounded the Phoenix program, an effort directed against Vietcong leaders. Mr. Moyar's book, "Phoenix and the Birds of Prey" (Naval Institute, 1997), is a product of that research and a groundbreaking piece of revisionist history on the war. -- The Wall Street Journal, James Webb, July 15, 1998
As an impartial, credible observer, Mark Moyar deserves a laurel for bringing the facts of the Phoenix Program to light. -- Special Warfare, Robert B. Adolph Jr., Winter 1999
He succeeds admirably. His work could be a textbook for the do's and don'ts of counterinsurgency warfare. -- Asian Thought & Society, William Nester, January-April 2000
Moyar began this study as an undergraduate thesis at Harvard, and even though he is now only in his mid-twenties, this book makes him a serious scholar of the Vietnam War. -- Infantry, Joe P. Dunn, January-April 1999
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Product details
- Publisher : Naval Inst Pr (December 1, 1997)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 416 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1557505934
- ISBN-13 : 978-1557505934
- Item Weight : 1.85 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.25 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,550,908 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2,591 in Southeast Asia History
- #4,704 in Vietnam War History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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3.1 out of 5 stars
3.1 out of 5
9 global ratings
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Reviewed in the United States on July 27, 2017
Verified Purchase
The detail of the research and the scope of the sources (me included) make this a redoubtable product. You may doubt he war or its participants. But Mark has nailed his research. it is clear that this was a program to coordinate resources and accomplish a legal and methodical reversal of the Communist submerged state.
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1.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting if you were not there. If you were, you'll roll your eyes at some of the content.
Reviewed in the United States on February 22, 2017Verified Purchase
I served for two years with CORDS in the delta. I find the statistics, as reported, are probably correct at the MACV level, but are not accurate at the hamlet/village level. I also disagree with many of the observations of the CORDS program at the village/hamlet level. The mission of the Phoenix program took on different objectives in the different locations throughout South Vietnam. Even in the Delta, there was contention on the impact on the local populace. It may be a valuable book for those to study the war at a political level of administration, but it falls way short of portraying the real Phoenix program and the effect it had on the populace and the politics at the village level. I give the author credit for the research, but as a friend said, “How do you tell someone what Nuoc-mam smells and tastes like until you have the misfortune to try it.?” And—you can’t write about such a painfully sensuous mission unless you crossed the Mekong and walked the village street.
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Reviewed in the United States on September 5, 2015
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Not again
5.0 out of 5 stars
Wipes away the slander and lies that defamed this excellent COIN tool for too long
Reviewed in the United States on October 21, 2013
This is a truly excellent book. For several reasons it dispels the B.S. and bogus lies that were used to smear this program which was the most effective COIN tool the US ever developed. This libeling was done at the behest of the North Vietnamese who told the American New Left leaders such as Tom Hayden how this tool was partially responsible for the NVA loosing the peoples war in the countryside of Vietnam in the last years of American involvement. So the New Left returned home from Hanoi and Paris and through there connections with anti war radical like John Kerry of swift boat fame they were able to influence powerful Democrat politicians such as Ted Kennedy to cease funding for this highly effective tool of counter insurgency warfare. This book published before the insurgencies of this century represent something of a passing down of the institutional knowledge of the Phoenix in Vietnam. I recommend that copies of this book be given to every intelligence enlisted man and officer and Sf professional deploying to a COIN war theater.
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Reviewed in the United States on February 9, 2011
For a work of history, PHOENIX AND THE BIRDS OF PREY has a very odd flavor as it possesses almost no "narrative flow." That is, it neither tells a story chronologically, nor presents its interpretive points in a smoothly flowing, logical sequence. Instead, the book is organized into a series of strictly thematic chapters, each of which presents its own arguments largely in isolation from the rest.
This odd flavor is attributable to the fact that what Mark Moyar has written is less a work of history than a legal brief. The author writes like a defense attorney who is reading down the list of charges in the indictment against the Phoenix Program and trying to refute them one by one, each in its own chapter. The fruits of Mr. Moyar's documentary research and interviews with American and Vietnamese veterans are presented as 'expert witnesses' to support the defense's case, contributing to the book's choppy delivery.
Like any good defense attorney, Mr. Moyar sometimes uses his witnesses in a selective and even misleading fashion. One specific case involves my own dissertation, which dealt with the 173rd Airborne Brigade's pacification operations in Binh Dinh Province in 1969-1971. In Chapter 26, Mr. Moyer states: "When the GVN [Government of South Vietnam] installed good leaders, it succeeded in forming village governments and effective territorial forces from the hamlet populations of every single province, including the coastal provinces from Phu Yen to Quang Nam [including Binh Dinh] where many villagers were still poor and landless and had relatives in the VC." Appended to this statement is a footnote that refers the reader to my dissertation as evidence of the accuracy of this statement. The problem is that my disseration proves the exact opposite -- namely that the GVN was unable to find good leaders in northern Binh Dinh and that its territorial forces there were accordingly almost totally worthless and ineffective.
Mr. Moyar wins some of his points (e.g., Phoenix was not just about assassination, that American advisers generally did not prompt Vietnamese interrogators to use torture, etc.), but in many cases his analysis is deeply flawed and unconvincing. Yet, even in those cases where Mr. Moyar presents telling arguments, his analysis suffers from an excessively polemical tone that pervades the entire book. His all-too-obvious loathing for antiwar critics of the Vietnam War, and determination to discredit other historians who do not agree with his thesis that the U.S. military successfully met the challenges posed by revolutionary guerrilla warfare that it encountered in Vietnam can only make the reader question his objectivity.
Serious historians will also be struck by the paucity of footnotes and citations in certain parts of the book -- particularly those wherein the author presents his most controversial conclusions. For example, Mr. Moyar repeatedly makes broad, sweeping statements about the motivations, attitudes, and political aspirations and loyalties of the South Vietnamese population that are absolutely central to his thesis, but -- judging by the absence of citations -- are unsupported by any evidence other than his own judgement. What makes this absence of supporting quantitative and/or qualitative analysis so alarming is the fact that Mr. Moyar is an historian, not an anthropologist or sociologist.
Thus, altough PHOENIX AND THE BIRDS OF PREY presents a considerable amount of new research, I cannot recommend it those seeking a deeper understanding of the reasons why the United States lost the war in Vietnam.
This odd flavor is attributable to the fact that what Mark Moyar has written is less a work of history than a legal brief. The author writes like a defense attorney who is reading down the list of charges in the indictment against the Phoenix Program and trying to refute them one by one, each in its own chapter. The fruits of Mr. Moyar's documentary research and interviews with American and Vietnamese veterans are presented as 'expert witnesses' to support the defense's case, contributing to the book's choppy delivery.
Like any good defense attorney, Mr. Moyar sometimes uses his witnesses in a selective and even misleading fashion. One specific case involves my own dissertation, which dealt with the 173rd Airborne Brigade's pacification operations in Binh Dinh Province in 1969-1971. In Chapter 26, Mr. Moyer states: "When the GVN [Government of South Vietnam] installed good leaders, it succeeded in forming village governments and effective territorial forces from the hamlet populations of every single province, including the coastal provinces from Phu Yen to Quang Nam [including Binh Dinh] where many villagers were still poor and landless and had relatives in the VC." Appended to this statement is a footnote that refers the reader to my dissertation as evidence of the accuracy of this statement. The problem is that my disseration proves the exact opposite -- namely that the GVN was unable to find good leaders in northern Binh Dinh and that its territorial forces there were accordingly almost totally worthless and ineffective.
Mr. Moyar wins some of his points (e.g., Phoenix was not just about assassination, that American advisers generally did not prompt Vietnamese interrogators to use torture, etc.), but in many cases his analysis is deeply flawed and unconvincing. Yet, even in those cases where Mr. Moyar presents telling arguments, his analysis suffers from an excessively polemical tone that pervades the entire book. His all-too-obvious loathing for antiwar critics of the Vietnam War, and determination to discredit other historians who do not agree with his thesis that the U.S. military successfully met the challenges posed by revolutionary guerrilla warfare that it encountered in Vietnam can only make the reader question his objectivity.
Serious historians will also be struck by the paucity of footnotes and citations in certain parts of the book -- particularly those wherein the author presents his most controversial conclusions. For example, Mr. Moyar repeatedly makes broad, sweeping statements about the motivations, attitudes, and political aspirations and loyalties of the South Vietnamese population that are absolutely central to his thesis, but -- judging by the absence of citations -- are unsupported by any evidence other than his own judgement. What makes this absence of supporting quantitative and/or qualitative analysis so alarming is the fact that Mr. Moyar is an historian, not an anthropologist or sociologist.
Thus, altough PHOENIX AND THE BIRDS OF PREY presents a considerable amount of new research, I cannot recommend it those seeking a deeper understanding of the reasons why the United States lost the war in Vietnam.
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Reviewed in the United States on December 15, 2000
That is the title of chapter 25. Moyar tries to create the impression that loss of support for the viet cong ipso facto meant increased support for the government of South Vietnam by the peasants in the villages. I don't buy it. The peasants in many areas were fed up with the war and wanted little or nothing to do with either side. They would have been happy to have seen a coalition government that would have stopped the fighting. But the last thing in the world that Thieu would agree to was something like that. In many areas the armed viet forces on both sides reached accomodations. To some this might have looked like the Government of Vietnam was coming out on top but the people in the area knew otherwise. When Diem was in power he brought about much the same situation in the countryside where for several years he with seeming ease rounded up most of the communists, to the point where the Americans believed the communist problem was solved. But it wasn't.
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Reviewed in the United States on September 5, 2002
This is the real truth about the Phoenix Program. The anti-war left has tried for years, with some success, to discredit it with disinformation. This is a well-written, accurate history of what really happened and is convincingly documented. And real -- I know, I was there (June 1968-June 1969)
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Reviewed in the United States on March 4, 2005
I happened on this book but haven't read it. My brother's name was mentioned in the book and I would like to hear from those who might have known him and what part he played: Mebane G. Stafford, who had 3 tours in VN, retired as a Col, now deceased.
Marian Stafford
mariana600@yahoo.com
Marian Stafford
mariana600@yahoo.com
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