Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente Revised Edition
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Jeremi Suri
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Jeremi Suri
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“Power and Protest is superb in every respect--imaginatively conceived and elegantly written. This is the most ambitious attempt I have ever seen to explicate the meaning of the cultural revolution of the 1960s and its aftermath. I find the argument provocative and on the whole persuasive. Disparate events usually presented in separate national histories are conceptually connected in what may be seen as the first truly global history of that turbulent decade. This is a most important study that will have an electrifying effect on scholarship and, one hopes, on political leaders everywhere who seem to be grappling with the question of reform versus stalemate both domestically and externally.”―Akira Iriye, Harvard University
“In the community of 'sixties scholars,' virtually all of us at one time or another have nodded sagely in agreement with the assertion that to truly understand the decade, one would need to undertake a comparative international history. In Power and Protest, Jeremi Suri boldly goes in the direction toward which the rest of us merely feebly gesture, and makes a singular contribution to our understanding of the 1960s in world history.”―Maurice Isserman, co-author of America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s
“Jeremi Suri has liberated us from the rigid formalism of "comparative history" to the more satisfying concept of "international history." His fresh look at the 1960s links the elite world of diplomacy and international politics to shared, underlying social and cultural experiences, transcending national and class boundaries, to reveal a more complex, richer view of that unsettling moment. Suri's work is ambitious, but he delivers with thoughtful, pioneering, and rigorous analysis. Here is history on a grand scale.”―Stanley I. Kutler, author of Wars of Watergate:The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon
“Suri's portrayal of detente as counterrevolution is a brilliant rendition of the new diplomatic history. Linking social, demographic, and cultural developments to international politics and diplomacy, Suri shows how domestic protest inspired American, Russian, Chinese, French, and German leaders to collude with one another to stabilize their societies and preserve internal order. This bold and provocative book vividly illuminates the connections between domestic and international politics.”―Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia
“This book heralds the emergence of a newly ambitious agenda in international history, Suri ingeniously links the domestic upheavals that convulsed so many societies in the 1960s with the emergence of the international regime known as detente, giving persuasive weight to his conclusion that "foreign policy is also social policy." Drawing on prodigious research in American and European sources, Suri suggests that common features powerfully shape the lives of all modern states, regardless of their particular demographic, institutional, or ideological configurations. An impressive, original achievement.”―David M. Kennedy, Stanford University
“In clear and concise prose, Suri tells the tale of the stalemate in the Cold War, the rise of global protest in the 1960s, and the coming of détente as a conservative reaction to these events...The watershed year is 1968, when Berkeley, West Berlin, Washington, Paris, Prague, and Wuhan, China were all convulsed by protests that added up to 'global disruption.' The reaction was, Suri argues, détente. Rejecting the traditional balance of power, he uses instead the 'balance of order' to describe the emerging common interest. Thereafter, Nixon, Brezhnev, Mao, and Willy Brandt worked in concert to stabilize their societies, avoid direct challenges, increase secrecy, secure arms control, and repair their personal images through treaties and summits...[I]n the final analysis, this is an indispensable new work.”―C. W. Haury, Choice
“This is a remarkable book which should command a good deal of attention. Not only does Jeremi Suri come up with a striking interpretation of détente but he has thought-provoking things to say about how to do international history. Above all, perhaps, Suri has produced a deeply researched monograph based on a large range of primary sources in several languages which also tackles large issues. There seems little doubt that Suri's book will stir the pot of cold war studies...This book is a major achievement and is eminently worth arguing with.”―Richard Crockatt, Cold War History
“Unlike many first books, Power and Protest is no narrow specialist monograph. On the contrary, Suri draws together domestic and international developments in a meaningful, even ambitious, manner to offer a history of the 1960s on a grand scale.”―Peter Beck, History
“In the community of 'sixties scholars,' virtually all of us at one time or another have nodded sagely in agreement with the assertion that to truly understand the decade, one would need to undertake a comparative international history. In Power and Protest, Jeremi Suri boldly goes in the direction toward which the rest of us merely feebly gesture, and makes a singular contribution to our understanding of the 1960s in world history.”―Maurice Isserman, co-author of America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s
“Jeremi Suri has liberated us from the rigid formalism of "comparative history" to the more satisfying concept of "international history." His fresh look at the 1960s links the elite world of diplomacy and international politics to shared, underlying social and cultural experiences, transcending national and class boundaries, to reveal a more complex, richer view of that unsettling moment. Suri's work is ambitious, but he delivers with thoughtful, pioneering, and rigorous analysis. Here is history on a grand scale.”―Stanley I. Kutler, author of Wars of Watergate:The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon
“Suri's portrayal of detente as counterrevolution is a brilliant rendition of the new diplomatic history. Linking social, demographic, and cultural developments to international politics and diplomacy, Suri shows how domestic protest inspired American, Russian, Chinese, French, and German leaders to collude with one another to stabilize their societies and preserve internal order. This bold and provocative book vividly illuminates the connections between domestic and international politics.”―Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia
“This book heralds the emergence of a newly ambitious agenda in international history, Suri ingeniously links the domestic upheavals that convulsed so many societies in the 1960s with the emergence of the international regime known as detente, giving persuasive weight to his conclusion that "foreign policy is also social policy." Drawing on prodigious research in American and European sources, Suri suggests that common features powerfully shape the lives of all modern states, regardless of their particular demographic, institutional, or ideological configurations. An impressive, original achievement.”―David M. Kennedy, Stanford University
“In clear and concise prose, Suri tells the tale of the stalemate in the Cold War, the rise of global protest in the 1960s, and the coming of détente as a conservative reaction to these events...The watershed year is 1968, when Berkeley, West Berlin, Washington, Paris, Prague, and Wuhan, China were all convulsed by protests that added up to 'global disruption.' The reaction was, Suri argues, détente. Rejecting the traditional balance of power, he uses instead the 'balance of order' to describe the emerging common interest. Thereafter, Nixon, Brezhnev, Mao, and Willy Brandt worked in concert to stabilize their societies, avoid direct challenges, increase secrecy, secure arms control, and repair their personal images through treaties and summits...[I]n the final analysis, this is an indispensable new work.”―C. W. Haury, Choice
“This is a remarkable book which should command a good deal of attention. Not only does Jeremi Suri come up with a striking interpretation of détente but he has thought-provoking things to say about how to do international history. Above all, perhaps, Suri has produced a deeply researched monograph based on a large range of primary sources in several languages which also tackles large issues. There seems little doubt that Suri's book will stir the pot of cold war studies...This book is a major achievement and is eminently worth arguing with.”―Richard Crockatt, Cold War History
“Unlike many first books, Power and Protest is no narrow specialist monograph. On the contrary, Suri draws together domestic and international developments in a meaningful, even ambitious, manner to offer a history of the 1960s on a grand scale.”―Peter Beck, History
About the Author
Jeremi Suri is Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin.
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Product details
- Publisher : Harvard University Press; Revised edition (April 15, 2005)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 384 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0674017633
- ISBN-13 : 978-0674017634
- Item Weight : 1.06 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.12 x 0.94 x 9.25 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#108,331 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #76 in International Relations (Books)
- #104 in International Diplomacy (Books)
- #1,002 in History (Books)
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Reviewed in the United States on April 29, 2019
Verified Purchase
I read this for a graduate history seminar at UC Berkeley and really enjoyed it. Also recommended: Kurlansky's classic: "1968: A Year that Rocked the World."
Reviewed in the United States on July 30, 2006
Verified Purchase
Although the other reviews I read here were justifiably positive, I just wanted to mention that this book is also a very worthwhile read for almost anyone with a passing interest in recent American history and its impact on modern politics, irrelevant of the readers background. Jeremi Suri writes in a wondefully clear and concise manner that allows the reader to immerse themselves in the period of history he is discussing and consider it from every perspective without any particular bias. I highly recommend this book to everyone -- if you buy it you will not be dissapointed.
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4.0 out of 5 stars
The 1960s were a very interesting time and Suri does an excellent job at analyzing how it lead to Detente
Reviewed in the United States on November 18, 2015Verified Purchase
This was a required reading for me, but I found myself surprisingly liking it. The 1960s were a very interesting time and Suri does an excellent job at analyzing how it lead to Detente.
Reviewed in the United States on May 24, 2017
Verified Purchase
Great book! Dr. Suri is insightful and brings attention to many items that aren't always clear contributors to this era! Great lecturer and a great author!
Reviewed in the United States on September 1, 2003
The main thesis of POWER AND PROTEST is best summarized by author Jeremi Suri himself at the end of this brilliant and original exploration of post WWII international relations and their impact and continuity with domestic policy: "In previous decades [the 40s through the early 60s] the Soviet-American rivalry had provided a simple bi-polar framework for both competition and cooperation. This inherited architecture now proved inappropriate for a world in which citizens besieged their leaders, small nations challenged the influence of larger states [France and West Germany; Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the East] and China acted as an independent great power [dealing directly with France, for instance, instead of through their "big brother states, the U.S. and Soviet Union]. The international environment had grown multipolar, but the United States and the Soviet Union desired the continued power and standing they had possessed in the earlier bipolar setting. What Kissenger called a new 'structure of peace' would protect the benefits of order and stability for the largest states despite the fragmenting trends in world affairs. This was the conservative core of detente, and the drive behind the central accomplishment of the superpower summit [between Brezhnev and Nixon in 1972]" P.256.
His supporting thesis that "The strength of detente derived from the fact that it addressed the fears and served the interest of the leaders in the largest states," is well and amply proven with reference to original source material from each period he explores. With state documents and memoirs, he dramatically shows the panic of the world leaders as they confront their suddenly, inconveniently active citizens, who, given reason to hope in the early 60s with their leaders' charismatic rhetoric about the "New Frontier," the "Great Society," "Great Leap Forward," "Communist Construction (and DeStalinization)," ironically had their rising expectations dashed by the very same men those who activated these hopes. In their tussle for power, and in their attempts to prove their systems or their insight into world and domestic politics were superior, Mao, DeGaulle, Kennedy, Johnson, Krushchev, Willy Brandt, and others came to fear the chauvinistic idealism they had unleashed in their charismatic rhetoric. Ironically, this leadership cohort, especially the most powerful actors, the U.S. and Soviet Union, felt compelled to reach out to each other, put aside the inflammatory anti-communist and anti-capitalistic rhetoric, and demonstrate to their unruly citizens and client states that as nations they could and would work together in peaceful coexistence. Suri likens these two states to "overmuscled wrestlers" who were constrained by the potential of mutally assured (nuclear) destruction to muzzle their client states' inflammatory rhetoric. The exception that proved the rule, according to Suri, was Vietnam. It was seen by Kennedy and Johnson, as well as by Chinese and Soviets, as a proving ground that would show which set of political arrangements was superior. Far enough away from the U.S., China and the Soviet Union, it met the requirements of a showcase war for all.
As Suri says: "Each of the great powers gained from stability when confronted with the prospect of wide-spread disruption. D?tente assured that the international system would operate smoothly so long as policymakers adhered to their objective 'national interests.' The problem, Suri suggests, is that national interests are "not objective laws, but instead contested ideas," and that "Detente's fatal weakness grew from its inability to address the claims of citizens and small states that refused to accept the status quo because of its perceived injustice." By this he means "From the day that Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Declaration of Principles through the end of the 1970s, the leaders of the great powers suffered repeated criticism for ignoring concerns about national self-determination, human rights, economic fairness, and racial and gender equality."
He notes that "Agitation around these issues had triggered the global disorders in the 1960s that initially made detente appear necessary as a source of stability. Ironically, political leaders reacted to the criticisms of injustice voice in the previous decade by isolating and containing dissent rather than by creating new sources of popular consent." "Detente reflected traditional balance-of-power considerations, but also included a set of policies that deliberately constrained domestic dynamism. Instead of eliminating the suffering and dissatisfaction in the Cold War, it tried to make it all seem 'normal.'"
Global protest, Suri suggests, was given impetus by state programs. College loans and grants, necessary to build a new technocratic citizenry who would through science demonstrate the superiority of their respective political systems, backfired as thousands of young people were herded together in colleges and universities all over the world. There they found a literature of dissent waiting for them by such authors as Solzhenitsyn, Marcuse, Galbraith, and Harrington. Armed with these anti-state and anti-"system" discourses, students around the world developed a common language of dissent and protest, a language soon taken up by the disspossessed all over the world.
Summing up, he says, "Skepticism toward authority is now a global phenomenon" that has grown out of the conservative core of detente and its stepchild, globalization. "Leaders are no longer loved or feared. In some of the largest democracies they are ignored by as much as half of the electorate, which refrains from voting. Leaders are frequently profaned by international media that play on public distrust of politicians. In this cynical environment, we are still living with the dissent and detente of a previous generation."
POWER AND PROTEST is a landmark work of history. Scholarly and highly readable, it is unsurpassed in tracing the roots of dentente as a conservative reaction to the political engagement of the demos across all types of states.
His supporting thesis that "The strength of detente derived from the fact that it addressed the fears and served the interest of the leaders in the largest states," is well and amply proven with reference to original source material from each period he explores. With state documents and memoirs, he dramatically shows the panic of the world leaders as they confront their suddenly, inconveniently active citizens, who, given reason to hope in the early 60s with their leaders' charismatic rhetoric about the "New Frontier," the "Great Society," "Great Leap Forward," "Communist Construction (and DeStalinization)," ironically had their rising expectations dashed by the very same men those who activated these hopes. In their tussle for power, and in their attempts to prove their systems or their insight into world and domestic politics were superior, Mao, DeGaulle, Kennedy, Johnson, Krushchev, Willy Brandt, and others came to fear the chauvinistic idealism they had unleashed in their charismatic rhetoric. Ironically, this leadership cohort, especially the most powerful actors, the U.S. and Soviet Union, felt compelled to reach out to each other, put aside the inflammatory anti-communist and anti-capitalistic rhetoric, and demonstrate to their unruly citizens and client states that as nations they could and would work together in peaceful coexistence. Suri likens these two states to "overmuscled wrestlers" who were constrained by the potential of mutally assured (nuclear) destruction to muzzle their client states' inflammatory rhetoric. The exception that proved the rule, according to Suri, was Vietnam. It was seen by Kennedy and Johnson, as well as by Chinese and Soviets, as a proving ground that would show which set of political arrangements was superior. Far enough away from the U.S., China and the Soviet Union, it met the requirements of a showcase war for all.
As Suri says: "Each of the great powers gained from stability when confronted with the prospect of wide-spread disruption. D?tente assured that the international system would operate smoothly so long as policymakers adhered to their objective 'national interests.' The problem, Suri suggests, is that national interests are "not objective laws, but instead contested ideas," and that "Detente's fatal weakness grew from its inability to address the claims of citizens and small states that refused to accept the status quo because of its perceived injustice." By this he means "From the day that Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Declaration of Principles through the end of the 1970s, the leaders of the great powers suffered repeated criticism for ignoring concerns about national self-determination, human rights, economic fairness, and racial and gender equality."
He notes that "Agitation around these issues had triggered the global disorders in the 1960s that initially made detente appear necessary as a source of stability. Ironically, political leaders reacted to the criticisms of injustice voice in the previous decade by isolating and containing dissent rather than by creating new sources of popular consent." "Detente reflected traditional balance-of-power considerations, but also included a set of policies that deliberately constrained domestic dynamism. Instead of eliminating the suffering and dissatisfaction in the Cold War, it tried to make it all seem 'normal.'"
Global protest, Suri suggests, was given impetus by state programs. College loans and grants, necessary to build a new technocratic citizenry who would through science demonstrate the superiority of their respective political systems, backfired as thousands of young people were herded together in colleges and universities all over the world. There they found a literature of dissent waiting for them by such authors as Solzhenitsyn, Marcuse, Galbraith, and Harrington. Armed with these anti-state and anti-"system" discourses, students around the world developed a common language of dissent and protest, a language soon taken up by the disspossessed all over the world.
Summing up, he says, "Skepticism toward authority is now a global phenomenon" that has grown out of the conservative core of detente and its stepchild, globalization. "Leaders are no longer loved or feared. In some of the largest democracies they are ignored by as much as half of the electorate, which refrains from voting. Leaders are frequently profaned by international media that play on public distrust of politicians. In this cynical environment, we are still living with the dissent and detente of a previous generation."
POWER AND PROTEST is a landmark work of history. Scholarly and highly readable, it is unsurpassed in tracing the roots of dentente as a conservative reaction to the political engagement of the demos across all types of states.
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Reviewed in the United States on February 28, 2010
Suri's book takes a perspective look at how power and protests around the globe contributed to détente in the world. Specifically, he centers his research on the 1960s and he is able to weave readers through with his narratives and arguments.
Chapter one is titled `The Strains of Nuclear Destruction.' Suri argues, like John L. Gaddis, that during the 1940s, possessing nuclear weapons showed the greatness of the superpowers, but by the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the beginnings of the 1950, major changes had set in. The nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers became obsolete because the USSR and USA realized that they could not use them to secure political dominance. They couldn't use them against each other because of the devastating effects they had. With Eisenhower fearing the devastating effect of nuclear weapons, he called on his ideological rival, the Soviet Union, for cooperation in reducing the arms race, but the Soviets cautiously rejected the call only to launch their first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik.
The United States engaged in a psychological warfare with the Soviets not only to allay public insecurity but also to show off to the Soviets that they were also capable of manufacturing stockpiles of arms and ammunitions. Suri is of the view that the Kennedy administration changed what its predecessor sought to do; to limit a nuclear build-up. Instead, Kennedy thought that he could encourage the stockpile of nuclear weapons, although the American public did not agree much with him. He then also sought to challenge the Soviets in space exploration.
Inherently, the Kennedy administration, like the Eisenhower's, was afraid of the effects of the nuclear build up. Suri successfully argues that the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis almost brought the two superpowers close enough to use their nuclear arms. However, they saw the wisdom of not using them thus avoiding war at all cost.
The second chapter of the book focuses on `Political Constraints and Charisma.' He argues that Mao Zedong and Charles de Gaulle of China and France respectively "struggled to create "charismatic" sources of authority that escaped the contradictions between Cold War stalemate and national purpose.... they made a virtue of objecting to compromises that many perceived as necessary" (pp. 44-45). These two leaders formed an alliance where they "grew" independently of the political scuffle between the Soviets and Americans. The images they created of themselves, as a result attracted domestic followers. Suri spends much time in discussing the many political crises that went on in France and how de Gaulle came back to the political scene as a leader in May 1958 during the Algerian independent crisis. A few years after coming back as leader of France, de Gaulle, like Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany, called for a nuclear disarmament and reconciliation between the super powers. He urged Germany to form an alliance with France so that they could become a stronger Europe against the United States in particular. France, however, could not shape the geopolitics of Europe just by forming an alliance with Germany; it was much wider than this. The Franco-German alliance in 1963 eventually led Adenauer to be kicked out of office by his political party, The Christian Democratic Union, because of America's disengagement in Europe. France therefore had to find a new partner and it focused its attention of China.
The communist party leader Mao Zedong brought new ideas into the Chinese political and social scenes. He redistributed land, gave women rights and he won the hearts of many people in China. Still searching for grandeur, and with the aim of neutralizing the power of the superpowers, France aligned itself with China. Interestingly, China had contributed arms to the FLN forces that fought French soldiers in Algeria, but France overlooked that fact in its quest to neutralize the `potency' of the super powers by breaking the Cold War rivalry. In fact, both France and China pursued their own successive nuclear ambitions which challenged the international dominance of the super powers. Suri argued that "at home nuclear power symbolized strength and achievement-two associations at the core of the charismatic claims to leadership... [T]he French-Chinese opening provided a channel for resisting superpower nuclear control" (p.77). The two `new" powers also engaged in exchange in trading activities which neutralized the influence of the USSR and USA. France was probably more aggressive than China because it had left NATO and so did not need to consult with the United States in its military pursuits.
Suri argued that despite the charismatic nature of Mao and de Gaulle, by 1967 they had lost popular support to the extent that neither could attend commemorative events in each other's country. The two leaders concentrated too much on external relations at the detriment of national domestic issues, hence the major demonstrations in their countries. In the `Illiberal Consequences of Liberal Empire,' Suri argues that the US administration sought to contain communism while it focused on industrial development. For this reason, the US concentrated on Vietnam, but this was later to backfire since it came to no avail; there were no victors in its military engagement in Vietnam. The United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China all asserted their new frontier on Southeast Asia. At the end, it was the divided Vietnamese who suffered most. Having divided Vietnam into two along the Seventeenth parallel into North and South, the superpowers took sides to engage each other in ideological and guerilla warfare. While the communists took the North, the capitalists concentrated on the South. The US did not only want to contain communism but also to promote development. Unfortunately, the US puppet of the South, Diem, did not kowtow to US wishes and so was deposed in a CIA master-minded coup
Lyndon Baines Johnson inherited Vietnam from his predecessor, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, but he was known to stand for the downtrodden; he could not do more to lessen tension than to escalate the situation by sending more American troops to Vietnam. Johnson could probably have done more but he was caught up in other domestic tensions at home. There were civil rights demonstration in major cities in America and he really couldn't focus on many things he had initially planned to do. The growing tension on the home front rose when American viewers saw the atrocities being committed in Vietnam. The anger, thanks to the media, spread all over the world and it sparked demonstrations making LBJ a prisoner in the White House.
The Global Disruption of 1968 is the fifth chapter and probably the cusp of Suri's book. He sees the root cause of the disruption as the "nuclear stalements between the superpowers, unresolved alliance disputes and the increasing imperial nature of domestic institutions that alienated citizens from their governments" (164). He then takes readers through students' activities at the University of California at Berkeley; The Free University in Berlin, West Germany; Demonstrations in Washington DC; Paris; Prague, and Wuhan in China.
Although Suri believes all these demonstrations led to détente, he does not argue successfully to create a direct ink between the demonstrations or riots and détente.
In the last chapter of his book, Suri attention turns to The Diplomacy and Domestic Politics of Détente. For him, "Détente was... a direct reaction to the "global disruption" of 1968 "and he saw "détente as mechanism for domestic fortification" (213). He believed that while balance of power created a stable national equilibrium, balance of order emphasized stability over change and repression over reform (216). Yes, France and China neutralized the USA and USSR potencies but was it a necessary a balance of order? It is a difficult question.
Suri brings the historical narratives to an end by summarizing what détente meant for each of the nations that were engulfed in the turmoil. For the Germans, it meant Ostpolitik, which was a change through rapprochement which called for greater connections between the East and West. Despite the dangers inherent in Ostpolitik, secret meetings between Bonn and Moscow and the acknowledgement of France and Britain led to mutual respect.
China had three fronts to deal with: Germany, the United States and Russia. It established full diplomatic relationship with Germany in 1972 and that also brought peace to their front. The Nixon administration also had secret talks with China and eventually Nixon visited China and that also brought about détente. China's disagreement with the Soviets was also settled between their leaders. Ideological warfare made Soviet-American détente extremely difficult for them but secret meetings solved their problems which also ended the Vietnam War.
Suri has a superb ways of writing which makes reading easy and interesting. Each paragraph begins with a topic sentence upfront and that makes it easy to grasp the content of the paragraph. However, the historical and social context of the book is good for sociologists, historians, and political scientists. The documentation of sources is rich with many primary sources. I, however, do think that Suri wasted too much energy on what did not matter for instance, writing about Lyndon B. Johnson poor background and breaking diplomacy in Senegal to talk to fishermen.
Chapter one is titled `The Strains of Nuclear Destruction.' Suri argues, like John L. Gaddis, that during the 1940s, possessing nuclear weapons showed the greatness of the superpowers, but by the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the beginnings of the 1950, major changes had set in. The nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers became obsolete because the USSR and USA realized that they could not use them to secure political dominance. They couldn't use them against each other because of the devastating effects they had. With Eisenhower fearing the devastating effect of nuclear weapons, he called on his ideological rival, the Soviet Union, for cooperation in reducing the arms race, but the Soviets cautiously rejected the call only to launch their first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik.
The United States engaged in a psychological warfare with the Soviets not only to allay public insecurity but also to show off to the Soviets that they were also capable of manufacturing stockpiles of arms and ammunitions. Suri is of the view that the Kennedy administration changed what its predecessor sought to do; to limit a nuclear build-up. Instead, Kennedy thought that he could encourage the stockpile of nuclear weapons, although the American public did not agree much with him. He then also sought to challenge the Soviets in space exploration.
Inherently, the Kennedy administration, like the Eisenhower's, was afraid of the effects of the nuclear build up. Suri successfully argues that the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis almost brought the two superpowers close enough to use their nuclear arms. However, they saw the wisdom of not using them thus avoiding war at all cost.
The second chapter of the book focuses on `Political Constraints and Charisma.' He argues that Mao Zedong and Charles de Gaulle of China and France respectively "struggled to create "charismatic" sources of authority that escaped the contradictions between Cold War stalemate and national purpose.... they made a virtue of objecting to compromises that many perceived as necessary" (pp. 44-45). These two leaders formed an alliance where they "grew" independently of the political scuffle between the Soviets and Americans. The images they created of themselves, as a result attracted domestic followers. Suri spends much time in discussing the many political crises that went on in France and how de Gaulle came back to the political scene as a leader in May 1958 during the Algerian independent crisis. A few years after coming back as leader of France, de Gaulle, like Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany, called for a nuclear disarmament and reconciliation between the super powers. He urged Germany to form an alliance with France so that they could become a stronger Europe against the United States in particular. France, however, could not shape the geopolitics of Europe just by forming an alliance with Germany; it was much wider than this. The Franco-German alliance in 1963 eventually led Adenauer to be kicked out of office by his political party, The Christian Democratic Union, because of America's disengagement in Europe. France therefore had to find a new partner and it focused its attention of China.
The communist party leader Mao Zedong brought new ideas into the Chinese political and social scenes. He redistributed land, gave women rights and he won the hearts of many people in China. Still searching for grandeur, and with the aim of neutralizing the power of the superpowers, France aligned itself with China. Interestingly, China had contributed arms to the FLN forces that fought French soldiers in Algeria, but France overlooked that fact in its quest to neutralize the `potency' of the super powers by breaking the Cold War rivalry. In fact, both France and China pursued their own successive nuclear ambitions which challenged the international dominance of the super powers. Suri argued that "at home nuclear power symbolized strength and achievement-two associations at the core of the charismatic claims to leadership... [T]he French-Chinese opening provided a channel for resisting superpower nuclear control" (p.77). The two `new" powers also engaged in exchange in trading activities which neutralized the influence of the USSR and USA. France was probably more aggressive than China because it had left NATO and so did not need to consult with the United States in its military pursuits.
Suri argued that despite the charismatic nature of Mao and de Gaulle, by 1967 they had lost popular support to the extent that neither could attend commemorative events in each other's country. The two leaders concentrated too much on external relations at the detriment of national domestic issues, hence the major demonstrations in their countries. In the `Illiberal Consequences of Liberal Empire,' Suri argues that the US administration sought to contain communism while it focused on industrial development. For this reason, the US concentrated on Vietnam, but this was later to backfire since it came to no avail; there were no victors in its military engagement in Vietnam. The United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China all asserted their new frontier on Southeast Asia. At the end, it was the divided Vietnamese who suffered most. Having divided Vietnam into two along the Seventeenth parallel into North and South, the superpowers took sides to engage each other in ideological and guerilla warfare. While the communists took the North, the capitalists concentrated on the South. The US did not only want to contain communism but also to promote development. Unfortunately, the US puppet of the South, Diem, did not kowtow to US wishes and so was deposed in a CIA master-minded coup
Lyndon Baines Johnson inherited Vietnam from his predecessor, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, but he was known to stand for the downtrodden; he could not do more to lessen tension than to escalate the situation by sending more American troops to Vietnam. Johnson could probably have done more but he was caught up in other domestic tensions at home. There were civil rights demonstration in major cities in America and he really couldn't focus on many things he had initially planned to do. The growing tension on the home front rose when American viewers saw the atrocities being committed in Vietnam. The anger, thanks to the media, spread all over the world and it sparked demonstrations making LBJ a prisoner in the White House.
The Global Disruption of 1968 is the fifth chapter and probably the cusp of Suri's book. He sees the root cause of the disruption as the "nuclear stalements between the superpowers, unresolved alliance disputes and the increasing imperial nature of domestic institutions that alienated citizens from their governments" (164). He then takes readers through students' activities at the University of California at Berkeley; The Free University in Berlin, West Germany; Demonstrations in Washington DC; Paris; Prague, and Wuhan in China.
Although Suri believes all these demonstrations led to détente, he does not argue successfully to create a direct ink between the demonstrations or riots and détente.
In the last chapter of his book, Suri attention turns to The Diplomacy and Domestic Politics of Détente. For him, "Détente was... a direct reaction to the "global disruption" of 1968 "and he saw "détente as mechanism for domestic fortification" (213). He believed that while balance of power created a stable national equilibrium, balance of order emphasized stability over change and repression over reform (216). Yes, France and China neutralized the USA and USSR potencies but was it a necessary a balance of order? It is a difficult question.
Suri brings the historical narratives to an end by summarizing what détente meant for each of the nations that were engulfed in the turmoil. For the Germans, it meant Ostpolitik, which was a change through rapprochement which called for greater connections between the East and West. Despite the dangers inherent in Ostpolitik, secret meetings between Bonn and Moscow and the acknowledgement of France and Britain led to mutual respect.
China had three fronts to deal with: Germany, the United States and Russia. It established full diplomatic relationship with Germany in 1972 and that also brought peace to their front. The Nixon administration also had secret talks with China and eventually Nixon visited China and that also brought about détente. China's disagreement with the Soviets was also settled between their leaders. Ideological warfare made Soviet-American détente extremely difficult for them but secret meetings solved their problems which also ended the Vietnam War.
Suri has a superb ways of writing which makes reading easy and interesting. Each paragraph begins with a topic sentence upfront and that makes it easy to grasp the content of the paragraph. However, the historical and social context of the book is good for sociologists, historians, and political scientists. The documentation of sources is rich with many primary sources. I, however, do think that Suri wasted too much energy on what did not matter for instance, writing about Lyndon B. Johnson poor background and breaking diplomacy in Senegal to talk to fishermen.
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Reviewed in the United States on November 12, 2009
Jeremi Suri tries to do a lot with this book, his first (a re-vamping of his doctoral dissertation), and does not entirely succeed. A United States historian, he tries to use his understanding of 1968 in Berkeley, CA to understand the rest of the world, and the American lens does not always display clearly. He's obviously enamored of Charles de Gaulle, to a point where it's almost embarrassing, and his treatment of Mao's China leaves a lot to be desired. That being said, Power and Protest has some good moments, particularly when Suri discusses Germany (although this part is far too brief and could have been much better had de Gaulle gotten fewer accolades). Still, overall, it's just not that great, and his thesis is if anything disproven.
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