- Paperback: 210 pages
- Publisher: United States Government Printing (November 1999)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 1929667000
- ISBN-13: 978-0160590351
- ASIN: 0160590353
- Product Dimensions: 0.5 x 6.2 x 9.2 inches
- Shipping Weight: 12 ounces
- Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars See all reviews (18 customer reviews)
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,665,132 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
Getting the download link through email is temporarily not available. Please check back later.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis 0th Edition
Use the Amazon App to scan ISBNs and compare prices.
Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought
Top Customer Reviews
Heuer's point is that `analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves'. The book presents a discussion of how mental models and subconscious cognitive processes can limit our reasoning capabilities (especially when coping with uncertainty and doubt), as well as an introduction on how we can try to understand and negate these effects.
In his analysis, Heuer presents data from internal and external cognitive studies, scrutinizes past CIA success and failure cases, and proposes a re-evaluation of the way we generally look at problems. The author brilliantly makes his point in Chapter 13 by showing scenarios in which the reader is invited to review previous statements and `evidence' from the text, look at the discussion from different angles, methodically apply or remove certain models, and then compare his/her own conclusions as a professional analyst would be expected to do.
The outcomes are disturbing, but not surprising. Disturbing because it is alarming to see how our judgments are normally biased by previous experiences, pre-conceptions and mental models; also because it is extremely hard to change or even notice this fact by ourselves.Read more ›
The author very succinctly and methodically explains how as intelligence/information is gathered, a natural and possibly unavoidable human response may prevent an analyst from seeing objectively what is occurring.
The author give examples of how an analyst will automatically start to correlate data into a primary analysis despite trying not to. As the author explains there is a strong tendancy to disregard information that is contrary to the analysts' primary analysis and over estimate the importance of data that correlates with the analysts' primary analysis. Thus the final analysis may be based upon a flawed primary analysis which is in turn based on incomplete data, colored any analytical prejudices the analyst may have.
An absolute must read for any police or law enforcement officers.
As well as anybody who must analyze data from engineers doing failure analysis to doctors doing disgnosis.
My main concern is that the examples are not really about intelligence,
they are general psychology, with very few examples directly relevant to intelligence.
There are not revelations about secret war here, not even of old incidencies: the book was carefully screened by CIA before it was declassified.
More modern books (and in freestyle, not in textbook format) with the same contents include:
Massimi Piatelli-Palmarini: Inevitable illusions: How our mistakes of reason rule our minds (1994)
Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds
Carol Tavris & Elliot Aronson: Mistakes were made (but not by me): Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions and hurtful acts (2007)
Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts
I believe it is clear that he is addressing this book (or series of articles) to those who are already trained intelligence analysts in some capacity, and is discussing the importance of, and giving some instruction on how, to avoid the pitfalls and hindrances associated with our human cognitive processes. From my perspective, he is not trying to teach a particular one-size-fits-all analysis technique, or trying to imply that anyone can perform and excel as an analyst just by following a prescribed procedure.
Actually, I believe he addresses some very deep and sophisticated topics in a very practical manner. His writing is very plain and easy to understand, as are the examples and studies he cites to make his point. He does not attempt to write like a scientist, he keeps the subject matter on a level that makes it easy to understand, which in turn, makes it more useful to you. (You cannot apply what you do not understand.) In fact, as I read this book I could immediately recall situations in my life where I paid a price for making some of the mistakes he outlines and see that I could have brought about much better conclusions and solutions if I had the knowledge in this book.Read more ›
Most Recent Customer Reviews
Fascinating read... Highly recommended to scholars and analysts across all academic and intellectual disciplines.Published 20 months ago by JRDM
Human beings, as Steven Pinker rightly asserts in How the Mind Works, are not equipped to handle statistics or large amounts of information. Read morePublished on January 25, 2014 by Alex
There is an excellent book! It is necessary for intelligence analysts.
***There is an error with the pages, because there is no page 83.
This book is a must read for anyone wishing to understand how the human brain can organize massive amounts of data despite having finite capacity and capability. Read morePublished on December 15, 2013 by ME Kincaid
Should be required reading for policy analysts as well. Worthwhile for anyone engaged in the practice of assessing information and making/recommending decisions, I think... Read morePublished on December 3, 2013 by GERALD B THOMPSON
to see a world in a grain of sand lies the complex ocean of sand grains of different angles of the brainPublished on July 1, 2013 by DCantu
This book is already a required text in many schools but I recommend it to intelligence analysts and leaders that evaluate intelligence reports. Read morePublished on February 7, 2013 by Chris Sims
I wish it has more insight on bias correction when making decisions. It could be that the only way to address your own bias is via argument with someone.Published on December 31, 2012 by a listener
I don't want to post a negative posting about this book. However, I ordered it for a crime analysis course and found it useless. I assume because it didn't really fit the course. Read morePublished on December 6, 2011 by LLOVETTE