- Paperback: 224 pages
- Publisher: Harper Torchbooks (1977)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0061319694
- ISBN-13: 978-0061319693
- Product Dimensions: 8 x 5.3 x 0.5 inches
- Shipping Weight: 5.6 ounces
- Average Customer Review: 11 customer reviews
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #624,872 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, The
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Text: English, German (translation) --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
About the Author
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was born in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. He studied at the University of Freiburg and became a professor at the University of Marburg in 1932. After publishing his his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), he returned to Freiburg to assume the chair of philosophy upon Husserl's retirement.
Top customer reviews
Yes, Heidegger is difficult. Heidegger is always difficult. But it is worth trudging through.
For those seriously attempting to understand Heidegger's essays this is a very helpful edition; although I do not know German, Levitt really seems to understand both Heidegger and the nuances of the German language. His notes (while not necessarily clearer than Heidegger) help the English speaker get into the nuances lost in translation which is of utmost importance.
Thing is you can get everything in this book online somewhere, and some guides that will help you through it. I read better with a hard copy, which is the only reason I bought the book. Turns out this guy is pretty big in the philosophy world, so it's a good read if that stuff intrigues you. Personally, I'm going to stick to programming and stay "enframed".
He wrote in the title essay, “In what follows we shall be QUESTIONING concerning technology… and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds. Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the essence of ‘tree,’ we have to become aware that That which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees. Likewise, the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.” (Pg. 3-4)
He says, “Freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and lighted up, i.e., of the revealed. It is to the happening of revealing, i.e., of truth, that freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship. All revealing belongs within a harbouring and a concealing. But that which frees---the mystery---is concealed and always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open. The freedom of the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint of mere laws. Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a revealing upon its way.” (Pg. 25)
He suggests, “Thus the coming to presence of technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power. Everything, then, depends on this: that we ponder this arising and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this happen? Above all through our catching sight of what comes to presence in technology, instead of merely starting at the technological. So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology.” (Pg. 32) In another essay, he says, “If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, Enframing as the danger within Being, is Being itself, then technology will never allow itself to be mastered, either positively or negatively, by a human doing founded merely on itself. Technology, whose essence if Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome by men. That would mean, after all, that man was the master of Being.” (Pg. 38)
In the essay on Nietzsche, he observes, “In the word ‘God is dead’ the name ‘God,’ thought essentially, stands for the suprasensory world of those ideals which contain the goal that exists beyond earthly life for that life and that, accordingly, determines life from above, and also in a certain way, from without. But now when unalloyed faith in God, as determined through the Church, dwindles away, when in particular the doctrine of faith, theology, in its role of serving as the normative explanation of that which is as a whole, is curtailed and thrust aside, then the fundamental restructuring, in keeping with which the fixing of goals, extending into the suprasensory, rules sensory, earthly life, is in no way thereby shattered as well.” (Pg. 64)
He asserts, “every anthropology in which previous philosophy is employed at will but is explained as superfluous qua philosophy has the advantage of seeing clearly what is required along with the affirmation of anthropology. Through this, the intellectual situation finds some clarification, while the laborious fabrications of some absurd offshoots as the national-socialist philosophies produce nothing but confusion. The world view does indeed need and use philosophical erudition, but it requires no philosophy, since, as world view, it has already taken over a particular interpretation and structuring of whatever is.” (Pg. 140)
He states, “Anthropology is that interpretation of man that already knows fundamentally what man is and hence can never ask who he may be. For with this question it would have to confess itself shaken and overcome. But how can this be expected of anthropology when the latter has expressly to achieve nothing less than the securing consequent upon the self-consciousness of the subjectum?” (Pg. 153)
In the final essay, he argues, “Physics as physics can make no assertions about physics. All the assertions of physics speak after the manner of physics. Physics itself is not a possible object of a physical experiment. The same holds for philology. As the theory of language and literature, philology is never a possible object of philological observation. This is equally the case for every science… historiography never grasps it essence of historiography, i.e., as a science. If we want to assert something about mathematics as theory, then we must leave behind the object-area of mathematics, together with mathematics’ own way of representing. We can never discover through mathematical reckoning what mathematics itself is.” (Pg. 176-177)
These essays are far less “abstract” than Heidegger’s writing usually is; they will be of great interest to anyone studying Heidegger.