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Hasegawa has written a great book, but there are enough caveats to his analyses, that I cannot award the book a full 5 stars. I think that Richard B. Frank's Downfall is more persuasive in his interpretations about the role of atomic weapons and Soviet entry, and I find Frank's thoughts (look for the H-diplo roundtable discussion online for Frank on Hasegawa) to usually be the ones I find most persuasive. Hasegawa has done some excellent research into this period, and his insights into the Soviet sphere are especially illuminating. He also is admirably clear in what his views are and why he thinks what he does.
First, a brief overview of Hasegawa's thesis and what the book is about. This is about the decisions that the Japanese, Americans, and Soviets made leading up to Japan's surrender in September 1945. Hasegawa maintains that Stalin and Truman raced to see who could force Japan's surrender first. In doing so, he gives a good overview of the situation in 1944-1945, and follows the political maneuvering in the USSR, the US, and in Japan itself. He has a good amount of focus on Truman's motivations, including revenge for Pearl Harbor. Stalin's motivations are to grab as much territory as possible from the Japanese. The Japanese wish to not accept an unconditional surrender that would change their political system greatly.
My greatest criticism is that Hasegawa often seems to have decided that his supposition that Truman didn't want the Soviets to enter the war (so he could force surrender by himself) is taken to be true, and he finds ways of reading Truman so that this seems plausible. I think that Truman's actions are far more ambiguous and find the criticism of some sources being displayed with too much bias to have some merit. Michael Kort's book review shows how Hasegawa's treatment of Truman's reaction to Soviet entry into the war suggests that Hasegawa reads too much into Truman's motivations [Hasegawa claims Truman was profoundly disappointed, but a look at the sources shows that Truman didn't appear to be disappointed at all, at least to me and Kort]. It's also odd that Hasegawa freely admits that the Truman administration didn't try to use China to stop Soviet entry into the war. If Truman was so determined to prevent Soviet entry, it seems like he should have jumped at the chance to prevent the Soviets by having the Chinese not come to an agreement with them.
Hasegawa also agrees that the Japanese were not about to surrender if the US had just added that the emperor would be retained (so a conditional "unconditional surrender"). While Hasegawa laments that other possibilities for peace were not always pursued, he states "Without the twin shocks of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would never have accepted surrender in August." This seems key to me, as the earlier the surrender, the fewer people (mostly non-Japanese Asians) would die under Japanese occupation, and fewer Japanese would starve from a naval blockade and bombing campaign against Japanese railways. Frank makes a great case for this, and I still have not found anyone with a satisfactory reply.
Hasegawa thinks that Soviet entry alone would have caused surrender before November 1, but in such a scenario the Soviets may have taken part of Hokkaido and been a part of the post-war occupation. It is difficult to believe this would have been a good thing for the Japanese, and may have meant more land under Soviet occupation than what actually happened. (The treatment of Japanese POWs by the Soviets does not inspire confidence that the Japanese in Hokkaido would have been treated well.)
One other problem I find with Hasegawa's analysis is how he views atomic weapons. It is certainly true that atomic bombs are much more powerful, but the idea behind them is very similar to strategic bombing, and the decision to attack civilians is never discussed with this full context. It may be true that it is easier to kill lots of people with atomic weapons, but fire bombing and conventional bombing of cities is also quite effective, and the same rationale backs both of them: civilians are military targets because they allow the opposing military to continue fighting. This certainly does not justify dropping the atomic bombs, but I think acknowledging this, adds a bit more balance to the discussion. Also, Alex Wellerstein (of the nuclear secrecy blog) has some excellent articles on Truman and the bomb that make a pretty good case that Truman did not fully understand that Hiroshima was a civilian and military target. He seemed to think it was mostly a military target. This also offers an alternative interpretation to Truman's defense of the bombs afterward.
Overall, I found the book enlightening, even if I found a lot to disagree with. Most of them are simply different interpretations of the same event, and I think for the most part Hasegawa does a good job explaining his view and justifying it as a possible or plausible explanation.
I would still recommend Frank's Downfall for an overview in general. Hasegawa's analysis of the Soviets is what really sets this book apart.
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