- Series: Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery
- Paperback: 464 pages
- Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition (April 12, 1992)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0415084008
- ISBN-13: 978-0415084000
- Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 1 x 9.2 inches
- Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
- Average Customer Review: 4 customer reviews
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,035,085 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery 1st Edition
Use the Amazon App to scan ISBNs and compare prices.
"Neverworld Wake" by Marisha Pessl
Read the absorbing new psychological suspense thriller from acclaimed New York Times bestselling author Marisha Pessl. Learn more
‘What distinguishes Popper from a great dull army of philosophers of science is that reading him is good for us’ Donald MacKay in Nature
Top customer reviews
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
The book itself is a hard read; much of it grinding logical argument that employs symbolic logic and probability notation. This is hard work to read, and the technical details start to seem repetitious at times. But, the persistent reader is rewarded with two types of payoff - first is the gradual building up of an understanding of Popper's key theses, as criticism after criticism is dealt with with technical argument, and second, every now and again a several page passage of incredibly lucid and inspiring prose appears, islands of passionate apology for science in seas of technical argument.
One of the interesting things about this book is that it shows how wrong even some Popperians are about Popper. It has been said that Popper understates the role of explanation in science - but after reading this book one could hardly say that. It has also been said that Popper put too much emphasis on the demarcation problem. This book shows exactly why that problem is important and why Popper focused on it so much.
A great book, and a hard book.
This is probably the least enjoyable of Popper's works, though it offers an important corrective to the widespread idea that Popper's ideas were superseded by Kuhn and Lakatos. In the first part, "The Critical Approach" Popper replies to Kuhn and Lakatos and shows that they never really offered significant criticisms (or alternatives) to the critical approach or to Popper's theory of conjectural objective knowledge. They did identify some problems with "falsification" and these were widely regarded as serious criticisms of Popper's ideas, even though he had recognized the problems some decades before and answered them. For example, Popper had always realised that falsification was only logically decisive (in a way that verification was not) because in real life observations are fallible and they need to be interpreted in the light of theories.
In the second part of the book Popper outlines his thoughts on the propensity interpretation of probability. This is his effort to overcome the defects of subjective theories of probability and the challenge of providing a theory of the probability of single events. This is an important but technical area of his work which some people find engrossing and others approach with a kind of mental block. I suggest that you ask David Miller to comment on Part II.