Enjoy fast, FREE delivery, exclusive deals and award-winning movies & TV shows with Prime
Try Prime
and start saving today with Fast, FREE Delivery
Amazon Prime includes:
Fast, FREE Delivery is available to Prime members. To join, select "Try Amazon Prime and start saving today with Fast, FREE Delivery" below the Add to Cart button.
Amazon Prime members enjoy:- Cardmembers earn 5% Back at Amazon.com with a Prime Credit Card.
- Unlimited Free Two-Day Delivery
- Instant streaming of thousands of movies and TV episodes with Prime Video
- A Kindle book to borrow for free each month - with no due dates
- Listen to over 2 million songs and hundreds of playlists
- Unlimited photo storage with anywhere access
Important: Your credit card will NOT be charged when you start your free trial or if you cancel during the trial period. If you're happy with Amazon Prime, do nothing. At the end of the free trial, your membership will automatically upgrade to a monthly membership.
Buy new:
$16.38$16.38
FREE delivery: Monday, Aug 14 on orders over $25.00 shipped by Amazon.
Payment
Secure transaction
Ships from
Amazon
Sold by
Returns
Eligible for Return, Refund or Replacement within 30 days of receipt
Buy used: $5.90
Other Sellers on Amazon
& FREE Shipping
91% positive over last 12 months
& FREE Shipping
92% positive over last 12 months
FREE Shipping
100% positive over last 12 months
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise Hardcover – February 15, 2011
There is a newer edition of this item:
$29.95
(69)
Only 3 left in stock (more on the way).
Purchase options and add-ons
How did China transform itself so quickly? In Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise, Revised Edition Carl Walter and Fraser Howie go deep inside the Chinese financial machine to illuminate the social and political consequences of the unique business model that propelled China to economic powerhouse status, and question whether this rapid ascension really lives up to its reputation.
All eyes are on China, but will it really surpass the U.S. as the world's premier global economy? Walter and Howie aren't so certain, and in this revised and updated edition of Red Capitalism they examine whether or not the 21st century really will belong to China.
- The specter of a powerful China is haunting the U.S. and other countries suffering from economic decline and this book explores China's next move
- Packed with new statistics and stories based on recent developments, this new edition updates the outlook on China's future with the most cutting-edge information available
- Find out how China financed its current position of strength and whether it will be able to maintain its astonishing momentum
Indispensable reading for anyone looking to understand the limits that China's past development decisions have imposed on its brilliant future, Red Capitalism is an essential resource for anyone considering China's business strategies in today's extremely challenging global economy.
- Print length256 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherWiley
- Publication dateFebruary 15, 2011
- Dimensions6.4 x 0.95 x 8.92 inches
- ISBN-100470825863
- ISBN-13978-0470825860
The Amazon Book Review
Book recommendations, author interviews, editors' picks, and more. Read it now.
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Editorial Reviews
Amazon.com Review
In Red Capitalism, Carl Walter and Fraser Howie detail how the Chinese government reformed and modeled its financial system in the 30 years since it began its policy of engagement with the west. Instead of a stable series of policies producing steady growth, China's financial sector has boomed and gone bust with regularity in each decade. The latest decade is little different. Chinese banks have become objects of political struggle while they totter under balance sheets bloated by the excessive state-directed lending and bond issuance of 2009.
Looking forward, the government's response to the global financial crisis has created a banking system the stability of which can be maintained only behind the walls of a non-convertible currency, a myriad of off-balance sheet arrangements with non-public state entities and the strong support of its best borrowers--the politically potent National Champions--who are the greatest beneficiaries of the financial status quo.
China's financial system is not a model for the west and, indeed, is not a sustainable arrangement for China itself as it seeks increasingly to assert its influence internationally. This is not a story of impending collapse, but of frustrated reforms that suggests that any full opening and meaningful reform of the financial sector is not, indeed cannot be, on the government's agenda anytime soon.
Q&A with Authors Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie
You have been writing together about the Chinese financial system for over a decade, what are the biggest changes you have seen?
The obvious one is just the shear size of the markets and the economy. At the time of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 China’s foreign reserves were about 150 billion US$. Now they are twenty times bigger. The number of listed companies has more than doubled, the daily trade volumes in Shanghai have increased ten-fold and only a handful of government bonds had been issued. Now there are thousands of different debt products. Everywhere you look the numbers just seem to get bigger and bigger, but that doesn’t tell the whole story. All the growth comes without the expected development: Chinese markets remain primitive in spite of their size.
How do the markets remain primitive? Surely the growth brought development?
China has done a fantastic job at building the market infrastructure. Trading and settlement systems and all that goes along with what we would call a modern market is there, but in nearly every case, the market has been warped or restricted by the government. Take the bond market, the government sets interest rates and even the rates at which bonds can be issued. No bond investor considers the possibility of default of the issuer because the assumption is that the government will step in to cover the risk. What then does a bond market do if credit risk and interest rate risk have been removed? In the stock market, the state still remains the largest holder of shares and has majority ownership of all the major companies. No one seriously expects the state to ever sell down their holdings, so the market doesn’t price companies but shares. The stock market fundamentally should be about pricing capital and companies, but since the state owns the companies, the market isn’t the place where company control and ownership are traded.
Has the entry of foreign investors, banks and brokers made a difference to the markets?
In a word, no. There have been a broad range of developments and programs to allow foreign capital into the domestic markets, but foreign onshore operations remain very small and tightly controlled. Foreign stock investors have only been allowed to invest less than 20 billion US$ into Chinese domestic stocks over the past decade; the foreign banks’ share of the banking market has fallen. Only now are we starting to see foreign capital get into the domestic bond market. China bulls point to this as progress and development, but the pace of change is glacial and the returns limited; foreigners hold only 1.77 percent of Chinese financial assets.
In Red Capitalism you focus on the banking sector. Why was that?
It is true that the restructuring of state enterprises in order to sell shares and raise capital has transformed China’s corporate sector. It is also the most glamorous area of finance. The truth, however, is that equity capital has provided in any given year less than 10 percent of all corporate capital raised. The real source of corporate finance in China was and remains the banks, which are the very heart of the entire system.
The Western financial system has been shown to be very imperfect, but does the Chinese model offer an alternative?
China’s bankers have said publicly that after the global financial crisis they no longer have a model to follow. The reason its banks emerged safely from the global turmoil is because they were walled off from it behind an inconvertible currency and tiny international credit exposures. In today’s world of global trade, banks must be more than simply purveyors of cheap capital to domestic companies. China’s banks have yet to reach out to assist its National Champions in their expansion overseas. So it is inaccurate to compare the two financial systems.
You talk about the fragile foundation of China’s rise, how do you think that will play out over the next twenty years? Will China become a superpower like America?
China’s weaknesses are very real and the problems will take a lot of determined effort to solve. Perhaps some of them can’t be solved without a break with the past, but we want to downplay the idea that collapse is imminent. The Chinese government is not getting rid of its currency controls any time soon, so they will be able to cushion the impact of any downturn reasonably well. The weakness of the system will play out through continual misallocation of capital and resources. Investment will follow political whim, resulting in tremendous waste and corruption. China will continue to grow and get bigger, so maybe the economy will be bigger than the states, but it will not be able to exert the same influence that the US can and will continue to do--unless the government embraces real reform across a broad spectrum of issues.
Review
– Financial Times, January 2011
“So pervasive has this view [that the 21st century is China's for the taking] become that any effort to examine whether it's actually true comes as a breath of fresh air. "Red Capitalism" is such a work. Authors Carl E. Walter and Fraser J.T. Howie, both investment bankers, argue that China isn't so different from other economies nor so immune from normal economic laws as cheerleaders argue. An examination of the financial system—or "how China's political elite manages money and the country's economy," as the authors put it—offers a useful lens through which to view much broader issues.”
– The Wall Street Journal, January 2011
“[The authors’] ongoing research is an indispensable resource for those seeking the reality behind the often nauseating and sycophantic hyperbole surrounding China’s capital markets.”
– China Economic Quarterly, December 2010
“In their new book, "Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Riser Carl E. Walter and Fraser IT. Howie paint a troubling portrait of the Chinese economy and financial system. Despite the nation's mind-boggling growth and images of gleaming skyscrapers and luxury cars, the authors say the Chinese growth model is flawed and fragile, and they warn about substantial risks accumutating in its banking system.”
– The New York Times & International Herald Tribune Asian edition, January 2011
“If Walter and Howie are right, China may be approaching a period when it can no longer hide the systemic flaws in its banking system; the more profound and problematic question the authors of Red Capitalism want their readers to ask is what this means for China as a whole. The answer will likely impact not just the Chinese, but people around the world as well.”
– Asia Times Online, January 2011
The most important financial book of the year."
— James Grant, editor, Grant's Interest Rate Observer
“Red Capitalism peels back the facade of China's economy and reveals how the dominant role of the state has led to enormous financial leverage and endemic malinvestment. China's major role in the global economy makes Red Capitalism required reading for any financial industry fiduciary.”
— Mark L. Hart III, Chairman, Corriente Advisors, L.L.C.
Review
--Rick Carew, Former Asia M&A Reporter, The Wall Street Journal
In Red Capitalism, Carl Walter and Fraser Howie give a powerful, albeit controversial explanation of the fragile underpinnings of the financial edifice that financed the seemingly unstoppable rise of China on the global stage-which is all the more persuasive thanks to their careful mining of the data. Their thesis that China has the trappings of a market system but not the substance should be considered by anyone dealing with or investing in China-categories which embrace most of the world today. Their contention that China ultimately is a "family business" explains much that is puzzling to outsiders.
--Henny Sender, Chief Correspondent, International Finance, Financial Times
Red Capitalism is a superb guide to China's financial labyrinth. It's a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the sources of Chinese economic power, and the threat posed by the nation's vast hidden debts.
--Arthur Kroeber, Editor, China Economic Quarterly
Finally, a way into the world's most important and least understood financial system. For insight into how China's economy actually operates, begin here!
--Thomas Easton, Asia Business Editor, The Economist
A penetrating analysis that demonstrates how hard it is to follow the old adage "follow the money", and how rewarding it is to understand what will really drive China into the future.
--Christian Murck, President, American Chamber of Commerce in China
Walter and Howie put the Chinese financial system under the microscope to examine how an absence of leadership, institutional squabbling and complacency have seen appetites for reform sputter out, and replaced by stagnation and dysfunction. Theirs is a fascinating, entertaining and necessary corrective to the hyperbole surrounding China's seemingly-miraculous rise.
--David Wilder, Beijing Bureau Chief, Market News International
Walter and Howie's penetrating study addresses a critically important issue in China's political economy. They possess a rare depth of experience in the analysis of the Chinese financial sector. Their hard-hitting conclusions, based on a wealth of empirical research, will stimulate debate about the future of the Chinese financial system at a critical point in its evolution.
--Peter Nolan, Sinyi Professor, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge
From the Inside Flap
For many years to come now, China's economy has seemed unstoppable. A slow appreciation of the renminbi in 2007 brought wave upon wave of liquidity into China and allowed its companies and banks to raise hundreds of billions in dollars via stock market listings. State banks that had started the new century as bankrupt relics of a communist past became the darlings of international investors.
Even the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the ensuing global financial crisis seemed to have little impact on China as the government quickly responded with a huge stimulus package. But the Lehman collapse was a dramatic wake-up call to the Chinese leadership. This model of bank and capital market reform had been studiously emulated for more than a decade and had brought great benefits to China. But now, although they believed it to be bankrupt, the Chinese government were bereft of new ideas. In the face of the global financial crisis, the government returned to what it knows best: massive state intervention via the banking system. Ten years of banking and capital market reforms were dead.
In Red Capitalism, Carl Walter and Fraser Howie detail how the Chinese government reformed and modeled its financial system in the thirty years since it began its policy of engagement with the West. Instead of a stable series of policies producing steady growth, China's financial sector has boomed and gone bust with regularity in each decade. The latest decade is little different. Chinese banks have become objects of political struggle while they totter under balance sheets bloated by the excessive state-directed lending and bond issuance of 2009.
Looking forward, the government's response to the global financial crisis has created a banking system the stability of which can be maintained only behind the walls of a non-convertible currency, a myriad of off-balance-sheet arrangements with non-public state entities and the strong support of its best borrowersthe politically potent National Championswho are the greatest beneficiaries of the financial status quo.
China's financial system is not a model for the West and, indeed, is not a sustainable arrangement for China itself as it seeks increasingly to assert its influence internationally. This is not a story of impending collapse, but one of frustrated reforms that suggests that any full opening and meaningful reform of the financial sector is not, indeed cannot be, on the government's agenda anytime soon.
From the Back Cover
"Carl Walter and Fraser Howie debunk a number of common myths about China's financial markets in this excellent new book. Investors stuffing their portfolios with China stocks would be wise to heed their warnings on the fragile foundations of China's banking system. The authors have done their homework, digging beneath the surface of "China's financial world to reveal uncomfortable truths about a financial system riddled with hidden land mines that threaten to undermine China's hard-fought economic success in the years ahead."Rick Carew, former Asia M&A Reporter, Wall Street Journal
"In Red Capitalism, Carl Walter and Fraser Howie give a powerful, albeit controversial explanation of the fragile underpinnings of the financial edifice that financed the seemingly unstoppable rise of China on the global stagewhich is all the more persuasive thanks to their careful mining of the data. Their thesisthat China has the trappings of a market system but not the substanceshould be considered by anyone dealing with or investing in Chinacategories that embrace most of the world today. Their contention that China ultimately is a 'family business' explains much that is puzzling to outsiders."Henny Sender, Chief Correspondent, International Finance, Financial Times
"Red Capitalism is a superb guide to China's financial labyrinth. It's a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the sources of Chinese economic power, and the threat posed by the nation's vast hidden debts."Arthur Kroeber, Editor, China Economic Quarterly
"Finally, a way into the world's most important and least understood financial system. For insight into how China's economy actually operates, begin here!"Thomas Easton, Asia Business Editor, The Economist
"A penetrating analysis that demonstrates how hard it is to follow the old adage 'follow the money,' and how rewarding it is to understand what will really drive China into the future."Christian Murck, President, American Chamber of Commerce in China
"Walter and Howie put the Chinese financial system under the microscope to examine how an absence of leadership, institutional squabbling, and complacency have seen appetites for reform sputter out, replaced by stagnation and dysfunction. Theirs is a fascinating, entertaining, and necessary corrective to the hyperbole surrounding China's seemingly miraculous rise."David Wilder, Beijing Bureau Chief, Market News International
"Walter and Howie's penetrating study addresses a critically important issue in China's political economy. They possess a rare depth of experience in the analysis of the Chinese financial sector. Their hard-hitting conclusions, based on a wealth of empirical research, will stimulate debate about the future of the Chinese financial system at a critical point in its evolution."Peter Nolan, Sinyi Professor of Chinese Management, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge
About the Author
Carl E. Walter has worked in China's financial sector for the past twenty years and has actively participated in many of its financial reforms. He played a major role in China's groundbreaking first overseas IPO in 1992 as well as the first listing of a state-owned enterprise on the New York Stock Exchange in 1994. He held a senior position in China's first and most successful joint venture investment bank where he supported a number of significant domestic stock and debt underwritings for major Chinese corporations and financial institutions. More recently, he helped build one of the most successful and profitable domestic security, risk, and currency trading operations for a major international investment bank. Fluent in Mandarin, he holds a PhD from Stanford University and a graduate certificate from Beijing University. Carl is a longtime resident of Beijing.
Fraser J. T. Howie has been trading, analyzing, and writing about Asian stock markets for nearly twenty years. During that time, he has worked in Hong Kong, trading equity derivatives at Bankers Trust and Morgan Stanley. After moving to China in 1998, he worked in the sales and trading department of China International Capital Corporation followed by a stint with China M&A Management Company. He is a regular commentator on China and its financial system, having spoken in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai, Singapore, and Cambridge. He is currently a managing director at a leading Asia-Pacific brokerage firm in Singapore helping international investors invest in both the Indian and Chinese markets.
Product details
- Publisher : Wiley; 1st edition (February 15, 2011)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 256 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0470825863
- ISBN-13 : 978-0470825860
- Item Weight : 15.9 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.4 x 0.95 x 8.92 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,862,029 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,791 in International Economics (Books)
- #39,645 in Classic Literature & Fiction
- #77,283 in Literary Fiction (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
Important information
To report an issue with this product, click here.
About the author

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
At the height of the 2008 crisis, the banks went on a lending spree mostly because of political pressure from the government to increase lending in order to boost GDP growth and avoid social unrest, which the party will try to avoid at all cost. There are a few problems with this approach (1) the banks rely on the high household saving rates in order to provide loans, however, as households increase spending in order to boost domestic consumption (a policy which is currently underway), lending will have to decrease as well since less capital is available to lend. (2) the most obvious and dangerous risk, which China is already suffering from, is high inflation. Due to this lending spree, real estate and food prices have been sky rocketing. (3) Under normal circumstances, the Chinese bank wouldn't be lending as much (similar to the U.S. banks which are sitting on massive amounts of excessive reserves) and, they would been lending only to projects/companies that would justify the risk. However, under political influence the banks loaned record amounts of money, a large chunk of which might not be returned. Thus, the banks might need to raise capital or get bailed out or go under (although this option will probably never happen). Either option might have profound implications on the Chinese banking system.
The second alarming point raised by the authors is China's public debt. Officially, this is also the data that most financial media refer to. The central government debt is around 20% of GDP. However, when taking into account the local governments and the state-owned companies' debts, the debt to GDP ratio balloons to around 75%. The authors argue that local governments and SOE debts should be included in the public debt, because they're just extensions of the central government. The authors provide plenty of evidence to back their argument. To cite just one example, as part of the stimulus package the local governments have provided around 2/3 of the stimulus money. As for the SOE, they act on behalf of the government and are owned by the government, and thus their debt should be considered a part of the central government's debt.
In conclusion, this book is full of interesting insights into China's banking system, insights which are hard to come by in other places. This book is highly recommended to people who wish to have a better understanding of the fragile condition the Chinese banks are in at this time and the Chinese financial markets in general.
Thoroughly documented with primary sources and utilizing an extensive arsenal of dizzying acronyms of state organizations, there's no doubt these guys have their facts straight. But for the uninitiated to the Chinese economy, the overwhelming number of acronyms poses a challenge; thankfully there is a glossary provided for just this reason. When the reader is finally able to get past the incalculable number of players in this economic shell game, the narrative unfolds nicely.
Although reformers such as Deng Xiaopeng and Zhu Rongji have made measurable strides in the direction of reform, the character of the Chinese markets remains the same as always: closed, internally focused, yet now more savvy to the benefits of global capitalism combined with strategic and limited foreign investment.
One of the most enlightening examples of the nature of Chinese markets is that of valuation of equities. Since the scope of permitted investors is limited by government controls, and in the case of many corporations the majority shareholder of a given equity on the market is a state owned entity, market caps don't follow traditional norms for valuation. Chinese corporations can't be valued by free market standards, because they are not controlled nor "owned" by the true players in the free market. And in most cases capital raised internationally or domestically is managed by the government or their proxies to supply resources to local governments and favored corporations in the manner of a "public utility" for money.
My final take? China is more leveraged in the red (no pun intended) than the US ever has been. Central Planning is banking on current dividends and worldwide financial speculation with China as the new "Wild West." With imminent social demands and rapidly changing labor demographics, there may just be a meltdown in the making. So as the Romans would say, "Caveat emptor," as regards investors in this market - but certainly not regarding the purchase of this book.
As for follow up reading, a better understanding of Zhu Rongji and Deng Xiaopeng would be useful to painting a more holistic picture of the modern Chinese economy, and there are a number of excellent biographies available on the two men.
Top reviews from other countries
- Missing heart. Banks are the heart of China's system (providing 73% of finance) yet risk is barely factored into lending decisions. "Peoples Bank Of China writes the cheque for party profligacy". The Party directs bank lending to State Owned Enterprises, resulting in banking sector bankruptcies (in all but name) at the end of each decade: 70s, 80s, and 90s, and one estimate of the late 90s/early 2000s bank recapitalisation is 28% of China's 2005 GDP (compared with 5% of US's GDP for TARP in 2008) We have yet to see bank recapitalisations after the credit splurge if 2009, but the authors argue it is just a matter of time.
- Missing lungs. Bond markets lack the two fundamentals of a market set price and a secondary market. They also fundamentally miss the point of a capital market, as 70% of bonds are anyway held by banks (why not just give a loan in the first place???).
- Missing stomach. The stock market is a 'policy market', and is essentially whatever level the government chooses it. "China's stock markets are not really about money, they are about power". Many of the largest "private listed" companies remain majority government owned (85% for Petrochina, over 40% for banks) with Communist Party assigned heads. "Private property is not the central organising concept of the Chinese economy; rather the central organising concept is tied to control and ownership by the communist party."
Finally, China's economy has two legs.
-One leg is 'inside the system' State owned Enterprises - "more politically competitive than economically competitive", they enjoy state bank directed lending and regulatory support. 54 of the largest SoEs have their heads appointed by the Communist Party, hold Ministerial rank in the Party and outrank (in Party terms) the bank heads. You can imagine how the conversation goes when the head of Petrochina asks the bank for money...
- The other leg is 'firms outside the system' without access to financing or power. These rely on the bewildering array of trust companies and pseudo-banks who fill the role the banks cannot (banks are forbidden to freely set interest rates which reflect the full risk, so most prefer not to lend to risky non- State owned firms). Westerners know of the export prowess of China, but this is largely In Guangdong and the Yangtzse river delta (home to 70% of China's Foreign Direct Investment), the successful 'outside the system' firms know they are better off trading with foreigners rather than China's "inside the system" tycoons.
The book is pretty critical of China, they deliberately go out of the way to counter the panglossian hyperbole in the Western media about China, and how far (or not) they have gone down the road to capitalism. It is not a light read, but useful if you need to know the detail.
Rather, China seems to retain the worst of both worlds, with local debt spiraling out of control from 2008's stimulus packages, and a banking sector that stands as a potent case against state owned banks.
Lending is increasingly politicized in China, with the government and the party pulling the strings in directing lending to State Owned Enterprises, with often dismal returns on the loans.
China, as this book reveals, has previously implemented banking reforms and rescues, particularly the good bank/bad bank model as has been implemented elsewhere.
On the whole, a very decent book filled with immense detail and scholarly research, and strongly recommended to followers of finance and economics, though those unacquainted with the detail of finance may at times struggle with the book.
Admittedly this is not a book for a general population but it is essential reading for anybody who is thinking of putting their hard earned capital to a 'Chinese themed' investment which runs from EM equities, commodities to even Western auto or luxury goods manufacturers. It is also a book for anybody, like me, who when visiting China doesn't stand in awe of of the new buildings, airports or roads but rather wonders 'How are they paying for this?' or 'Who is going to use this?'.
Despite the complex subject matter the book is written in a lucid and engaging style. It is very well researched and manages to capture the various politics, economics and accounting involved with how the Chinese banks are managed. Ultimately, the book shies away from delivering really hard hitting conclusions other than 'there is likely to be trouble ahead', there again the PRC doesn't like criticism. For those that are interested, I couldn't recommend this book more.



