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Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine Hardcover – October 10, 2017
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From the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning Gulag and the National Book Award finalist Iron Curtain, a revelatory history of one of Stalin's greatest crimes—the consequences of which still resonate today
In 1929 Stalin launched his policy of agricultural collectivization—in effect a second Russian revolution—which forced millions of peasants off their land and onto collective farms. The result was a catastrophic famine, the most lethal in European history. At least five million people died between 1931 and 1933 in the USSR. But instead of sending relief the Soviet state made use of the catastrophe to rid itself of a political problem. In Red Famine, Anne Applebaum argues that more than three million of those dead were Ukrainians who perished not because they were accidental victims of a bad policy but because the state deliberately set out to kill them.
Applebaum proves what has long been suspected: after a series of rebellions unsettled the province, Stalin set out to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry. The state sealed the republic’s borders and seized all available food. Starvation set in rapidly, and people ate anything: grass, tree bark, dogs, corpses. In some cases, they killed one another for food. Devastating and definitive, Red Famine captures the horror of ordinary people struggling to survive extraordinary evil.
Today, Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, has placed Ukrainian independence in its sights once more. Applebaum’s compulsively readable narrative recalls one of the worst crimes of the twentieth century, and shows how it may foreshadow a new threat to the political order in the twenty-first.
- Print length496 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherDoubleday
- Publication dateOctober 10, 2017
- Dimensions6.49 x 1.65 x 9.54 inches
- ISBN-100385538855
- ISBN-13978-0385538855
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Editorial Reviews
Review
—Timothy Snyder, Washington Post
“Lucid, judicious and powerful . . . The argument that Stalin singled out Ukraine for special punishment is well-made . . . [An] excellent and important book.”
—Anna Reid, Wall Street Journal
“Applebaum chronicles in almost unbearably intimate detail the ruin wrought upon Ukraine by Josef Stalin and the Soviet state apparatus he had built on suspicion, paranoia, and fear . . . Applebaum gives a chorus of contemporary voices to the tale, and her book is written in the light of later history, with the fate of Ukraine once again in the international spotlight and Ukrainians realizing with newly-relevant intensity that, as Red Famine reminds us, 'History offers hope as well as tragedy.'”
—Steve Donoghue, Christian Science Monitor
“A magisterial and heartbreaking history of Stalin’s Ukrainian famine.”
—Simon Sebag Montefiore, London Evening Standard
"Powerful . . . War, as Carl von Clausewitz famously put it, is the continuation of politics by other means. The politics in this case was the Sovietisation of Ukraine; the means was starvation. Food supply was not mismanaged by Utopian dreamers. It was weaponised . . . With searing clarity, Red Famine demonstrates the horrific consequences of a campaign to eradicate 'backwardness' when undertaken by a regime in a state of war with its own people."
—The Economist
“Anne Applebaum’s Red Famine—powerful, relentless, shocking, compelling—will cement her deserved reputation as the leading historian of Soviet crimes.”
—Daniel Finkelstein, The Times (London)
“Chilling, dramatic . . . In her detailed, well-rendered narrative, Applebaum provides a ‘crucial backstory’ for understanding current relations between Russia and Ukraine. An authoritative history of national strife from a highly knowledgeable guide.”
—Kirkus Reviews (starred review)
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The Ukrainian Question
For centuries, the geography of Ukraine shaped the destiny of Ukraine. The Carpathian Mountains marked the border in the southwest, but the gentle forests and fields in the northwestern part of the country could not stop invading armies, and neither could the wide open steppe in the east. All of Ukraine’s great cities—Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa, Donetsk and Kharkiv, Poltava and Cherkasy and of course Kyiv, the ancient capital—lie in the East European Plain, a flatland that stretches across most of the country. Nikolai Gogol, a Ukrainian who wrote in Russian, once observed that the Dnieper River flows through the centre of Ukraine and forms a basin. From there “the rivers all branch out from the centre; not a single one of them flows along the border or serves as a natural border with neighbouring nations.” This fact had political consequences: “Had there been a natural border of mountains or sea on one side, the people who settled here would have carried on their political way of life and would have formed a separate nation.”
The absence of natural borders helps explain why Ukrainians failed, until the late twentieth century, to establish a sovereign Ukrainian state. By the late Middle Ages, there was a distinct Ukrainian language, with Slavic roots, related to but distinct from both Polish and Russian, much as Italian is related to but distinct from Spanish or French. Ukrainians had their own food, their own customs and local traditions, their own villains, heroes and legends. Like other European nations, Ukraine’s sense of identity sharpened during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But for most of its history the territory we now call Ukraine was, like Ireland or Slovakia, a colony that formed part of other European land empires.
Ukraine—the word means “borderland” in both Russian and Polish—belongedto the Russian empire between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Prior to that, the same lands belonged to Poland, or rather the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which inherited them in 1569 from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Earlier still, Ukrainian lands lay at the heart of Kyivan Rus’, the medieval state in the ninth century formed by Slavic tribes and a Viking nobility, and, in the memories of the region, an almost mythical kingdom that Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians all claim as their ancestor.
Over many centuries, imperial armies battled over Ukraine, sometimes with Ukrainian-speaking troops on both sides of the front lines. Polish hussars fought Turkish janissaries for control of what is now the Ukrainian town of Khotyn in 1621. The troops of the Russian tsar fought those of the Austro-Hungarian emperor in 1914 in Galicia. Hitler’s armies fought against Stalin’s in Kyiv, Lviv, Odessa and Sevastopol between 1941 and 1945.
The battle for control of Ukrainian territory always had an intellectual component as well. Ever since Europeans began to debate the meaning of nations and nationalism, historians, writers, journalists, poets and ethnographers have argued over the extent of Ukraine and the nature of the Ukrainians. From the time of their first contacts in the early Middle Ages, Poles always acknowledged that the Ukrainians were linguistically and culturally separate from themselves, even when they were part of the same state. Many of the Ukrainians who accepted Polish aristocratic titles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remained Orthodox Christians, not Roman Catholics; Ukrainian peasants spoke a language that the Poles called “Ruthenian,” and were always described as having different customs, different music, different food.
Although at their imperial zenith they were more reluctant to acknowledge it, Muscovites also felt instinctively that Ukraine, which they sometimes called “southern Russia” or “little Russia,” differed from their northern homeland too. An early Russian traveller, Prince Ivan Dolgorukov, wrote in 1810 of the moment when his party finally “entered the borders of the Ukraine. My thoughts turned to [Bohdan] Khmelnytsky and [Ivan] Mazepa”—early Ukrainian national leaders—“and the alleys of trees disappeared . . . everywhere, without exception, there were clay huts, and there was no other accommodation.” The historian Serhiy Bilenky has observed that nineteenth-century Russians often had the same paternalistic attitude to Ukraine that northern Europeans at the time had towards Italy. Ukraine was an idealized, alternative nation, more primitive and at the same time more authentic, more emotional, more poetic than Russia.4 Poles also remained nostalgic for “their” Ukrainian lands long after they had been lost, making them the subject of romantic poetry and fiction.
Yet even while acknowledging the differences, both Poles and Russians also sought at times to undermine or deny the existence of a Ukrainian nation. “The history of Little Russia is like a tributary entering the main river of Russian history,” wrote Vissarion Belinsky, a leading theorist of nineteenth-century Russian nationalism. “Little Russians were always a tribe and never a people and still less—a state.” Russian scholars and bureaucrats treated the Ukrainian language as “a dialect, or half a dialect, or a mode of speech of the all-Russian language, in one word a patois, and as such had no right to an independent existence.” Unofficially, Russian writers used it to indicate colloquial or peasant speech. Polish writers, meanwhile, tended to stress the “emptiness” of the territory to the east, often describing the Ukrainian lands as an “uncivilized frontier, into which they brought culture and state formations.” The Poles used the expression dzikie pola, “wild fields,” to describe the empty lands of eastern Ukraine, a region that functioned, in their national imagination, much as the Wild West did in America.
Solid economic reasons lay behind these attitudes. The Greek historian Herodotus himself wrote about Ukraine’s famous “black earth,” the rich soil that is especially fertile in the lower part of the Dnieper River basin: “No better crops grow anywhere than along its banks, and where grain is not sown, the grass is the most luxuriant in the world.” The black-earth district encompasses about two-thirds of modern Ukraine—spreading from there into Russia and Kazakhstan—and, along with a relatively mild climate, makes it possible for Ukraine to produce two harvests every year. “Winter wheat” is planted in the autumn, and harvested in July and August; spring grains are planted in April and May, and harvested in October and November. The crops yielded by Ukraine’s exceptionally fertile land have long inspired ambitious traders. From the late Middle Ages, Polish merchants had brought Ukrainian grain northwards into the trade routes of the Baltic Sea. Polish princes and nobles set up what were, in modern parlance, early enterprise zones, offering exemptions from tax and military service to peasants who were willing to farm and develop Ukrainian land. The desire to hold on to such valuable property often lay behind the colonialist arguments: neither the Poles nor the Russians wanted to concedethat their agricultural breadbasket had an independent identity.
Nevertheless, quite apart from what their neighbours thought, a separate and distinct Ukrainian identity did take shape in the territories that now form modern Ukraine. From the end of the Middle Ages onwards, the people of this region shared a sense of who they were, often, though not always, defining themselves in opposition to occupying foreigners, whether Polish or Russian. Like the Russians and the Belarusians, they traced their history back to the kings and queens of Kyivan Rus’, and many felt themselves to be part of a great East Slavic civilization. Others identified themselves as underdogs or rebels, particularly admiring the great revolts of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, against Polish rule in the seventeenth century, and by Ivan Mazepa against Russian rule at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Ukrainian Cossacks—self-governing, semi-military communities with their own internal laws—were the first Ukrainians to transform that sense of identity and grievance into concrete political projects, winning unusual privileges and a degree of autonomy from the tsars. Memorably (certainly later generations of Russian and Soviet leaders never forgot it), Ukrainian Cossacks joined the Polish army in its march on Moscow in 1610 and again in 1618, taking part in a siege of the city and helping ensure that the Polish-Russian conflict of that era ended, at least for a time, advantageously for Poland. Later, the tsars gave both the Ukrainian Cossacks and Russian-speaking Don Cossacks special status in order to keep them loyal to the Russian empire, with which they were allowed to preserve a particular identity. Their privileges guaranteed that they did not revolt. But Khmelnytsky and Mazepa left their mark on Polish and Russian memory, and on European history and literature too. “L’Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre,” wrote Voltaire after news of Mazepa’s rebellion spread to France: “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.”
During the centuries of colonial rule different regions of Ukraine did acquire different characters. The inhabitants of eastern Ukraine, who were longer under Russian control, spoke a version of Ukrainian that was slightly closer to Russian; they were also more likely to be Russian Orthodox Christians, following rites that descended from Byzantium, under a hierarchy led by Moscow. The inhabitants of Galicia, as well as Volhynia and Podolia, lived longer under Polish control and, after the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, that of Austria-Hungary. They spoke a more “Polish” version of the language and were more likely to be Roman Catholics or Greek Catholics, a faith that uses rites similar to the Orthodox Church yet respects the authority of the Roman pope.
But because the borders between all of the regional powers shifted many times, members of both faiths lived, and still live, on both sides of the dividing line between former Russian and former Polish territories. By the nineteenth century, when Italians, Germans and other Europeans also began to identify themselves as peoples of modern nations, the intellectuals debating “Ukrainianness” in Ukraine were both Orthodox and Catholic, and lived in both “eastern” and “western” Ukraine. Despite differences in grammar and orthography, language unified Ukrainians across the region too. The use of the Cyrillic alphabet kept Ukrainian distinct from Polish, which is written in the Latin alphabet. (At one point the Habsburgs tried to impose a Latin script, but it failed to take hold.) The Ukrainian version of Cyrillic also kept it distinct from Russian, retaining enough differences, including some extra letters, to prevent the languages from becoming too close.
For much of Ukraine’s history, Ukrainian was spoken mostly in the countryside. As Ukraine was a colony of Poland, and then Russia and Austria-Hungary, Ukraine’s major cities—as Trotsky once observed—became centres of colonial control, islands of Russian, Polish or Jewish culture in a sea of Ukrainian peasantry. Well into the twentieth century, the cities and the countryside were thus divided by language: most urban Ukrainians spoke Russian, Polish or Yiddish, whereas rural Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian. Jews, if they did not speak Yiddish, often preferred Russian, the language of the state and of commerce. The peasants identified the cities with wealth, capitalism and “foreign”—mostly Russian—influence. Urban Ukraine, by contrast, thought of the countryside as backward and primitive.
These divisions also meant the promotion of “Ukrainianness” created conflict with Ukraine’s colonial rulers, as well as with the inhabitants of the Jewish shtetls who had made their home in the territory of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since the Middle Ages. Khmelnytsky’s uprising included a mass pogrom, during which thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of Jews were murdered. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ukrainians rarely saw the Jews as their most important rivals—Ukrainian poets and intellectuals mostly reserved their anger for Russians and Poles—but the widespread anti-semitism of the Russian empire inevitably affected Ukrainian-Jewish relations too.
The link between the language and the countryside also meant that the Ukrainian national movement always had a strong “peasant” flavour. As in other parts of Europe, the intellectuals who led Ukraine’s national awakening often began by rediscovering the language and customs of the countryside. Folklorists and linguists recorded the art, poetry and everyday speech of the Ukrainian peasantry. Although not taught in state schools, Ukrainian became the language of choice for a certain kind of rebellious, anti-establishment Ukrainian writer or artist. Patriotic private Sunday schools began to teach it too. It was never employed in official transactions, yet the language was used in private correspondence, and in poetry. In 1840, Taras Shevchenko, born an orphaned serf in 1814, published Kobzar—the word means “minstrel”—the first truly outstanding collection of Ukrainian verse. Shevchenko’s poetry combined romantic nationalism and an idealized picture of the countryside with anger at social injustice, and it set the tone for many of the arguments that were to come. In one of his most famous poems, “Zapovit” (“Testament”), he asked to be buried on the banks of the Dnieper River:
Oh bury me, then rise ye up
And break your heavy chains
And water with the tyrants’ blood
The freedom you have gained . . .
The importance of the peasantry also meant that from the very beginning the Ukrainian national awakening was synonymous with populist and what would later be called “left wing” opposition to the Russian and Polish-speaking merchants, landowners and aristocracy. For that reason, it rapidly gathered strength following the emancipation of the serfs across imperial Russia under Tsar Alexander II in1861. Freedom for the peasants was, in effect, freedom for Ukrainians, and a blow to their Russian and Polish masters. The pressure for a more powerful Ukrainian identity was, even then, also pressure for greater political and economic equality, as the imperial ruling class well understood.
Because it was never linked to state institutions, the Ukrainian national awakening was also, from its earliest days, expressed through the formation of a wide range of autonomous voluntary and charitable organizations, early examples of what we now call “civil society.” For a brief few years following the serfs’ emancipation, “Ukrainophiles” inspired younger Ukrainians to form self-help and study groups, to organize the publication of periodicals and newspapers, to found schools and Sunday schools and to spread literacy among the peasantry. National aspirations manifested themselves in calls for intellectual freedom, mass education, and upward mobility for the peasantry. In this sense, the Ukrainian national movement was from the earliest days influenced by similar movements in the West, containing strands of Western socialism as well as Western liberalism and conservatism.
This brief moment did not last. As soon as it began to gather strength, the Ukrainian national movement, alongside other national movements, was perceived by Moscow as a potential threat to the unity of imperial Russia. Like the Georgians, the Chechens and other groups who sought autonomy within the empire, the Ukrainians challenged the supremacy of the Russian language and a Russian interpretation of history that described Ukraine as “southwest Russia,” a mere province without any national identity. They also threatened to empower the peasants further at a time when they were already gaining economic influence. A wealthier, more literate and better-organized Ukrainian peasantry might also demand greater political rights.
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Product details
- Publisher : Doubleday (October 10, 2017)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 496 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0385538855
- ISBN-13 : 978-0385538855
- Item Weight : 1.93 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.49 x 1.65 x 9.54 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #57,699 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #127 in Russian History (Books)
- #343 in Agricultural Science (Books)
- #769 in European History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Anne Applebaum is a historian and journalist. She is a staff writer for the Atlantic as well as a Senior Fellow at the Agora Institute, Johns Hopkins University. She is the author of several history books, including GULAG which won the 2004 Pulitzer Prize for non-fiction; IRON CURTAIN, on the Sovietization of Eastern Europe after the war, which won the 2013 Cundill Prize for Historical Literature; and RED FAMINE, which begins with the Ukrainian revolution of 1917, ends with the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 and provides the background to today's Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Her newest book, TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY, examines the attraction of autocratic forms of government, especially to intellectuals, all across the Western world.
Anne has been writing about Eastern Europe and Russia since 1989, when she covered the collapse of communism in Poland for the Economist magazine. She has also covered US, UK and European politics for a wide range of American and British publications. She is a former Washington Post columnist, a former member of the Washington Post editorial board, and a former deputy editor of the Spectator magazine. She is married to Radoslaw Sikorski, a Polish politician and writer, and lives in Poland and Britain.
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The resulting history is extremely complicated with constantly changing borders but the short summary is that Poland absorbed western Ukraine while Moscow absorbed eastern Ukraine. It was in 1480 AD that the Grand Duchy of Moscow overthrew Mongol rule and slowly expanded westward taking Ukrainian areas from Poland. By the time of the Soviet famine in 1932-1933 Russia controlled central and eastern Ukraine. By this time Russia and Ukraine had developed into similar but separate nationalities like Austria and Germany. Their languages were different but similar like Spain and Portugal. In 1939 Russia finally absorbed western Ukraine under the Hitler-Stalin pact.
The short story of the famine is that around 1930 Stalin decided to complete the Sovietization of the USSR by enforcing collectivization of the peasantry. When the Ukrainian peasantry resisted he sent armed teams to the countryside which confiscated the peasants' food supplies and left them to starve. The choice was collectivization or starvation. The famine peaked in 1933 after about four million peasants had died and Stalin decided it was enough to teach them a lesson.
The details of the Soviet famine are increasingly well known with books such as this one but what is not emphasized is that many of the themes used to justify the famine are being repeated by the left right here in America today. One of the first themes was that the poor farmers (poor producers) were Soviet heroes while the rich farmers (better producers) were class enemies. Today we constantly hear about the poor as being victims and the producers as being exploiters.
The Soviet famine was above all a war on peasants who as a group were the most resistant to Communism. Today we have a war on the middle class which resists the open borders and free trade which support Globalism. Any criticism of Soviet policy meant imprisonment, deportation, or execution. Today any criticism of open borders is labeled as racism and people can lose their jobs for this.
One of the first things the Soviets did was ban Christmas which the peasants always celebrated. Today corporate America has basically banned Christmas and court decisions constantly restrict Christian practices. The Soviets encouraged students to denounce their parents who could then be arrested or executed. Today schools encourage students to harangue their parents about global warming and now the Green New Deal.
The Soviets engaged in hysterical propaganda which accused the peasants of being class enemies by sabotaging grain production to resist collectivization. Claiming that the inefficiencies of collectivization caused the decline in production would mean the Gulag or worse. Today any attempt to enforce immigration laws is met with similar hysteria.
Since the Ukrainian peasants were nationalistic the Soviets attempted to wipe out all vestiges of nationalism. The Ukrainian language was banned. Thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals were executed. Today we see a war on nationalism all over the West as an impediment to Globalism. Meanwhile China is becoming more powerful as it asserts its nationality.
While the artificial famine raged on word leaked out to the West. It should come as no surprise that the New York Times led the way in the denial and cover up of the famine. Today the New York Times has been one of the major players in the coup against an elected president who supports nationalism.
The Soviets tried to create a new Soviet Man and killed millions of people who resisted the creation of this artificially created type. Today the Globalists are trying to create a new American by bringing in as many people as possible through open borders and thus globalize America as a fait accompli.
Above all the famine was the culmination of an attempt to use government power to completely remake society. Today we hear about the Green New Deal as necessary to remake society. Communism was justified as being the result of scientific socialism. Today the Green New Deal is similarly said to be based on science. Not much has changed except for the genocidal measures taken by the Soviets.
Why is it difficult? Because reading so much evidence about how terrible people can be to one another is not to everyone's taste.
This is the story of how Joseph Stalin deliberately caused the deaths of 3.9 million Ukranians in 1932-33 and how thousands of ordinary Russians and Ukranians helped him do it. As Ukraine failed to meet Stalin's impossible targets for grain production, to feed Russian citizens and for export, Stalin sent thousands of young Russians to search farms (though some couldn't tell a colt from a calf) and to find food—not huge caches of hidden grain, but bits of bread, meet and eggs that were keeping families alive.
And so they starved—men, women and children. Western diplomats in Russia looked away, and western reporters, with two astounding exceptions (Gareth Jones and Malcolm Muggeridge) knew what was happening but denied there was a famine. Since western aid might have saved some of the dying, this was surely the greatest journalistic crime of the 20th century.
The great Robert Conquest first told this story 30 years ago. And now, Anne Applebaum, accessing sources not available to Conquest, tells the story again in another great book. To know how great this work is, just look at the footnotes—the sources in English, Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, French. The patient accumulation of small details that paint the whole ghastly picture.
Read this above all to know another chapter in the annals of large-scale human misbehavior. Read it to learn about brave people who were calm or generous in the face of death and others who were inhuman to them. And read it to appreciate the work of one of the greatest and hardest-working historians of our time.
This is an excellent book which analyzes how the 1932 – 1933 drought in Ukraine was the result of Soviet policies. It offers detailed records and moving oral histories of life in the Ukraine from 1918 to 1935. The first third of the book is a little dry as it is dealing with places, names and events that I wasn’t familiar with. However, by the time the book starts to describe the campaign against the “kulaks” (small landowners who employed 2 or 3 farmhands) to the brutal collectivization of the early 30s to the forced confiscation of all peasant food stuffs in the winter of 32-33, the story is stunning in its brutality.
The Ukraine famine is rarely mentioned in the retelling of brutal 20th century genocides (20th century should probably be known as the “death century”) as the retelling of it would go against the prevailing leftist cultural stranglehold which propagates the idea that socialist/communist societies are magical wonderlands where humanity flourishes. As AOC and Bernie Sanders and a generation of university educated morons assure us that this time the promise of socialism (now rebranded as “democratic “) will magically meet the needs of mankind, this book is a brutal reminder of what power in the hands of ideologically inspired, class conscious, “do gooders” actually looks like.
The demonization campaign against the Kulaks reminded me so much of the current cultural currents surrounding straight white CIS men that it was eerie. (From chapter 4 )
"public shaming played an important role in the campaign ……. to who knew them. Silence and terrify everyone. In the atmosphere of hysteria and hatred any criticism of the Communist Party (prevailing liberal ethos) could be used as evidence that the critic was a nationalist, a fascist (or the catch all racist)”
Ever wonder why comedians aren’t so funny anymore?
“The official dislike of the kobzar and he bandura was no surprise, like court jesters in Shakespeare’s day, they had always expressed impolitic (politically incorrect) thoughts and ideas, sometimes singing of things that could not be spoken. In the heated atmosphere of collectivization, when everyone was in search of enemies, this form of humor—along with the nostalgia was intolerable”
After 5 million dead in just over a year, the Soviets yielded and stopped the confiscation of grains. By this time any resistance to the Soviet way was long evaporated. The only thing that remained was to insure the genocide was lost to history. Aided and abetted by such liberal luminaries of our “free” press such as NY Times journalist Walter Duranty, the real facts of this genocide lay hidden for 40 years.
The history of the Ukrainian people is tragic and reverberates today. I have a co worker in his mid-20s at work whose family emigrated from Ukraine in the 90s. The other day he happened to ask me if I had read any good books lately. I said I’m reading “Red Famine”. He asked what that was about and I told him it was about the collectivization of the farms in Ukraine and subsequent famine. He said “Oh the famine of 32-33.” For a young kid, born in America to know the dates of that famine, when the typical millennial couldn’t tell you the date of Pearl Harbor, I thought was remarkable. It shows the psychic effect of Socialism 3 generations later.
Read this book for the knowledge you will game, your humanity it will touch and use it to inspire you to resist the false promises of state run economies which a segment of our naïve, woefully mis-educated electorate is pushing.
Top reviews from other countries
This book traces the reason why even today Russian leaders are keenly aware of this history; a history in which Stalin had expressed what his ‘greatest fear’ was – losing Ukraine. Applebaum sketches not only a history of the changing map of Ukraine, but a portrait of the Ukrainian people, both the peasant class that is deeply anti-Soviet, and the intellectual and political class that was voicing nationalistic pride and ideals.
Applebaum begins with three important periods, the Ukrainian revolution of 1917, the peasants’ revolt in 1919, and first famine in 1920. Through it all, she attempts to show what happened between the years 1917 and 1934, focusing on the events from the autumn of 1932 to the spring of 1933. The question was, who was responsible? And although the Sovietization of the Ukraine did not begin with the famine, Applebaum contends, it ‘did not end with it’.
The chapter catastrophe and suffering are vividly depicted in the chapter, ‘Starvation: Spring and Summer, 1933’, including vignettes like the account of a starving 15-year-old girl who was berated for begging for food. The storekeeper who berated her, hit her and she fell. He then kicked her as she lay, stretched and grasping a crumb of bread, and shouted to her to go home and get work. She died there and then. Applebaum tells us, ‘As during the Holocaust, the witnesses of intense suffering did not always feel – perhaps they could not feel – pity.
This book is important because of the silence that ensued; that in the years following the famine, ‘Ukrainians were forbidden to speak about what happened. They were afraid to mourn publicly.’ The accounts in this book include the remembrance, the private memories of survivors. These included the story of Volodymyr Chepur, who was five years old at the time. His parents were starving and suffering, but they told him that they would give everything to ensure he lives even if they perish, so that he can bear witness.
This involves going wider than the narrow tale of dekulakisation, collectivisation and, ultimately, mass starvation in the Ukrainian countryside in the early 1930's. The whole Soviet Union underwent the first two processes without (quite) tipping into massive starvation (though she concedes this needs more examination-recent scholarship suggests that Kazakhstan's experience was as horrendous). Her argument is that, in effect, whatever screws were turned on the countryside elsewhere were given extra twists in Ukraine to break its national identity and that the destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry was paralleled by the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural elites- even ones who saw themselves as loyal Communists. Stalin and his closest associates, on this telling, were obsessed with a fear of "losing" Ukraine after their experiences in the post-Revolutionary civil war when the region collapsed into chaos and Reds, Whites, Nationalists of various kinds, peasant Anarchists led by Makhno and outside powers like Poland fought for power. If the New Economic Policy represented a fragile compromise with the peasantry, Soviet Ukrainianisation in the same period was a fragile and deceptive compromise with the carriers of national identity. Both were consciously destroyed by Stalin in an assertion of central, Moscow-based power- and grain delivery targets were deliberately set at completely unrealistic levels to justify stealing even seed corn from the peasantry. Although on one level the horrendous consequences (just under 4 million deaths from starvation on the most recent estimates) were an open secret in Soviet society, they were nevertheless covered up both domestically (by shooting those who had undertaken the 1937 census and discovered the massive population shortfall) and internationally (by a largely servile foreign press corps).
Overall her account carries conviction. The understandable focus on Ukraine leads one to wonder whether there is a slight loss of perspective at times- was Ukraine really at the very top of Stalin's agenda every day and its fate the driving factor in all Soviet policy, as is implied? Some aspects of the aftermath of the famine are somewhat under-examined. Ironically one of these is just what long term effects it had on agriculture in Ukraine; was collectivisation there an even worse disaster than elsewhere? How did survivors and perpetrators coexist in the Ukrainian countryside afterwards given that the gangs looting food from Ukrainian peasants were overwhelmingly composed of Ukrainian peasants- in many cases this was very much neighbours turning on each other? On the cultural side, how far did the undoubted achievements of the brief period of Ukrainianisation survive- for instance, is the spelling of modern literary Ukrainian derived from the attempt to create a standardised written language then? When dealing with the cover up for international consumption, the story is a bit centred on a limited number of mostly Anglophone figures (including, in fairness, the Welsh journalist who managed to report the truth and was largely disowned as a result). It's revealing that the only authentic photographs of the famine came from an Austrian engineer with links to the Catholic church while some of the sharpest and best informed diplomatic reports were filed by consuls appointed by Mussolini's Italy.
Overall though the book does put the horrors of the Holodomor into a proper long term perspective.
Applebaum draws a parallel with Ireland as 'a colony that formed part of other European land empires', without referencing the consequences, of starvation accompanied by continuing exports of the food that the people produced. Those policies underlie current political relationships both for Russia, and for England facing the 'backstop' proposal.
'Imperial armies battled over Ukraine...Polish Hussars fought Turkish Janissaries (Christian)...Hitler's armies fought Stalin's.' Yet typical of the Narrow Nationalism that afflicts Europe and is today being exploited in political populism, 'there is always an intellectual component as well'. Local academics whose incomes depend on it promote antiquated folk cultures boosting their 'language': the Ukrainian dialect of Russian; Ulster-Scots based on Old English ex Scotland. Both historically used by the rural peasants and needing to be adapted to modernity, as do their organised religions.
The modern political battlelines in both countries were drawn c1917, when Stalin as a Georgian and outsider became the People's Commissar for Nationalities, 'responsible for negotiating with the non-Russian nations and peoples who belong to the Russian empire.' The author describes this activity as 'forcing them to submit', just at the time when the Nationalists were unilaterally laying out the NEW borders of a Ukrainian nation-state, that long continued to be expansionist. Stalin faced down the 'intellectuals' and the wealthier peasants/kulaks with increasing ruthlessness.
The new Soviet state eventually took in the Black Sea coastline, previously rules by the Ancient Greeks, and Ottoman Turks who particularly dominated the Crimean peninsular (not shown in maps here as part of the Ukraine), until it was reallocated as an entity within the Soviet Union by (the Russian-village born son of the Donbas), Soviet President Kruschev, supposedly after a drunken night in 1956 among friends in Kiev.
At the end (p364) Applebaum states that 'many Russians do not treat Ukraine as a separate nation, Ukrainians themselves have mixed and confused loyalties,' Just as the English have never really recognised the sovereignty of the Irish (or the Cypriots), and have recently had to come to terms with their new-found power and influence through the European Union.
Exhaustive research of a very complicated period with so many actors, some creating untrue documents for their own ends.
Applebaum creates a very readable detailed analysis.( This is not lightweight reading, but stick with it ! )
It extends before, and after, the famine to the present day, to put that 1932 time in context.
Dikotter's great book on the Mao's created famine covers a similar scenario. 'Compare and contrast the Stalin and Mao famines' - my intellect isn't up to it !












