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Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System 1st Edition
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The financial crisis that unfolded in September 2008 transformed the United States and world economies. As each day's headlines brought stories of bank failures and rescues, government policies drawn and redrawn against the backdrop of an historic Presidential election, and solutions that seemed to be discarded almost as soon as they were proposed, a group of thirty-three academics at New York University Stern School of Business began tackling the hard questions behind the headlines. Representing fields of finance, economics, and accounting, these professors-led by Dean Thomas Cooley and Vice Dean Ingo Walter-shaped eighteen independent policy papers that proposed market-focused solutions to the problems within a common framework. In December, with great urgency, they sent hand-bound copies to Washington. Restoring Financial Stability is the culmination of their work.
- Proposes bold, yet principled approaches-including financial policy alternatives and specific courses of action-to deal with this unprecedented, systemic financial crisis
- Created by the contributions of various academics from New York University's Stern School of Business
- Provides important perspectives on both the causes of the global financial crisis as well as proposed solutions to ensure it doesn't happen again
- Contains detailed evaluations and analyses covering many spectrums of the marketplace
Edited by Matthew Richardson and Viral Acharya, this reliable resource brings together the best thinking of finance and economics from the faculty of one of the top universities in world.
- ISBN-100470499346
- ISBN-13978-0470499344
- Edition1st
- PublisherWiley
- Publication dateMarch 23, 2009
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions6.3 x 1.35 x 9.4 inches
- Print length416 pages
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Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global FinanceNew York University Stern School of BusinessHardcover
Editorial Reviews
Review
"…ably tackles complex issues and covers a wide spectrum of the current debate, including the multiplicity of regulators, the need for international regulatory coordination, transparency, fair value accounting, compensation reform, and the extent to which monetary policy should address systemic asset bubbles." (The Investment Professional)
“…the book that best combines history, analysis and prescription is “Restoring Financial Stability”, a series of essays by academics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. The 60-page prologue is packed with telling facts and sophisticated analysis, and alone is worth the steep cover price. The individual chapters deal methodically with the myriad issues raised by the crunch, and the policy changes that will be needed, covering everything from the American mortgage market to the need for international cooperation in regulating finance." (The Economist)
"We are always better analysts with a 20/20 hindsight. Indeed, an ex post reading about events leading up to a crisis appears logical, and often leaves one with the question about why the evolution of the crisis could not be seen and corrected in time. Still, policy-makers know that such a review and understanding are important to learning from mistakes. Restoring Financial Stability (Wiley) acts as a catalyst to that understanding by offering a comprehensive sequencing of the causes and progression of the build-up of the financial strains that . . evolved into a full-blown global financial crisis. . . highly recommended even though bankers will remain bankers and will probably figure out ways to beat the new system." (Business Standard)
Review
―Franklin Allen., Nippon Life Professor of Finance, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in FinReg21.com
"The best available on this extraordinary and fascinating subject. . . brilliant idea, superbly executed, and has first-class content. Buy it."
―VoxEu.org
From the Inside Flap
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY
The financial crisis that unfolded in September 2008 transformed the United States and world economies. As each day's headlines brought stories of bank failures and rescues, government policies drawn and redrawn against the backdrop of an historic presidential election, and solutions that seemed to be discarded almost as soon as they were proposed, a group of thirty-three academics at New York University Stern School of Business began tackling the hard questions behind the headlines. Representing fields of finance, economics, and accounting, these professorsled by Dean Thomas Cooley and Vice Dean Ingo Waltershaped eighteen independent policy papers that proposed market-focused solutions to the problems within a common framework. In December, with great urgency, they sent hand-bound copies to Washington.
This book, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, is the culmination of their work. For policymakers and business executives alike, the book proposes bold ideasfinancial policy alternatives and specific courses of actionto deal with this unprecedented, systemic financial crisis. Their remedies acknowledge the power and potential of the free market. Some require modest regulatory intervention; others will shake regulatory practice to its very foundation.
To better understand the origins of the current financial crisis as well as the options for restoring financial health, don't miss this important and timely work. Edited by Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson, this reliable resource brings together the best thinking of finance and economics faculty from one of the top universities in world.
From the Back Cover
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY
The financial crisis that unfolded in September 2008 transformed the United States and world economies. As each day's headlines brought stories of bank failures and rescues, government policies drawn and redrawn against the backdrop of an historic presidential election, and solutions that seemed to be discarded almost as soon as they were proposed, a group of thirty-three academics at New York University Stern School of Business began tackling the hard questions behind the headlines. Representing fields of finance, economics, and accounting, these professorsled by Dean Thomas Cooley and Vice Dean Ingo Waltershaped eighteen independent policy papers that proposed market-focused solutions to the problems within a common framework. In December, with great urgency, they sent hand-bound copies to Washington.
This book, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, is the culmination of their work. For policymakers and business executives alike, the book proposes bold ideasfinancial policy alternatives and specific courses of actionto deal with this unprecedented, systemic financial crisis. Their remedies acknowledge the power and potential of the free market. Some require modest regulatory intervention; others will shake regulatory practice to its very foundation.
To better understand the origins of the current financial crisis as well as the options for restoring financial health, don't miss this important and timely work. Edited by Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson, this reliable resource brings together the best thinking of finance and economics faculty from one of the top universities in world.
About the Author
VIRAL V. ACHARYA is Professor of Finance at New York University Stern School of Business and London Business School. He is Academic Advisor to the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Philadelphia and Academic Director of the Coller Institute of Private Equity. Professor Acharya earned a Bachelor of Technology in computer science and engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai, and a PhD in finance from NYU Stern. He lives in New York City with his wife and son.
MATTHEW RICHARDSON is the Charles E. Simon Professor of Financial Economics and the Sidney Homer Director of the Salomon Center for the Study of Financial Institutions at New York University Stern School of Business. Professor Richardson received his PhD in finance from Stanford University and his MA and BA in economics concurrently from the University of California at Los Angeles. He lives in New York City with his wife and three children.
Product details
- Publisher : Wiley; 1st edition (March 23, 2009)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 416 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0470499346
- ISBN-13 : 978-0470499344
- Item Weight : 1.39 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.3 x 1.35 x 9.4 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,857,213 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #452 in Macroeconomics (Books)
- #647 in Public Finance (Books)
- #1,207 in Business Investments
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About the author

VIRAL V. ACHARYA is Professor of Finance at New York University Stern School of Business (NYU-Stern), Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in Corporate Finance, Research Affiliate of the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in Financial Economics, Research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), and an Academic Advisor to the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland, New York and Philadelphia, and the Board of Governors. He was the Academic Director of the Coller Institute of Private Equity at London Business School during 2008-09 and a Senior Houblon-Normal Research Fellow at the Bank of England for Summer 2008. He completed his Ph.D. in Finance from NYU-Stern and Bachelor of Technology in Computer Science and Engineering from Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai.
His research interests are in the regulation of banks and financial institutions, corporate finance, credit risk and valuation of corporate debt, and asset pricing with a focus on the effects of liquidity risk. He has published articles in the American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Business, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and Financial Analysts Journal. He is editor of the Journal of Financial Intermediation.
He is the recipient of Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance - Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, Best Paper Award in Equity Trading - Western Finance Association Meetings, 2003, Outstanding Referee Award for the Review of Financial Studies, 2003, the inaugural Lawrence G. Goldberg Prize for the Best Ph.D. in Financial Intermediation, Best Paper Award in Capital Markets and Asset Pricing - Journal of Financial Economics, 2005 (First Prize) and 2007 (Second Prize), the inaugural Rising Star in Finance (one of four) Award, 2008, European Corporate Governance Institute's Best Paper on Corporate Governance, 2008, Distinguished Referee Award for the Review of Financial Studies, 2009, III Jaime Fernandez de Araoz Award in Corporate Finance, 2009, Viz Risk Management Prize for the Best Paper on Energy Markets, Securities, and Prices at the European Finance Association Meetings, 2009 and Excellence in Refereeing Award for the American Economic Review, 2009, Review of Finance Best Paper Award, 2009 and Best Conference Paper Award at the European Finance Association Meetings, 2010.
He has co-edited the book Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, NYU-Stern and John Wiley & Sons, March 2009, co-edited the forthcoming book Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance, Wiley, October 2010, and co-authored the forthcoming book Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, Princeton University Press, March 2011.
THOMAS F. COOLEY is the Paganelli-Bull Professor of Economics at the New York University Stern School of Business, as well as a Professor of Economics in the NYU Faculty of Arts and Science. The former President of the Society for Economic Dynamics and a Fellow of the Econometric Society, Professor Cooley is a widely published scholar in the areas of macroeconomic theory, monetary theory and policy and the financial behavior of firms, and is recognized as a national leader in both macroeconomic theory and business education. Professor Cooley was Dean of NYU Stern from 2002-2010.
Responding to the financial crisis of fall 2008, Professor Cooley spearheaded a research and policy initiative that yielded 18 white papers by 33 NYU Stern professors, later published as “Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System,” (Wiley, March 2009). He also writes a weekly opinion column for FORBES.com.
Professor Cooley is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations.
Before joining NYU Stern, Professor Cooley was a Professor of Economics at the University of Rochester, University of Pennsylvania, and UC Santa Barbara. Prior to his academic career, Professor Cooley was a systems engineer for IBM Corporation. Professor Cooley received his BS from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and his MA and PhD from the University of Pennsylvania. He also holds a doctorem honoris causa from the Stockholm School of Economics.
MATTHEW RICHARDSON is a Professor of Finance at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University, and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has also held the title of Assistant Professor of Finance at The Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Richardson received his Ph.D in Finance from Stanford University and his MA and BA in Economics concurrently from University of California at Los Angeles.
Professor Richardson teaches classes at the MBA, executive and PhD level. His MBA classes cover Debt Instruments and Markets and International Fixed Income. He is serving or has served as associate editor for the Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Finance and Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. He has been a referee for over 20 academic journals, including Econometrica, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies and American Economic Review. In 1997 Professor Richardson was awarded the Rosenthal Award for Financial Innovation.
Professor Richardson has published papers in a variety of top academic journals, including, among others, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, and the American Economic Review. His work has also appeared in practitioner journals and books such as Advanced Tools for the Fixed Income Professional, Emerging Market Capital Flows, and VAR: Understanding and Applying Value-at-Risk.
INGO WALTER is the Seymour Milstein Professor of Finance, Corporate Governance and Ethics and Vice Dean of Faculty at the Stern School of Business, New York University. He has taught at New York University since 1970. He has served as a consultant to various corporations, banks, government agencies and international institutions and has authored or co-authored numerous books and articles in the fields of international trade policy, international banking, environmental economics, and economics of multinational corporate operations.
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RFS is neither dumbed-down nor overly complex. Anyone who reads the Wall Street Journal or Financial Times will easily grasp the material covered and the language being used. The sources cited for the individual essays are predominately articles from academic journals but the authors of RFS do a nice job of summarizing the important points from these articles rather than assuming the reader is familiar with the sources. I am a history major and had no trouble following the authors.
You do not need to be interested in the solutions proposed in order to buy the book. The policy recommendations are brief and follow the much more important background information covering the causes and progression of the financial meltdown.
The book is especially worth reading because of its refreshing objectivity. It is not a political book or an anti-capitalism book. It tells the story of self-interested actors altering their behavior according to the incentives before them. The book focuses on these incentives and how they might be adjusted in order to achieve the same ends without the risk of harmful macroeconomic effects.
For those interested in the text's contents, Stern has a fantastic site featuring on-line resources including video of the book-launch conference and executive summaries of each of the book's chapters ( [...] )
Most importantly, this crisis was clearly a supply driven phenomena. It's not as though the demand for housing drove up the price of financing - quite the opposite. A worldwide excess of short-term funding drove up the price of assets. Gladly, the book does not resort to the trite argument that the Fed inflated the money supply by lowering short-term interest rates following the 2002 recession, as M2/GDP fails to convincingly confirm much if any monetary inflation. Instead, the book unfortunately makes no account of the source of this funding whatsoever. It never even crosses its radar screen. I would say that misses the forest from the trees!
The book also fails to put the US financial system and it's regulations into the proper context. In a world awash in short-term funding, banks strove to borrow and lend this capital within the confines of their limited equity and capital adequacy requirements. They did this by logically raising additional equity off-balance sheet to take advantage of segmenting capital markets and by selling risky tranches of debt with high equity requirements to outside investors. In addition to lending, banks also earn profits by holding duration risk - it's the raison d'être for banking. Banks clearly compared spreads to the equity requirements for each tranche and chose to hold tranches with the highest return. Logically designed regulation led them to hold the least risky, AAA, tranches. Public market valuations supported these decisions.
The book argues that banks thwarted capital adequacy requirements. In one instance it cited the mere fact that banks held less risky AAA securities with logically lower regulatory capital adequacy requirements as proof that banks engaged in regulatory arbitrage (e.g. figure 2.3). That surely does not make the case. It claims banks used off balance sheet SIVs to avoid capital adequacy requirements but it is careful to never definitively accounts for the combination of capital held both on and off balance sheet. Instead, the authors claim capital adequacy requirements for liquidity enhancement alone would have allowed banks to hold one tenth the capital requirement on-balance sheet, but to make that narrow argument, one would have to be referring only to the capital used to derive FDIC premiums (a side issue) and not capital adequacy requirements essential to the core argument. Regardless, others have calculated that banks would have needed to hold 12 to 15% equity vs. the pittance required by regulators for AAA rated (mortgage) securities. To suggest that regulatory arbitrage and not regulations themselves is the source of the problem requires showing dramatic examples of arbitrage which the book never does without resorting to the kinds of gimmicks described above.
Regulations require banks to hold 4 to 8% equity against loans. They also allow investors to buy equity with 50% margin. The chief way to reduce capital requirements is to tranche loans, sell off the risky first-loss equity-heavy tranches and then lend money to the buyer of these tranches. The book makes virtually no account of this. At the same time, bank regulation and margin requirements are long standing and time tested. Bank regulators, rating agencies and capital markets are sophisticated; it's not as though banks operated without these institutions largely recognizing the critical issues. Perhaps regulators could have plugged this hole but it would have had repercussions elsewhere and the resulting equity requirements are not dissimilar to those imposed on Freddie and Fannie. In part, regulations have been politically designed to encourage home ownership at the expense of increased financial stability. Again, an analysis of this core issue is simply unaddressed by the book.
Thin equity requirements are built on a long-standing underlying regulatory assumption that financial risk is predominately unsystematic. Ratings that turn the collateralized tails of B tranches into A tranches are consistent with this view. The book presents public market prices of tranches that are not substantially inconsistent with this view. To argue that banks were undercapitalized, especially in light of the fact that they were not undercapitalized relative to their worldwide counterparts, is to challenge this underlying regulatory assumption. But to make this argument one must present historical evidence that this assumption is in fact mistaken. The book never raises the issue directly nor does it present any evidence. The argument must also show the cost-benefit of the holding more equity against the benefit of increased protection from 50 year storms or simply that we should have left available short-term debt un-invested, something, I doubt which has ever been done. It might well be the case that we should risk the capital rather than letting it sit idle and suffer the occasional consequences. On page 136, the authors concede that "...to avoid systematic risk the capital requirements may be too imposing..." This critical topic, perhaps the very core of the debate, warrants far more than a sentence! Again, it's off the radar screen.
One solution is to insist that homeowners hold 20% equity. That clearly shifts the risk from financial institutions and investors to homeowners, perhaps the group least able, financially, to bear that risk. Homeowners logically sold that risk to investors, including the US-quasi owned Freddie and Fannie, who appear to have under-priced that risk relative to historical standards. If prices are low, why shouldn't homeowners sell off this risk and if they logically do, why don't they (i.e. taxpayers) benefit, all things considered? Again, these core tradeoffs are unaddressed by the book's analysis.
As an aside, I would also contend that many of the book's arguments are sloppy. Take the argument on compensation as an example. The book shows evidence that the compensation of financial sector CEOs was more skewed toward equity ownership relative to other sectors, that it was surprisingly well linked to market valuations and that it generated appropriately wide dispersion between top and bottom performers. It goes on to cites, without details, one countervailing study that claims financial sector compensation was 20% less correlated to market valuations than other sectors. From that evidence it argues that compensation was improperly designed. That might be true but the evidence presented surely does not convincingly support that conclusions. If anything, a tighter link would have driven more compensation into 2003 when markets rebounded outside the control of company managers. Further, public markets clearly rewarded risk-taking. The book also simply ignores the large volume of liberal academic studies denying the link between stock market valuations and shareholder designed compensation structures that align incentives to share prices with managerial behavior. Without any reference to this literature, academia has now widely concluded that bonuses largely paid as shares that vested over time over-incented managerial behavior (i.e. risk-taking). Even if the book's argument on compensation is accurate, it's superficial at best. In general, my complaint with the logic is that it largely fails to address the significance of the null hypotheses and in many cases the same data could be used to argue the opposite conclusion.
Lastly, I would contend that if we had implemented every single one of the book's recommendations it would have had very little effect on the current situation. Capital would have had to have sat idle or been diverted from other more successful endeavors. It seems unlikely that precious capital would have or should have simply sat idle to protect against 50 year storms. And had other endeavors been more logical, capital should have and would have flowed to them assuming regulations were consistently applied. The problem lies in the fact that a surplus of short-term financing existed relative to the available investment opportunities, opportunities that are always, by their very nature, long-term. And further, that relative to this expanded supply, the equity available to underwrite the resulting duration risk was, logically, in short supply. The supply of short-term debt relative to the equity available to underwrite this risk is more than merely a matter of relative price. Japanese and Swiss interest rates, for example, have demonstrated that risk adverse short-term investors are largely insensitive to returns so changing relative returns will not covert debt into equity in order to adjust the mix. Again, the book makes no argument why increased regulations, changes to incentive structures or any other of its recommendations in part or in whole would have altered this market imbalance. At "best", it would have left short-term capital underinvested or consumed. More likely, it would have reduced returns to equity and may have exacerbated this imbalance. Again, this core issue is unaddressed by the book. Instead, cries of, "Too much debt!" (i.e. not enough equity) and, "Too little regulation!" implicitly assume as their starting point that regulation can correct this imbalance (or at least divert it from our financial infrastructure; that consuming rather than investing this surplus would be better for society in the long run; or that it would be wiser to let some other economy invest this capital. All seem unlikely.







