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Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Hardcover – Illustrated, June 3, 2014
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The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America’s consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength.
After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.
- Print length256 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherCornell University Press
- Publication dateJune 3, 2014
- Reading age18 years and up
- Dimensions6.12 x 1 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-100801452589
- ISBN-13978-0801452581
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An MIT professor, Posen has written a tightly argued, impeccably sourced, and lucid case for a new American national security strategy. Though written by an expert for experts, it is an accessible read. No term is undefined, no assumpiton unspecified, and no assertion not carefully supported.
-- Jessica T. Mathews ― The New York Review of BooksIn his deeply wise new book Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy, MIT professor Barry Posen agrees that powers that have the might will always believe they have the right. That China is climbing closer to the US on the power ladder requires us to understand that it figures it's in the right no matter what anyone says. Yet the US will stay in Asia as long as China thinks it shouldn't. Even Posen, who wants the chore list of the US military substantially downsized (now in the network: some 800 extraterritorial bases, ports and airfields in more than 80 countries), puts it this way: 'Asia is a more difficult case [than other issues for the US].... China may reach a point where it has sufficient power to bid for hegemony.'But, speaking directly to Beijing, the professor notes that China 'does not yet possess much offensive capability; it can punish and harass, but not crush or conquer. Its options are limited.'
-- Tom Plate ― South China Morning PostPosen's calmly heretical book is an argument for Washington to discipline its seemingly compulsive and spasmodic projections of global power.... [A] masterclass in threat deflation,... Barry Posen's succinct policy brief is a deeply moral book. The correct proportion of GDP to spend on military defence, how many aircraft carrier groups to deploy to the Persian Gulf: these are not just technical matters. It is in just such questions that morality inheres.
-- Chase Madar ― Times Literary SupplementPosen's new book will be compulsory reading for anyone concerned with both the direction that US grand strategy has followed since the end of the Cold War and the possible alternative strategies to help secure vital American national interests, in a period where once again we are witnessing a rise and fall power dynamic in the international system.... This is an enormously important and timely book which challenges the conventional wisdom about the merits and logic of liberal hegemony. Restraint provides an insightful alternative that should be carefully pondered and will certainly advance the debate on American grand strategy.
-- Brian C. Schmidt ― International AffairsRegardless of the reader's views on the grand strategy of Restraint, this book has value. Posen outlines the benefits of having a clearly articulated grand strategy and demonstrates the pitfalls that the U.S. has faced in navigating national security policy without this level of clarity. His case against becoming embroiled in conflicts that require counterinsurgency operations is strong.
-- Joseph Becker ― PrismRestraint makes an eloquent case for a new grand strategy. It is not a new case, for it echoes the arguments offshore balancers have been making for twenty years. It does, however, codify much good thought and consistently makes judicious judgments with precision and fairness. Critics of the status quo would do well to incorporate Posen's case into public discourse.
-- Jared McKinney ― The American Spectator"The three most consequential books of international relations theory published at the end of the Cold War are Frances Fukuyama's The End of History, Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.... Thankfully, there has now emerged a stunning new contender: MIT Professor Barry Posen’s Restraint: The New Foundation of American Grand Strategy. The good news is―if employed―Posen’s prescriptive will enhance U.S. security and a large measure of its post-Cold War global primacy within realistic limits and at a lower cost.
-- Donald L. Sassano ― Homeland SecurityReview
Unnecessary and exhausting military ventures have flowed from the foreign policy elite's excessive ambition, overconfidence in the appeal of U.S. policies, and facile underestimation of the costs in blood and treasure. Barry R. Posen’s seasoned strategic wisdom and technical expertise put these tragic mistakes in their place and chart a realistic alternative to American overstretch.
-- Richard K. Betts, Columbia University Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, author of American ForceAbout the Author
Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Security Studies Program at MIT. He is the author of The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (winner of the Furniss Award and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award) and Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, both from Cornell.
Product details
- Publisher : Cornell University Press; Illustrated edition (June 3, 2014)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 256 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0801452589
- ISBN-13 : 978-0801452581
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 1.1 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.12 x 1 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,383,282 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,604 in National & International Security (Books)
- #2,579 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- #11,581 in American Military History
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Mr. Posen argues that the consensus grand strategy that he dubs Liberal Hegemony is costly, wasteful, and self-defeating for the following reasons:
1) The U.S. is causing countervailing behavior. Think for instance about China, Russia, and the rogue states.
2) The U.S. is also encouraging “cheap ride,” e.g. Europe and Japan, or “reckless drive,” i.e. hurting U.S. interests, or even their own, e.g. Israel and Iraq.
3) The U.S. is perceived as insufficiently sensitive to identity politics. Think for example about Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
The author makes the case for a grand strategy of Restraint that is different from both Liberal Hegemony, which is most concerned about opportunities forgone, and Realism, which is most concerned about costs and risks incurred.
The grand strategy of Restraint calls for the following integrated reforms which should be implemented gradually:
1) The U.S. needs real allies, not the security dependencies it has now in Europe and Asia. These states are wealthy enough to defend themselves or to make much greater contributions to their own security.
2) In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. can defend the flow of oil from the gulf and defend Gulf States from one another. However, the U.S. should not maintain military power to intervene in the internal politics of these countries. Think for example about Iraq in 2014.
3) The U.S. should reduce, if not eliminate its military subsidies to Israel. At the same time, the U.S. should sell Israel the weapons it needs to remain secure in its bad neighborhood, while distancing itself from the occupation.
4) In South Asia, the U.S. should move toward the lowest possible commitment of military force to the region consistent with keeping nihilist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State on the defensive.
5) The U.S. must reconcile itself to slowing down nuclear proliferation, rather than its prevention. The key to U.S. security in a nuclear armed world is a potent secure retaliatory capacity backed by an intelligence and warning system for tracking the source of any nuclear attack on the U.S. The country also needs contingency plans for stolen or lost nuclear weapons that could fall into the hands of violent non-state actors. Mr. Posen doubts that preventive war against potential new nuclear powers is likely to be a sustainable answer.
The grand strategy of Restraint is best served by a “maritime” military strategy and force structure that does not require over 2.5% of GDP, barring a major increase in global tensions, to support it.
Mr. Posen bases its 2.5% estimate on three arguments:
1) As mentioned above, there are a limited number of interests that truly matter to U.S. security.
2) Picking a ceiling imposes discipline on one’s choices.
3) This limit responds to concerns about the long-term fiscal health of the U.S.
The maritime military strategy relies on the U.S. command of the commons – naval, air, and space superiority. Under the author’s grand strategy, most active duty troops regularly stationed abroad would be withdrawn and demobilized. Mr. Posen also pleads for the significant reduction of the U.S. overseas base structure and the reorganization of much of what it keeps. In addition, the author pushes for a reduction of the training efforts and exercises with the military forces of other countries. Mr. Posen is here at his weakest because he does not deal thoroughly with the economic and social consequences of his grand strategy for the impacted service men / women, civilians as well as their families.
To his credit, the author reviews the Liberal Hegemony and Realist critiques of the grand strategy of Restraint. Supporters of Liberal Hegemony believe that Restraint cannot work because the U.S. has to systematically take the lead to reform international politics in the current “unipolar moment.” Realists also believe that Restraint cannot work because the absence of a world government forces nation-states to look out for themselves.
Mr. Posen is well aware that the grand strategy of Liberal Hegemony will not be easily abandoned. The author sees three possible paths to the adoption of his grand strategy:
1) The least likely is that politicians will decide to adopt Restraint imminently based on its merits.
2) A second path to reform would arise from a major crisis.
3) The most likely is that the U.S. will reform the consensus grand strategy gradually, reflecting the modus operandi of modern pluralist democracies.
In summary, Mr. Posen invites a necessary debate about the extent to which the U.S. has to engage the rest of the world to preserve its interests and those of its allies.
This of course is only about Asia, but if restraint is advised on such shaky premises...
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Jeder Autofahrer weiß, dass Rückwärtsfahren die Hohe Schule ist, speziell dann, wenn man hinten mehrere Anhänger dran hat. Gorbachov und Jelzin wissen das und haben die Anhänger vorher abgekoppelt, bevor sie die Kupplung losliessen, aber dennoch viele Trümmer hinterlassen, die Putin jetzt wieder (mit der Kalashnikov?) zusammennähen will. Obama wird den Wandel der US-Rolle in einer zunehmend multi-polaren Welt hoffentlich besser hinbekommen. Die Studie Restraint von Barry R. Posen wäre/ist dabei eine gute Hilfe.




