- Amazon Business: Make the most of your Amazon Business account with exclusive tools and savings. Login now
- Amazon Business : For business-only pricing, quantity discounts and FREE Shipping. Register a free business account
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities Reprint Edition
by
Mancur Olson
(Author)
|
Mancur Olson
(Author)
Find all the books, read about the author, and more.
See search results for this author
Are you an author?
Learn about Author Central
|
ISBN-13:
978-0300030792
ISBN-10:
0300030797
Why is ISBN important?
ISBN
Scan an ISBN with your phone
Use the Amazon App to scan ISBNs and compare prices.
This bar-code number lets you verify that you're getting exactly the right version or edition of a book. The 13-digit and 10-digit formats both work.
Use the Amazon App to scan ISBNs and compare prices.
Have one to sell?
Add to book club
Loading your book clubs
There was a problem loading your book clubs. Please try again.
Not in a club?
Learn more
Join or create book clubs
Choose books together
Track your books
Bring your club to Amazon Book Clubs, start a new book club and invite your friends to join, or find a club that’s right for you for free.
In Stock.
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com.
New from James Patterson
Aaron Paul leads an all-star cast in the Black Book audio drama. Listen now
Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
-
Apple
-
Android
-
Windows Phone
-
Android
|
Download to your computer
|
Kindle Cloud Reader
|
Frequently bought together
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix (Harvard Economic Studies)PaperbackIn Stock.
Power And ProsperityPaperbackIn Stock.
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and PovertyDaron AcemogluPaperbackIn Stock.
Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Veritas Paperbacks)PaperbackIn Stock.
The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis WorldPaperbackIn Stock.
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)PaperbackIn Stock.
Customers who bought this item also bought
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix (Harvard Economic Studies)PaperbackIn Stock.
Power And ProsperityPaperbackIn Stock.
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)PaperbackIn Stock.
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)Douglass C. NorthPaperbackIn Stock.
Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have FailedPaperbackIn Stock.
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and PovertyDaron AcemogluPaperbackIn Stock.
Special offers and product promotions
Editorial Reviews
Review
"[T]his elegant, readable book . . . sets out to explain why economies succumb to the 'British disease,' the kind of stagnation and demoralization that is now sweeping Europe and North America. . . . A convincing book that could make a big difference in the way we think about modern economic problems."—Peter Passell, New York Times Book Review
"Clearly, this is no ordinary theory. Equally clearly, it sprang from the mind of no ordinary economist."—James Lardner, Washington Post
"[Olson's] seminal work The Rise and Decline of Nations, published in 1982, helped explain how stable, affluent societies tend to get in trouble. The book turns out to be a surprisingly useful guide to the current crisis. . . . Olson's book was short but sprawling, touching on everything from the Great Depression to the caste system in India. His primary case study was Great Britain in the decades after World War II. . . . Olson's insight was that the defeated countries of World War II didn't rise in spite of crisis. They rose because of it."―David Leonhardt, New York Times
"One of the really important books in social science of the past half-century."―Scott Gordon, The Canadian Journal of Economics
"The thesis of this brilliant book is that the longer a society enjoys political stability, the more likely it is to develop powerful special-interest lobbies that in turn make is less efficient economically."―Charles Peters, The Washington Monthly
"Remarkable. The fundamental ideas are simple, yet they provide insight into a wide array of social and historical issues. . . . The Rise and Decline of Nations promises to be a subject of productive interdisciplinary argument for years to come."―Robert O. Keohane, Journal of Economic Literature
"I urgently recommend it to all economists and to a great many non-economists."―Gordon Tullock, Public Choice
"Olson's theory is illuminating and there is no doubt that The Rise and Decline of Nations will exert much influence on ideas and politics for many decades to come."―Pierre Lemieux, Reason
"Olson has already provoked a small tempest with this book, making it must reading for all serious students of political economy, sociology, and organization theory."―Orbis
"This is a useful, insightful, and easily readable book. . . . Provocative and compelling."―The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science
"Mancur Olson has laid an important new idea on the table of the profession. I am attracted by the idea, and I think that other readers will be too."―Robert D. Tollison, The Southern Economic Journal
"An extraordinary achievement. While we still don't know what accounts for secular economic and social change, Mancur Olson has made a solid contribution toward our understanding of those issues."―Douglass C. North, Science
"History will tell us whether Olson has built a cathedral of ideas or a shack in the intellectual winds, but either way he provides an interesting starting point for our speculations. One doesn't need a cathedral to get religion."―Lester C. Thurow, The New York Review of Books
"There is both a challenge and a stimulant in this ambitious theory, which is not frightened of ranging widely and drawing conclusions about great matters."―James Douglas, Political Science Quarterly
"Olson's vivid descriptions, extensive data, and interpretations of the social and economic difficulties are persuasive and eloquent. He has a remarkable talent for combining sobriety of thought with formal but graceful prose. . . . Political scientists are indebted to Olson for this stimulating and ambitious effort to write a theory of political economy. In his sometimes quaint and subtle manner, he has managed once more to address the big issues and make sense of them in nontechnical language both respectable among his peers and accessible to noneconomists."―William C. Mitchell, The American Political Science Review
"Few economists dare to generalize as broadly as Olson, and this boldness is what makes his work intriguing."―Eliot Marshall, Science
"Schumpeter and Keynes would have hailed the insights Olson gives into the sicknesses of the modern mixed economy."―Paul A. Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
"Rises above the descriptive level of most books and directs our attention to the theoretical concerns in a way which gives the work a broader scope and the richness we have come to associate with the classic texts."―Kristen Monroe, Princeton University, New York University, from citation for Kammerer prize
"A prize-winning performance: Olson's social theory of economic growth and decay is far superior to existing alternatives."―Aaron Wildavsky
"Olson has taken the implications of his earlier work, The Logic of Collective Action and used them in an extraordinarily innovative and impressive way. The result, quite apart from the specific predictions about when nations decline, is an important contribution to institutional economics―or equivalently, to the sociology of institutions. What makes the contribution especially important is its derivation from microeconomic foundations. The latter constitutes the most promising theoretical paradigm in the social sciences, yet little progress has been made in moving from micro to macro level. Olson's book constitutes a valuable step in that direction."―James S. Coleman
"Clearly, this is no ordinary theory. Equally clearly, it sprang from the mind of no ordinary economist."—James Lardner, Washington Post
"[Olson's] seminal work The Rise and Decline of Nations, published in 1982, helped explain how stable, affluent societies tend to get in trouble. The book turns out to be a surprisingly useful guide to the current crisis. . . . Olson's book was short but sprawling, touching on everything from the Great Depression to the caste system in India. His primary case study was Great Britain in the decades after World War II. . . . Olson's insight was that the defeated countries of World War II didn't rise in spite of crisis. They rose because of it."―David Leonhardt, New York Times
"One of the really important books in social science of the past half-century."―Scott Gordon, The Canadian Journal of Economics
"The thesis of this brilliant book is that the longer a society enjoys political stability, the more likely it is to develop powerful special-interest lobbies that in turn make is less efficient economically."―Charles Peters, The Washington Monthly
"Remarkable. The fundamental ideas are simple, yet they provide insight into a wide array of social and historical issues. . . . The Rise and Decline of Nations promises to be a subject of productive interdisciplinary argument for years to come."―Robert O. Keohane, Journal of Economic Literature
"I urgently recommend it to all economists and to a great many non-economists."―Gordon Tullock, Public Choice
"Olson's theory is illuminating and there is no doubt that The Rise and Decline of Nations will exert much influence on ideas and politics for many decades to come."―Pierre Lemieux, Reason
"Olson has already provoked a small tempest with this book, making it must reading for all serious students of political economy, sociology, and organization theory."―Orbis
"This is a useful, insightful, and easily readable book. . . . Provocative and compelling."―The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science
"Mancur Olson has laid an important new idea on the table of the profession. I am attracted by the idea, and I think that other readers will be too."―Robert D. Tollison, The Southern Economic Journal
"An extraordinary achievement. While we still don't know what accounts for secular economic and social change, Mancur Olson has made a solid contribution toward our understanding of those issues."―Douglass C. North, Science
"History will tell us whether Olson has built a cathedral of ideas or a shack in the intellectual winds, but either way he provides an interesting starting point for our speculations. One doesn't need a cathedral to get religion."―Lester C. Thurow, The New York Review of Books
"There is both a challenge and a stimulant in this ambitious theory, which is not frightened of ranging widely and drawing conclusions about great matters."―James Douglas, Political Science Quarterly
"Olson's vivid descriptions, extensive data, and interpretations of the social and economic difficulties are persuasive and eloquent. He has a remarkable talent for combining sobriety of thought with formal but graceful prose. . . . Political scientists are indebted to Olson for this stimulating and ambitious effort to write a theory of political economy. In his sometimes quaint and subtle manner, he has managed once more to address the big issues and make sense of them in nontechnical language both respectable among his peers and accessible to noneconomists."―William C. Mitchell, The American Political Science Review
"Few economists dare to generalize as broadly as Olson, and this boldness is what makes his work intriguing."―Eliot Marshall, Science
"Schumpeter and Keynes would have hailed the insights Olson gives into the sicknesses of the modern mixed economy."―Paul A. Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
"Rises above the descriptive level of most books and directs our attention to the theoretical concerns in a way which gives the work a broader scope and the richness we have come to associate with the classic texts."―Kristen Monroe, Princeton University, New York University, from citation for Kammerer prize
"A prize-winning performance: Olson's social theory of economic growth and decay is far superior to existing alternatives."―Aaron Wildavsky
"Olson has taken the implications of his earlier work, The Logic of Collective Action and used them in an extraordinarily innovative and impressive way. The result, quite apart from the specific predictions about when nations decline, is an important contribution to institutional economics―or equivalently, to the sociology of institutions. What makes the contribution especially important is its derivation from microeconomic foundations. The latter constitutes the most promising theoretical paradigm in the social sciences, yet little progress has been made in moving from micro to macro level. Olson's book constitutes a valuable step in that direction."―James S. Coleman
From the Back Cover
The years since World War II have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions. Leading political economist Mancur Olson offers a new and compelling theory to explain these shifts in fortune and then tests his theory against evidence from many periods of history and many parts on the world.
Start reading The Rise and Decline of Nations on your Kindle in under a minute.
Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.
Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.
Yo-Yo Ma: Beginner's Mind
Hear an icon's life story, timeless music, and message. Listen free
Product details
- Publisher : Yale University Press; Reprint edition (September 10, 1984)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 276 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0300030797
- ISBN-13 : 978-0300030792
- Item Weight : 11.8 ounces
- Dimensions : 8.47 x 5.38 x 0.74 inches
-
Best Sellers Rank:
#450,023 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #175 in Business Development
- #372 in Development & Growth Economics (Books)
- #414 in India History
- Customer Reviews:
Customer reviews
4.3 out of 5 stars
4.3 out of 5
71 global ratings
How are ratings calculated?
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzes reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
Reviewed in the United States on April 23, 2015
Verified Purchase
Great book. Not for everyone as the writing is pretty dry and academic, but Mr. Olson after all was an academic. This book was very close to 5 stars and would have given it 4 1/2 if possible, but I try to be stingy with 5 star ratings for those books I will definitely read again or those that have a profound impact upon my thought. I enjoyed his investigations of European growth and development and how he looked at the southern states (of the U.S) in the post Civil War period.
4 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United States on March 11, 2007
Verified Purchase
Olson seeks to explain why some nations achieve high rates of economic growth while others suffer bouts of stagflation. He contends that the number and strength of "distributional coalitions," coupled with the length of economic and political stability will influence a nation's rate of economic growth. As such, Olson's hypothesis is two fold. First, Olson argues that states with lower levels of "distributional coalitions" often have higher rates of economic growth. Second, states which have experienced prolonged periods of disorder or armed conflict will have lower numbers of interest-group, or collusion organizations.
Olson's explanation builds upon his early work in The Logic of Collective Action, which holds that "...large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest" (18). Rather, the rational actor will seek to further his or her self-interest, and will subsequently free-ride when possible. Olson expands the scope of this logic to encompass not only the rationality of the individual, but the rationality of the firm in explaining The Rise and Decline of Nations.
As the power of the firm expands, the firm seeks to maximize its own utility at the expense of a societal common good. In order to simplify a complex argument, we can think of Olson's theory in this way. An organization or firm will not expend its energy to create a benefit to society writ large, as it, and its members, will only receive a fragment of that benefit in relation to the costs incurred. On the other hand, if the same firm seeks to maximize its utility, it will seek to obtain a larger slice of the social "pie." In so doing, it may lower the benefits of society as a whole, but will significantly expand its own gain and that of its members. Meanwhile the firm will only incur a fraction of the costs such action projects on society at large. As such, Olson writes, "The great majority of special-interest organizations redistribute income rather than create it and in the ways that reduce social efficiency and output" (47).
Olson argues that a society with long-term stability - free from war, and economic and political turmoil - tend to accrue more special-interest and collusion groups. This occurs because it takes time and reasonable amount of stability for such interest-groups to organize, solidify, and begin to achieve some collective benefits for their members. Once collective benefits are seen as the result of organization, a host of other interests will begin to coalesce and seek to obtain gains for themselves. What emerges is a highly pluralistic society.
This leads us to the second part of Olson's hypothesis, those nations with high numbers of special-interest or collusion groups have lower levels of economic growth. Olson writes, "Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and they reduce the rate of economic growth" (65). First, distributional coalitions stymie technological adoption when such innovation stands to benefit a rival group. A present day illustration can be found in a labor unions vehement opposition to the implementation of labor saving machinery. Second, distributional coalitions will attempt to block policy initiatives that change the status quo. When policy needs to be developed to increase economic or social advancement, the special-interest groups are likely to feel a certain displacement and will act to prevent such policy. According to Olson, these actions, coupled with others, often lead to policies which promote policies which have the potential to stifle economic growth.
Olson's explanation builds upon his early work in The Logic of Collective Action, which holds that "...large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest" (18). Rather, the rational actor will seek to further his or her self-interest, and will subsequently free-ride when possible. Olson expands the scope of this logic to encompass not only the rationality of the individual, but the rationality of the firm in explaining The Rise and Decline of Nations.
As the power of the firm expands, the firm seeks to maximize its own utility at the expense of a societal common good. In order to simplify a complex argument, we can think of Olson's theory in this way. An organization or firm will not expend its energy to create a benefit to society writ large, as it, and its members, will only receive a fragment of that benefit in relation to the costs incurred. On the other hand, if the same firm seeks to maximize its utility, it will seek to obtain a larger slice of the social "pie." In so doing, it may lower the benefits of society as a whole, but will significantly expand its own gain and that of its members. Meanwhile the firm will only incur a fraction of the costs such action projects on society at large. As such, Olson writes, "The great majority of special-interest organizations redistribute income rather than create it and in the ways that reduce social efficiency and output" (47).
Olson argues that a society with long-term stability - free from war, and economic and political turmoil - tend to accrue more special-interest and collusion groups. This occurs because it takes time and reasonable amount of stability for such interest-groups to organize, solidify, and begin to achieve some collective benefits for their members. Once collective benefits are seen as the result of organization, a host of other interests will begin to coalesce and seek to obtain gains for themselves. What emerges is a highly pluralistic society.
This leads us to the second part of Olson's hypothesis, those nations with high numbers of special-interest or collusion groups have lower levels of economic growth. Olson writes, "Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and they reduce the rate of economic growth" (65). First, distributional coalitions stymie technological adoption when such innovation stands to benefit a rival group. A present day illustration can be found in a labor unions vehement opposition to the implementation of labor saving machinery. Second, distributional coalitions will attempt to block policy initiatives that change the status quo. When policy needs to be developed to increase economic or social advancement, the special-interest groups are likely to feel a certain displacement and will act to prevent such policy. According to Olson, these actions, coupled with others, often lead to policies which promote policies which have the potential to stifle economic growth.
33 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United States on June 7, 2009
Verified Purchase
Like another reviewer, I am puzzled why Olsons work has not become mainstream by now. A comment on page 45 "The argument also has only a lesser applicability to any country in which constitutional and structural factors constrain the number and power of lobbying organizations, as appears to be the case in Switzerland." sent me to the internet to read the constitution of Switzerland, and provides a ray of sunshine. Perhaps we can loosen the grip of trial lawyers, labor unions, the AMA, defense contractors, multi-national corporations, etc. with a constitutional amendment.
The only weakness in Olsons work is references to "growth" without reference to population increase or decrease, one of three factors (population, productivity, inflation) of growth that must be considered. But that was not an obvious issue 25 years ago when Olson wrote, and does not subtract from the brilliance of his theory. I highly reccommend this book.
The only weakness in Olsons work is references to "growth" without reference to population increase or decrease, one of three factors (population, productivity, inflation) of growth that must be considered. But that was not an obvious issue 25 years ago when Olson wrote, and does not subtract from the brilliance of his theory. I highly reccommend this book.
4 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United States on August 25, 2014
Verified Purchase
Great insight, hard read. This is the best theory about the decline of the USA that I have ever seen. I bought this book because it was mentioned in a George Will column. I am very glad I did. I did skip over some of the mathematical part though. The theory and conclusions are so obvious once you have read them, but Olson put the idea into words. He was right.
8 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 1999
Verified Purchase
Olson does a stellar job "proving" his theory using accepted scientific standards. His main thesis is that stable societies, over time, will be stifled by a steady growth of groups each committed to obtaining a disproportionate amount of society's goods. This theory, composed of only nine implications, is parsimonious with wide explanatory power. It helps to explain the post-war growth of coutries such as Japan and Germany, while providing a reason why the growth rates of the United States, and especially Great Britain, have been stagnated. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the book is the last, in which Olson merges both Keynesianism and monetarism to form a new theory of macroeconomics. By using his theory, he is able to better explain involuntary unemployment than either of the more popular schools of macroeconomic theory. I was amazed at how many phenomena, such as slavery and the Indian caste system, can be at least partially explained by Olson's theory. Anyone seriously interested in knowing the way the world works will want to give this theory substantial consideration.
139 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United States on March 18, 2012
Verified Purchase
As a citizen of post communist country I was under constant propaganda of pure scientific economy coming from West. Much like scientific atheism but in realm of economics. Everything was about correct manupilation with numbers. Over time I was more and more convinced that main powers in our society remained same. What changed was only political environment. This book very clearly describes how much influence social groups have on economics. How hard it is to introduce some changes which go against interests of some groups, even when society as a whole would benefit. Thanks to numerous examples given in this book I can be pretty confident, that I am not a crazy person who can hear grass growing.
4 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Top reviews from other countries
Athan
5.0 out of 5 stars
More relevant than ever
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 27, 2014Verified Purchase
A genuine classic.
Mancur Olson starts with a three chapter summary of his "Logic of Collective Action," where he explained how stability breeds special interest groups (e.g. cartels, guilds, unions, oligopolies etc.) and how those groups acquire influence in an economy. Some of the most basic observations are
1. Bargaining power will never be perfectly symmetric, i.e. there will be winners and losers;
2. The longer the period of stability, the more these special interests will flourish;
3. Smaller groups can organize better than bigger ones;
4. Cartels are bad for growth;
5. Smaller ones are worse than big ones (for example a union that represents every worker must in the end take account of what's good for society at large, but a small one needn't);
6. These "Distributional Coalitions" slow things down because they only have one or two levers to pull and must satisfy the needs of all their members,
6b. the easiest lever to control is price, because it's observable, rather than quantity;
7. Special interest groups fight progress that might make them redundant;
8. In order to form, cartels must include everybody who can produce a good / provide a service, but then they concentrate on excluding everybody else;
9. As these special interest groups accumulate they make the economy and society progressively unworkable.
Armed with these basic findings from "The Logic," Olson takes you on a truly amazing voyage where he applies the lessons learnt. He runs all the regressions you'd ever need to convince yourself that US states that joined the union later are growing faster than those which joined earlier because the various "coalitions" like unions and lawyers have had less time to organize. He compares the growth of rich countries and demonstrates that the UK is suffering growth-wise because its polity has been uninterrupted for the longest time. (Thatcher had only been in office for 3 years when he wrote this!) Japan and Germany, on the other hand , grew the fastest post-war and that could well have had something to do with the fact that their militaristic pre-war governments first quashed anything resembling a "special interest," while the US occupations subsequently levelled the political playing field. He moves on to the success of the European Union in tearing down trade barriers, with all the economic benefits it reaped, and laments that this was more of a coincidence than anything else, since he is not aware of a single case where trade barriers were not torn down by a separate political reason. (the book pre-dates NAFTA) So, for example, the EEC (the precursor of the EU) was founded to prevent another Franco-German war and to provide a counterweight to the superpowers, trade was but the excuse. From there he moves on to explain the motives for primogeniture in European nobility, the formation of castes in India and apartheid in South Africa: a group enacts an exclusionary practice to preserve a privilege, and as time goes by the practice gets progressively stricter, as the gradient of privilege between insiders and outsiders increases.
And so on.
I now understand 1948-1981 Greece ten times better. I understand why we used to make washing machines in Greece, why we established distilleries and alumina smelting facilities in some of the most beautiful settings on earth (ancient Eleusis and Delphi) and why I was limited to USD 250 of hard currency per trip. Rather than do the right thing and develop from scratch industries that took advantage of my country's unique location, the lazy upper class imported already existing business models from abroad, protected itself with massive tariffs and made sure we normal people did not have the ability to buy foreign products. So when we got the double whammy of EEC entry and borrow-and-spend "Socialists" in 1980 and 1981 our goose was well cooked. I had always known that the socialists took us from 18% debt/GDP in 1980 to 85% by 1985, all wasted on building "Sweden on the Aegean," but now I also understand why all pre-existing business disappeared in less than half a decade, leaving us all dependent on the largesse of our government and its international sponsors. It is unlikely we will ever recover. Sigh!
The book ends with the author's best shot at explaining the problem of his times, stagflation. In short, all the various cartels, guilds, unions etc. end up setting the prices for their products and their sweat above what would otherwise be the market-clearing price. If the economy is doing better, this mispricing becomes less unjustified, but if the economy is doing worse (for example subsequent to a shock to relative prices which leaves everybody in an economy poorer, like the one caused by OPEC) then the mispricing becomes even worse. So the misallocation of resources is less egregious when prices go higher than when they go lower. So the "natural" drift in prices, the one that hurts the least, is upwards. So when nominal income for the economy goes down, the more natural way to take the hit is via quantity, rather than price. A la limite, and as the powerful lobbies push their own agendas increasingly harder, you could even observe rising prices. And from that he concludes that "the best macroeconomic policy is good microeconomic policy." Stop protecting your local industry from foreign competition, force companies to compete with each other in the marketplace, force the workforce to get rid of restraints on new entrants and the macroeconomy will take care of itself. IS ANYONE LISTENING?
So this was overall an amazing read. What I most enjoyed, however, was the continuous torrent of pithy one-liners that flow so effortlessly off of Olson's pen. My favourite: "evolution also happens in the zoo, not only in the jungle." Wow!
Mancur Olson starts with a three chapter summary of his "Logic of Collective Action," where he explained how stability breeds special interest groups (e.g. cartels, guilds, unions, oligopolies etc.) and how those groups acquire influence in an economy. Some of the most basic observations are
1. Bargaining power will never be perfectly symmetric, i.e. there will be winners and losers;
2. The longer the period of stability, the more these special interests will flourish;
3. Smaller groups can organize better than bigger ones;
4. Cartels are bad for growth;
5. Smaller ones are worse than big ones (for example a union that represents every worker must in the end take account of what's good for society at large, but a small one needn't);
6. These "Distributional Coalitions" slow things down because they only have one or two levers to pull and must satisfy the needs of all their members,
6b. the easiest lever to control is price, because it's observable, rather than quantity;
7. Special interest groups fight progress that might make them redundant;
8. In order to form, cartels must include everybody who can produce a good / provide a service, but then they concentrate on excluding everybody else;
9. As these special interest groups accumulate they make the economy and society progressively unworkable.
Armed with these basic findings from "The Logic," Olson takes you on a truly amazing voyage where he applies the lessons learnt. He runs all the regressions you'd ever need to convince yourself that US states that joined the union later are growing faster than those which joined earlier because the various "coalitions" like unions and lawyers have had less time to organize. He compares the growth of rich countries and demonstrates that the UK is suffering growth-wise because its polity has been uninterrupted for the longest time. (Thatcher had only been in office for 3 years when he wrote this!) Japan and Germany, on the other hand , grew the fastest post-war and that could well have had something to do with the fact that their militaristic pre-war governments first quashed anything resembling a "special interest," while the US occupations subsequently levelled the political playing field. He moves on to the success of the European Union in tearing down trade barriers, with all the economic benefits it reaped, and laments that this was more of a coincidence than anything else, since he is not aware of a single case where trade barriers were not torn down by a separate political reason. (the book pre-dates NAFTA) So, for example, the EEC (the precursor of the EU) was founded to prevent another Franco-German war and to provide a counterweight to the superpowers, trade was but the excuse. From there he moves on to explain the motives for primogeniture in European nobility, the formation of castes in India and apartheid in South Africa: a group enacts an exclusionary practice to preserve a privilege, and as time goes by the practice gets progressively stricter, as the gradient of privilege between insiders and outsiders increases.
And so on.
I now understand 1948-1981 Greece ten times better. I understand why we used to make washing machines in Greece, why we established distilleries and alumina smelting facilities in some of the most beautiful settings on earth (ancient Eleusis and Delphi) and why I was limited to USD 250 of hard currency per trip. Rather than do the right thing and develop from scratch industries that took advantage of my country's unique location, the lazy upper class imported already existing business models from abroad, protected itself with massive tariffs and made sure we normal people did not have the ability to buy foreign products. So when we got the double whammy of EEC entry and borrow-and-spend "Socialists" in 1980 and 1981 our goose was well cooked. I had always known that the socialists took us from 18% debt/GDP in 1980 to 85% by 1985, all wasted on building "Sweden on the Aegean," but now I also understand why all pre-existing business disappeared in less than half a decade, leaving us all dependent on the largesse of our government and its international sponsors. It is unlikely we will ever recover. Sigh!
The book ends with the author's best shot at explaining the problem of his times, stagflation. In short, all the various cartels, guilds, unions etc. end up setting the prices for their products and their sweat above what would otherwise be the market-clearing price. If the economy is doing better, this mispricing becomes less unjustified, but if the economy is doing worse (for example subsequent to a shock to relative prices which leaves everybody in an economy poorer, like the one caused by OPEC) then the mispricing becomes even worse. So the misallocation of resources is less egregious when prices go higher than when they go lower. So the "natural" drift in prices, the one that hurts the least, is upwards. So when nominal income for the economy goes down, the more natural way to take the hit is via quantity, rather than price. A la limite, and as the powerful lobbies push their own agendas increasingly harder, you could even observe rising prices. And from that he concludes that "the best macroeconomic policy is good microeconomic policy." Stop protecting your local industry from foreign competition, force companies to compete with each other in the marketplace, force the workforce to get rid of restraints on new entrants and the macroeconomy will take care of itself. IS ANYONE LISTENING?
So this was overall an amazing read. What I most enjoyed, however, was the continuous torrent of pithy one-liners that flow so effortlessly off of Olson's pen. My favourite: "evolution also happens in the zoo, not only in the jungle." Wow!
5 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Ian Robertson
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Peek Behind the Curtain; Why Economies Grow at Different Rates
Reviewed in Canada on August 8, 2016Verified Purchase
The second of three major works by the late University of Maryland economist Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations builds on the theories of his first work,
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
, and applies them to macroeconomic issues, in particular: stagflation, unemployment, and business cycles. Olson writes for a general audience, with both the economic theory and the examples presented in plain English and well explained. The final chapter delves a bit deeper into economic theory, but will still be within the grasp of non-economists.
For centuries, if not millennia, people have been fascinated by the rise and fall of nations. Many have written about the issue in various ways: Edward Gibbon opted for an historical case study in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1-6 ; Jared Diamond took a broad, resource-based geographic approach in his bestselling Guns, Germs, and Steel ; while Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century used an economic approach to note that extreme divergences in wealth have historically led to civil unrest, revolution, and the collapse of regimes.
Olson acknowledges in his first chapter John Maynard Keynes’ enormous contribution to economic theory, but notes too the gap between his macro-economic focus and the micro-economic context within which individuals operate. Olson aims to link macro and micro, and endeavors to show over the course of his book “how involuntary unemployment, and also deep depressions, can occur even when each decision maker in the economy acts in accordance with his or her best interests.”
Like Piketty, Olson looks to more recent history. He cites European countries’ varied rates of economic growth or decline and the many, varied theories advanced in their explanation, and then wonders if there might not be some more unified explanation, something that has been missed. Olson uses a bottom-up approach, drawing on his earlier work in Logic to propose that the incentive and ability of groups to self-organize within a society has a growing impact over time on economic efficiency and growth. From this, he draws nine implications:
1. “There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining.
2. Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time.
3. Members of "small" groups have disproportionate organizational power for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time in stable societies.
4. On balance, special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth.
8. Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of incomes and values of their membership.
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social evolution."
Bolstering the data-set, Olson expands the historical European figures to include the growth rates of different states within the US, and then of various countries around the world. He then matches the economic growth rates with the growth and intensity of each jurisdiction’s special interest groups, paying close attention his theory’s nine implications.
“The logic of the argument implies that countries that have had democratic freedom of organization without upheaval or invasion the longest will suffer the most from growth-repressing organizations and combinations”, but Olson warns that forward looking citizens shouldn’t hope for upheaval to spur growth any more than Piketty’s poorer citizens should look for the wealthy to go bankrupt as a way of reducing inequality. Rather, they should look to improve economic outcomes for all through cross-border free trade and the mobility of the factors of production, because Olson’s nine implications break down across borders (i.e. without a stable nation-state to nurture them).
In his concluding chapter, Olson brings his theoretical framework to address his (and other economists’) concerns about Keynsian and monetarist (and two related) models, and in particular their failure to address high unemployment or the combination of high unemployment and high inflation (stagflation). The explanatory variable, contends Olson, is the societal and labour rigidities, in part caused by special interest groups and imperfect information.
The book was written in 1982, when stagflation was presumed economically impossible. (The Philips Curve predicted a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, not both together). Reading today, though, Olson’s theories are still fresh, and can be used to frame many inefficient (and often annoying) structures we see around us: sclerotic labour unions; powerful industry lobbies; antiquated organisations; and – following Olson’s second implication that organisational difficulty increases with group size – also groups that would be welcome but haven’t been able to organise. With the internet age and new communication tools, Olsen’s theories will provoke further thought still.
For centuries, if not millennia, people have been fascinated by the rise and fall of nations. Many have written about the issue in various ways: Edward Gibbon opted for an historical case study in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1-6 ; Jared Diamond took a broad, resource-based geographic approach in his bestselling Guns, Germs, and Steel ; while Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century used an economic approach to note that extreme divergences in wealth have historically led to civil unrest, revolution, and the collapse of regimes.
Olson acknowledges in his first chapter John Maynard Keynes’ enormous contribution to economic theory, but notes too the gap between his macro-economic focus and the micro-economic context within which individuals operate. Olson aims to link macro and micro, and endeavors to show over the course of his book “how involuntary unemployment, and also deep depressions, can occur even when each decision maker in the economy acts in accordance with his or her best interests.”
Like Piketty, Olson looks to more recent history. He cites European countries’ varied rates of economic growth or decline and the many, varied theories advanced in their explanation, and then wonders if there might not be some more unified explanation, something that has been missed. Olson uses a bottom-up approach, drawing on his earlier work in Logic to propose that the incentive and ability of groups to self-organize within a society has a growing impact over time on economic efficiency and growth. From this, he draws nine implications:
1. “There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining.
2. Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time.
3. Members of "small" groups have disproportionate organizational power for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time in stable societies.
4. On balance, special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth.
8. Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of incomes and values of their membership.
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social evolution."
Bolstering the data-set, Olson expands the historical European figures to include the growth rates of different states within the US, and then of various countries around the world. He then matches the economic growth rates with the growth and intensity of each jurisdiction’s special interest groups, paying close attention his theory’s nine implications.
“The logic of the argument implies that countries that have had democratic freedom of organization without upheaval or invasion the longest will suffer the most from growth-repressing organizations and combinations”, but Olson warns that forward looking citizens shouldn’t hope for upheaval to spur growth any more than Piketty’s poorer citizens should look for the wealthy to go bankrupt as a way of reducing inequality. Rather, they should look to improve economic outcomes for all through cross-border free trade and the mobility of the factors of production, because Olson’s nine implications break down across borders (i.e. without a stable nation-state to nurture them).
In his concluding chapter, Olson brings his theoretical framework to address his (and other economists’) concerns about Keynsian and monetarist (and two related) models, and in particular their failure to address high unemployment or the combination of high unemployment and high inflation (stagflation). The explanatory variable, contends Olson, is the societal and labour rigidities, in part caused by special interest groups and imperfect information.
The book was written in 1982, when stagflation was presumed economically impossible. (The Philips Curve predicted a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, not both together). Reading today, though, Olson’s theories are still fresh, and can be used to frame many inefficient (and often annoying) structures we see around us: sclerotic labour unions; powerful industry lobbies; antiquated organisations; and – following Olson’s second implication that organisational difficulty increases with group size – also groups that would be welcome but haven’t been able to organise. With the internet age and new communication tools, Olsen’s theories will provoke further thought still.
2 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Mehmet
3.0 out of 5 stars
Good book for economists
Reviewed in Germany on December 30, 2020Verified Purchase
As a non-economist, this book was really hard to understand for me because of its heavy language. This might also be because I'm not a native english speaker. But writer himself also states multiple times that this book is mostly for economists. Overall I got the main points but wanted to understand deeply.
Rolf Andreas
5.0 out of 5 stars
The classic....
Reviewed in Germany on February 5, 2013Verified Purchase
Clearly and for good reason one of the classic books in this field. A very important and relevant model which offers excellent explanations.
What other items do customers buy after viewing this item?
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
Pages with related products.
See and discover other items: accounting theory, books on india, social economic

