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The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda 1st Edition
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In The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, Gerges, a public intellectual known widely for his expertise on radical ideologies, including jihadism, argues that the Western powers have become mired in a "terrorism narrative," stemming from the mistaken belief that America is in danger of a devastating attack
by a crippled al-Qaeda. To explain why al-Qaeda is no longer a threat, he provides a briskly written history of the organization, showing its emergence from the disintegrating local jihadist movements of the mid-1990s-not just the Afghan resistance of the 1980s, as many believe-in "a desperate
effort to rescue a sinking ship by altering its course." During this period, Gerges interviewed many jihadis, gaining a first-hand view of the movement that bin Laden tried to reshape by internationalizing it. Gerges reveals that transnational jihad has attracted but a small minority within the Arab
world and possesses no viable social and popular base. Furthermore, he shows that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were a major miscalculation--no "river" of fighters flooded from Arab countries to defend al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as bin Laden expected. The democratic revolutions that swept the
Middle East in early 2011 show that al-Qaeda today is a non-entity which exercises no influence over Arabs' political life.
Gerges shows that there is a link between the new phenomenon of homegrown extremism in Western societies and the war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and that homegrown terror exposes the structural weakness, not strength, of bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Gerges concludes that the movement
has splintered into feuding factions, neutralizing itself more effectively than any Predator drone.
Forceful, incisive, and written with extensive inside knowledge, this book will alter the debate on global terrorism.
- ISBN-100199790655
- ISBN-13978-0199790654
- Edition1st
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Publication dateSeptember 14, 2011
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions5.75 x 1 x 8.75 inches
- Print length272 pages
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About the Author
Fawaz A. Gerges, the Director of the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics, is Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations. His books include Journey of the Jihadist and The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global.
Product details
- Publisher : Oxford University Press; 1st edition (September 14, 2011)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 272 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0199790655
- ISBN-13 : 978-0199790654
- Item Weight : 13.6 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.75 x 1 x 8.75 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #3,418,883 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #874 in Middle Eastern History (Books)
- #3,809 in Terrorism (Books)
- #4,086 in Middle Eastern Politics
- Customer Reviews:
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About the author

Fawaz A. Gerges, the Director of the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics, is Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations. His books include Journey of the Jihadist and The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. (Photo Credit: Jane Hoffer)
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Gerges' book, full of accessible critcal analysis and opinion, would be an excellent addition to any university seminar on the topic. It would also serve as a solid introduction to a casual reader wanting to enrich their own understanding of today's world.
Very good book, the only downside is it's shortness. A little more time could have been spent on each chapter.
I would recommend and hope that many others, especially in the U.S., read this book. The war on terror has dominated our politics, culture, and legal system. It led us into two full scale wars. Given the profound affect it has had on our core institutions, we have a moral duty to have a basic understanding of the facts. There is no better person than Fawaz Gerges to help us fulfill this duty. In addition to being a leading scholar in his field, Gerges has been able to interview more people in the movement and access more source materials than a team of journalists and historians. As a non-expert in the field, this grounding in evidence is critical. Also, as a non-expert, I cannot read 10 books and 100 articles on the topic so I have to choose only the most informative, explanatory, and expert books on the topic. This is clearly such a book.
Top reviews from other countries
While terrorism is a real hazard, Fawaz A. Gerges shows that the perception of Al Qaeda as an existential threat is vastly overblown. Al Qaeda is a busted flush. The organisation has been degraded by a combination of ideological bankruptcy and external pressure. Military and police action has contributed to this but the organisation's fundamental weaknesses were and are political and ideological. Al-Qaeda's ambition to be the vanguard of a mass Muslim uprising, leading a transnational Jihad against the West, has failed.
But such a vision never had much credibility in the first place. Al-Qaeda was born out the defeat of armed Jihad in places like Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s, and its failure to make any headway elsewhere, like Indonesia. Its foundation in the badlands of Afghanistan in the 1990s was a marriage of convenience between two fugitives, the Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Saudi Osama Bin Laden, both of whose respective ambitions to topple the secular Egyptian and theocratic Saudi regimes had failed. Their joining forces in the 1990s was a desperate attempt to revive their flagging struggles. It was Bin Laden's vision of a war against America, Saudi Arabia's ally, (as opposed to Zawahiri's war against local, `apostate' regimes) that prevailed. But Bin Laden's (seeming) success in 9/11 did not provide him with the vindication he sought. 9/11 (widely condemned in much of the Islamic world) failed to galvanise the Muslim masses against the West. America's military response shattered Al-Qaeda Central and the Muslim masses did not rally to save it.
However, the United States' invasion of Iraq was a boon for Bin Laden. For a while, it generated a surge of pan-Islamic outrage against the United States, something 9/11 never achieved - and a provided Al-Qaeda's golden opportunity. It soon squandered it. Al-Qaeda failed to establish itself in Iraq for the same reasons that armed jihad failed in Egypt and Algeria: its indiscriminate violence against fellow believers, its insensitivity to local varieties and understandings of Islam, its failure to appreciate the strength of local nationalisms.
The book makes very clear that, down the years, Al-Qaeda's military weaknesses have been on account of its political weaknesses. These were manifest before 9/11 (even the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda before 9/11 was nowhere near as cosy as widely assumed) and they are especially pronounced now. It is true that the movement has a presence in places like Yemen, and several plots have been allegedly traced to there. But rather than see this as a revival of a transnational Jihad, its off-shoots should be understood as `franchise' elements, inspired by the tenets of Bin Laden's example and ideology, but not centrally directed by his successors. The fragmented nature of the organisation makes such central coordination all but impossible. Further, it does not follow that the local presence of Al-Qaeda inspired elements in trouble spots like Somalia and Yemen means that the prospects of a revived global Jihad are going to improve anytime soon. The various strands are too disparate to coalesce into any such entity.
This is not to say that Gerges is complacent. He does not say that terrorism is no longer a threat. The global, transnational jihad terrorist model has exhausted itself but there is a noticeable ideological disaffection among young Muslims resident in the West. This provides tinder for the replication of the `franchise' model of terrorism closer to home, and indeed the example of the failed Christmas Day airliner bombing in 2009 seems to be the shape of terrorism to come in the near to intermediate future. For Gerges the roots of this disaffection are in the West's on-going 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan-Pakistan and the `occupation' of Muslim lands. Although I differ from him regarding this, I accept his point that terrorism needs to be seen as a criminal and local threat, not an ideological, transnational menance. The scale of threat needs to be properly appraised. There are after all many possible threats and harms and proposed remedies need to be assessed in terms of costs and benefits. A dollar spent on fighting the threat of terrorism is a dollar that is not spent to fight another threat, like pandemic flu. With regards to terrorism, cost-benefit thinking has gone out of the window. Instead we have a never-ending demand on the part of an ever-inflating terrorism industry of a greater and greater share of resources, with no sense of competing priorities.
Overall, this book cuts Al-Qaeda down to the size. For this reason, many security experts will in all likelihood not bother to read this book, for many of them may have to look for work elsewhere if they accepted its analysis. Nonetheless, it deserves the widest readership and the broadest discussion.


