Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Strategy and History) 1st Edition
| Frans P.B. Osinga (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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John Boyd is often known exclusively for the so-called ‘OODA’ loop model he developed. This model refers to a decision-making process and to the idea that military victory goes to the side that can complete the cycle from observation to action the fastest.
This book aims to redress this state of affairs and re-examines John Boyd’s original contribution to strategic theory. By highlighting diverse sources that shaped Boyd’s thinking, and by offering a comprehensive overview of Boyd’s work, this volume demonstrates that the common interpretation of the meaning of Boyd’s OODA loop concept is incomplete. It also shows that Boyd’s work is much more comprehensive, richer and deeper than is generally thought. With his ideas featuring in the literature on Network Centric Warfare, a key element of the US and NATO’s so-called ‘military transformation’ programmes, as well as in the debate on Fourth Generation Warfare, Boyd continues to exert a strong influence on Western military thinking. Dr Osinga demonstrates how Boyd’s work can helps us to understand the new strategic threats in the post- 9/11 world, and establishes why John Boyd should be regarded as one of the most important (post)modern strategic theorists.
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Editorial Reviews
Review
If you have any interest in war, this is a book your library cannot do without. Just as America cannot do without John Boyd's ideas, although our military has not yet figured that out.
William Lind, Military.com
Osinga provides lucid expositions of the various elements that Boyd synthesized into some truly original formulations and ways of thinking about strategy.
Lawrence Freedman, Foreign Affairs
Osinga's book should be read by military professionals and academics alike, but also by anyone interested in the social and cultural impacts of science in general, and chaos and complexity theories in particular. Science, Strategy and War will and should remain required reading for years to come.
Sean Lawson, Emergence
Product details
- Publisher : Routledge; 1st edition (December 8, 2006)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 336 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0415459524
- ISBN-13 : 978-1843764564
- Item Weight : 1.05 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.14 x 0.76 x 9.21 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #906,928 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #256 in Military Sciences
- #715 in Military History (Books)
- #919 in Political Freedom (Books)
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Equally valuable is Osinga's explanation of Boyd's essays and lectures, which are very abstract. Each one builds off the previous work, and in some ways that process is as important as the result. Boyd did not provide a comprehensive doctrine, but rather a mindset. This way of thinking permits the development of a doctrine suited to the circumstances. As Osinga demonstrates, the "OODA Loop" is NOT Boyd's only idea, or even his most important one. He also shows that the common belief that Boyd claimed the key to victory was rapidly cycling through the OODA Loop is incorrect. Successful armies act quickly, but acting quickly does not make an army successful.
John Boyd's other ideas are difficult to summarize here without reproducing Osinga's excellent book, because they build on one another. But Osinga clearly and concisely connected the dots without overshadowing Boyd's own words. This book is as essential for understanding modern military theory as ON WAR.
Although Osinga does not address it, John Boyd appears to have had what can only be called the mind of an engineer. The application of scientific principals to practical ends seemed to come naturally to him. He actually received a degree in industrial engineering from Georgia Tech in 1962, but this appeared to have primarily credentialed his existing engineering talent.
Boyd was an experienced and successful fighter pilot from the Korean War and his initial engineering efforts had to do with designing an air superiority fighter. To this end Boyd developed a simple, but revolutionary concept for fighter design namely the relationship of Energy to Maneuverability or EM concept. Once Boyd developed the EM Concept it was obvious, but he was surprised to discover that no one had thought of it before. Application of this concept led directly to the development of the F-15 fighter and to the most cost effective and versatile fighter produced in the last quarter of the 20th Century, the F-16.
Boyd is best known for his brilliant and original concept of command and control (C2) processes, the so-called Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop. Like the EM concept once somebody thinks of it the OODA loop is obvious, but only after Boyd developed it. The OODA loop describes what are quite complex C2 processes. It was developed directly from Boyd's analysis of physics specifically the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and Quantum Mechanics (especially Heisenberg's Law of Indeterminacy) and their relationship to conflict and war. Because Boyd developed the OODA loop from these broad scientific concepts, it is applicable to tactical, operational, and strategic situations.
With the OODA loop Boyd had developed the precursor of what was later described as "Network Centric Warfare" both in its limited meaning as a Command, Control, Computer, Communications, Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (C4ISR) system and its broader strategic implications as a strategic concept. Boyd emphasized the importance of communications as the foundation of the loop and information management as essential to the Orientation portion of the loop. The OODA strategic applications were related to creating greater flexibility by moving decision making down to the lowest level while creating situational awareness on the highest level. On a grand strategy level Boyd noted the goal of any conflict was to undermine the morale and will of an opponent by "getting inside the opponents OODA loop and creating confusion and uncertainty. In this respect in successfully he transformed the teachings of Chinese strategic thinker Sun Tzu into modern applications.
This book provides considerably more about Boyd's thinking and more importantly his approach to problem solving. The few random notes in this review are meant to give an idea of the breadth and depth of this brilliant engineer and military analyst as revealed by this outstanding study.
Science, Strategy, and War covers every concept from Boyd (meaning it's not just a book about the OODA "loop") as well as their origins. You, the lucky reader, get to discover how Boyd formed his ideas, how they are applied, and how they all link together.
So any of you who want to battle the armchair theorists or clueless executives who pretend they know about Boyd, or try to fumble through the implementation of some OODA-based strategy, I suggest you read and reread this book. Then USE it. Some business renegades (Steven Blank immediately comes to mind) have figured out how to strip the warfare context and use these ideas to rapidly test concepts in the real world before dumping millions into yet another failed start-up. Join that crowd, because Boyd's concepts are alive and well in both the private and public sectors, and are working brilliantly when they aren't twisted up by bureaucratic meddling.
Multiple thumbs up, and then some.
Top reviews from other countries
Boyd’s thinking led to the development of post-Vietnam, pre-stealth fighter aircraft that dominated the world’s skies. Boyd employed his experience and the insight that a ‘Swiss Army knife’ approach seldom provided an adequate design solution. A lesson that the US failed to learn when it created the F-35.
Boyd was also responsible for creating the ideas that encouraged the US to move war into the IT space. Boyd’s thinking on strategy has shaped military thinking on tools, structure, integration and responsibility. What military-types call network-centric warfare. This seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive advantage.
We saw the potential of this thinking in the first Gulf War when sensors, missiles and satellite imagery changed the face of modern warfare. What was less appreciated at the time by commentators is that this form of warfare was uniquely aided by Iraq’s flat terrain; which aided remote sensors and wireless networks. But the network-centric aspect really came into its own with William Owens’ paper on the system-of-systems which was emerging as the military followed Boyd’s approach.
Ok, whilst there is some crossover with technology concepts such as Kevin Kelly’s ‘mirrorworld‘; where AR knits together networked information with location this is all pretty arcane stuff.
Osinga’s critique of Boyd
In Science, Strategy and War, Osinga sets out to do achieve a number of things with regards John Boyd’s ideas.
First of all Osinga provides context, by providing a history of Boyd’s career in military service and as a retired service member and academic. Osinga brings a great deal of understanding to this part of the book as he also served in an air force and is an academic.
Secondly, he explains how Boyd developed and honed his ideas over time. Boyd’s OODA model was borne out of empirical experience as a combat pilot. It was first used to change fighter pilots about engaging with the enemy. Use of it then expanded to encompass bigger strategic outlooks.
Boyd read widely and had a deep understanding fo scientific principles due to his engineering background. He applied meta analysis to the great strategies and military campaigns of history and the literature describing them. He drew on his understanding of science to try and provide analogies for the many areas of uncertainty in implementing a strategy. He drew on the social sciences and concepts like post-modernism.
Whilst Boyd was technical; Science, Strategy and War makes it clear that he wasn’t technocratic in nature. Boyd was keenly aware of human factors including the different aspect of moral power. I think that this one of the least understood aspects of Boyd’s thinking.
I don’t think that Osinga’s book is essential reading for marketing. It was never meant to be. Instead, it provides a good insight into how many of our thinkers operate only at the surface level without truly understanding the concepts they talk about. Boyd was not a surface player, he thought deeply about things and read widely. In that respect I think he can be an example to us all. Osinga did a really good job at bringing this to light in an accessible way.
Other than going back in time and attending Boyd's presentations I would be hard pressed to recommend
a superior reference.
For those interested in postmodern warfare and strategy, the bibliography alone is worth the book's cost.








