In the Shadow of the Garrison State

by Aaron L. Friedberg (Author)

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ISBN-13: 978-0691048901

ISBN-10: 0691048908

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War--or the threat of war--usually strengthens states as governments tax, draft soldiers, exert control over industrial production, and dampen internal dissent in order to build military might. The United States, however, was founded on the suspicion of state power, a suspicion that continued to gird its institutional architecture and inform the sentiments of many of its politicians and citizens through the twentieth century. In this comprehensive rethinking of postwar political history, Aaron Friedberg convincingly argues that such anti-statist inclinations prevented Cold War anxieties from transforming the United States into the garrison state it might have become in their absence. Drawing on an array of primary and secondary sources, including newly available archival materials, Friedberg concludes that the "weakness" of the American state served as a profound source of national strength that allowed the United States to outperform and outlast its supremely centralized and statist rival: the Soviet Union. Friedberg's analysis of the U. S. government's approach to taxation, conscription, industrial planning, scientific research and development, and armaments manufacturing reveals that the American state did expand during the early Cold War period. But domestic constraints on its expansion--including those stemming from mean self-interest as well as those guided by a principled belief in the virtues of limiting federal power--protected economic vitality, technological superiority, and public support for Cold War activities. The strategic synthesis that emerged by the early 1960s was functional as well as stable, enabling the United States to deter, contain, and ultimately outlive the Soviet Union precisely because the American state did not limit unduly the political, personal, and economic freedom of its citizens. Political scientists, historians, and general readers interested in Cold War history will value

Editorial Reviews

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"One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 2000"

"Essential . . . for anyone interested in the history of the American state as well as its future reform."---Andrew P.N. Erdmann, Orbis

"An engaging revisionist history of American society during the Cold War. . . Friedberg performs a real service: reminding us that democracies do a pretty good job of keeping peace as well."---Victor Davis Hanson, The Weekly Standard

"[A] lucid and meticulously documented study. . . . Though Friedberg's close analysis focuses on the period 1945-1960, it provides a framework that also illuminates subsequent events."---Patrick Glynn, Commentary

"Friedberg's account of the development of the American military-industrial complex is very convincing precisely because of the way in which he blends institutional and ideational analyses into a single coherent whole. The work is meticulously researched and is a must read for anyone interested in the diplomatic history of the United States." (Virginia Quarterly Review)

Review

"Friedberg offers an important corrective to our tendency to assume that events had to turn out as they did by analyzing why the United States did not turn into a 'garrison state,' as many feared at the start of the Cold War. The research is meticulous, the story fascinating, and Friedberg's explanation in terms of the power of anti-state actors and ideology is convincing."―Robert Jervis, Columbia University

"This is one of the most exciting books I've read in years. Friedberg is putting forth a sweeping and fundamental reassessment of the American military-industrial complex during the Cold War. It is historical revisionism in its very best sense: clearly written, thoroughly documented, and overwhelmingly convincing. Aaron Friedberg will emerge, with this book, as one of those rare scholars whose work redefines an entire field."―John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University

"This book will be a major contribution to a number of different literatures: it speaks to the extensive literature on war and state formation by exploring how different state mobilization strategies produce different outcomes. It contributes to the growing history of the Cold War by focusing attention on the important issue of the comparative political economy of defense mobilization.... It engages a number of current debates about the impact of domestic ideas, institutions, and regime types upon state behavior."―Michael Desch, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky

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Product details

Series: Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives (Book 127)
Paperback: 416 pages
Publisher: Princeton University Press (March 27, 2000)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0691048908
ISBN-13: 978-0691048901
Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 1 x 9.1 inches
Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
Customer Reviews: 5 customer reviews
Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #972,772 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1659 in General Elections & Political Process
- #1391 in International Relations (Books)
- #1730 in Government

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Robert Bebber

We have been here before

November 4, 2018

Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase

Thorough analysis of US Cold War planning and mobilization. A useful reminder that we have prepared for protracted Great Power war successfully in the past, and need to do so again.

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Steven S. Berizzi

The Cold War as the Engine of American State-Building

July 7, 2000

Format: Paperback

In 1947, Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent for The New York Times asked whether the United States could "prepare for the next, truly total war...without becoming a `garrison state.'" According to Princeton Professor Aaron Friedberg, by the middle of the 20th, "the imminent threat of war produced pressures for the permanent construction of a powerful central state." Friedberg argues, however, that the size and scope of the federal government was held in check during the Cold War by a tradition and ideology of anti-statism. Although this book merely synthesizes previously- published works, it effectively argues that the apparatus of the American state grew less during the Cold War than might have been have been expected.
Friedberg examines "five main mechanisms of power creation: those intended to extract money and manpower and those designed to direct national resources toward arms production, military research, and defense-supporting industries." Friedberg explains: "In the span of only two decades the United States was engulfed in three waves of crisis as depression, world war, and cold war followed each other in rapid succession. The onset of each emergency produced a powerful impetus toward state-building." The early-Cold War debate about defense spending demonstrates Friedberg's point. He writes that "the American people wanted a state that was strong enough to defend them against their foreign enemies but not strong enough to threaten their domestic liberties," defending the country was expensive. In 1949, when President Truman wanted to hold defense spending for the next fiscal year, to $14.4 billion, the Secretary of Defense instructed the service chiefs to base their estimates "on military considerations alone," which resulted in a "wish list with a staggering $30 billion price tag." Truman's final budget message estimated the annual cost of sustaining his planned long-term force posture to be $35 to $40 billion. According to Friedberg, President Eisenhower's "commitment to holding down defense spending was a logical outgrowth of his essentially anti-statist philosophy of political economy," and, in June 1954, he warned that a massive new buildup would involving transformation of the United States into "a garrison state." In 1960, John Kennedy asserted that Eisenhower's "excessive attention to the budget" had "resulted in a serious weakening of the nation's defenses." Compulsory military service also generated intense debate. Senator Robert Taft warned that the adoption of universal military training would transform the United States into a "militaristic and totalitarian country." According to Friedberg, "the strongest and most consistent congressional opposition to came from the Republican party, and in particular from its conservative midwestern wing. It was in this part of the country that principled anticompulsion arguments struck their most responsive chord." According to Friedberg: "The widespread animosity to statism that characterized the early post-war period...played a critical role in blocking the creation of new, powerful governmental industrial planning institutions." Friedberg explains: "Even in the face of an enemy, and to a remarkable degree even in wartime, the American system has proven itself to be highly resistant to centralized industrial planning." Friedberg writes: "[T]he push for privatization, and the ideological language in which it was couched, also raised troubling questions about the legitimacy of the military's large-scale industrial activities, even those with long traditions. In the context of a worldwide contest with communism, private ownership of the means of production came to be regarded...as morally superior to any alternative form of economic organization." According to Friedberg: "The postwar privatization of American arms production was the end result of a protracted process of debate and political struggle...At the most general ideological level the burgeoning anti-statist sentiments in the 1940s and 1950s tended to strengthen the hands of the privatizers and to discredit those who advocated anything that savored of socialism." In discussing the structure of the U.S. research and development system and its performance during the Cold War, Friedberg asserts that the "large, open, and loose-limbed American system was well suited for promoting innovation, and it tended over time to outperform its more rigid, closed, and hierarchical Soviet counterpart." According to Friedberg: "[F]or nearly a half century, the pursuit of qualitative superiority [in military technology] was a central, persistent feature of the entire American defense effort." Friedberg explains: "Before the Second World War had ended and the Cold war began, senior American scientists and top military planners were already agreed that the preservation of a `preeminent position' in weapons technology must be a central goal of peacetime defense policy." "The clear emergence of the Soviet Union as the most likely enemy in any future war added urgency and a clear focus to the discussion of the role of technology in American strategy." Friedberg reports: "`Atomic weapons used tactically are the natural armaments of numerically inferior but technologically superior nations,' declared one congressional enthusiast in 1951." He explains: "The Eisenhower administration elevated the substitution of firepower for manpower to the position of key organizing principle of national strategy. Atomic and thermonuclear weapons of every conceivable yield were...at the heart of Western defenses;" and "For the West, by the mid-1950s, preserving technological supremacy had become even more essential and urgent than it had appeared only a few years before." According to Friedberg: "Critics and enthusiasts alike agree that the American research and development system was highly productive of technological advances, that it tended over time to outpace its Soviet counterpart, and that the superior performance of the American system was connected in some way to its structure."
Was there ever a real likelihood that Cold War America would turn into a "garrison state?" The clear answer is: No. References to the garrison state were rhetorical devices used most often by congressional opponents of the concentration of power in the executive branch in Washington, D.C. But Friedberg is absolutely correct that anti- statist rhetoric had powerful antecedents in American history and, therefore, resonated deeply with the public. The specter of creating a garrison state was ominous, even when it was intentionally exaggerated.

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Jason N. Palmer

Hope for America in Iraq that militarism will fade . . .

March 15, 2005

Format: Paperback

Harold Lasswell developed the idea of the garrison state in the late 1930s and early 1940s. He proposed that "under conditions of continual crisis and perpetual preparedness for total war, every aspect of life would eventually come under state control." In 1947, Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent for The New York Times asked whether the United States could "prepare for the next, truly total war...without becoming a garrison state." George Orwell popularized the notion with his 1949 release of 1984, a harrowing view of totalitarian control by the garrison state. To a large extent, these arguments fuel Aaron Friedberger's premise that "war and the threat of war required the creation of military power, and, over time, the creation of military power led to the construction of strong, modern states." (3)

From this premise Friedberg contends that the growth of the American state was held in check during the Cold War by a tradition and ideology of anti-statism. The Cold War produced pressures for the permanent construction of a powerful central state. "In the American case," Friedberg argues, "these pressures came comparatively late in the process of political development... they were met and, to a degree, counterbalanced, by the strong anti-statist influences that were deeply rooted in the circumstances of the nation's founding. (3-4) Friedberg identifies the mechanisms for state growth between 1945 and 1960 as "the product of a collision between these two sets of conflicting forces." (4) He effectively demonstrates that the apparatus of the American state grew less during the early years of the Cold War than might have been have been expected.

Friedberg examines "five main mechanisms of power creation: those intended to extract money and manpower and those designed to direct national resources toward arms production, military research, and defense-supporting industries." (5) In each of these areas he finds anti-statist influences holding state-building in check. "Mounting popular and congressional resistance to taxes and controls compelled the Truman administration to lower its sights and to accept the necessity of a slower and, in the end, smaller military buildup." (121) Friedberg concludes "Eisenhower's commitment to holding down defense spending was a logical outgrowth of his essentially anti-statist philosophy of political economy." (127) Friedberg finds that "in the absence of sustained public opposition, the pressures for universal military training would probably have proved overwhelming," except that it raised doubts over legitimacy. (167) Like the rejection of universal military training, Friedberg also identifies the demise of centralized defense industrialization policy as "at least as much a product of domestic anti-statist influences" as a "logical, inevitable response to the advent of nuclear weapons." (199) Anti-statist influence not only resisted centralized planning and industrial dispersal, but it also strengthened the hand of privatizers, discrediting "those who advocated anything that savored of socialism." (247) Finally, Friedberg maintains that "each of the essential structural characteristics of the American Cold War research and development system was strongly influenced by ideological considerations and by the workings of American domestic political institutions [both identified as anti-statist forces]." (296) Friedberg identifies the strengthening of civilian rule in the Department of Defense, resistance to centralization, heavy reliance on private contracting and government sponsorship of domestic vice purely military technology as anti-statist influences that reduced the size, scope and effect of America's garrison state. With remarkable clarity Friedberg is able to conclude that domestic constraints on state expansion--including those stemming from mean self-interest as well as those guided by a principled belief in the virtues of limiting federal power--protected economic vitality, technological superiority, and public support for Cold War activities. He identifies the strategic synthesis that emerged by the early 1960s from this collision between anti-statist ideology and security imperative as functional and stable; it enabled the United States to deter, contain, and ultimately outlive the Soviet Union precisely because the American state did not limit political, personal, and economic freedom.

Friedberg is not a historian, and at times his lack of attention to culture, race, gender and class make this abundantly clear. Several broad assertions, while supported in the text, lack specificity. For example, Friedberg describes American business's post-war ideology in their own simplistic terms, "Free enterprise was good; too much government was not only bad for the economy, it was a profound threat to traditional American liberties," (50) without putting those statements in an anti-New Deal context.

In Friedberg's well documented 351-page text synthesis, one sees Samuel Huntington's influence (The Soldier and the State, 1957). Friedberg provides a nice tonic for Huntington's pessimism and places the entire civil-military, liberal-statist conflict in perspective. He takes a much more positive view of American liberalism's retardation of military professionalism and other state influences. Essentially agreeing with Huntington, Friedberg comes to a different conclusion: that this was not a bad thing. Of course, Friedberg has the luxury of viewing the Cold War from its successful conclusion whereas Huntington contemplated its ominous beginnings. Because it gives us insight into our current reaction to September 11, 2001, and hope that militaristic trends as expressed in the current war in Iraq will not leave permanent scars on the American state, In the Shadow of the Garrison State deserves attention at all levels in the collegiate setting.

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Greg Garcia

Shedding light on the Cold War Milieu

May 6, 2000

Format: Paperback

For those interested in the dynamics and interplay of domestic and national security issues, this book is fantastic. Friedberg frames and then details key power transforming institutions and elements such arms, technology, supporting industrial complex, money and manpower, and how they formed the basis of both a powerful deterrence and a relative stable, non-garrison state that excelled economically.
Not a book for all readers, but for those pundits and novices of national security or Cold War history, this is a must have book. Sure to become required reading for top notice public policy and political science departments in leading universities.

6 people found this helpful

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A. D. Adesnik

INSTANT CLASSIC

May 12, 2003

Format: Paperback

Friedberg has written the best book on international relations since John Gaddis' "Strategies of Containment". Like Gaddis, Friedberg is one of a handful of authors who possess a sophisticated knowledge of both American diplomatic history and modern theories of international relations.
With the aid of his groundbreaking archival research, Friedberg shatters existing paradigms by showing that American culture played a leading, perhaps dominant role in the forging of the United States' Cold War grand strategy.
Friedberg's book is indispensable reading for every scholar and student of international relations. It is a classic that will be read and reread for generations.

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