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Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the U.S. Mortgage Giants Paperback – September 14, 2015
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So why does the government now want them dead?
In 2008, the U.S. Treasury put Fannie and Freddie into a life-support state known as “conservatorship” to prevent their failure―and worldwide economic chaos. The two companies, which were always controversial, have become a battleground. Today, Fannie and Freddie are profitable again but still in conservatorship. Their profits are being redirected toward reducing the federal deficit, which leaves them with no buffer should they suffer losses again. China and Japan are big owners of Fannie and Freddie securities, and they want to ensure the safety of their investments―which helps explain why the government is at an impasse about what to do. But the current state of limbo is unsustainable.
Based on comprehensive reporting and dozens of interviews, Shaky Ground chronicles the story of Fannie and Freddie seven years after the meltdown, and tells us why homeownership finance is now one of the biggest unsolved issues in today's global economy―and why it must be placed on firmer ground.
- Print length159 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherColumbia Global Reports
- Publication dateSeptember 14, 2015
- Dimensions5 x 0.25 x 7.5 inches
- ISBN-100990976300
- ISBN-13978-0990976301
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Editorial Reviews
Review
A Washington Post Bestseller
"Bethany McLean has written an insightful guide to one of the fascinating true-financial-crime cases of our time." ―Simon Johnson, Washington Post
"Bethany McLean romps through the well-intentioned founding of Fannie and Freddie, via their gradual corruption to the current unhappy limbo, with the government and hedge funds fighting over the scraps in the courts.... McLean deftly steers a sensible course through the competing claims." ―Tom Braithwaite, Financial Times
"An excellent new book that attempts to make sense of the senseless history of Fannie and Freddie." ―Alan Murray, Fortune
"In a short, lucid paperback (or e-book) from a new publishing arm of Columbia University, McLean explains how the topsy-turvy world of Fannie and Freddie came to be and why government control of them likely will limp along indefinitely as the major unresolved issue of the financial crisis." ―USA Today
"The latest very smart finance book by McLean...[who] found a very good [topic] in our deeply flawed home mortgage system." ―The National Book Review
"Readers of this maddening, sharp report will rightly wonder why Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been allowed to survive and why we can't do better." ―Kirkus Reviews
"McLean ably describes a situation where, seven years past the brink of economic collapse, Fannie and Freddie are severely undercapitalized, faced with investor lawsuits, and caught up in political infighting that prevents either comprehensive reform or their ultimate abolition." ―Publishers Weekly
"Based on in-depth reporting and dozens of interviews with key players in Washington and Wall Street, Shaky Ground vividly describes how we got into this unsustainable situation―and why everyone should care. This is business journalism at its best and a must-read for anyone concerned about a full recovery from the financial crisis." ―Porchlight
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Columbia Global Reports (September 14, 2015)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 159 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0990976300
- ISBN-13 : 978-0990976301
- Item Weight : 6.5 ounces
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,051,109 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #237 in Financial Services Industry
- #281 in Mortgages (Books)
- #538 in Government Management
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Bethany McLean is a well-known journalist. Her March 2001 article in Fortune, "Is Enron Overpriced?," was the first in a national publication to openly question the company’s dealings.
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As someone who has spent 50 years in higher education along with 40 years as an arbitrator I was struck over a decade ago by McLean’s ability to reduce complexity to simplicity by asking and informing the right question. Teaching is at its best when the methodology is Socratic and the resolution of conflict is best achieved by correctly framing the core issue and informing a dispute between parties or interests rooted , at best, with incomplete information or, at worst, with discounted information shrouded in ideology. The Fannie and Freddie issue beckons an independent call to frame and inform the issue and Bethany does so in Shaky Ground.
Why does it appear Bethany McLean is so preoccupied with topics she may know little about? As an academic, I am inclined to conclude she remains the intellectually curious student every teacher prizes. Her experience with Enron offers excellent evidence to show that Fortune assigned her to the story as a young writer because they assumed the easiest story to write is the story about success. Upon reflection and ironically, it is reasonable to assume her Enron discovery evolved mostly from her lack of understanding. It was McLean’s relative inexperience in the financial sector—a background formed mostly as an admittedly unique English and Mathematics collegiate major combined with a relatively short experiential learning opportunity with Goldman Sachs—that prompted her to ask Enron leadership the simple and seemingly innocent question most seasoned financial sector professionals would never think or have the courage to ask: “How exactly does Enron make its money?” When the response was silence, McLean wondered whether the story may be more about failure than success.
Bethany McLean’s work, Shaky Ground included, is an excellent example, especially for students, of how to merge poetry and prose—rhetoric and data—in the quest for understanding risk-laden situations in need of intervention before they cast devastating harm. However, her work is also worthy of attention by professionals, both financial practitioners and regulators. It is members of that audience who often find themselves so steeped in financial sector culture that reading McLean’s work offers a back to basics exercise in renewing one’s capacity to think and act analytically and critically in the same manner that a morning visit to the gym is a fundamental exercise in sustaining one’s physical fitness.
McLean’s disciplined manner of writing is especially important in this age of transforming and waning journalism—especially in regional and local markets where the economics and organizational disruption of the news sector is profound. But, her methodology is also important to the quest to address seemingly marginalized, but important national issues with global significance. Pause to think, in this October 2015 moment, how much our journalistic discourse is dominated throughout the day by reporting on what appears to be a celebrity-centric fascination with Presidential aspirants while the traditional and important role of investigative journalism—a role critical to the importance of shedding light on the darkness of power in public and private/national and global settings—appears to be waning or distilled to repetitive investigations in search of air time over truth.
Also, reflect upon how often we find ourselves looking back on harmful economic events admitting that “if we had only known…”. Surely, we saw the risks associated with sub-prime mortgage practices at least a decade before the 2008 economic debacle with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the emergence of little understood mortgage-related financial products, and the failure of credit agencies to adequately define risk. And, yet we did little until we had to and with all the harmful consequences such inaction caused and still causes. Sadly, the tragedy of September 11, 2001 offers ample evidence of the importance of investigative journalism when one considers Federal officials at the highest levels were seemingly surprised by the event as evidenced by the testimony of one official who said “…no one could have predicted that they would try to use an airplane as a missile” despite evidence of years of similar attempts in various parts of the world as well as the existence of training programs designed specifically to counter such offenses.
Bethany McLean’s ponderous and questioning style and signature are once again clear in Shaky Ground. She is faithful to what she claims to do by calling attention to her concern about the fragility of government-sponsored enterprises, aka GSE’s, when she says: “…I don’t think everyone should agree with me. But I do think everyone should care. What I have tried to do in this book is to lay out the facts in a way that I hope will help readers think about the issues and make up their own minds.” And, she succeeds.
Bethany does seem to stray a bit from her quest to call attention to the risk intensive mortgage market exacerbated by the GES model, when she suggests that one approach to eliminating the risk posed by mortgage GES’s is to find a way to eliminate our national preoccupation with home ownership. Ouch. The wisdom of home ownership as a government backed cornerstone of our economy is a vestige of FDR’s heroic initiatives to mend the Great Depression (though the economic multiplier effects of WWII are often overlooked) and it has come to be viewed as a fundamental social right in much the same way that Social Security has become and healthcare will become.
Yes, young people are more diverse with many impeded from entering the house-centric world of suburbia by the effects of lingering segregation and a shrinking middle class increasingly comprised of people of color and single women devoid of both the financial capacity and the communal welcoming suburbia should afford. And yes, young people are more mobile—in part because they are young and in part because, unlike their parents, they are not likely to have 40 year careers with the same firm in the same place, but are likely destined to become corporate nomads—even virtually. But, the price volatility of the rental market—especially in large urban areas, surely NYC—when combined with family-centric points in one’s life cycle is likely to sustain the importance of home ownership.
In her ponderous way, Bethany McLean does seem to tilt in the direction of thinking that Fannie and Freddie cannot be allowed to simply fade away, but have to be reformed—even perhaps with different branding—if home ownership and its economic spillover effects are to be sustained. In doing so she seems to be mimicking Fiddler on the Roof’s Tevye and his unending “on the one hand, on the other hand” interrogatories in search of the truth when it comes to a choice between family and tradition. If so, it sounds like Bethany McLean may have tripped over another unanswered question that she is yet to understand. Hopefully, we can stay tuned for her next book and the revelations, some still unresolved, it is likely to offer.
Bethany is amazing in her research and ability to put the details of her story into relatable terms. The financial sector does their best to hide behind a veil of secrecy and use complex terms to define what they do. Bethany does a great job of breaking that down and letting a lay person understand what is actually going on. That strength is why I like this book as it delves into the inner workings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The majority of the book is excellent and I am so grateful for her insight of how these two juggernauts work in the U.S. housing market. It also brings to light how these companies with shareholders also have the government managing them and why having a foot in both public and private sectors is not a good idea. The detail in which Bethany goes is amazing and at times can be too much. Yes it is important to know the inner workings but I feel like it could have been edited down in parts to move the story along better. I struggled to make it through the middle part of the book and that’s where I think it should be trimmed down a bit.
Overall a great book and I’m enriched by reading it.
On "Shaky Ground," here are my thoughts:
1. This book might have been titled "Sympathy for the Devils." There is way too much sympathy expressed for the hedge funds that bought preferred stock in Freddie and Fannie. They were making a bet that the political process would come out a certain way, and they lost that bet, fair and square. End of story, as far as I am concerned. I should note that on several occasions representatives of the hedge funds have felt me out about doing some "research" or writing an article to support their position. I would not have done it for any amount of money. I am not saying accusing McLean of having succumbed to this.
2. The other devil who gets a ton of sympathy is former Fannie Mae executive Tim Howard. McLean endorses all of his self-serving views, which include a claim that he did nothing wrong in Fannie's giant accounting scandal. Also, his view is that had the Fannie management not been replaced, his team would have averted the crisis. Both claims may be true. In my opinion, Freddie and Fannie were better managed before both of their management teams fell in accounting scandals. But I think that more journalistic skepticism is in order. Regardless of who was in charge, there was pressure on Freddie and Fannie management to dive into high-risk lending, with shareholders seeing profits and regulators seeing a mission to expand home ownership opportunity.
3. Her treatment of Ed DeMarco left me confused. I thought she sided with those who viewed him as a free-market ideologue, but in an email to me she praised him as an decent civil servant. I am glad that she did not intend to defame him.
4. She says that if you take it as given that the government is going to promote what the housing lobby wants, namely "home ownership" with little actual equity and a mortgage market dominated by the 30-year fixed-rate loan, then keeping Freddie and Fannie is better than the alternatives. If you accept the premise, then I agree. But there is a powerful case to be made against government caving into the housing lobby. The costs of this, including serial financial crises (the S&L crisis, the crisis of 2008) and misallocation of capital, are huge, and the social benefits are miniscule. (The private benefits can be enormous--just ask Tim Howard.) McLean does mention some of the evils of this housing-industrial complex, but her bottom line is, in effect "you can't beat 'em, so don't try."
Overall, this is not a terrible book. But if you read it, you should keep in mind that she gives the most favorable treatment possible to Freddie, Fannie, the hedge fund investors, and to policy makers who attempt social engineering using housing finance. Although the book is not completely one-sided, she does not give alternative points of view as much respect as I think they deserve.
Finally, I should note that I have been personally attacked by people connected with the old Fannie Mae lobbying machine. This nasty bullying behavior only reinforces my belief that it would be bad policy to restore Freddie and Fannie to the status that they had before the crisis.
Top reviews from other countries
Bethany McLean has done it again, basically. And she makes it all feel like a short story.
I’m still in awe at how much was made to fit into this pocket book without making it at all feel like the Cliff Notes for a much bigger opus. In fact, when I finished it I thought to myself “wow, this was nice and sweet.” Only when I went back to summarize my findings did I realize what a feat the author has accomplished.
That said, her analysis has two HUMONGOUS gaps. Let’s get them out of the way:
1. All countries in the world automatically favor owning versus renting, because my rent is someone else’s income on which he pays income tax. Elementary understanding of the distinction between the formal and effective incidence of tax shows renters pay tax that owners don’t. They pay it indirectly (via the landlord) but they pay it all the same. The American system’s additional support of owning versus renting (via tax deductibility of mortgage debt, via the creation of the market for 30yr mortgage debt etc.) is merely the American cherry on a worldwide cake.
Rent means tax. Ergo, if you can own, you should own, unless you think you’ll be moving soon or if you think prices are falling. Worldwide, this is one of the ways the poor stay poor, and they are not stupid for wanting to own like everyone else; it is uninformed (or worse) to look down on them for taking on subprime loans. Their (perhaps unrealistic) aim is to duck that tax like you and I can (though I’d recommend a book called “House of Debt” by Mian and Sufi to anyone who cares to see how this totally backfired in the 2008 crisis). Conversely, any government attempt to further tilt things in favor of homeowners is in rather poor taste if your leanings are egalitarian.
2. Fannie and Freddie did not survive the crisis because of the 400 billion commitment from the Treasury and are not crazy profitable at the moment because they are naturally set up to make money. They owe their existence and profitability to the fact that the Fed has throughout the crisis bought staggering amounts of their debt at pretty much flat price to the safest investment on earth, US Treasuries.
If you can always borrow, then you will never die. If you can always borrow for free from someone with infinite pockets (2.8 trillion and counting, with the Fed still as of October 2015, as I’m writing this, replacing maturing GSE debt it holds from QE1,QE2 and QE3) then you can earn some very high "economic rents." This argument alone is enough to make a total joke of any claim from any hedge fund regarding how capitalism should work.
Claims on Fannie and Freddie are contingent claims on the mindblowing and continuing largesse from the part of government called the Fed. If, for argument’s sake, the Fed has paid 100 cents on the dollar for 2.8 trillion of debt that would otherwise trade at 99 cents on the dollar, that’s an 28 billion gift right there. If the debt should trade at 90 cents on the dollar, then that part of the gift is worth 280 billion. If it would not trade at all (which it didn’t during the crisis)…… you get the picture.
The geniuses who invested in Fannie and Freddie stock in 2011 did not spot some amazing free-market company with undervalued stock. They took a bet that they could benefit enormously (something like 30:1) from a government subsidy that was meant for people other than themselves.
Bill Gross did it safer, he bought himself GSE debt at the lows, and bet the Fed would follow in his footsteps to save the Chinese. Perry Capital and friends thought they’d pull the same scam three years later, absent a crisis. Unlucky, fellows! For now, at any rate. Tomorrow, who knows? I would not bet against them eventually earning that 30:1 return. This is America!
With those two points behind us (and they do cost the book the final, fifth, star from where I stand, much as I totally loved it) here come the five pages of notes I took in my attempt to summarize this little masterpiece:
HISTORICAL PURPOSE OF (AND MOTIVATION FOR) THE GSEs
1. “Other countries chose healthcare. We chose housing”
2. “Other countries, like Germany, subsidize rents. We subsidize ownership”
3. Until very recently, the US banking system was regional, so mortgage lenders were exposed to local economy. There was a need for way to pool mortgage risk across the nation
4. 30yr mortgages are impossibly dangerous instruments. They carry three risks: credit, interest rates and prepayment (p.63) Only a government-backed scheme could hope to create a market in such instruments
5. “What the GSEs really were was a giant subsidization machine, where wealthier borrowers in desirable areas paid more than they otherwise would have, while less well-off borrowers in less desirable locations paid less than they otherwise would have” (p. 81)
PRE-CRISIS HISTORY OF THE GSEs
1. The National Housing Act (1933) provided for the creation of privately owned mortgage associations that would buy FHA-issued mortgages from lenders (p.64) but in the three years after they were authorized none were set up. So government set up Fannie Mae in 1938. Jessie Jones (chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) pledged in the NYT to match private competitors’ capital dollar-for-dollar but nobody accepted.
2. Fannie was set up as a company with shareholders much more recently, in 1968, during the Johnson administration, precisely to avoid consolidating its debt with that of the US. “It was privatized to get it out of the budget.” -Paul Volcker (p.67) The 1968 law also removed any limits in the amount of Fannie debt banks could hold on their balance. Freddie was established around that time (1970) to compete with Fannie and was “privatized” like Fannie a decade or so later, presumably for similar reasons. Originally Fannie and Freddie owned mortgages, but later they started guaranteeing them instead. In 1986, finally, restrictions were lifted on buying non-GSE guaranteed mortgages, paving the way for the creation of the private market.
3. In 1992 Congress established OFHEO to oversee Fannie and Freddie with a pitiful budget, equivalent to the pay of the top 4 Fannie executives. The same legislation (i) set tiny capital requirements for Fannie and Freddie and (ii) established affordable housing goals (originally goals that were already comfortably exceeded).
4. By 1999 Fannie Mae had become America’s 3rd largest corporation by assets (p. 74) And right about then, they started selling bonds to foreigners, stepping in where the Clinton surplus left off: in 1998 USD 198bn; in 2000, USD 348bn; in 2004, USD 875bn: foreign money was funding the most domestic asset (p. 75) “They took the worst possible investment and turned it into the second most liquid instrument on earth” (p. 75) BIS regulations assigning relatively low risk weighting to their debt contributed to this, in all probability.
5. Just as Fannie and Freddie were reaching the zenith of their powers, the private market was working hard to supplant them. “Subprime mortgages rose from 8 percent of mortgage originations in 2003 to 20 percent in 2005” (p. 28) “By 2006, private label issuance reached USD 1.15 trillion and an astonishing 71% of the mortgages were either subprime or Alt-A” (p.28) ”As the private market boomed, Fannie and Freddie were rapidly becoming irrelevant. Their market share fell from 57 percent in 2003 to 42 percent in 2004 and to 37 percent in 2006” (p. 29)
6. The choice was explicitly made not to fall behind the private market: “We face two stark choices: stay the course or meet the market where the market is” – Tom Lund (head of single-family business); “If you’re not relevant, you’re unprofitable, and you’re not serving the mission.” -CEO Dan Mudd (p.31) Ken Bacon: “It’s very hard to any one person to sit as the market moves and say ‘I’m smarter than everyone in this market.’ Everyone was getting into the market and I just can’t give you a breaking point. Over time, we started doing things we used to not do.” Ken Bacon congressional testimony (p. 53)
7. “Fannie and Freddy together purchased 3.8 percent of subprime issuance in 2001, 11.9 percent in 2002, 34.7 percent in 2003, 38.9 percent in 2004, and 28.9 percent in 2005, tapering to about 25 percent in 2006 and 2007.” Between 2005 and 2007 they also guaranteed USD 350bn of Alt-A.
8. What’s more, they “conned” the Department of Housing and Urban Development into allowing these loans to count toward the congressionally mandated goals to provide affordable housing that Fannie and Freddie had had to meet since 1992. Wall Street even began designing a special product just for Fannie and Freddie that was packed with loans that satisfied the goals.
9. It’s very difficult to argue that in embracing subprime they were actually promoting affordable housing. Subprime was chiefly to take money out of your home, not to help you buy it in the first place: by 1999 a staggering 82% of subprime were refinancings. (p. 27) “Between 2003 and 2007, homeowners cashed out approximately $966 billion in home equity from Freddie Mac. In 2006, cash-out refinancings accounted for nearly 30 percent of all refinances at Freddie Mac.” (p.28) “One could argue that refinancing worked to undermine, not strengthen homeowners, by generating a lot of overextended homeowners who couldn’t make their mortgage payments.”
10. One thing they may have achieved is to “crowd out” the private sector. Ed Pinto, a former chief credit officer of Fannie May who left the firm in the 1980’s argues that “Fannie and Freddie drove the private issuers further out on the risk curve.” (p. 54)
FLAWS OF THE GSE MODEL
Michael Stegman: “The critical flaws in the legacy system that allowed private shareholders and senior employees of the GSEs to reap substantial profits while leaving taxpayers to shoulder enormous losses cannot be fixed by a regulator or conservator because they are intrinsic to the GSEs’ congressional charters.” (p. 141)
“The CBO produced study after study showing that the subsidy was not going to homebuyers. It was going to shareholders and executives” (p. 80)
Larry Summers: “The absolutely best way to mine money out of government” (p. 76)
1. Non-transparent (implicit guarantee)
2. Staple the rents to a broad middle-class subsidy (so you can’t attack the rents without attacking the middle class)
3. A source of positive opportunity for opportunistic politicians
Austan Goolsbee: “whatever safeguards you put in, the flawed nature of the structure –having any kind of government subsidy that isn’t fully paid for- means it will inevitably go bad… Even if the government guarantee is priced appropriately initially, meaning that it covers the risk, the pricing will inevitably become politicized by the housing industrial complex. And it may not be possible to price it appropriately. If you do, those who can opt out will do so, leaving the weaker credits to the government, which actually magnifies the problem (p. 148)
HOW IT ALL WENT WRONG
1. The GSEs became the epicenter of the “Housing Industrial Complex.” Under leaders such as Jim Johnson they became the biggest lobbyists in Washington, established foundations such as the Fannie Mae Foundation and established “revolving door” hiring practices with Congress. Also they traded enough derivatives with Wall Street (ostensibly to manage the prepayment risk of the mortgages they held) to make Greenspan worry (p. 86) Such is still their clout, that despite the humiliation of having to restate their earnings in post-Enron 2003, the disaster of 2008, the establishment of conservatorship status and the curtailment of their lobbying budget they have seen off three attempts to shut them down: (i) Shelby and Calabria, (ii) Jon Hensarling’s PATH and (iii) the Obama-endorsed Corker and Warner bill.
2. By the turn of the millennium they had become the embodiment of “private profits and public losses” with their management mis-stating profits by up to USD 9bn to smooth earnings and maximize personal compensation, but also deciding to protect market share in order to “stay relevant” rather than focusing on their public mission of supporting the market for 30yr mortgages, cross-subsidizing mortgages at less desirable zip codes and promoting affordable housing.
3. And then in 2006 house prices started going down and the GSEs’ goose was cooked. The roughly USD 64bn in cash losses they accumulated ended up exceeding their very slim capital buffer. That said, Fannie and Freddie resolutely did not create the crisis:
• Subprime was not invented by Fannie and Freddie. Entrepreneurs started the subprime lenders, to make money.
• Fannie and Freddie bought mortgage insurance on all the loans with less than 20% down. The private sector took this risk!
• Landesbanken, IKB, New Century, Bear Sterns funds and BNP funds took the first hits, not Fannie and Freddie
• Fannie and Freddie did not bring down Lehman or AIG
Regardless, Fannie and Freddie’s mortgage exposure and their foray into subprime and Alt-A in particular drove them to bankruptcy in all but name as they were forced into conservatorship (a fact that among other things (i) robbed them of their lobbying budget (ii) robbed them of their deferred tax assets and (iii) forced them to pay a 10% of their future profits to the Treasury).
Institutions that should have acted as a bulwark against panic required massive bailouts themselves. As the crisis got worse, in early 2009, the funding made available from the Treasury to Fannie and Freddie was doubled from 200bn to 400bn (half of the 10yr Obamacare projection) and even that cap was removed on Christmas Eve of 2009 (p. 95)
Meantime, however, as part of Quantitative Easing, Bernanke’s Fed started buying billions of Fannie and Freddie paper every month. The purpose, of course, was to restore confidence in the mortgage market and the housing market, thereby bringing back down mortgage borrowing rates. A side effect would prove to be to restore the profitability of the GSEs when the market for mortgages eventually took off again.
According to Paul Willen, a senior economist at the Boston Fed, between 2008 and 2014 the Fed purchased $2.8 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities. (p. 95)
WHY THE GSEs AND THEIR BONDHOLDERS WERE BAILED OUT
1. Private flows to the mortgage market had disappeared. By the end of 2009, Fannie and Freddie, along with Ginnie Mae, accounted for 97 percent of mortgage-backed securities issuance, according to the GAO. In the absence of Fannie and Freddie. housing would have collapsed “they have to be used to keep the flow of capital going to the housing market” –Larry Summers (p.42)
2. Foreign institutions, mainly central banks, owned around $1 trillion of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. China and Japan also owned almost half of the U.S. Treasury debt in foreign hands at the time. (p. 43)
3. A Fannie and Freddie failure “would have taken down the whole financial system. It would have been worse than the Great Depression” (Paulson, p. 44)
4. If you were to abolish Fannie and Freddie, what would happen to the existing $5 trillion of GSE-backed securities? (p. 103) 2009 was a very bad time to consolidate that debt into the US government debt (and, politically, there is no such thing as a good time to do so, besides)
WHAT HAPPENED NEXT + HEDGE FUND OPPORTUNISM
1. The fate of Fannie and Freddie was then left to Ed DeMarco, provisional chair at the FHFA, who was not provisional at all and ran the FHFA for six years after the bailout. The way he put it, “there’s no one making policy; I’ll make policy” (p. 100)
• De Marco fought all principal-forgiveness schemes tooth and nail to protect the one remaining shareholder, the government, from strategic defaults (p.99)
• De Marco also sued 18 banks seeking to recover USD 200 billion in losses from mis-sold private-label mortgage product. Nomura and RBS foolishly did not settle and lost in court.
• Under De Marco’s prodding, GSEs steadily increased their guarantee fees for new mortgages. Fannie Mae’s average effective guarantee fee on new loans tripled from 21bp in the first quarter of 2009 to 63bp in the first quarter of 2014. He also began charging extra fees for riskier mortgages in order to decrease the amount of cross-subsidization in the system.
• The whole idea was that as the cost of Fannie and Freddie’s insurance policy rose, the private sector would see an opportunity to make money, and come back into the market (p. 101)
2. “When almost everyone was gnashing his teeth about the apparently mounting losses at the GSEs, some investors began to do the math, and they found that Fannie and Freddie weren’t doing nearly as poorly as it seemed.” (p.111) Many hedge funds slowly started snapping up Fannie and Freddie
3. In a particularly bold move, on June 13, 2011 Skadden Arps and Blackstone pitched to the government on how to deal with Fannie and Freddie: build up fresh capital through their earnings and make sure investors are paid. “private capital will not make any substantial commitment to a solution in the absence of any likelihood of a meaningful return on capital” (p. 114)
After the meeting, Blackstone loaded up on Fannie and Freddie securities. (I view this as blackmail, basically, but the author never calls it that)
4. The government took about a year to respond, and it was not what the hedge funds were expecting: August 17, 2012, the Third Amendment of the conservatorship’s rules requires Fannie and Freddie to send every penny to the government, not just 10%. The government is doing itself the trade the hedge funds had been eyeing for themselves.
• This has turned the GSEs into the “piggy bank” for the government, helping it circumvent the annual debt ceiling stalemate. In the words of Jack Lew “as a practical matter, it’s what has helped us reduce our overall deficit” (p. 117)
• “Thanks to the GSE’s profits, federal spending was under-reported by a combined $178 billion in 2013 and 2014, according to a paper by the Heritage Foundation.” (p. 118)
• Not incidentally, there is no accountability for how the profits from Fannie and Freddie are spent; and once the money is spent, it’s gone and cannot be used to buffer any losses they might suffer again or used to capitalize a new house financing system.” (p. 118)
5. In defiance of the Third Amendment of the conservatorship, and in a strategy that in the business we call “get long and get loud,” hedge fund Pershing Square (i) bought in the open market 13% of the 20% of Fannie Mae stock still in circulation and (ii) released a report entitled “It’s Time to Get off our Fannie” invoking the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution (against the confiscation of private property ) and advocating that Fannie and Freddie should go back to where they were.
WHERE THAT LEAVES THE GSEs TODAY
The GSEs are woefully undercapitalized zombies
The GSEs are 85% of the mortgage market in the US
15% of GSE paper is still owned by foreigners
Half of GSE paper is owned by the branch of government called the Fed
The government is refusing to nationalize the GSEs because it would have to consolidate their 5.8 billion of debt into its own debt
The government is refusing to privatize the GSEs because that would amount to going back to private profits and public losses
The government won’t let the GSEs’ current profits accrue to them for two reasons:
• The practical reason is that the government is using the GSEs to pad its own budget by hundreds and billions of dollars
• The ideological reason is that if they were building back their capital “there would be tremendous pressure on Congress to release them” (Peter Wallison p. 121)
BETHANY MCLEAN’S FINAL THOUGHTS (pp. 147 and 148)
This system we live with was established in the 1930s, which was a very different time. Why do we need long-term fixed mortgages in a world where the workforce of the future is going to change jobs and is going to move every three to five years? Why do we even need homeownership?
If what we need is energy-efficient multifamily housing for the urbanized world, what are we doing subsidizing the construction of ever-larger single family homes?
If what we want to subsidize is homeownership, why not limit government backing to first-time homebuyers and exclude refinancings, or at least cash-out refinancings?
Don’t cheap mortgages make homes more expensive?




