Richard Lacquement's Shaping American Military Capabilities After the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003) offers an insightful analysis of how the United States military changed, or failed to change, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As such, the book is a must read for scholars and military officers interested in the defense policy process and institutional change in the armed services. Lacquement does an excellent job detailing the force structure debates following the Cold War, and offers practical solutions to address the shortfalls in force structure and doctrine. However, in his analysis of future requirements and needs, it seems that he places too much weight on the role of small-scale peace contingencies in the 1990's whose strategic value to the United States is peripheral at best.
The book's primary premise is that America's military failed to take advantage of the window of opportunity opened by the demise of the Soviet Union and merely reduced rather than restructured its forces in an effort to return a "peace dividend" to the American people. Thus America remains prepared to fight the last war, without altering force structure and doctrine to optimize the new technologies made available by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and properly account for changes in the international environment, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and increased reliance on peace operations. However, with the beginning of the War on Terrorism, another window is opening to allow change and adaptation without the budgetary pressures and trade-offs of the past. With real increases in defense spending the defense budget is no longer zero-sum, and the military should take advantage of this second window while it is open.
Lacquement explains the lack of change as a function of the Bureaucratic Process Model, with the entrenced interests of the military holding sway over a civilian leadership ill prepared to challenge the status quo. General Colin Powell began the process of reduction through his 1990 Base Force initiative, which outlined a plan to reduce the size of the military by 25% while the general structure and doctrine of the services remained unchanged. General Powell developed the Base Force in anticipation of the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a threat-based justification for the size and structure of the military. Using authority granted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, General Powell led the development of the Base Force concept from the top-down with input from only a few actors. However, the Joint Chiefs and the services realized that reduction was inevitable and agreed to the Base Force as a means to shape the debate on reduction on the military's terms. The Base Force became the foundation of the bureaucratic position the military would defend in future reviews of force structure and doctrine.
An analysis of the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR), 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and 2001 QDR reveals that despite calls for change from defense experts and certain key leaders in congress, the military repeatedly defended the status quo. Very little changed throughout the 1990's in terms of force structure and doctrine. The military possessed an advantage during the reviews because of its ability to leverage institutional power such as the creation of departments dedicated to writing position papers and advancing the military's position. The military and civilian leadership replaced the threat-based rationale for forces with a capabilities based approach that justified the need for certain levels of forces by outlining the capabilities a superpower required to defend its interests. The primary yardstick used to structure forces became the ability to fight and win two simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). Later incarnations of this capability would change to a win-hold-win approach to MRCs. However, despite the lack of substantial progress on realizing change, the reviews succeeded in establishing an on-going quadrennial review process. Also, the services now speak about the need for transformation, with the Army already implementing incremental change with its Interim Brigade Combat Team, a step forward towards its goal of achieving the Objective Force.
As a means of inducing the necessary transformation of the military to optimize the Revolution in Military Affairs and properly account for missions across the full-spectrum of contingencies from combat to peace operations, Lacquement argues for six steps to speed the process. First, he proposes the restructuring of a small force for RMA experimentation and adaptation; this force will act as a test-bed of future concepts before full-scale production and implementation. Also, he argues for the creation of a separate force specially equipped, trained, and configured for peace operations, war fighting is a lesser-included task to peace operations. To better safeguard against terrorist threats, the adjustment of forces for homeland defense. Improve training and education of future military leaders; specifically restructure service schools to create a common joint school prior to attending service specific schools. Reform the defense-review process so that QDR's take place during the second year of a new administration, which allows time for appointments, and creation of an outside panel that conducts its own assessment during the first year of a new administration. Finally, increased civilian leadership, especially by the president, over the process of military transformation. If the changes outlined are implemented, then the military will move forward in the process of changing from a Cold War force to a force designed to meet the needs of the 21st century.
In sum, the book offers great insight and recommendations, and all serious military scholars should study Lacquement's recommendations in determining the course ahead.
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