Sicily-Salerno-Anzio: January 1943-June 1944 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) (v. 9) Hardcover – May 31, 2001

If newspapers are the first draft of history, the History of the United States Naval Operations of World War II in a good second draft. While these volumes contain some errors or misinterpretations compared to later works, they form the foundation on which those later works were built. These books contain many details which are missing from other works. Being written only a few years after the war, gives a favor to the writing that is more connect to the war than later works. For example, the Japanese are often referred to as "Japs".
Yes, these books have some flaws, but they are enjoyable to read and have a wealth of information. I recommend all the volumes of in this series to anyone who interested in World War II or in naval actions in general, but especially in the U.S. Navy.

Morison's multi-volume history of the US Navy in World War Two is a must have for the history buff. It's very interesting to compare what he wrote immediately after the war (he was an observer in many of the battles) with what has been written in years since that have benefited from research and multiple sources.

Has the information I wanted

When I was a pre-teen, in the 50s, a friend of mine's father had served in the submarine service in the Pacific & had the complete set. He let me read them and that started me on a life-long fascination with history. They are finally back in print and, after over 45 years, I now own the complete set myself. They are just as good now as they were then and I cannot recommend them too highly. I plan on leaving my set in my will to my grandson.

This ninth volume of Admiral Morison's great work brings us back to the European theatre of operations, resuming the story interrupted after the success of operation "Torch" in 1942. It describes the successive allied landings in Sicily and at Salerno in 1943 and at Anzio-Nettuno in the beginning of 1944. Those three operations are described in great detail, with a great deal of place devoted to the land battles. The writing is as usual of the highest quality and the maps are excellent. The illustrations however could be better - but it is a minor point. General Patton playing a considerable role in the Sicilian fight (and dropping later by as visitor), be prepared for some absolutely delicious anecdotes...))) I couldn't however agree with some of author's conclusions.

Below, please find some more remarks on each of three main parts.

1. Invasion of Sicily (Operation "Husky"), 10 July-17 August 1943.

This is the best part of the book. It begins with the strategic debate among allies about the next move once Tunisia is taken - and it was quite a debate, with many tense but also some quasi comical moments... Once Sicily is selected to be the next target Admiral Morison describes the planning and training, secret operations destined to deceive Hitler and Mussolini about allies real intentions, preparatory air strikes and finally the landings themselves. Once the troops were disembarked (with very little immediate resistance) the real campaign begins - and it was a tough one.

Both US Navy and Royal Navy had to work very hard for the next five weeks to keep the invading troops well supplied, with Axis torpedo planes and submarines gnawing angrily at communication lanes - and with the Italian deadly MAS "sea mosquitos" of prince Borghese and Kriegsmarine's E-boats coming out at nights by scores from their hidden lairs...

Both allied navies also had to keep watch over allied controlled ports, especially Palermo, to protect them from possible raids by Regia Marina large warships, as battleships "Giulio Cesare", "Caio Dulio", Andrea Doria" and especially the gigantic dreadnoughts "Littorio" and "Vittorio Ventetto", some seven light cruisers and quite a number of large and small destroyers were still very much operationnal. Luckily for the allies, Regia Marina's flagship and top asset, the superbattleship "Roma", was earlier damaged by a single "lucky shot" in an American air raid and thus unavailable for this campaign (and her twin, the mighty "Impero", was not yet finished - three and a half years after being launched!!)

Naval fire support to the troops was absolutely crucial and in fact it was only after Sicily that the efficiency of modern naval artillery against land targets was commonly accepted in allied headquarters, as previously the very bad experiences from Gallipoli campaign during World War I dominated the reflection in this field. Smaller tactical landings were made after Patton forced the high command to accept this idea and they sped somehow allied advance - but not as much as it was expected.

Author describes with considerable respect the tactical success of German and Italian evacuation of Sicily (including almost all tanks and artillery still in fighting condition!), which allowed most of their troops to survive and fight another day (especially at the bloody struggle at Salerno...).

The two questionable conclusions in this point concern the real fighting capacities of Italian Navy and the possibilities that allies had to stop Axis evacuation. Concerning the first point author considers that Italian Navy couldn't make any kind of efficient sortie against allied fleet during the campaign, because Italians had no radar - but that never stopped the Japanese who defeated Americans at Savo, Tassafaronga and Vella Lavella... Also, two sorties by Italian light cruisers went through allied picket lines and it was only because of the Italian commanders lack of motivation (and, to say it straight, courage) that they both turned back before having an occasion to shell almost defenseless American held ports, full of supplies... Concerning the second point, in my opinion author justifies too easily allied passivity, which allowed Axis commanders to escape from Sicilian trap in a situation when allies had command of BOTH air and sea!!

2. Landing at Salerno (Operation "Avalanche"), 3-16 September 1943

The description of this very dramatic battle is excellent. This was the most difficult allied landing during the whole war in European theater - and Germans almost succeeded in throwing allied troops back to the sea. Once again the fire support by both allied navies proved to be crucial. Germans on their side introduced at that very moment their new anti-ship weapons - radio guided bombs Fritz-X and radio-guided glide bombs Henschel Hs-293. British battleship HMS "Warspite" and light cruiser HMS "Uganda" as well as American light cruiser USS "Savannah" were all crippled by those bombs and some transports, full of precious supplies, sunk.

This chapter describes also what occurred after "Avalanche" and before "Shingle", when Italy switched sides and Regia Marina joined the allies - with the notable exception of small, but still deadly dangerous MAS torpedo-boats commanded by the "Black Prince" Junio Valerio Borghese, who stayed loyal to Mussolini and his Social Italian Republic. Admiral Morison describes there the hard fight against Kriegsmarine's U-boats and E-boats, which cost US Navy some precious destroyers also and the devastating Luftwaffe's raid against Bari on 2 December 1943. This raid was possibly the most destructive single anti-shipping air operation in whole history: twenty eight cargos sunk, eleven cargos and one destroyer seriously damaged, more than 1000 allied sailors and soldiers killed, at least 1000 Italian civilians killed and the whole port closed for operation for more than three weeks!

3. Landings at Anzio and Nettuno (Operation "Shingle"), 22 January - 5 June 1944

This part of the book is in my opinion the weakest. The description of the landings and of the long excruciating land battle which followed are as usual excellent and very interesting, with especially the appearance on the battlefield of a new threat - German midget submarines of "Neger" and "Marder" classes.

But Admiral Morison's analysis of the reasons for which "Shingle" was a partial disappointment (although definitely not a total failure) seemed to me weak. He left both American generals in charge (General Clark, leader of the whole American sector of the front and General Lucas, commanding on the beachhead at Anzio and Nettuno) "off the hook" - and I think he shouldn't have.

Today most historians consider that the way this campaign was waged was flawed and as a result many precious allied soldier's lifes were wasted for a lesser gain that could have been made. General Lucas ended by being sacked for his mistakes - but his superior, general Clark, surprisingly escaped with his record intact.

It is also mostly a consensus that Rome could have been captured in February 1944 (instead of June) if General Lucas was a little more energic and courageous - and historians also frequently claim that Kesselring's forces could have been destroyed in June 1944 (instead of holding their own until May 1945), if only General Clark didn't prefer a photo-ops in Rome (already evacuated by Germans) to a battle of encirclement outside the city... Once again, general Clark was not sanctioned for this heavy mistake - to the contrary, he was soon after promoted!

But ultimately, although some conclusions are in my opinion very questionable, this books still is a most excellent read and a must to anybody interested in World War II in Mediterranean theatre. I am very glad that I finally read it and I sincerely recommend it.

I bought this book when it first appeared and was amazed at the wealth of detail, location maps and the general presentation of what is basically dry fact. There is a wealth of understanding of the times and events, that the author was able to bring to the the lay reader, that stands out in my mind even today. He provided military undestanding, foundation and logistics for the campaigns waged in these three areas. A major work for the WWII History 0fficiando

this history is where my dad was in ww2. so i feel closer to him, by reading it.