Singapore Burning: Heroism And Surrender In World War Ii Paperback – International Edition, May 30, 2006

The fall of Singapore in February 1942 was one of the epochal events of the Second World War, but it has received decidedly little coverage. It was an all-around humiliation for Commonwealth forces, to be defeated by numerically-inferior Japanese forces in just 55 days and for “fortress Singapore” to be overcome so easily. In British minds, this catastrophe is best forgotten. Nor is there a large market of historiography that focuses on Japan’s early conquests in the war, even though they are clearly of interest to military professionals. I have read a number of books about the fall of Singapore before, all flawed in their own way, but Colin Smith’s Singapore Burning (2005) is clearly the best written and most detailed that I have seen to date. Smith, a noted journalist, writes a very lively account that adds a great deal of perspective from both the Allied and Japanese sides in the campaign. Overall, an excellent piece of military historical writing. The book has seven sketch maps of indifferent quality, so be prepared to have an atlas handy.

The book begins with a brief introduction into how the British decided to build a major naval base at Singapore. I was surprised to read that Churchill had opposed fortifying Singapore in 1926 but Stanley Baldwin’s government is the one that made the decision. The base cost £60 million and was not operational until 1938, by which time Britain no longer had the military resources to defend it. Smith does an excellent job showing the lead-up to war, with the British allocating only obsolete and token forces to defend Malaya, while the Japanese were preparing for an all-out strike into Southeast Asia. Yet the British did manage to store 12,000 mustard gas shells in Singapore, which seems ridiculous. Along the way, Smith manages to humanize the opposing commanders, Percival and Yamashita. Most readers will not be aware that the first shots in the Pacific War occurred when the Japanese shot down an RAF PBY reconnaissance plane near Malaya – 10 hours before the Pearl Harbor attack.

As Smith discusses at length, the British had a contingency plan to disrupt the Japanese amphibious landings in northern Malaya, but they hesitated and executed the plan in botched fashion. As it was, the British beach defenses at Kota Baharu were formidable and inflicted great slaughter on the Japanese first wave. Yet the RAF was handicapped with ridiculously obsolete aircraft and simply melted away in Malaya. Without air cover, the British ground forces and the Royal Navy were unable to stand up to the Japanese. Smith also covers the loss of Force Z (HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales) in great detail.

Commonwealth forces attempted a delaying action in northern-central Malaya, but the appearance of Japanese tanks made this idea unworkable, since the CW forces had very few anti-tank guns. One battalion rearguard after another was overrun and scattered by small numbers of Japanese tanks. A lot of people believe that the British Army was unsuited to jungle warfare but Smith points out that they did have a few well-trained units, such as LTC Ian Stewart’s Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders. This was a very good battalion, experienced in jungle field craft and it managed to ambush Japanese columns several times. Smith also points out that the British had very good artillery support, that could halt a Japanese advance when well-sited. Here and there – like at Kampar, British defenses almost gelled, but when the RAF precipitously abandoned their airbases in central Malaya it all went to pot. Smith also takes a close look at the Japanese performance, particularly in the Battle of the Slim River on 5-7 January 1942. Although the CW forces had established a defense-in-depth behind the river, the Japanese mounted a night attack with 30 medium tanks that ripped the entire scheme apart. Multiple British battalions were ruined in this action and the bulk of a division was lost.

Smith also discusses the role of Gordon Bennett’s 8th Australian Division, which was believed to be an elite formation even though some of its men were raw recruits. The Australians were initially kept in reserve but when committed to battle, they managed one very skillful ambush that demolished several Japanese companies. Unfortunately, in the retreat to Singapore, most of an Australian brigade was cut off and scattered. In the final battle for Singapore Island, the CW had a 3-1 numerical superiority in men and better artillery, but morale was rock-bottom. In fact, it was the Australians who routed when the Japanese landed, which fatally compromised the final stand. As Smith notes, there was no shortage of heroism in the Malayan campaign and it is surprising to see how many British brigade commanders were killed in action. However, the defense of Malaya was fatally undermined by poor strategic choices made prior to the war, such as the diversion of tanks and Hurricane fighters to Russia instead of the Far East. If just two Lend Lease convoys had gone to Singapore in late 1941, the CW might have had the means to stop Japanese tank attacks and destroy more bombers. Lacking the material resources to fight properly, the CW forces’ tactical execution was quickly undermined by defeatism, which turned to panic. All around, Singapore was a painful mess for the British forces, equivalent to what the French went through in 1940.

Singapore Burning by Colin Smith tries to convey the confusion and horror experienced by the British, Malayan, Chinese, and others who were on the Malayan peninsula and in Singapore during the Japanese conquest in December of 1941 and January of 1942. He also ventures into the Japanese ranks and imparts the feelings of revenge and triumph among the troops of the Rising Sun. In this endeavor he is successful. He manages to bring this to the reader by telling numerous personal stories, most of which avoid happy endings.

If you like numerous personal stories as a way of conveying history you will probably enjoy the book. The author does give overviews so the reader is aware of how the personal stories fit into the overall action. In my opinion, these overviews are the best part of the book because I dislike history as a string of personal accounts. Not that Colin Smith’s accounts are boring, it just isn’t my cup of tea.

Personal accounts aside, it is obvious the British forces in Malaya were not prepared for the Japanese onslaught. The United Kingdom had literally years to plan and prepare the Malay peninsula for an assault from the north. Their troops could have been trained for jungle combat – some were – and anti-tank guns could have been supplied in much better numbers. Or perhaps a few tanks. However, the real technical failure was a lack of air power. The machines flown by the aviators of the Empire were out of date. In addition, there was a lack of coordination throughout the battle in the air, at sea, and on the ground. Very bad decision making plagued the English from the start. The failure was so complete and occurred on so many levels that the British collapse was embarrassing, to say the least. The fall of Singapore also opened the entire area of the southwest Pacific to Japan. The author takes the time to let the reader know the extent of the debacle.

The writing style is fast flowing and not at all academic. While I got bored with the endless supply of personal stories the normal reader will probably find them engaging. A lot was going on during the fighting for Singapore and the reader is put into the thick of it. I came away with a much better understanding of why the jewel of the Empire east of India fell so dramatically.

AD2

Enjoyed the good balance of high level strategy, unit combat, and a leavening of individual experiences. Until reading this book I had no concept of how poorly trained and sadly equipped the troops defending Singapore were, or how commanders influenced the campaign through incompetence or by heroism. The poor showing of some of the Indian & Australian forces vis-a-vis the heroism of most is dealt with in a fair and balanced way. Finally, the history of the colony and the complicated relations between the various cultures is examined. The book is very readable; flows well, and appears well researched.
I wish the editors had provided a few basic maps through the book to give a broad view of the peninsula and the island, to show just how near & surrounded the island is to the mainland.
I recommend this book highly as the comprehensive history of the development of, & the fall of, Malaysia & Singapore.