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The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 Hardcover – Unabridged, March 19, 2013
| Christopher Clark (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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One of The New York Times Book Review’s 10 Best Books of the Year
Winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize (History)
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 is historian Christopher Clark’s riveting account of the explosive beginnings of World War I.
Drawing on new scholarship, Clark offers a fresh look at World War I, focusing not on the battles and atrocities of the war itself, but on the complex events and relationships that led a group of well-meaning leaders into brutal conflict.
Clark traces the paths to war in a minute-by-minute, action-packed narrative that cuts between the key decision centers in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and Belgrade, and examines the decades of history that informed the events of 1914 and details the mutual misunderstandings and unintended signals that drove the crisis forward in a few short weeks.
Meticulously researched and masterfully written, Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers is a dramatic and authoritative chronicle of Europe’s descent into a war that tore the world apart.
- Print length736 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHarper
- Publication dateMarch 19, 2013
- Dimensions6 x 1.72 x 9 inches
- ISBN-10006114665X
- ISBN-13978-0061146657
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Editorial Reviews
From Booklist
Review
“Excellent. . . . The book is stylishly written as well as superb scholarship. No analysis of the origins of the First World War will henceforth be able to bypass this magisterial work.” -- Ian Kershaw, BBC History
“The most readable account of the origins of the First World War since Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August. The difference is that The Sleepwalkers is a lovingly researched work of the highest scholarship.” -- Niall Ferguson
“This compelling examination of the causes of World War I deserves to become the new standard one-volume account of that contentious subject.” -- Foreign Affairs
“Clark is a masterly historian. . . . His account vividly reconstructs key decision points while deftly sketching the context driving them. . . . A magisterial work.” -- The Wall Street Journal
“A monumental new volume. . . . Revelatory, even revolutionary. . . . Clark has done a masterful job explaining the inexplicable.” -- The Boston Globe
“Easily the best book ever written on the subject. . . . A work of rare beauty that combines meticulous research with sensitive analysis and elegant prose. The enormous weight of its quality inspires amazement and awe. . . . Academics should take note: Good history can still be a good story.” -- The Washington Post
“A meticulously researched, superbly organized, and handsomely written account.” -- MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History
“Superb. . . . One of the great mysteries of history is how Europe’s great powers could have stumbled into World War I. . . . This is the single best book I have read on this important topic.” -- Fareed Zakaria
“A thoroughly comprehensive and highly readable account. . . . The brilliance of Clark’s far-reaching history is that we are able to discern how the past was genuinely prologue. . . . In conception, steely scholarship and piercing insights, his book is a masterpiece.” -- Harold Evans, The New York Times Book Review
From the Back Cover
On the morning of June 28, 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie Chotek, arrived at Sarajevo railway station, Europe was at peace. Thirty-seven days later, it was at war. The conflict that resulted would kill more than fifteen million people, destroy three empires, and permanently alter world history.
The Sleepwalkers reveals in gripping detail how the crisis leading to World War I unfolded. Drawing on fresh sources, it traces the paths to war in a minute-by-minute, action-packed narrative that cuts among the key decision centers in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and Belgrade. Distinguished historian Christopher Clark examines the decades of history that informed the events of 1914 and details the mutual misunderstandings and unintended signals that drove the crisis forward in a few short weeks.
How did the Balkans—a peripheral region far from Europe's centers of power and wealth—come to be the center of a drama of such magnitude? How had European nations organized themselves into opposing alliances, and how did these nations manage to carry out foreign policy as a result? Clark reveals a Europe racked by chronic problems—a fractured world of instability and militancy that was, fatefully, saddled with a conspicuously ineffectual set of political leaders. These rulers, who prided themselves on their modernity and rationalism, stumbled through crisis after crisis and finally convinced themselves that war was the only answer.
Meticulously researched and masterfully written, The Sleepwalkers is a magisterial account of one of the most compelling dramas of modern times.
About the Author
Christopher Clark is a professor of modern European history and a fellow of St. Catharine's College at the University of Cambridge, UK. He is the author of Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, among other books.
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Product details
- Publisher : Harper; 1st Printing edition (March 19, 2013)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 736 pages
- ISBN-10 : 006114665X
- ISBN-13 : 978-0061146657
- Item Weight : 2 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.72 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #382,540 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #700 in World War I History (Books)
- #2,663 in Great Britain History (Books)
- #3,972 in World War II History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Christopher Clark is a professor of modern European history and a fellow of St. Catharine's College at the University of Cambridge, UK. He is the author of Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, among other books.
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It is an argument that I'm not sure I entirely agree with, but it is a fascinating new perspective. Clark is generally correct in his treating the road to war as the complex set of mechanisms that it was. He is equally correct in giving weight to the various voices and interest groups throughout Europe, and how their perceptions helped set the Great Powers on a collision course. Clark does not treat each nation as a monolithic entity, but rather considers the roles of the monarchs, the ministers, the press, and the people in each state. The book also begins with the grizzly murders of the king and queen of Serbia in 1903, and how that event shifted the Balkan nation from a pro-Austrian position to a pro-Russian alignment. Clark also notes just how modern in so many ways the events of 1914 were. Gavrillo Princep, the Serbian assassin, was little different from modern suicide bombers; Serbia itself was not so different from other states that sponsor terrorism today; and for all of our technology it is remarkable how little international diplomacy has changed. I would be reluctant to recommend "The Sleepwalkers" to undergraduates, or people without much knowledge on the subject looking to "smarten up" on it. This is a deeply complex book that assumes the reader already has a basic understanding of the issues, personalities, and systems at work in 1914.
All told, this book is a wonderful analysis of the beginning of World War I, and offers much food for thought on an event that has been debated on for over a century.
The causes and events leading to the outbreak of the War are indeed complex. Many countries were involved, major players (Germany, Russia, France, England, Austria-Hungary) and less major ones (the Balkans, Belgium, Italy, Turkey). European Wars were not a rarity, though they generally lasted for less than a year, sometimes only a few months. Many countries were ruled by monarchies, and the key player of the moment could be the king, prime minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister or an Ambassador - or some combination. And in some cases, the scorecard kept changing, rapidly. There were ententes, detentes, demarches, and inceptions. And Alliances. Most of the key players were involved in at least two alliances; I was particularly struck by how tenuous some of these alliances were as they became uncomfortable for some participants as events changed. I was amazed how dismissive government officials could be of time honored agreements that suddenly dictate unforeseen and costly entanglements. So part of the chess game became guessing how truly committed potential opponents (and partners) would be to alliances, formal and less formal.
Most of us know the simple answer to the question posed here - the assassination of Austria's Archduke. But where? by whom? and where was he from? But most importantly why? Clark begins his story with a few paragraphs on the event but then dives backwards into events leading up to that moment. 367 pages later, we now are treated to a more detailed, minute by minute account of the assassination, in reality a quasi black-comedy horror story. And then the chess game continues but at a much faster pace - incredibly WWl will be well underway in only 6 weeks. A war which will last four years and take twenty million lives. There were many moments in those six weeks when "if only" had truly occurred, war could have been paused at a minimum. Or perhaps limited to a local affair instead of a global one. Clark details all the reasons (and then some) why it did happen. Recommended.
I wanted to learn more about each country’s history and motivations that lead to the Great War but I don’t think this book does the job. There might be something else out there, I would suggest looking for that first.
Top reviews from other countries
The grenade pin for all this seems to have been Serbia, a brutal backwater and recently established kingdom in the Balkans. As the Ottomans are beaten back, the impoverished societies that remained began to fight each other for territory, irredentist ambitions, and proto-fascist nationalism. Because Austria-Hungary was involved in Croatia, the Serbs became a proxy for Russia as it pursued an ill-defined pan-slavism and harassed its Habsburg rivals. How did Serbia become such a crucial player?
With the exception of republican France, all the involved European powers were monarchies, ranging from a constitutional one in the UK, through the semi-autocracies in Austria-Hungary and Germany, to full blown despotism in Russia. In their evolving modalities, the foreign policy apparati were in chaotic states, with the sovereign in nominal control while bureaucrats and aristocrats fought for influence; in theory, the executives should issue official orders and at best, play the role of balancing all the competing interests, but none of them seemed up to that task. As a result, policy making was an opaque process in which aims, signals, and actions were impossible to discern clearly; this increased uncertainty and led the actors into decisions that further aggravated the dangers and uncertainties. Moreover, there was no neutral power or multi-lateral diplomatic body that could mediate, provide a space to openly discuss the situation, or de-escalate situations in which military courses of action had been initiated. It was like a massive Rube Goldberg machine with ten entry points, each player trying to balance complex equations of military stability, prestige, ego, societal and economic needs, and the like. One might also picture the situation as a teetering boulder atop a mountain with all manner of actors throwing rocks at it and at each other.
Another unfortunate development was the diplomatic configuration that had emerged with secret protocols, vague promises, and volatile pronouncements. On the one hand, there was the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy), which pledged mutual defense. On the other hand, there was the looser Entente, whereby Britain, France, and Russia pledged to defend each other if attacked or in the event that any member of the Triple Alliance fully mobilized its military. The end result was extreme polarization, pitting central European powers against vast colonial Empires. Their principal playing field consisted of the territories opening up with the Turkish retreat and peripheral areas such as Serbia and Bulgaria (they were intermittently at war); the former was allied to Russia, the latter to Austria-Hungary. There were so many flash points, with multiple crises resolved, that it all seemed grist for the mill.
The concerns of each country are examined in detail. Not only are there fascinating mini-biographies, but the geopolitical situations are explained and subtly interpreted. Beyond the obvious, such as Germany's fear of a war on two fronts, there are many surprises here. The cumbersome dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, for example, was by no means doomed in Clark's view, but an evolving and stabilizing force; even Archduke Ferdinand comes off as a man of great potential in spite of his unpopularity. Perhaps this kind of detail is of interest only for history buffs, but I learned an immense amount from these analyses.
The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo was the last straw, the pebble that loosed the boulder and sent it to smash everything. Austria-Hungary blamed Serbia and issued demands for an investigation and humiliating surrenders of sovereignty. Russia backed Serbia, emboldening it to resist, and began to mobilize its troops, triggering Germany to mobilize in support of Austria-Hungary. France of course supported Russia and, after some hemming and hawing, the UK committed itself to the defense of France, particularly if neutral Belgium was attacked by Germany. Although in the weeks between the assassination and war's outbreak, there were many opportunities where mobilizations were ordered halted so that talks could begin, once in motion the military machines appeared unstoppable. Kaiser Wilhelm even cut short his summer vacation to slow things down, but his orders were ignored or lost. The book ends on the eve of the war.
This is one of the most satisfying reading experiences I have had in years. Clark is a great writer, finding the right biographical detail or quote to support a point, always with extremely human sensibilities and empathy. He questions many accepted conventions, which are sure to be controversial but highly stimulating. I cannot recommend this book more highly or more enthusiastically. If the book occasionally gets bogged down or lost in detail, it always returns to a powerful narrative, whose momentum builds over nearly 600 pages. This is a masterpiece.
President Wilson’s 14 Points (Jan 1918) – an exercise in hindsight or ‘shutting the stable-door’!– included ‘Open covenants openly arrived at’ and Clark expertly details the’ secret diplomacy’ going on both WITHIN and between governments. However, he doesn’t mention espionage (e.g. MI5 began in Oct 1909, FBI in 1908 and France reactivated the Deuxieme Bureau in 1907) which often revealed OR distorted such activity.
Clark is able to sum up whole problem areas in a sentence or two. Here are some examples. ‘The mismatch between national visions and ethnic realities made it highly likely that the realisation of Serbian objectives would be a violent process’ (P.26). ‘The extreme inconsistency of the Kaiser’s utterances makes an assessment of their impact difficult’ (P.179). Analysing the origins of World War 1 requires ‘understanding sustained rapid-fire interactions between executive structures with a relatively poor understanding of each other’s intentions, operating with low levels of confidence and trust (even within the respective alliances) and with high levels of hostility and paranoia’ (P.240). The July 1914 crisis (to generalise from one analysis) involved a ‘panicky lack of focus, the preference for swollen metaphors over clear formulations, the employment of histrionic devices to achieve an emotional effect, the juxtaposition of different perspectives in the absence of a unifying meta-narrative’ (P. 401).
Clark’s analysis of the last weeks of peace is masterly As regards Austrian diplomacy he writes: ‘The Austrians resembled hedgehogs scurrying across a highway with their eyes averted from the rushing traffic’ (P.429) – e.g. far from Germany’s ‘blank cheque’ revealing a masterminding of events, due to suspected links the Austrians withheld their ultimatum from Berlin till 22 July (days after it was known in Paris and St. Petersburg). Delivery was delayed till French and Russians leaders were no longer together: the Serbs, however, delayed replying till after they were sure of Russia. The Serbian response was certainly not the surrender usually described and ‘may have have looked messy, but it was a masterpiece of diplomatic equivocation...... a subtle cocktail of acceptances, conditional acceptances, evasions and rejections....the text was perfectly pitched to convey the tone of voice of reasonable statesmen in a condition of sincere puzzlement, struggling to make sense of outrageous and unacceptable demands... a highly perfumed rejection on most points’ (PP 464-466). Russia was excited at the prospect of achieving long-held ambitions, with exaggerated self-confidence and misread the effect of mobilisation, In Britain, Grey ‘plotted, as so often before, a meandering path that steered clear of straightforward commitments’(P. 491) and both country and government were divided. France faced a similar state of indecision involving ‘the complex triangulations of a French policy that had to mediate between the hard imperatives of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the fuzzy logic of the Anglo-French Entente’ (P. 506). Regarding Germany, Clark insists nothing ‘suggests that they viewed the crisis as the welcome opportunity to set in train a long-laid plan to unleash a preventive war on Germany’s neighbours’(P.521). Perhaps not, but they didn’t have any Plan B alternative to the Schlieffen Plan etc.as Germany was swept along in the general rush into war. The Kaiser MAY have believed Britain would stay neutral if Germany didn’t attack France, but did anyone really believe Germany could risk just concentrating on the eastern front? Throughout Europe there was ‘reflex deflection of responsibility that placed the onus of deciding between peace and war on another’s shoulders’ (P.537). For several days Britain threatened not to back France. Older studies stress the balance of power in Europe threatened by Germany but revisionist works concentrate of British GLOBAL challenged by an expanding Russia.. ‘British intervention on the side of the Entente offered a means BOTH of appeasing and tethering Russia AND of opposing and containing Germany’ (P547) is Clark’s suggestion on the topic. Personally I think Clark gives too much weight to British desire to aid ‘gallant little Belgium’ and it was rather a question of the ‘monster’ of European diplomacy etc. out-running its Frankenstein ‘masters’.
The book is far more ‘even-handed’ than several studies I’ve used and so no surprise that it’s proved very popular in Germany. However, Clark sometimes may be trying too hard. In 1914 Germany agreed to bail out a bankrupt Bulgaria but Clark insists ‘This did not reflect some long-laid plan to draw Bulgaria into the clutches of the Triple Alliance’ (P.277). They also offered loans to the Serbs. Then the French (backed by Russia) offered Bulgaria a loan. Clark insists, “.... the plan was to persuade the Bulgarians to accept the loan and then pressure them at a later gate into changing their government’ (P.277). The loan was rejected. Clark cites evidence for the French plan but none for his comment re’ the Triple Alliance. I think BOTH groups were trying to recruit / neutralise BOTH Balkan states – just like later policies by the USA and USSR (e.g. Egypt 1955).
So what don’t I like in the book? There’s no bibliography. Although the extensive end-notes quote numerous sources, the MAJOR authorities used should be listed to make clearer the APPROACH to the subject and so reveal its strengths and limitations. One critic has referred to the absence of treatment of the OPPOSITION to war (e.g. Lenin) or indeed the ‘Marxist interpretation’ (not confined to Communists) of the approach to war. Surprisingly there is no mention ANYWHERE of Jean Jaurès, leading French socialist and advocate of peace, who was assassinated (31 July), as a ‘traitor’ just as France slipped into war, undermining the opposition campaign. The planned strikes throughout Europe to stop the war proved abortive. The author largely ignores the growth of technology (e.g. radio, telegraphy) which too rapidly exposed shortcomings (e.g. during the last month of peace). He also overlooks the GENERAL rise in prosperity and aspirations among the masses which increased pressure on the ‘movers and shakers’. Perhaps too much attention is given to the ‘jitter-bugging’ of tiny groups involved in Balkan politics. To evoke a metaphor, in essence they were the cracks and leaks in the piping, it was the nature of the contents of the plumbing system that proved the danger. Even so, I’m still awarding 5 stars to what is the best analysis of the subject I’ve ever come across – and for introducing me to a lot of historical data I didn’t know!
Why my title? During the decades spanning 1900 international diplomacy had become a sea of mud, created out of improving technology, growing aspirations and competition for resources. As Clark often indicates situations had become beyond the abilities of those expected to control them. Unfortunately, I don’t think international diplomacy is in any better condition today.





