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The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Zenith Military Classics) Hardcover – October 23, 2004
Purchase options and add-ons
- Print length336 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherZenith Press
- Publication dateOctober 23, 2004
- Dimensions6.25 x 1.25 x 9 inches
- ISBN-100760320594
- ISBN-13978-0760320594
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Product details
- Publisher : Zenith Press; First Edition (October 23, 2004)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 336 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0760320594
- ISBN-13 : 978-0760320594
- Item Weight : 1.32 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.25 x 1.25 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,736,645 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #3,323 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Sadly enough, the material of the book was mainly derived from two long internal essays the author generated within the military back in 1988 and 1994. So, the concepts that seemed new to me as a civilian at the end of 2004 were known within the military for over a decade. Thus, even though the author proposed a framework for restructuring the Department of Defense based around human skills able to deal with insurgent warfare instead of solely technological capabilities aimed at outdated State-to-State warfare, the DOD under Rumsfeld and his predecessors chose to go in exactly the wrong direction.
The author develops his analytical framework around its main theme: fourth generation warfare (4GW) in 17 very clearly written and sequentially developed short chapters. Near the beginning of the book, he gives his concept a broadbased historical foundation by suggesting that warfare evolves in parallel to society in general. So, just as our civilization has evolved from various disaggregated stages including: nomadic, agricultural, industrial, and finally information based; warfare has now also reached its fourth stage centered also on information and the dissemination of ideas.
Counterintuitively, the author demonstrates brilliantly that the U.S. DOD is at a huge disadvantage in this new information based warfare style. Yes, we have superior technology, we have the best weapons. But, because of our uncreative hierarchical monopolistic centralized organization we are totally incapable of exploiting our technology in a timely manner. The author takes the example of generating a surveillance request within the DOD. The turnaround for this information to be authorized and processed will be about a week. On the other hand, a terrorist group simply watching CNN and using cheap commercially available surveillance technology will have information on many of the enemies positions almost live.
The more perplexing challenge is that the U.S. with all its wealth and infrastructure and military personnel represents a huge set of targets. The insurgents in whatever shape or form are totally stealthy, mixed in within civilian populations, and often use explicitly civilians as either shields or supporting system for their warfare.
Another challenge is the battle of ideas. The 4GW combatants use the media effectively to wear down the political resolve of their enemies. This entails showing bloody civilian casualties as any result of U.S. offensive. This is also done by orchestrating spectacularly shocking beheadings of innocent civilians whose only crime were collaborating with the U.S.
The author proposes many detailed solutions to all the above challenges. They appear somewhat Herculean in the changes that the DOD will have to undertake to spend its $500 billion effectively so as to fight today's wars instead of yesterday's. The author makes an interesting comparison between IBM in the pre PC world and today. IBM was focused on mainframes where it had an unrivaled advantage. It did so for too long until mainframes became almost irrelevant. Today, the technology industry is more flexible, creative, and fast paced moving than IBM was capable of handling. But, the author feels that the DOD's obsession with developing superior but irrelevant technology at the detriment of developing the smart human skills necessary to deal with 4GW effectively is just as ineffective as IBM's former mainframe based strategy. What good is superior technology if it takes you five days to turnaround a surveillance request.
The most fascinating part of the book is his analysis of Vietnam and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts (chapters 6 and 8) using his 4GW framework. These are the most insightful writings I have read on the subject.
I strongly recommend this book for how much knowledge it provides not only in military strategy but in the recent history of the most intractable conflicts. If you are interested in this subject, I also recommend Wesley Clark's "Winning Modern Wars"; Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" and van Crevald's "The Transformation of War." All these books outline the changes of warfare, and complement nicely this book. But, this book serves as the core of the knowledge base regarding the evolution of warfare from a State-to-State phenomena to something completely different the DOD is ill equipped to deal with organizationally.
A better place to start is with Victor Hanson's "Carnage and Culture," whereupon it becomes obvious that non-western forces simply can't compete against the Western Way of War. By dressing up his analysis with new lingo "Fourth Generation War" (4GW) Hammes merely underscores Hanson. He then describes strategic approaches by inferior forces to try and defeat superior (usually Western) forces, and naturally these rest on altering the political resolve of the free population in the western nation conducting the war. In Vietnam, this was especially successful---but in the Philippines, it was not. Indeed, in ten out of thirteen of the "insurgencies" over the last 100 years (counting today's Iraq as a victory), the government has won over terrorists. And these governments did so long before they knew anything about "4GW" or the like.
Hammes correctly identifies political will and a PR/propaganda campaign that advances that will as central to a "4GW" effort. But in that context he misses some our most serious failures in Vietnam. We never, for example, demonized Ho Chi Minh as we did Hitler, Tojo, or Saddam; we never identified the North as the central enemy in the fight, nor provided a rationale for the American public for taking the war to the North; and indeed, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all failed to make the case for defeating the North rather than simply "blocking" its efforts to overrun South Vietnam.
Finally, in reading current U.S. Army and Marine doctrine, I don't see any evidence that the military forces have ignored the political. Quite the contrary: fifty years from now, the rapid re-shaping of Iraq from a terror state into a democracy will be a case study in effective military and political operations. In short, this book had potential, but is ultimately unsatisfying.
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Thomas Hammes is a recently retired US Marine Colonel his argument is that war has entered the fourth generation (4GW) and the US has failed to prepare for it even though it has already been defeated by 4GW opponents three times in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia (this edition has a 2006 publication date but the text is unchanged from the 2004 initial publication) and is facing defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of learning how to deal with insurgent networks the Pentagon has invested in the high tech systems necessary to defeat a non-existent Warsaw Pact enemy.
Much of what Hammes has to say is sensible but trying to fit the whole story into four generations of warfare seems implausible. 1st generation is Napoleonic tactics, 2GW is First World War firepower based conflict, 3GW is blitzkrieg and 4GW is what comes after this. He argues that the transition is driven by changes in the broader social context of warfare. This doesn't work for me because the first of his case studies is Maoist People's War - if the level of development of the society drives innovation in warfare how can the China of the 1930s be more advanced...? I suspect that 4GW works more a marketing concept to sell his ideas in the military community.
My take on what Hammes sees as 4GW is essentially networked protracted war. Clausewitz realized that a stronger opponent could be defeated by protracted warfare provided that the weaker side could survive for long enough to build strength and/or transform the political situation. This insight lies at the heart of the Chinese/Vietnamese concept of protracted war. Hammes sees that in the contemporary world new civilian communications and transport systems provide new opportunities for the weak to challenge the strong while at the same time creating new vulnerabilities for their opponents.
If we look at the conflicts that the US has actually engaged in apart from Desert Storm and the March/April 2003 phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom Hammes is right. He seems on much weaker ground in putting forward ideas about how the US can actually prevail - can western democracies actually fight decades long wars in the current media environment? Here what he really needs is a more concrete analysis of current global politics.









