"A troubling fact for Israel with the wartime mentality it has never shaken off, is the inherent contradiction between democracy and clandestine defense."
Dan Raviv/Yossi Melman "Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's
Secret Wars"
As highly-regarded espionage authors Raviv and Melman note regarding Mossad at the outset of their excellent overview of Israeli intelligence, "The agency's reputation for decisive action and hyperactivity has inevitably led to a mystique that it is all-powerful, all-knowing, ruthless, and capable of penetrating every corner of the world." A major virtue of their book is that it offers a much more balanced appreciation of Mossad's successes and failures than ofen described elsewhere, and, equally important, emphasizes that there are other Israeli intelligence organizations in play. Shin Bet (equivalent of the FBI) and Aman (military intelligence--the DIA) are critical players, and indeed Aman provides more hard intelligence than Mossad. Then there's a whole gamut of `special operation' units, including Lakam (scientific intelligence), Caesarea (Mossad's operational unit), Nativ (covert operations in Jewish communities abroad)., and the notorious Kidon ("Bayonet") described by the authors as "one of the most notorious yet admired units in the worldwide business of espionage," widely known as the "Israeli killing machine."
As promised by the authors, the book reveals some fascinating previously undisclosed secrets about its intelligence achievements--and disasters--including details on assassinations, the destruction of Syria's nuclear reactor in 2007 and the murder of five key Iranian nuclear scientists. Much of the broad outlines of these operations, however, is already on the record, including Gordon Thomas' "Gideon's Spies" and Ian Black/Benny Morris's outdated but still useful "Israel's Secret Wars," and the authors' own earlier books, including "Every Spy a Prince." They detail Mossad's sophomoric missteps in causing the arrest of two of its finest operators--Eli Cohen in Syria and Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt and Mossad's successful psychological (and letter bomb) program against German scientists working on Egypt's nuclear bomb, prompting most to leave the country. How Israel caught up with the murderers of its athletes at the 1972 Olympics has been widely described elsewhere. One delightful tidbit: the authors reveal that the vaunted capture of Adolph Eichman in Argentina was not the result of Mossad genius but began with a tip from a German prosecutor. Mossad failed to predict the Egyptian/Syrian attack in 1967 and 1973. Both it and CIA entirely missed the 9/11 preparations. Mossad also was pathetically slow to recognize the danger of Hasran Nasrallah's Hezbollah. These extremely critical blunders sharply undercut the hyped-up public relations image of all the Israeli agencies and remind us that everything we know about them is manipulated by censorship, selected leaks, shrouded in the myths of spying's "Hall of Mirrors."
The authors' description of the vicissitudes in Mossad's relations with CIA reveal a lot about relations between the two countries. Under a 1951 agreement the CIA and Mossad agreed to exchange information. The American side, however, never felt comfortable with the arrangements. They constantly worried that the heavy influx of Soviet immigrants to Israel and into the Israeli intelligence community represented a huge security threat--as indeed proved to be the case. CIA even believed Amos Manor, head of Shin Bet, was a KGB agent. The Americans were deeply angered at the continuing Israeli denial--including lying directly to President Kennedy--about the Dimona nuclear reactor--though CIA as early as 1960 knew what was going on. Revelation of spying by Jonathan Pollard plummeted relations to an absolute low--especially when Israel, while demanding the release of Pollard from prison, refused for years to provide Washington with details of just what information Pollard had provided, enabling CIA to take necessary measures to deal with the damage. It helped greatly that Israel was able to provide two items of enormous value--Khruschev's famous speech denouncing Stalin (acquired largely by accident) and an intact MIG aircraft. Fortunately for Israel, James Angleton, powerfully pro Israel, deeply disturbed by the holocaust, was in charge of CIA-Mossad relations and was able to smooth over many tensions--even to the extent of manipulating intelligence reports. One contact said of the eccentric Angleton, "What impressed me more than anything was Angleton's capacity for drinking." Many CIA staffers (and some directors!) felt that the hard-drinking Angleton was the wrong man for the job, but he managed to hold on.
The book offers repeated examples of the Israeli genius for recruiting individuals, the "Humint." While it tended (at least in the past) to rely heavily on the CIA for technical equipment such as advanced listening devices, the Israelis were far and away much superior in persuading foreigners to work for them. These included the Iraqi pilot who delivered the MIG aircraft, and Ashraf Marwan, the son in law of President Nasser, who turned over precise details (ignored by Israeli leaders) on the upcoming Yom Kippur assault. Of course, the Israeli agencies have enormous advantages in recruiting individuals--the world-wide reservoir of Jews born abroad, fluent in languages and perfect for "false flag" operations. There's an enormous treasure-trove of what the intelligence services call Sayanim (helpers), Jews who can be called on for operational assistance, including in many cases assassinations. "Israel has never admitted using Jews as Sayanim and doing so would carry the danger of endangering local Jewish communities." But of course despite this Israel recruits Jews around the world---many who cooperate without any formal relationship--and that creates a real burden for Jews who would never perform such services. Top US officials--especially the FBI--remain convinced of Mossad penetrations--most likely justifiably so, but it remains a painful issue of great sensitivity for Jews. This situation was exacerbated by the Pollard case.
Of particular interest is the authors' portrayal of the internal dynamics of the Israeli intelligence community--all the many agencies and subgroups, often engaged in nasty intramural battles, with senior political leaders intervening in operational details much more than is the case in Washington. Issel Harel did manage to serve in office for eleven years, but even he complained that the all-powerful Lakam section was set up in Aman behind his back. His successor, Meir Amit,turned Mossad into an alternative Foreign Ministry, to the distress of Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Shin Bet was over-stretched by the responsibility for handline security in the occupied West Bank. Like the CIA, the Israelis organizations were slow to incorporate women--except for the occasional `honeytrap' operation.
In the end, for all the titillating spy exploits and bloody assassinations, the real lesson of the book is indicated in the title: "Armageddon." The Israeli services, like the nation itself, are still mired in the notion of "Armageddon," the great existential fear. While that might well have been a justified foundation for policy in the early years of the state, the security situation has changed radically. Israel now is by far the dominant military force in the region, easily able to repel the combined forces of all its neighbors. Neither the military nor the intelligence groups accept the constant saber-rattling of Prime Minister Netanyahou and former Defense Minister Ehud Barak who urge a military assault against Iran. Long-time Mossad chief Meir Dagan publicly called such an action "the stupidest thing I have ever heard" and "patently illegal under international law. Dagan and most of the top advisors urge a continuation of economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiations. Despite Israel's military and intelligence decades-long crusade against its neighbors, in reality its security has steadily diminished. The Arab Spring in the surrounding countries has totally changed Israel's situation and the authors suggest Israel would be well advised to recognize this.
Raviv and Melman offer a wise summation of the Jewish state's current situation. "Israel's leadership seemed focus only on the here and now, while the immense changes in the Middle East called for complex analysis. A unique opportunity (Oslo) to resolve the heart-rending dispute between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was neglected. Almost half a century later, the Israel Defense Forces...was still stuck as an occupying force in the West Bank. The dilemma clashes, roadblocks, settlements and patrols al threatened the fragile fabric of Israel as a Jewish and democratic country." Amen.
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- Reviewed in the United States on January 12, 2013
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- GabrieldReviewed in Germany on March 27, 2015
informed, informative and worth reading
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Della Porta JacopoReviewed in Italy on May 23, 2013
Avvincente, documentato, utile
