Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941 (Modern War Studies) Hardcover – August 16, 1996

Reese does maginficent job at describing the poor state of the Red Army before the Second World War. According to Reese the main reason for the defeats that the Red Army suffered during the opening phases of the Second World War was due to the lack of training prior to the German attack. Soldiers spent more time working in factories or collective farms rather than training for war. To make matters worse the huge expansion of the army according to Reese left a huge shortage of junior officers and NCOs to train the new recruits. Stalin only excerbated the situation by abolishing the national guard in order to spend money on the new recruits, this only led to a lack of any reserve units in case of a emergency. Due to the above mentioned factors, Reese concludes that the Red Army suffered massives defeats during the opening phases of the Second World War. I would highly reccomend this book for anyone who wants to understand why the Russian army performed so poorly at the outset of World War II.

For a long time, there's been a myth about the Red Army. Supposedly, the Red Army was incredibly advanced until about 1937, when Stalin destroyed the High Command. This is mostly a myth. The weaknesses and strengths of the Red Army were organic to it, and stemmed partly from the old Imperial Russian Army, and partly from the Red Army's history as it developed during the Civil War, partly from the nature of Soviet society and the Czarist society that preceded it.

Reese looks at the Red Army as it really was. How was it formed, who were its soldiers, how was it trained, who decided on promotions, what was the military doctrine and how did it originate? Reese digs into the facts, showing how the "peasant base" of the rank and file, and the Russian Civil War background of the officers shaped the structure, doctrine, and performance of the pre-German invasion Red Army. It's full of insights into the real conditions within the Red Army, how the Army and the society influenced each other, why the Red Army took the path it did, and how the nature of the army contributed to its defeat by the Germans. Reese especially highlights the problems caused by lack of training, rapid expansion, and the inherent difficulties of trying, in Stalin's words, to catch up in ten years when you were a century behind. Reese also takes a hard look at the Soviet soldiers' disaffection with the Stalinist regime over the horrors of collectivization, which left many soldiers indifferent to the fate of the USSR.

My highest recommendation for those interested in this subject at all.

This book was illuminating. Reese's research, based on many Russian-language sources, seems robust. It was just dragged down a bit by the dry writing. The author says that this is based on his dissertation research, and the method may be in the foreground.

In brief, the major revelation is simple. Many problems (if not all of them) in the Soviet army in the pre-WWII time period have one major cause: expansion. Reese gives us some insights on daily life for soldiers, the political aspects of the time, and focuses a major portion of this study (about two-thirds) on the officer corps.

Soldiers spent little time in training, because they were forced to do things due to the army's expansion such as build barracks and help bring in the crops in nearby collectives.

The most surprising aspect, and perhaps a great myth-busting bit of research, is that the impact of the purge was small: As little as 3.7% of the officers of the time may have been affected, and many of those that were were simply dismissed from the service. This is not to be kind to the Stalinist regime, but rather gives the officer purge some perspective.

The real problem with the Soviet officer corps was that (again due to expansion) many officers were poorly trained and put in higher-level commands for which they had little or no training.

Throughout, an ongoing theme is that the Soviet army of this time was a reflection of its society. This is often overlooked by military history buffs. In brief, the Soviet army was focused on rapid industrialization and collectivization. These drives may have helped the USSR modernize and prepare for the war, but the rapidity and brutality of these efforts caused resentment in the peasants, who formed the bulk of the soldiery. As a result, there were discipline problems, and it was difficult to keep young men interested in the military when they could earn more in a factory. So, the army was losing men at the same time it was expanding. Reese traces these trends well.

If you're interested in the Soviet army and how it fared in the early years of Barbarossa, you'll get a lot out this book, as I did. It tends to focus on training and recruitment, so it takes some dedication to get through. Those who do will be rewarded.

The writing style reminds me of the typical American historians of the modern period, trained and untrained (especially from the Univeristy of Kansas Press, so like David Glantz and Dennis Showalter). The "just-the-facts" style certainly works, but it lacks the color, nuance, and page-turning interest of the much more literary and epic-minded British historians (Ian Kershaw, Richard Evans, Chris Clark, Norman Stone, and on and on). The American journalist-historians also write better, and so do those of the American Civil War, for example. In any event, be prepared for factual but sometimes dull prose here. Nevertheless, Reese's insightful research, from primary and secondary Russian-language sources, shines through, enlivening this rookie effort.

This is the first book about social history of the Red Army. The russian historian.