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Strange Defeat Paperback – July 17, 1999
| Marc Bloch (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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A renowned historian and Resistance fighter―later executed by the Nazis―gives his firsthand perspective on why France fell in 1940.
Marc Bloch wrote Strange Defeat during the three months following the fall of France, after he returned home from military service. In the midst of his anguish, he nevertheless "brought to his study of the crisis all the critical faculty and all the penetrating analysis of a first-rate historian" (Christian Science Monitor).
Bloch takes a close look at the military failures he witnessed, examining why France was unable to respond to attack quickly and effectively. He gives a personal account of the battle of France, followed by a biting analysis of the generation between the wars. His harsh conclusion is that the immediate cause of the disaster was the utter incompetence of the High Command, but his analysis ranges broadly, appraising all the factors, social as well as military, which since 1870 had undermined French national solidarity.
- Print length204 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherW. W. Norton & Company
- Publication dateJuly 17, 1999
- Dimensions5.6 x 0.6 x 8.3 inches
- ISBN-100393319113
- ISBN-13978-0393319118
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― P. J. Philip, New York Times Book Review
"The most wisdom-packed commentary on the problem set [before] all intelligent and patriotic Frenchmen by the events of 1940."
― D. W. Brogan, Spectator
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Product details
- Publisher : W. W. Norton & Company; 1st Edition (July 17, 1999)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 204 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0393319113
- ISBN-13 : 978-0393319118
- Item Weight : 8.5 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.6 x 0.6 x 8.3 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #215,449 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #190 in Historical France Biographies
- #460 in French History (Books)
- #788 in WWII Biographies
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Being an accomplished historian rooted in France and serving in the army in both World Wars One and Two Bloch was in an excellent position to expose the roots of the collapse of France under the shock of German forces and capitulate while still able to fight. He was unsparing in accusing military commanders, political and civic leadership, trade unions, the education system and society as a whole for the disaster.
He also emphasized the memory of the bloody First World War as in impotnat factor, stating “It might be a good thing if an old-established nation could forget more easily, because memory often distorts the image of the present, and the crying need of most men is that they should be able to adapt themselves to new conditions” (Kindle location 1326).
At the same time Bloch denied that the constitution of the Third Republic caused the collapse and claimed that most of the soldiers and society were ready to fight on if called upon to do so by high-quality political leadership, which was sorely lacking at the critical time.
In a key passage Bloch sums up the underlying main reason for the collapse of France: “What drove our armies to disaster was the cumulative effect of a great number of different mistakes. One glaring characteristic is, however, common to all of them. Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war. In other words, the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect--and it is that which makes it so peculiarly serious” (Kindle location 847). This was also the conclusion reached in the thorough study by Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France.
The book concludes with a personal statement on the reasons for writing it: “For a man to form a clear idea of the needs of society and to make an effort to spread his views widely is to introduce a grain of leaven into the general mentality. By so doing he gives himself a chance to modify it to some small extent, and, consequently, to bring some influence to bear upon the course of events which, in the last analysis, are dictated by human psychology” (Kindle location 2898).
To sum up, It is hard for me to evaluate contemporary global leadership as any better than the French leadership which brought about the collapse. Our global leaders clearly lacks the intellect to think in terms of a new world rising before their closed eyes. This makes this book all the more pertinent.
Professor Yehezkel Dror
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Bloch's book is short, as it was written while he was in the Resistance, and so didn't have access to full sources. So, much of what he writes is his opinion, based on what he saw as a pre-war French citizen and as a staff reserve officer in 1939-1940.
His overarching theme is that the French defeat was an intellectual, mental one. Interestingly, he seems to understand that the defeat wasn't just a military one, but that militaries are a reflection of the societies that make them. France's defeat, when seen in this way, was a complete failure of almost every aspect of French national life. Dogmatism and narrow thinking were the ultimate causes of the defeat.
He provides plenty of examples, as he saw them. Of course, the military failing is foremost. The French military was wedded to a defensive doctrine, and the pace of thinking was so slow that the German advances often came as a shock. Promotion in the French high command often depended on age, and younger thinkers with fresh ideas were not promoted fast enough. Internal processes were a mess, as Bloch saw first-hand. One of Bloch's jobs was to determine the location of fuel dumps in Belgium; he couldn't do that because the intelligence staff kept the list of dumps in a vault, but Bloch couldn't access it and no one would give it to him. Soldiers surrendered, often without a fight, because as he says: "Our soldiers were defeated and, to some extent, let themselves be too easily defeated, principally because their minds functioned far too sluggishly." Ultimately, the High Command should have prepared its soldiers and the nation for the next war, but it didn't.
(Curiously, at one point Bloch mentions in passing that he has a batman, a sort of military butler who serves an officer in some armies. It never occurs to him that this vestige of an older way of military thinking is outdated or that such a person could be better used in some other capacity, despite the obvious personal convenience of having such an assistant.)
Bloch also considers French society leading up to the war. In his view, French society was at odds with itself, and major sections of society were rigidly self-centered. The working classes and its unions were focused on preserving the 8-hour day to the exclusion of all else. He accuses the bourgeoisie of separating themselves from the rest of the country, perhaps out of fear. The newspapers strayed from factual reporting, and were so opinion-based that people sometimes read them so as to infer the opposite of what they were reading; skepticism of anything in print resulted. In this kind of intellectual climate, it was difficult to believe anything, or to put anything (say, for example, the defense of France) above one's own interests. A "ruthless heroism," as he calls it, was distinctly absent. Bloch seems to be saying that France was pardadoxically fighting with a WWI military mindset, but without the national spirit of self-sacrifice that characterized that prior war. Throughout this analysis, one can see why Bloch's book has been influential to later writers: he considers a range of factors, beyond the obvious military ones, as an explanation for France's collapse in 1940.
Above the prose narrative there hovered themes that reminded me of Albert Camus's "The Stranger." Bloch's book has a man-vs-society quality about it. At times, his narrative led me to wonder if he's searching for meaning where none may exist; the anecdote about the safe is a case in point. In such situations, an individual has to follow his or her own course, and Bloch does that. He fought in WWI, he came back to service in WWII, and after France fell, he joined the Resistance and died as a consequence, leaving behind six orphaned children (his wife died suddenly while he was in prison, according to the forward).
His story is one of an individual struggling to make his society a better place in spite of itself. After reading this, different readers may draw different conclusions from his (voluntary?) self-sacrifice in the Resistance: was it more pointless given that he left behind 6 children, or was it more heroic because of it? Should he have been more self-interested for his family's sake, or less so, for France's? What was right for Bloch wasn't right for everyone else, even though at times he seems to think that self-sacrifice for the national interest is the highest good, as opposed to the spirit of self-interest that reigned in pre-war France. In this context, one wonders if his death was a sort of suicide to prove his point, a Quixotic final exclamation point to the whole thrust of "Strange Defeat."
In conclusion, this book is probably of most interest to students of the campaign who are looking for a memoir from the period or a widely consulted cornerstone work. It is of less value to a general reader looking for an overview history of events or for a comprehensive and well-researched review of the French defeat.
account of many of the reasons for that collapse written by a French officer observing the decision makers
who caused this stunning collapse.
Top reviews from other countries
At only 133 pages, it was written in a turgid academic style, that might have also lost something in translation. It fell into 3 primary sections
1) in military terms, how the fall came about, and the author's involvement in it
2) in simple terms, his view of who or what was to blame for the fall
3) an appreciation of the role of French society blame for leading to the downfall, in the widest terms
In addition, there was a foreword by a friend/colleague and the author's dying testimony in 1944
Section 1, was generally known to me, and section 3 was a waffly piece of excuse for the events, without attributing any blame to any individual, but the message was largely ' you get what you vote for'.
Section 2 was the most interesting piece, but it was still too vague for my liking, or not direct enough on blame. To summarise and save you buying the book, he blamed the following for the Fall;
- REMF Staff Officer's, as a class of military position, who were not at the front line
- Staff College, who produced automatom's who merely reinforce the 'fossilised s**ts' argument, bred by the military thinking of the 1930's
- Intelligence officer's, who were far from intelligent and merely kept all info to themselves, than it share with those who needed it
- General Blanchard, commander of the First Army; who were to the right of the BEF, and who later became CiC of the First Army Group, commanding the group of divisions trapped between the coast and the German panzer columns
Section 3 blamed
- Academia
- Middle classes
- Anti-establishment parties
- aged officers and politicians
I think the book was probably a refreshing read when it was introduced, for it tackled a difficult question in light of the Fall of France, and their unwillingness to continue the fight against Germany from Algeria, but the best of its content has been picked off by others, and told in a less turgid format.
To be commended as the first real French appreciation of their fall in 1940, but now dated.
Although it's an old publication, there were considerable typing errors which can only be blamed upon the modern re-publishers, and a shocking lack of copy editors.



