The collapse of France before the German onslaught of 1940 was not, as many historians have argued, the result of the Wehrmacht's absolute superiority or the terrible fury of blitzkrieg. Indeed, writes
Ernest May in
Strange Victory, France had more soldiers in the field than did Germany, their arms were evenly matched in many categories and superior in many others, and the German army was far from fearless. What carried the day for the Nazi invaders was a greater imaginativeness in planning. France and its allies "made no effort to understand how or why German thinking might differ from theirs," did not allow for surprise, believed that their defenses would shield them, and in any event paid little attention to the intelligence that their spies brought them, including irrefutable evidence that German forces were massing along the little-defended border with Lorraine, avoiding the heavily fortified (and, May allows, highly effective) Maginot Line.
The Allies soon overcame their lack of common sense, May continues in this penetrating study, while in the wake of his French victory, Adolf Hitler "became so sure of his own genius that he ceased to test his judgments against those of others, and his generals virtually ceased to challenge him." The outcome is well known. Still, May suggests, Hitler's comeuppance does not diminish the lessons to be learned from the fall of France--notably, that bureaucratic arrogance, a reluctance to risk life, and a reliance on technology over tactics will quickly lose a battle. Students of realpolitik, no less than history buffs, will find much to engage them in May's book. --Gregory McNamee
The book's title inverts Marc Bloch's classic Strange Defeat because, for Harvard historian May, it is the German victory that requires explanation. In this provocative analysis, May argues that the French and British defeat in 1940 was a consequence of neither moral decay nor military ineffectiveness. In the late '30s, the Wehrmacht was still a network of improvisations, by no means the formidable instrument of later mythmaking. After Poland had fallen, Hitler demanded an immediate attack on France, and his generals balked; an "encounter battle" in central Belgium was what the French expected and were prepared to fight. Instead, the Germans famously developed an alternate design, based on a thrust through the Ardennes. May argues convincingly that a major factor in the offensive's reorientation was the German army intelligence service's justified conviction that the French and British high commands would respond slowly to a large-scale surprise. More than enough evidence was available to turn French and British eyes to the Ardennes in the spring of 1940. But since 1933, May argues, generals and politicians on both sides of the English Channel had failed to read German intentions and German decision-making processes. Instead, they sacrificed thought to habit, and put unexpected events into preconceived models. This well-written book, suitable for general readers as well as specialists, offers no easy counterfactuals, no check lists for future guidance, but it illustrates the importance of common senseAits presence and its absence. (Aug.)
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Conventional wisdom has held that the defeat of France in just six weeks was the result of German military superiority, poor French military leadership, and the divisiveness and moral rot that permeated the Third Republic. Harvard historian May, in a provocative and engrossing work, provides persuasive evidence that each of these factors has been given unjustified credence. In fact, in most areas, the French army was superior to the German in manpower and equipment. The "defeatism" that supposedly infected French political leaders has been exaggerated. Even the oft-ridiculed Maginot Line could have served as an effective defense. Why, then, did the Germans win such a devastatingly rapid and "strange" victory? Essentially, May asserts, the French were outthought and outgeneraled at the tactical level. At several critical points, disastrous decisions by French field commanders undermined sound strategic planning. Military and history buffs should find this work especially attractive, but the smoothly flowing narrative and avoidance of overly technical jargon will allow general readers to appreciate this fresh look at an old controversy. Jay Freeman
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
From Kirkus Reviews
An engaging, thoroughly researched account of Nazi Germany's surprising, rapid defeat of French and Allied forces in the spring of 1940. Historian May (The Kennedy Tapes, 1997) argues that fatal misjudgments of the Allied command brought a defeat that was almost inconceivable to just about all the participants. Prior to the German victory, virtually no one but Hitler himself believed that the superior forces of France (allied with Britain, the Netherlands, and--too late--Belgium) could lose. With the swift felicity of a scholar in total command of his subject, May moves from Berlin to London to Paris, describing and assessing the decision-making and the decision-makers. We meet a Hitler who, though a late sleeper and habitual moviegoer, had a broader conceptual framework than his professional advisers and a broader base of knowledge. His strident, intransigent insistence on having his way is one of the principal reasons for Germany's military successes from 1938 to 1940, and also accounts for Britain's ability to evacuate nearly 340,000 men from Dunkerque (Hitler had issued a puzzling stop order that prevented his forces from capturing or killing tens of thousands). The German invasion involved an elaborate feint in Belgium, followed by a major attack through the Ardennes Forest (the so-called Plan Yellow), which succeeded because the best French soldiers [were] in the wrong places, and the worst-prepared French soldiers found themselves confronting the best that the Germans had. May notes a number of eerie parallels to our own day (when Americans expect to fight wars without casualties). Hitler, for instance, believed that the French were preoccupied with their comfort and that the British were materialists who would quit once their pocketbooks suffered. Among May's many provocative conclusions are that the imaginativeness of Nazi planners far surpassed that of the Allies and that Allied intelligence services performed abominably. Many informative notes, a 50-page bibliography. Both a lucid history and a gripping cautionary tale. (b&w photos, not seen; 19 maps) -- Copyright © 2000 Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
Review
"Ernest May has done for the outbreak of World War II what Barbara Tuchman did for World War I in The Guns of August. A beautifully written narrative, rendered in deft prose and in riveting and fascinating detail, Strange Victory will become a classic." - W.R. Louis, president, American Historical Association
"A splendid revisionist work ... A truly international study in European diplomatic and military history ... May's description of the military campaigning of 1940 is superb." - Paul Kennedy, Los Angeles Times Book Review
About the Author
Ernest R. May is a professor of history at Harvard University and the author of eighteen books, including, most recently (with Philip Zelikow), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis.
