This book is both magnificent and maddening. It is magnificent in its amazing scope, with short summaries and interesting insights on practically every strategic thinker in history, and many others who are not thought of as strategists, but whom Freedman rightly and insightfully includes. It is maddening in its failure to actually address the question of what strategy is best, under what conditions. In fact, the book is mis-titled, because it is not about strategy, but about theories of strategy. It could be more accurately titled: "The Pretensions of Strategists: A History," because that is its actual theme.
What is most maddening about the book is its consistent ducking responsibility for saying that any strategy is good under certain circumstances. It is an "academic" book in both the best and worst ways. It has massive erudition, keen critical intelligence and brilliant insights. But it sticks to criticism, and fails to offer any positive advice on good strategy. For every thinker Freedman follows this formula: he summarizes the theory of the thinker, describes the initial case for it or temporary success, and then points out where it has failed. Then he magisterially pronounces all views limited in applicability. This is a maddening ivory tower game, because the author is so risk averse that in his evasion of possible criticism he avoids also avoids insights that might actually be helpful to a decision maker.
In spite of the avoidance of positive recommendations, Freedman does have themes that he keeps coming back to, and are interesting and informative. One of these themes is that leaders often radically get wrong what can be accomplished by victory in a battle. G.W. Bush's "Mission Accomplished" is the most glaring example of this, but Freedman has numerous other illustrations, including Napoleon. In this respect, clearly Clausewitz is one of his heroes for his insight that battles need to serve political ends.
As far as military strategy, one of Freedman's really interesting insights is that the decisive thing in wars is more often alliances more than any cleverness on the battle field. The weight of allies tips the balance. This would indicate, as with Napoleon and Hitler, ISIL has now doomed itself by allying the world against it.
A third theme, and the one that he returns to most and is perhaps the most innovative in the book is that persuasion is a key part of strategic leadership, whether in battle, politics or business. Freedman's breathtaking breadth of scope really works in discussing this theme, where he brings people as disparate as Foucault and Lee Atwater into the same story--rightly.
I couldn't put the book down, all 650 pages of it, and will return to study parts of it, which I made note of. But I had the weird sensation of being continually dazzled, grateful, and disappointed all at the same time.
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Leaves nothing out!
Under this disarmingly simple title but undoubtedly comprehensive volume, Lawrence Freedman addresses what may be one of the most complex concepts in human language. Moving through time and history, he discusses strategy's varying ideas, motivations, and manifestations across human endeavors.Beginning with Jane Goodall's study of primates and ending with modern Bounded Rationality Theory, the story plunges through the dimensions of human conflict, analyzing the protagonists and factors that precipitated political, social, and revolutionary movements, as well as war. Like an expert dramatist, Freedman moves nimbly to and from sequences of events as they occurred, without ever imposing a moral judgment but constantly examining causal factors and consequences. Discussed here are a breadth of well-known strategists like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Machiavelli, and Liddell Hart, as well as lesser-known and seemingly unstrategic characters like Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi and Max Webber. However, the unity and harmony of thought are maintained in what can only be characterized as the primacy of power and clashes of will. Those looking for specific applications in academic disciplines will be happy to find the foundation of strategic thought behind Business, Management, Economics, and Politics without ever getting bogged down by the noise of sensationalism or opinion.I gave the book 4 out of 5 stars because although it is exceedingly well written and thorough, there are a few instances in which Freedman meanders too far from base camp. Here, I am thinking about the history of various revolutions. There was undoubtedly something to be said about how strategy played into them, but the degree of description and detail may have been unnecessary. In other instances, he labors to fit in topics that can be dispensed. Examples of this are seen in Exodus and Milton's "Paradise Lost" discussion. I love Milton, but I'm not convinced that the epic of the fallen angels fits in here.What you should know: If you pick up this book, it will be well worth your time, regardless of your background. Just be prepared to set aside time to savor it. This may sound counterintuitive, but I recommend reading the last chapter before you read the first. It provides a roadmap to the book, so you can always see in which direction you're headed. Now that I have read it once, I will probably re-read it again to make sure I get the most out of it. I definitely see myself referencing it from time to time.
