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Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises Paperback – May 5, 2015
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Stress Test is the story of Tim Geithner’s education in financial crises.
As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and then as President Barack Obama’s secretary of the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner helped the United States navigate the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, from boom to bust to rescue to recovery. In a candid, riveting, and historically illuminating memoir, he takes readers behind the scenes of the crisis, explaining the hard choices and politically unpalatable decisions he made to repair a broken financial system and prevent the collapse of the Main Street economy. This is the inside story of how a small group of policy makers—in a thick fog of uncertainty, with unimaginably high stakes—helped avoid a second depression but lost the American people doing it. Stress Test is also a valuable guide to how governments can better manage financial crises, because this one won’t be the last.
Stress Test reveals a side of Secretary Geithner the public has never seen, starting with his childhood as an American abroad. He recounts his early days as a young Treasury official helping to fight the international financial crises of the 1990s, then describes what he saw, what he did, and what he missed at the New York Fed before the Wall Street boom went bust. He takes readers inside the room as the crisis began, intensified, and burned out of control, discussing the most controversial episodes of his tenures at the New York Fed and the Treasury, including the rescue of Bear Stearns; the harrowing weekend when Lehman Brothers failed; the searing crucible of the AIG rescue as well as the furor over the firm’s lavish bonuses; the battles inside the Obama administration over his widely criticized but ultimately successful plan to end the crisis; and the bracing fight for the most sweeping financial reforms in more than seventy years. Secretary Geithner also describes the aftershocks of the crisis, including the administration’s efforts to address high unemployment, a series of brutal political battles over deficits and debt, and the drama over Europe’s repeated flirtations with the economic abyss.
Secretary Geithner is not a politician, but he has things to say about politics—the silliness, the nastiness, the toll it took on his family. But in the end, Stress Test is a hopeful story about public service. In this revealing memoir, Tim Geithner explains how America withstood the ultimate stress test of its political and financial systems.
- Print length592 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherCrown
- Publication dateMay 5, 2015
- Dimensions5.15 x 1.3 x 8 inches
- ISBN-100804138613
- ISBN-13978-0804138611
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“He’s written a really good book — we might as well get that out of the way, as so much else about Timothy F. Geithner remains unsettled… There’s hardly a moment in Geithner’s story when the reader feels he is being anything but straightforward — a near-superhuman feat for someone who spent so much time in public life defending himself from careless and dishonest personal attacks. The decisions he made are easier to criticize than they are to improve upon. I doubt many readers will put his book down and think the man did anything but his best. On his feet he might have stammered and wavered. That in itself was always a sign he was unusually brave.” –Michael Lewis, New York Times Book Review
“An intimate take on the financial crisis… gripping… conveys in visceral terms just how precarious things were during the crisis, just how frightened many first responders were, and just what an achievement it was to avert a major depression… [Geithner] demonstrates that he can discuss economics in an accessible fashion, making the situation the country faced in 2008 and 2009 tactile, comprehensible—and harrowing—to the lay reader. Along the way, he also gives us a telling portrait of himself.” –New York Times
“A how-to manual for anyone faced with a financial crisis… Mr Geithner was known for his brutal candor, and as an author, he does not disappoint.” —The Economist
“A fascinating memoir about life in the maelstrom of the financial crisis… Earlier books have described much of what happened that September, but Geithner was present for all the frantic meetings, the thousands of phone calls — and in the case of Lehman, the failure to find a buyer that could keep it alive. New problems cropped up almost weekly, if not daily. He explains each in easy-to-understand language and what the issues were that shaped the responses… There could be another crisis someday, of course, but what Geithner and his colleagues did has made one far less likely.” –USA Today
“Sharply worded and candid memoir.” —Financial Times
“Geithner does an admirable job of explaining the origins and complexities of the crisis for the average person. But there’s enough detail and retrospective lessons-learned to make it valuable for students of financial history….fast-paced and colorful….Stress Test goes beyond other crisis books.” –Los Angeles Times
“Throughout Stress Test, one gains a deep appreciation for the heart-pumping decisions made by Geithner and his colleagues from 2007 through 2012. And he makes a compelling case that overhwelming force is necessary in crisis, and that the measures taken by the Fed and two successive administrations prevented even more pain for ordinary Americans.” –WashingtonPost.com
“An unsparing insider’s account of the financial crisis from the former Secretary of the Treasury, unpacking the hard decisions and terrible trade-offs that devastated the economy but staved off a deep, lasting depression.” —TIME.com
“The central irony of Stress Test, the new memoir by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, is that a guy who was accused of being a lousy communicator while in office has penned a book that is such a good read…I’ve now read four or five of these first drafts of the history of the Great Recession, and I believe Stress Test represents the biggest contribution of the bunch.” —Bill Gates
“Sensational . . . Tim’s book will forever be the definitive work on what causes financial panics and what must be done to stem them when they occur.” —Warren Buffett
“Very few important subjects in American history have been the subject of as much disinformation and deliberate distortion as the events surrounding the financial crisis that broke in 2008. Tim Geithner’s candid, clear-headed, and refreshingly self-effacing account of his role in formulating the federal government’s response is a very welcome antidote. Geithner’s book is a triple threat: it is first-rate economic history, insightful political science, and, most important, a cogent exposition of the importance of adhering to the policies adopted in the aftermath of the crisis if we are to succeed in diminishing the likelihood of any recurrence.” —Barney Frank
“Stress Test is an absolutely compelling account of the financial crisis, written in a clear, graceful style with striking honesty at every step along the way. Timothy Geithner brings a complex story to life with telling anecdotes and personal reflections.” —Doris Kearns Goodwin
“This is a lucid, fascinating, and extremely important book. Every American should read it. Geithner does something unusual: he engages in substance. With both insight and humility, plus a good dose of wry humor, he explains what really happened during the financial crisis. No matter your political persuasion, you will find this book educational, enlightening, and interesting.” —Walter Isaacson
“The country owes Tim Geithner great appreciation for his role in overcoming the financial crisis of 2008. He has now indebted it further with writing a thoughtful, very readable and informative account of the conduct of policy at the edge of disaster.” —Henry A. Kissinger
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- Publisher : Crown; NO-VALUE edition (May 5, 2015)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 592 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0804138613
- ISBN-13 : 978-0804138611
- Item Weight : 14.4 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.15 x 1.3 x 8 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #127,970 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #52 in Government Management
- #101 in Economic Policy & Development (Books)
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Let me begin with two simple yet crucial economic concepts.
First. The one paragraph version of the "Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle" here it goes:
Imagine two couples, each with a toddler, want to go out tonight but there is only one babysitter in town. No matter how wealthy the couples are, or how much money the bank lends them, only one of them will get the necessary resource/wealth/babysitter needed to successfully execute their plan. What the couples need is not an increase in little pieces of paper with dead American presidents on them, they need an increase in wealth(another babysitter), and all the little pieces of paper regardless of how many zeroes there are in them will not change this fact. Let us now make this a little more realistic. At any moment there are millions of entrepreneurs who need wealth(tractors, computers,buildings, tool, engineers, salespeople, doctors/etc.) in order to carry out their business plans, but there is a FINITE amount of resources(tractors/computers/etc.) and injecting trillions of dollars into the banking system to drive interst rates down so that all of these entrepreneurs can borrow the money to buy such resources does not change the fact that not a single new ounce of resources has been created by printing trillions of dollars. The only thing that the government achieves by creating all this new money with which to lower interest rates and allow everyone to borrow money is to increase the prices of the various resources(tractors, computers/engineers/etc.) while creating unsustainable bubbles, and who gets to control the resources, and ultimately economic chaos/bust since it should be obvious that it will be impossible for every businessman to eventually complete their plans when it becomes painfully obvious that there just wasn't enough wealth at the right prices for all of them to profitably execute their business plans just like the couples would eventually realize. As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises explained, it is as if at any given point society only has a certain amount of bricks[resources] with which to make a
certain amount of houses[profitable businesses], say 100 for my example. By artificially lowering the interest rates via pumping money into banks[not real wealth remember], say 150 entrepreneurs build bases for homes, yet unfortunately there were only enough bricks to complete 100 of them so what looks like a boom as everyone builds the bases, will eventually turn into a bust as less than 100 businessmen will be able to complete them. As Mises wrote: “However conditions may be, it is certain that no manipulations of the banks can provide the economic system with capital goods[bricks]. What is needed for a sound expansion of production[more houses or profitable businesses] is additional capital goods[bricks/resources], not money or fiduciary media. The boom is built on the sands of banknotes and deposits. It must collapse.” [bricks/etc.] added by me.
A related fallacy is to believe that just because the government creates a trillion dollars the economy has grown by a trillion dollars. If you are going to INCREASE the economic pie by say a trillion dollars’ worth of new homes, in order to achieve this you will have to DECREASE or CONSUME about a trillion dollars of wealth while doing so. Millions of home builders, their suppliers/etc. will be consuming fuel, food, housing, medial services/etc. as they work to PRODUCE the trillion dollars’ worth of homes. The lesson here is that the social order is in a constant cycle of production and consumption and that in order to produce you must also consume. If you are a good businessman, you produce more than you consume and have a profit leaving the social order or economic pie bigger. Economically ignorant people erroneously believe that you print a trillion and somehow people will create wealth to exchange for such a trillion thus increasing the economic pie by a trillion, but they don't realize that in order to create such wealth they must consume nearly a trillion and this wealth they consume as they produce is not created by governments when they print the trillion.
I believe or hope that these two brief paragraphs begin to prepare a mind to understand the so-called "Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle" which is among the many key pieces of information that people like Geithner do not properly understand. But this too is not his fault because the concepts just discussed simply do not exist in America's mainstream economics textbooks which are based on flawed Keynesian economics. The entire boom/bust anemic nature of the American and world economies is a result of not understanding the last two paragraphs, among many other things...
Ok. On to at least a couple of things form the book's content:
Obama is hated by many for using the crisis as a way to greatly expand government intervention in the economy. Yet Geithner writes "We told the President we had to err on the side of doing too much, even though the public thought we were already doing too much." The blame for our economic problems probably has as much to do with politicians' well intentioned yet economically ignorant Socialist policies as with the misguided Keynesian so-called "experts" that advise them.
Geithner writes "Every financial crisis is a crisis of confidence" This is nonsense. When the Federal Reserve keeps pumping money into the banking system, thus keeping interest rates low, allowing low wage earners to borrow huge sums of money with which to bid up the price of homes creating a huge bubble, and then the fed has to pop the bubble by raising interest rates and slowing down the money creation. Common sense and good-ol self-interest guarantee that there will be a huge sell-off/panic/crisis. Geithner writes "Human beings are prone to panics, just as we are prone to the kind of irrational confidence ( in real estate, or stocks, or seventeenth-century Dutch tulips) that produces the booms that precedes the panics." Again, nonsense, all of these bubbles (stock, real estate, tulip) were caused by erroneous/fraudulent banking which provided the easy money that would drive up prices leading to bubble. He writes in final chapter "Financial crises can't be reliably anticipated or preempted, because human interactions are inherently unpredictable. More nonsense. People with the proper understanding of how easy money by central banks causes booms and busts knew all along. Just youtube "Peter Schiff was right" .
When criticizing people who opposed his various bailouts he referred to some as having "Old Testament view". I can see why Mr. Geithner labels people as such. People who use moral arguments, especially those rooted in religion as most moral arguments are, are sometimes ignored or downplayed by the enlightened "experts" like Geithner who try to see past adherence to such simple rules. Geithner explains how in order to save the world's economy one had no choice but to prevent a deeper punishment of such reckless firms. I have some advice for people who preach the "Old Testament view" . Read Henry Hazlitt's best-selling "Economics in One Lesson" to refute Keynesian nonsense instead of using "Old Testament" arguments. In the final chapter Geithner provides a summary of all the great accomplishments. There is a chart showing how the US economy has been growing faster than other counties like Japan, France, Spain and Italy. The caption says "Because of the aggressive fiscal, monetary, and financial force we deployed, the U.S. economy has grown faster than other major advanced economies since the financial crisis". The USSA economy is still a freer one than places like Spain and Italy. The US always has lower unemployment and better growth than such places and this has nothing to do with what Geithner thinks he has achieved. In a little over five years in order to simply kick the can down the road for the coming megacrisis, the Obama administration has increased the national debt by over 60%. Once again real estate prices have been soaring, there is the massive student debt bubble. In 2013 the Fed bought over 60% of new government debt. Basically the Fed is just printing money to keep the current social order afloat.
Near the beginning of chapter 4 Geithner writes:
"In his 1973 book "Lombard Street", the bible of central banking, Walter Bagehot explained that the way to stop a run is to show the world there's no need to run, to put money in your window, to "lend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on lending" " Then he mentions how "Bernanke believed in Bagehot, and he believed that central bankers who failed to act in a crisis could make it exponentially worse. In his academic life, Bernanke had been a leading scholar of the Great Depression". First, Bagehot's advice is the best way to attempt to fool the public about the fact that you have squandered their money. A proper honest bank has 1)deposits that are kept at bank and not loaned out and those you can be 100% sure will be there, and 2)deposits that carry risk which the bank might lend at interest for a time and you know you can't get back with certainty. No bank that is honest and does not fraudulently use type 1 deposits ever need to fear a bank run. It welcomes them to prove to the public that it is an honest bank.
Anyways.. I'm not going to turn this review into a massive book although you are welcomed to buy my "How the World Works" for 99 cents. With respect to Bernanke being the Great Depression guru. Even though his book must be forced down the throat of thousands of econ majors, Murray Rothbard's book on the great depression constantly outsells it and has far more glowing reviews.
So to wrap things up. From my perspective this book is good for seeing how a misguided person(a Keynesian economist) manages to inadvertently kick the can down the road by doing the very same things that got us into trouble to begin with. I would find it just as interesting as reading a book by an economist in the Soviet Union during the 1960s describing how they fixed something that was an inevitable consequence of their communist policies. Mainstream Keynesian economists are simply clueless and go from crisis to crisis just like in the Soviet Union they would blame their failures on the weather or saboteurs.
William E. Simon, former Secretary of the Treasury for presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, fills us in on the incompetence of the nation’s “most prominent economists” during the financial crisis of the 70s. His statements apply just as well to today’s government “experts”:
“The Wall Street Journal interviewed several dozen of the most prominent economists in the United States on the causes of the recession and on ways to prevent a recurrence. They disagreed about virtually everything save this: that there was much economists did not yet understand. The details of the economists’ ignorance are of interest, but I stress here the overriding conclusion to be drawn from their statements: The economists who had been advising our Presidents simply had not known what they were doing…Gerson Green, formerly of the Office of Economic Opportunity, summed up the attitude of many of his colleagues when he observed caustically, “The change I discern is that none of us knows what to do. In those days, we thought we did. The country has taught the social engineers a lesson.”… So who was running the store? The answer is: nobody. Not one human being in the whole vast realm of political control over the American economy has ever known what he was doing…For forty years the American ship of state has been lunging erratically toward economic disaster, with no awareness of its direction…”
Ok.. enough.
Let’s start off with some of the early turn-offs. His calling of Dinesh D’Souza a “dick” early in the book does not set the tone for a serious tome. But then again neither does his snarky treatment of what he calls the “moral hazard fundamentalists”. He uses the term “Old Testament crowd” over one hundred times in the book. The idea that a serious policymaker cannot see the credible legitimacy to those who fear moral hazard precedence in policies of continued international finance backstops is a tough pill to swallow. Geithner has some legitimate points to make about some of the actions they took during the crisis, but I believe the weight of those points is entirely lost by the dismissive and patronizing attitude Geithner takes towards the other side.
One of the more difficult parts of the book to read is Geithner’s coverage of his years at the New York Fed prior to the crisis. I challenge any reader to tell me they got a different interpretation of Geithner’s version of the story than this: I was worried about excess leverage; I was worried about inadequate transparency in the derivatives market; I was uncomfortable with the lending standards in the housing market; I felt there was too much accommodation in monetary policy; BUT I was the victim of a Wall Street that wouldn’t listen to me, a Fed Chair who had his own ideas, and research I didn’t write telling me that housing problems would have no impact. The entire section is the opposite of the mea culpa I expected. It is a really feeble request for exoneration, or at least it reads that way, and it left me as a reader frustrated and not amused. I mean the amount of times he says that “I warned …” and “I expressed concerns …” and “I knew that …” is just insane. There is no documentation of his prescient but frustrated attempts to prudently save the world. There are lots of contrarian evidences (he voted FOR every single interest rate decrease; his Fed published the paper saying there was little systemic exposure in the economy to housing; etc.). We are to take his word for it that he was a “chicken little” being rebuffed by more powerful forces. His version of the story doesn’t pass the smell test. Geithner faced a Herculean task in this book to try and rationalize his post-crisis decisions; the section of the book focused on rationalizing his pre-crisis decisions is wholly unconvincing and frankly rather insulting.
There are a few little things the Secretary should be called out on. It isn’t a hyper-prevalent theme in the book but any time the subject of Fannie/Freddie came up, Geithner threw in an anecdotal comment about “the efforts the Clinton administration and Greenspan had made to reel in the leverage of Fannie/Freddie”. This is so demonstrably false and contrary to the indisputable testimony of history that one wonders who Secretary Geithner, an intelligent man, thought he was fooling. The book doesn’t so much set any records straight as it does attempt to assume facts not only “not in evidence”, but directly contrary to the evidence. It is unfortunate, because he had an opportunity in the book to defend some of the actions taken by the Fed and the Treasury which, while hyper unpopular, deserve some defense. But things like claiming the Rubin/Greenspan cabal of housing bubble-blowers were trying to rein in Fannie leverage is unforgivably disingenuous.
For Secretary Geithner, the “post hoc” of the stress test plan of 2009 being a resultant financial recovery is indisputable: The good things that happened in late 2009 had to have happened because of what they did in early 2009 (i.e. announce a stress test that would force more capital in still-troubled financial institutions and presumably generate confidence in stronger ones). But he is missing something that warrants attention: The adjustment to mark-to-market accounting made in March of 2009. Let’s say for a moment that Steve Forbes and Brian Wesbury and many others are off their rockers that the strictness of FASB 157 (mark to market requirements) were to blame for much of the financial meltdown, and equally insane to believe that its repeal was the major catalyst to a healing of the nation’s financial system … Wouldn’t their theory still warrant SOME discussion, even if just to dismiss and refute? In a 538-page book I find it painfully disingenuous that this subject doesn’t receive a single word of attention.
If I ever write a memoir I hope I will not use it to “settle scores”, but I imagine it is highly tempting to do so. Geithner has no reservations about using the book to play out his internal feud with Larry Summers, to pick on former FDIC chair Sheila Bair, and yet to reaffirm the impenetrable wisdom of the Holy President Obama at every opportunity (the man who, inexplicably, picked Geithner over Summers). The self-serving nature of this component to the book is unfortunate. I suspect, though I may be disappointed again, that when Ben Bernanke’s book comes out we will not be subjected to so many personal little scuffles and feuds. It is unbecoming.
My final major criticism of the book is the completely fallacious but totally taken-for-granted assertions about Main Street’s innocence in the Great Recession. Secretary Geithner writes over and over again that people were being evicted from their homes “for no fault of their own”. This is just patently false and while I have always understood the political wisdom of saying such nonsense, I am getting tired of it. Five years later can we be honest and admit that the vast majority of people who lost their homes themselves committed some act of financial irresonsibility? Is this seriously even controversial? Since we know it to be true, what is the merit in acting otherwise? Let’s all do a big first step together here and admit the real nature of the societal problem. The secretary does no one any favors by excusing the financial irresponsibility of all the actors in the Great Recession.
There are some fascinating parts of the book that I will briefly mention. The contempt Geithner feels for then-SEC Chairman (and my former Congressman) Chris Cox is not exactly disguised in the book. It seems to mirror the impression I get from Secretary Paulson’s book and other insiders I have discussed this with that they collectively feel Cox’s demeanor throughout the crisis was utterly useless. If, in fact, Cox did close out the famous night-before-Lehman-fell meeting with a speech thanking all the Wall Street firm heads “for their patriotic service to our nation”, I have to say that is one of the most awkward and wince-inducing things I have ever heard. Overall the impression I have been given that Chairman Cox spent the entire crisis as a deer-in-the-headlights is reinforced by Geithner’s book.
Geithner’s admission that he pressured Wachovia and Sheila Bair’s FDIC to take the $1/share offer from Citi (with billions of dollars of FDIC support) over the $7/share offer from Wells Fargo (with no FDIC support requested) is dumbfounding. His reasoning is perhaps worse: He feared that no one would take a government seriously that changed their mind for a better offer? Huh??? Who would take seriously a government that didn’t?
At the end of the day, Geithner’s book does something very important for those of us who are students of the great financial crisis of our day. Most critiques of the way policymakers handled various parts of the crisis impugn motive and make assumptions (sometimes very reasonably). What this book does for me is crystalize beyond any shadow of any doubt that at least Secretary Geithner, and I suspect a great deal of other monetary policymakers, view ongoing financial crises as part of the DNA of a modern economy. They do not believe there are structural impediments that cause boom/busy cycles; they simply believe that full blown financial panics are supposed to happen, and central banks are then supposed to act (whereby once one crisis is resolved policymakers are to wait for the next one to extinguish). I do not merely mean that there will be the natural ebb and flow of a business cycle, a contention against which there should be no argument. I mean that Geithner and his ilk believe in the core of their being that financial crises are part of the deal – they cannot be prevented – and a central bank exists to deal with them when they do. His book reinforces this view from page 1 all the way through. That lens is how the Secretary saw the great crisis of 2008. I do not agree with him on his fundamental premise, but if I did it would not be too hard for me to agree with his underlying conclusion. But there are structural causes for the various crises we have endured as an economic society, and those causes can and should be remedied. Reading Geithner’s book, a man whom I have no doubt is a decent person and faithful disciple of the economic worldview he believes in, I would say that it is safe to conclude that we are a long way’s off from any structural resolution.
P.S. – I would be remiss if I didn’t point out something Geithner says word-for-word on pp. 381-382 of the book, something that I believe tells me all I need to know about the fallacious thinking guiding our Treasury Secretary in the post-crisis recovery period. “The biggest driver of the foreclosure crisis wasn’t underwater mortgages. It was the weak economy. Too many unemployed and under-employed were having trouble making their mortgage payments”. This is the sort of “main street is a victim” mentality that drives most of the post-game commentary on the financial crisis, and in this case I believe that Secretary Geithner actually believes this. He is wrong, and in reality, he is obscenely wrong. Well over 90% of foreclosures came from people with the same jobs they had when they bought their bubble-priced home. People walked from their mortgages because they had negative equity and, well, didn’t care anymore. The modification data bears this out as 70% of people who got mortgage payment relief simply re-defaulted within a year. I don’t mention this to isolate Geithner’s errant thinking, as his narrative is the consensus but mistaken view, but it is telling that our own Treasury head could get something so important, so wrong.
P.S.S. – I would have loved to have spent this review defending some of the unpopular decisions Geithner made that do, in fact, deserve defense. His book forced me to take the review in a different direction.











