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The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (New Cold War History) Hardcover – December 2, 2016
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Chris Miller
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Chris Miller
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Print length244 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherUniversity of North Carolina Press
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Publication dateDecember 2, 2016
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Dimensions6.5 x 1 x 10 inches
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ISBN-101469630176
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ISBN-13978-1469630175
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Editorial Reviews
Review
Miller helps readers understand why communism survived in China but encountered an abrupt and amazing collapse in the former Soviet Union. Highly recommended.--Choice
Miller's work goes a great distance in bettering our knowledge and understanding of the politics behind the Soviet economic collapse.--Reviews in History
An important contribution to our understanding of the Sino-Soviet interaction and the forces that led to the demise of the Soviet Union.--The Russian Review
Using new archival material, Miller demonstrates that Gorbachev was always much weaker than many realized.--Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
This book is clearly written and forcefully argued.--Slavic Review
It is a well-researched, fluidly written, and timely book that is sure to leave its mark on the historiography.--H-Diplo
Miller brings together politics, ideology, and, most importantly, economics to explain one of the most dramatic and consequential developments in recent history--the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in not only the history of the Cold War, but also the future of the world that awaits us.--Serhii Plokhii, author of The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union
The Soviet collapse was the unexpected denouement of the 'short 20th century,' but Miller shows that it was not something willed by Mikhail Gorbachev alone. Rather, the powerful vested interests that resisted fiscal reform--the military and the KGB, the collective farm lobby, and the energy industry--were the real causes of the Russian Katastrophe. This is a meticulous autopsy on homo sovieticus.--Niall Ferguson, author of The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West
While there are plenty of works on Gorbachev and perestroika, none tackle the intellectual and political debates surrounding economic reform the way Miller does in this book. Miller's innovative outlook shows us how the history of reform in the late USSR is entangled with the broader story of contemporary economic transformation in China and beyond.--Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University of Amsterdam
We should be grateful to Miller for providing this account on the factors behind the great divergence of Russian and Chinese economic performance. It is a subject about which we know much too little.--Paul R. Gregory, Stanford University
Miller's work goes a great distance in bettering our knowledge and understanding of the politics behind the Soviet economic collapse.--Reviews in History
An important contribution to our understanding of the Sino-Soviet interaction and the forces that led to the demise of the Soviet Union.--The Russian Review
Using new archival material, Miller demonstrates that Gorbachev was always much weaker than many realized.--Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
This book is clearly written and forcefully argued.--Slavic Review
It is a well-researched, fluidly written, and timely book that is sure to leave its mark on the historiography.--H-Diplo
Miller brings together politics, ideology, and, most importantly, economics to explain one of the most dramatic and consequential developments in recent history--the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in not only the history of the Cold War, but also the future of the world that awaits us.--Serhii Plokhii, author of The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union
The Soviet collapse was the unexpected denouement of the 'short 20th century,' but Miller shows that it was not something willed by Mikhail Gorbachev alone. Rather, the powerful vested interests that resisted fiscal reform--the military and the KGB, the collective farm lobby, and the energy industry--were the real causes of the Russian Katastrophe. This is a meticulous autopsy on homo sovieticus.--Niall Ferguson, author of The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West
While there are plenty of works on Gorbachev and perestroika, none tackle the intellectual and political debates surrounding economic reform the way Miller does in this book. Miller's innovative outlook shows us how the history of reform in the late USSR is entangled with the broader story of contemporary economic transformation in China and beyond.--Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University of Amsterdam
We should be grateful to Miller for providing this account on the factors behind the great divergence of Russian and Chinese economic performance. It is a subject about which we know much too little.--Paul R. Gregory, Stanford University
About the Author
Chris Miller is assistant professor of international history at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and co-director of the school's Russia and Eurasia Program. He is also Eurasia Director at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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Product details
- Publisher : University of North Carolina Press (December 2, 2016)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 244 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1469630176
- ISBN-13 : 978-1469630175
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1 x 10 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#1,227,216 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #3,078 in Economic History (Books)
- #3,313 in Russian History (Books)
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Reviewed in the United States on April 6, 2019
Verified Purchase
Gorbachev came into power with the best of intentions to improve live for Soviet citizens, and realistically he knew he had to start with the moribund Soviet economy. Despite his "due diligence" and "best efforts" he was stymied all the way along. by various "vested interests". He and his allies were enamored of the "Chinese model" that was supercharging the PRC's economic growth, but it was not to be. This book is very readable, even to non - economists, and is a very vivid portrait of a dissolving Soviet Union. My highest recommendation!
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4.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent book on the economic collapse of the USSR. However, there are several issues that I will call "readers beware."
Reviewed in the United States on May 16, 2017Verified Purchase
This is an excellent book on the economic collapse and political disintegration of the USSR in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, however, there are several issues that I will call “readers beware.”
In my opinion, the book is not well organized. The first two chapters (54 pages) are literally solutions in search of a problem. These two chapters describe what policy alternatives the Soviet leadership was contemplating to solve the USSR’s economic problems. Much text is devoted to the Soviet view of what the Chinese were doing to revive their economy, make it grow, and how those ideas might be adapted to the Soviet situation. But there is no discussion on just what economic problems the Soviet leadership was trying to solve. One might logically assume that there were probably several issues: slowing growth in the economy, poor labor productivity, huge wastage of materials and resources in general, poor labor morale, and so forth. But this is never clearly stated in a concise chapter or section on “description of the problem.” Eventually all these issues are dragged out, spread throughout the book.
Chapter 3 begins a discussion on some of these issues. For example, the economic industrialization system that Stalin and his cohorts imposed in the 1930s and 1940s achieved the desired performance though the use of terror. As the author puts it “Thanks to state socialism, a poorly performing manager’s firm was safe from liquidation. But the manager himself was not.” This started to change in the 1950s after Stalin’s death and mass and continuous purges became a thing of the past. To again quote the author, “In Stalin’s state economy, violence played the same role that market incentives play in a capitalist economy – a means of ensuring that workers and managers work hard and effectively. When the USSR’s post-Stalin leadership made the political system less violent, they removed a main lever for enforcing economic effectiveness.”
Chapter 3 then begins to discuss a primary reason for the inability of the political leadership to make changes to the economy. For all practical purposes, the bureaucratic and ministerial leadership of the military, the associated military or defense industry, the energy industry, and the agricultural industry (“agro-industrial complex”) ran the Communist Party, not the other way around as you might think. These groups indulged in a complex system of patronage, power, rewards for non-performance, and corruption. They simply had no reason to desire any change in the status quo.
Chapters 6 and 7 finally describe the consequences of this system. For example, all those ministries or power-groups previously mentioned successfully extracted enormous subsidies from the central government over the years. Chart 2 in Chapter 7 shows that by 1991, the USSR budget deficit amounted to 30% of GDP. In several cases of specific industries, output was actually decreasing despite massive increases in investment. All this eventually resulted in a combination of inflation and severe shortages. The government planning agencies set prices far below market levels, so enterprises lacked any incentive to produce and sell products. By 1991, the agricultural and food distribution supply chains simply stopped functioning.
The final chapter “Conclusion” then summarizes all the problems resulting from the Stalinist economic system and the vast powers of the economic interest groups that successfully resisted any changes. There are some interesting speculations on what might have been done earlier: had Stalin not collectivized agriculture, had Kosygin’s proposed reforms of the 1960s been supported, had Brezhnev refused to provide the massive subsidies to the Soviet agricultural system, had factories been built around Moscow instead of in the frozen wastelands of Siberia, and so forth. But by the 1970s and 1980s the various decisions had been made and the entire system had become ossified and sclerotic.
In my opinion, the book is not well organized. The first two chapters (54 pages) are literally solutions in search of a problem. These two chapters describe what policy alternatives the Soviet leadership was contemplating to solve the USSR’s economic problems. Much text is devoted to the Soviet view of what the Chinese were doing to revive their economy, make it grow, and how those ideas might be adapted to the Soviet situation. But there is no discussion on just what economic problems the Soviet leadership was trying to solve. One might logically assume that there were probably several issues: slowing growth in the economy, poor labor productivity, huge wastage of materials and resources in general, poor labor morale, and so forth. But this is never clearly stated in a concise chapter or section on “description of the problem.” Eventually all these issues are dragged out, spread throughout the book.
Chapter 3 begins a discussion on some of these issues. For example, the economic industrialization system that Stalin and his cohorts imposed in the 1930s and 1940s achieved the desired performance though the use of terror. As the author puts it “Thanks to state socialism, a poorly performing manager’s firm was safe from liquidation. But the manager himself was not.” This started to change in the 1950s after Stalin’s death and mass and continuous purges became a thing of the past. To again quote the author, “In Stalin’s state economy, violence played the same role that market incentives play in a capitalist economy – a means of ensuring that workers and managers work hard and effectively. When the USSR’s post-Stalin leadership made the political system less violent, they removed a main lever for enforcing economic effectiveness.”
Chapter 3 then begins to discuss a primary reason for the inability of the political leadership to make changes to the economy. For all practical purposes, the bureaucratic and ministerial leadership of the military, the associated military or defense industry, the energy industry, and the agricultural industry (“agro-industrial complex”) ran the Communist Party, not the other way around as you might think. These groups indulged in a complex system of patronage, power, rewards for non-performance, and corruption. They simply had no reason to desire any change in the status quo.
Chapters 6 and 7 finally describe the consequences of this system. For example, all those ministries or power-groups previously mentioned successfully extracted enormous subsidies from the central government over the years. Chart 2 in Chapter 7 shows that by 1991, the USSR budget deficit amounted to 30% of GDP. In several cases of specific industries, output was actually decreasing despite massive increases in investment. All this eventually resulted in a combination of inflation and severe shortages. The government planning agencies set prices far below market levels, so enterprises lacked any incentive to produce and sell products. By 1991, the agricultural and food distribution supply chains simply stopped functioning.
The final chapter “Conclusion” then summarizes all the problems resulting from the Stalinist economic system and the vast powers of the economic interest groups that successfully resisted any changes. There are some interesting speculations on what might have been done earlier: had Stalin not collectivized agriculture, had Kosygin’s proposed reforms of the 1960s been supported, had Brezhnev refused to provide the massive subsidies to the Soviet agricultural system, had factories been built around Moscow instead of in the frozen wastelands of Siberia, and so forth. But by the 1970s and 1980s the various decisions had been made and the entire system had become ossified and sclerotic.
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Reviewed in the United States on February 25, 2017
Verified Purchase
A vividly written and deeply sourced narrative of the Soviet Union's last decade. Too often the collapse of the Soviet economy is seen as historically inevitably and therefore uninteresting, but Miller brings to life the actual events and choices that led to that collapse. One of the interesting themes running through the book is how Soviet leaders in the 1980s viewed the economic reforms that China was making at the same time, and why the two countries ended up on such different trajectories. Highly recommended.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 28, 2018
Verified Purchase
This should be read prior to reading this author's latest offering, Putinomics. It takes the China-Russia perspective, rather than the America-Russia perspective. Its main themes are repeated too often, but the author may have felt that necessary to get across to many fast-paced skip-readers. This book is well-worth a slower, closer reading. Many insights are unexpected. All points are absolutely well-documented.
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Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 2017
Verified Purchase
Miller's writing is engaging, even for someone with absolutely no knowledge of the topic. The topic is increasingly relevant in today's world, and Miller brings new life to the discussion. A great book!
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Reviewed in the United States on April 9, 2017
Verified Purchase
The world is awash with concerns that Donald Trump fired Tomahawk missiles at a Syrian airbase after refugee children were gassed with Sarin. The left-wing press has become hysterical about setting off WW III or what about Putin and Russia--we're scared of them aren't we? The answer is no--and this book illustrates the reason why. Arguably the major, #1 catastrophic event to befall mankind in the 20th century was Stalin outmaneuvering his colleagues to be the General Secretary of the Communist Party after Lenin's death in 1925. Over sixty million people Soviet citizens died under Stalin's Reign. Yet, 9 or 10 years after Gorbachev is ousted in a coup and the Soviet Union collapses into disarray, the Russian people are now governed by Vladimir Putin, who has rapidly taken on the trappings of a new dictatorship/tyrannical regime. Why would the Russian people do this? I don't know, but it's worth several books. However, Chris Miller has synthesized a vast trove of economic and political information from the archives to write this masterful book. Miller traces the key threads of Russia's tentative moves toward capitalism; studying and analyzing the Chinese Regime did after Mao died in '76 to understand how they revived and grew a nascent, existence-level economy into one of the great powers of the world. Unfortunately, the Russians got it wrong for two reasons: (1) Stalin-esque ideology got the upper hand; and more importantly, (2) Powerful interest groups: read-Agro-Industrial Complex; Militarial-Industrial Complex; big business/state run businesses--all became blockers or "wreckers" to use Stalin's favorite term; and coalesced to prevent Gorbachev and his successors from successfully pivoting Russia's economy in a capitalist/market-based economy (as the Chinese successfully did.). At minimum a thought-provoking, sobering book! At least one of the reasons Donald Trump was willing to risk it with the Russians is because he knows he is up against a paper tiger
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