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Dave Richard Palmer

Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. Hardcover

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ASIN ‏ : ‎ B00AQRZA7A
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.3 pounds

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M Tucker

America in Vietnam, The Search for a Strategy

Reviewed in the United States on June 2, 2017

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Lieutenant General Dave Palmer has written a very good, very informative work chronicling the military side of the war. It is not a detailed examination of the war but a critical look at the general prosecution of the war.

In the Preface to the book General Palmer says, “…although I have tried to write as an historian, the book is, in the final analysis, a soldier’s view of Vietnam.”

General Palmer has given us just that and his “soldier’s view” is achieved by focusing on key moments of the conflict. But the best parts of his story are those when he critically examines US strategy and tactics. He has a lot to contribute on that score but I think the best paragraph is:
“One should carefully note that while American field commanders openly admitted that they were waging a war of attrition, they winced at calling it a strategy of attrition. Attrition is not a strategy. It is, in fact, irrefutable proof of the absence of any strategy. A commander who resorts to attrition admits his failure to conceive of an alternative. He rejects warfare as an art and accepts it on the most non-professional terms imaginable. He uses blood in lieu of brains. To be sure, political considerations left military commanders no choice other than attrition warfare, but that does not alter the hard truth that the United States was strategically bankrupt in Vietnam in 1966.” (p117) That situation would not improve much but General Palmer does not ignore the improvements made with the AVRN by 1971 and 1972.

Also examined is the 1973 Paris peace agreement and the final fall of South Vietnam. On page 259 the author, speaking of the agreement says, “Article four, by far the shortest and clearest clause in the agreement, stated flatly: “The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.” So no more ground troops and no more air support, no more bombing. Then on page 262, still speaking about the agreement he says, “The North had agreed to refrain from attacking again, and the United States had pledged to resupply the South should Hanoi renege. South Vietnam appeared no longer too need American fighting men,…” Here he is referring to the 1972 Easter defeat of the communist offensive achieved on the ground by ARVN troops alone, no US ground forces were involved. He strangely is ignoring that the success of the ARVN forces was dependent on massive US air support. Article 4 of the agreement precludes further US military involvement. The next offensive by the North would succeed, the North knew it and Thieu knew it. Nixon and Kissinger just wanted out, wanted to be able to wave the peace paper to the press, wanted to be able to say they had peace with honor. Neither was achieved. General Palmer continues on page 262, “By the end of 1973, the anticipated year of peace, the war was being sustained at a level of violence practically indistinguishable from previous years.” And what of President Nixon’s promise to Thieu, that America would “respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam.” Well the settlement was violated in 1973 and the US did nothing. The US had moved on. Nixon, by the end of 1973, was nearing the end of a presidency shattering scandal. The continuation of the war was accepted. To many it was expected. The agreement also forced the South to accept that communist combat forces would remain in SVN. Everyone looking at the agreement knew it meant nothing but possibly buying a little extra time before the final defeat...about two years of time.

General Palmer has done an excellent job of presenting the military side of the war while not ignoring the political. Recent scholarship and research has now shown that Ho Chi Min and General Giap were not the radical leaders of the communist movement to destroy the nation of South Vietnam. It turns out they were the moderates. Unknown to Americans at the time, the radical leader of the North, who insisted on immediate prosecution of the war, was Le Duan and he was assisted by his number 2, Le Duc Tho. Yeah, the guy who defeated Kissinger at the negotiating table. Of course this is information uncovered in the last few years so the reader needs to keep that in mind.

The author’s critiques of US strategy and tactics are first rate and I have found that the very best, most satisfying and informative histories and critiques have been written by military men who were actually there. For the interested reader I can recommend the following: The War Managers by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard and On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War by Colonel Harry G Summers Jr.

I will finish by giving a shout-out for General Palmer’s other outstanding book, being re-released soon under a new title. The original title was The Way of the Fox. The new title is George Washington: Military Genius. Better, right? I think so. Provocative titles seem to gather the most attention. It will be available in December of this year.

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DRK

Simply the best overview of the Vietnam war

Reviewed in the United States on May 6, 2021

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If you're willing to approach the Vietnam War without preconceptions (unlike the 2 star reviewer) this book will give you the facts to interpret, and background to place them in context of the time. This is the best overview going, period. I refuse to argue about the Vietnam Conflict with anyone who has not read this book as they are always hugely misinformed.

Reviewed in the United States on April 25, 2011

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Summons of the Trumpet is a great read and would be an excellent first book to read on the Vietnam War. With 266 pages and 30 chapters, most of the chapters are short, but they convey a lot of information on a lot of different topics. A very brief overview of France's experience in Vietnam after World War II, Eisenhower's and Kennedy's sending American military advisors, the important decisions made by North Vietnam and the United States, the overthrow of Diem, the logistical challenge when American combat units were sent, a few typical or key battles, Americanization, Tet, Vietnamization, the 1972 communist offensive, the peace process, the conquering of South Vietnam in 1975. Palmer gives interesting details and insights on all these topics. The book is never boring. Covering so many topics in so few pages, it cannot provide great depth on any topic.
I believe that Palmer was honest in everything he tells, while showing sympathy for the Americans and South Vietnamese, and not so much sympathy for the North Vietnamese. It is remarkable that such a comprehensive book was published in 1978, only five years after North Vietnam and the United States signed a peace agreement and the United States withdrew all military forces. Occasionally, I identified something that he may have had a little bit wrong. On p 55, he says that the Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in August, 1964, and then two days later both the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked. It is widely believed today that the Maddox was attacked once, and that the crews of the Maddox and Turner Joy were mistaken two nights later - their radar gave false indications of an attack. I get the idea that Palmer understates the capabilities of North Vietnam to send supplies, equipment, and men down the Ho Chi Minh trail (P 84). He describes a North Vietnamese man on foot carrying two mortar shells down the trail, watching a crew fire them, then going back for two more. There may have been a time when that was how it worked, but later on North Vietnam was able to send tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, ammunition, and anti-aircraft artillery all the way down the trail. This probably started earlier than Palmer realizes. According to Dale Andrade's America's Last Vietnam Battle, and my own experience as a participant, South Vietnam came closer to losing the 1972 battles than Palmer indicates, and the outcome was more dependent on American air power than he indicates. The siege of An Loc in 1972 was longer than the sieges of Dien Bien Phu or Khe Sanh. Palmer mentions South Vietnams losses, and he mentions the use of American air power, but you just don't get the severity of the offensive.
During much of the war, both the ARVN and American forces had a different way of fighting, compared to the Viet Cong and NVA. ARVN and American forces tended to cling to firebase, while the Viet Cong and NVA maneuvered everywhere and usually chose where they would fight. From their firebases, the ARVN and Americans would use artillery and air power as much as they could to destroy the enemy. Westmoreland called it "firebase psychosis", P 98.
You get two things from this book. You get the big picture of the major campaigns, the major decision points, the major players, plus some detail on a few select battles, complete with maps to illustrate. You also get Palmer's opinion, analysis and critique. It was most unfortunate that the Buddhist uprising occurred just when South Vietnam was having some success fighting the insurgency. Palmer argues that Lyndon Johnson put way too many restrictions on the air war against North Vietnam. The air war was supposed to escalate if North Vietnam did not scale back its support for the insurgency, but North Vietnam did not scale back, and Johnson did not escalate sufficiently. In the ground war in the South, North Vietnam was allowed to have safe sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia from which to launch attacks on South Vietnam. Palmer argues that these sanctuaries should have been attacked. There is lots of criticism of Johnson. Westmoreland is described as making the best he could of the situation, considering the constraints Johnson put on him. Palmer says that `war of attrition' is no strategy at all. The focus became the body count, which is the way to measure attrition. No matter how much you might disagree with Palmer, keep in mind that thousands of U. S. Army officers have read this book and have been shaped by it. I agree with Palmer's analysis and criticism.
The book has several good maps, which I appreciate. It does not have any footnotes, which weakens its authority. It does have a nice annotate bibliography at the end, which is somewhat helpful, but is limited by the fact that the book was published in 1978 and the bibliography does not have any more recent citations.

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Dimitrios

Excellent!

Reviewed in the United States on February 16, 2006

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This is one of the best books (if not the best) I have ever read on the Vietnam War. The author develops his arguments with such clarity and eloquence that the book is a real joy to read. Palmer does not describe many battles but only those which were characterized as turning points of the conflict, like Ap Bac (1963), Ia Drang (1965) and Tet (1968) but the depth of the political and military analysis is fantastic. I especially enjoyed the chapter on the military logistics of the US forces in Vietnam as well as the role of the air power in the conflict. It is astonishing to realize that the US actually defeated the insurgency in Vietnam and lost the war only because of the persistent commitment of numerous regular North Vietnamese divisions, which were also mauled badly in battle in many cases! The `Ahilles heel` of the US was the Vietnamization program which the communists didn't allow to mature. Very highly recommended!

5 people found this helpful

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FourDoor

honest and knowledgeable author

Reviewed in the United States on October 12, 2021

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I was glad to find this book. It had been recommended to me by a retired command US Army officer. Many books have been written about Vietnam; this book is rare as it is written soon after our departure and contains an honest assessment of our Vietnam involvement with what went right and what went horribly wrong, both militarily and diplomatically. Good perspective!

Reviewed in the United States on March 1, 2019

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Objective story covering an unpopular war. Author presented factual story, not partisan. It was quick read, the content held my attention.

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