Reviewed in the United States on February 24, 2010
Jack F. Matlock Jr.'s "Superpower illusions" suggests myths and false ideologies led America astray following the end of the Cold War, although I think the problem with US foreign policy is deeper. Still, this is a smart analysis by a sharp cookie with top credentials: US ambassador to the Soviet Union, expertise about Russia, government nonpartisan insider with terrific people skills and excellent memory who is a shrewd analyst to boot. Matlock has a keen ability to see through smoke and fog and see, seemingly effortlessly, reality.
His book is strongest as critical commentary on US foreign policy during and after the Cold War. Matlock dispels superpower delusions like the "US won the Cold War", as the first president Bush bragged unfortunately, and argues convincingly that Gorbachev and not Reagan was the prime mover behind the Soviet Union's abrupt turnabout. Matlock suggests that US military pressure had little to do with the Soviet collapse. The whole concept of "superpower", in Matlock's view, was overdrawn and illusory. He blames ideology for producing a "zero-sum mentality in negotiations". He favors strategies of negotiating even with hardened adversaries. The arms race was driven mostly by psychological factors rather than military necessity, in his view. The disappearance of the Soviet threat meant that other nations didn't need the US for protection, but American policymakers didn't seem to grasp this new dynamic which actually lessened American influence. Other illusions? One is that control of territory automatically equates to power; I agree this is an illusion.
Matlock saw the Soviet Union as a front organization controlled by a "giant conspiratorial mafia" which managed a state-monopoly capitalism. Was it socialist? Was it communist? Matlock answers "nyet" twice; rather, it was a command economy with consumer goods supplied by an unofficial black market. Soviet leaders were blindsided by their own ideology and failed to get accurate information despite their comparatively larger intelligence agencies. Gorbachev, in his view, was an excellent tactician with an uncanny skill allowing him to seem to be talking "out of both sides of his mouth". This skill helped him appease both hard-line communists as well as liberal democratic elements and steer the country towards freedom, although he didn't handle Yeltsin right. Perhaps it was the friendship between Reagan and Gorbachev -- not Reagan alone -- which brought about change beneficial for both countries.
Matlock's analysis adds to a long list of criticism of American foreign policy for being ineffective, clumsy, short-sighted, riven by partisanship, and sometimes counter-productive. He faults every president since Carter for a litany of mistakes. US policy did not help the satellite states within the USSR win freedom; instead, they were subsumed by local tyrants, and he faults American policy for failing to take more steps to prevent this from happening. Russia's transition to a market economy was badly mismanaged, and the US depended too much on IMF and World Bank loans which were late, leading to economic collapse in 1992. Western advice wasn't particularly helpful, he argues. He is kindest towards Reagan, toughest on the second Bush, but has criticism for all presidents since the late 1970s. The first Bush and Clinton didn't help wean Americans away from cheap oil, and the subsidized energy prices undercut incentives to develop alternatives. Generally I agree with Matlock's assessments.
Matlock examines the American post Cold War period critically. Festering, unresolved problems were allowed to worsen (e.g. energy dependence, failure to reform healthcare, runaway entitlement programs.) The military-industrial complex proved difficult to trim. His insights into the subject of empire were particularly helpful, although I don't think he proved his assertion that "empires are not worth the blood and treasure necessary to create and maintain them" although I generally agree with this view. With the advantage of hindsight, Matlock criticized Brzezinski for bad predictions about the Eurasian balance of power, Huntington for his "clash of civilizations" hypothesis, and Ferguson for his call for a "liberal" American empire (liberal = emphasizing free trade).
However, now my problems with the book. I'm a non-partisan critic with extreme views on preventing terrorism and fixing America politically (for example, I call for a Second Constitutional Convention to restore the political process.) But even wearing my mainstream hat, the book shifts uneasily between two purposes: (1) analyzing US foreign policy after the Cold War and (2) criticizing past administrations for missteps. In other words, he argues at times that failure to learn lessons from the Soviet collapse caused further foreign policy screw-ups. In my view, one set of screw-ups didn't cause another set; rather, both are symptoms of a flawed foreign policy architecture. Matlock thinks factors undermining the Soviet Union are the same ones undermining the US today; I think it's more complex. In my view, foreign policy is difficult -- it's a tough task for any nation -- and few nations throughout history have consistently got it right. So while I agree with his criticisms of past American foreign policy, my sense is that there are deeper constitutional problems requiring an overhaul of the foreign policy structure. Matlock blames particular presidents; I blame the structure for empowering incompetent presidents. Matlock wants to work within the existing system; I say it's time for an overhaul.
Generally he thinks like a diplomat, not an academic, and while his footnotes at the back of his book are adequate, I don't have the sense that he researched some of his statements with the clinical fact-checking eye of an academic. He sometimes shoots from the hip. For example, I disagree with his assertion that the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented by high-level efforts within the US government. This is a tough case involving numerous hypotheticals, and steps such as president George W. Bush ordering an "inter-agency review", asking pilots to lock cabin doors, or instructions to airport screeners to hunt for smaller knives -- I don't think these steps would have prevented the creative unexpected attack of that day. The problem of terrorism is deeper, more pernicious, in my view. Matlock, like almost all Americans, hasn't focused on the essence of terrorism or, in his terms, he has the illusion of understanding how to prevent it. But I can't hold this against his excellent book which is a superlative effort from a seasoned foreign policy observer. Five stars.
-- Thomas W. Sulcer
Author of "The Second Constitution of the United States"
(free on web; google title + Sulcer)
